Accounting Organizations and Society最新文献

We conduct an experiment to examine how repeated earnings notifications and the mode in which investors check notifications affect their reactions to managers' strategic positive emphasis in earnings release titles (i.e., when firm performance is not as positive as the emphasis indicated in the title). We predict and find that a title with (versus without) a strategic positive emphasis can result in both a negative content incongruency effect and a positive title impression effect. Consistent with our expectations, we find that repetition not only dampens the negative content incongruency effect but also amplifies the positive title impression effect. As a result, compared to a title without a strategic positive emphasis, we find that a title with a strategic positive emphasis is more likely to result in a favorable investment judgment when investors receive repeated notifications in a one-by-one mode than when they receive a notification for the first time. These results are consistent with our predictions. We also explore the impact of title emphasis when investors receive repeated notifications in an all-at-once mode. Our results show that a strategic positive title emphasis does not influence investment judgment when investors check repeated notifications all at once, suggesting that a small behavioral change can protect investors from being swayed by managers’ strategic positive title emphasis.

This paper examines whether and how different types of CEO power affect the incorporation of past performance into CEOs' future targets. We theorize that CEOs can use their structural and prestige power to downward bias the target updating process to receive easier targets. However, CEOs with high prestige power may be more willing to accept target increases due to the signaling value of ambitious targets. Results from data on earnings per share (EPS) targets support our hypotheses. We find that asymmetric upward ratcheting, as reported in prior studies, is mostly driven by low-power CEOs. In contrast, CEOs with structural power receive weaker upward and stronger downward target adjustments. CEOs with prestige power receive favorable upward and downward target adjustments relative to CEOs with low power but not relative to CEOs with structural power. Interestingly, the two types of power do not have additive effects on target adjustments. Moreover, we use three natural experiments that enhance the signaling motive of CEOs and find that after these events, CEOs with prestige power agree to more challenging upward revisions compared to low-power CEOs. Our results contribute to accounting literature by distinguishing between different types of CEO power and by examining how organizational and social factors affect target-setting dynamics.

Obesity has become a topic of public discourse in Britain with claims that it is now one of the major causes of ill health and premature death. In an effort to tackle this obesity ‘crisis’, the UK government has introduced mandatory calorie labelling on menus. This legislation requires that the number of calories associated with a meal option, together with the recommended calorie consumption per day, be displayed on menus. Such ‘calorie accounting’ seeks to prompt the consumer to make menu choices consistent with public health ambitions and to encourage food establishments to reformulate lower calorie menu offerings. Drawing on the concepts of technologies of government (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 1992) and biopedagogy (Harewood, 2009; Wright, 2009), this paper suggests that calorie accounting operates as a technology of biopedagogy which seeks to discipline and govern the body in contemporary neoliberal society. The paper also contributes to recent accounting scholarship on counter-conduct (Foucault, 2007) by highlighting how calorie accounting produces a form of counter-conduct that coexists with conformity to governmental goals. The paper draws upon three primary data sources: a documentary analysis of 44 policy documents on obesity and calorie reduction, an analysis of 112 responses to a public consultation exercise on calorie labelling, and 20 interviews with relevant actors.

Arguably the world's most iconic platform organization, Uber relies on a disaggregated labour force and a technology application accessible to users on mobile devices. The company contracts with over three million drivers worldwide and has curated an infrastructure of platform-based control characterized by algorithmic processes. The effects of this new wave of control on the driver-led workforce are unclear. Drawing on interviews with 36 Uber drivers, mainly from Australia and France, this research investigates how the ‘gig economy’ workforce engages with platform-based control. We find that the platform organization's control algorithms operate with strong disciplinary effects. Drawing on Foucault's concept of self-formation, we examine worker responses to the new order of work. We highlight the way workers engage in practices to ‘take care of oneself’, by enduring, subverting or exiting the conditions of algorithmic management. We find that these practices are related to the distance embedded in the field between management and the workforce. In this way, we argue that the gig economy operates differently upon the ‘governable self’ and urge caution in relation to the use of algorithms to control at a distance.

Peer recognition systems are an increasingly popular management control tool through which employees can recognize and thank one another. I examine the effectiveness of these systems in motivating employee helping behavior. My theory and experimental findings suggest that group affiliation is a key moderating factor in determining the motivating influence of peer recognition systems. Specifically, I predict and find that the presence of a peer recognition system has a greater positive effect on in-group versus out-group helping. Results suggest this occurs because peer recognition systems, by formalizing the opportunity for social approval, sensitize employees to preexisting social expectations. I also predict that the incremental benefit of adding rewards to a peer recognition system will be greater for out-group versus in-group helping because the rewards will strengthen the perceived value of recognition among out-group members but simply replace in-group members’ social motivation. Statistical support for this prediction is weak, however. My findings provide insight into when peer recognition systems are effective in motivating helping behavior.

The paper seeks to enhance our understanding of the interaction between the development of disciplinary power in western liberal society and Foucault's writings on governmentality, through examination of the political processes resulting from the largest public scandal in the UK, the Poulson scandal of the early 1970s. The first research motive is to uncover any additional insights or hidden understandings that can be derived by applying Foucauldian historiographical and governmental perspectives as strengthened by Dean's (2010) analytics of government to the history of corporate governance in English local authorities over the forty years following Poulson. We argue that the continual process of intervention, investigation and prescription by central government set in motion by the scandal resulted in an increase in disciplinary power within local government by changing the expectations of council officials, elected representatives and politicians in Westminster through the normalisation of these intrusions and the spirit of dependency and compliance which resulted. Secondly, the paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of the analytics approach in a complex situation involving many genealogical disruptions to the status quo over a long time-period; and whilst the paper found the method helpful, limitations emerged regarding its claims to empirical certainty through precise questioning. Finally, the paper examines the significance of countering corruption as a motivating factor in the rise of disciplinary power in English local government, which it finds as limited.

We introduce a novel Big Data analytics model to detect upward revenue misreporting. The model uses freely available Google searches of firm products to provide external entity business state (EBS) evidence. The veracity of the reported numbers is enhanced when auditors can obtain external EBS evidence congruent with the reported numbers. The Google search volume index (SVI) of firm products is a good candidate for such EBS evidence because it nowcasts (i.e. predicts present) firm sales and is independent of management control. A large discrepancy such as a high sales growth together with a large decline in the SVI suggests possible manipulation upwards of revenues. We find that an indicator variable, MUP, of a firm in the top sales growth quartile and bottom ΔSVI quartile in each industry-quarter predicts revenue misstatements incrementally to the F_Score, Discretionary-Revenues model, two alternative upward revenue manipulation identifiers, and analyst and media coverages. MUP predictability is stronger in end-user industries and in interim quarters relative to the fourth quarter. We also find corroborating evidence that MUP firms have lower sales growth persistence, larger increases in accounts receivables, and lower allowances for bad debts, consistent with their lower revenue quality.