Accounting Organizations and Society最新文献

Arguably the world's most iconic platform organization, Uber relies on a disaggregated labour force and a technology application accessible to users on mobile devices. The company contracts with over three million drivers worldwide and has curated an infrastructure of platform-based control characterized by algorithmic processes. The effects of this new wave of control on the driver-led workforce are unclear. Drawing on interviews with 36 Uber drivers, mainly from Australia and France, this research investigates how the ‘gig economy’ workforce engages with platform-based control. We find that the platform organization's control algorithms operate with strong disciplinary effects. Drawing on Foucault's concept of self-formation, we examine worker responses to the new order of work. We highlight the way workers engage in practices to ‘take care of oneself’, by enduring, subverting or exiting the conditions of algorithmic management. We find that these practices are related to the distance embedded in the field between management and the workforce. In this way, we argue that the gig economy operates differently upon the ‘governable self’ and urge caution in relation to the use of algorithms to control at a distance.

Peer recognition systems are an increasingly popular management control tool through which employees can recognize and thank one another. I examine the effectiveness of these systems in motivating employee helping behavior. My theory and experimental findings suggest that group affiliation is a key moderating factor in determining the motivating influence of peer recognition systems. Specifically, I predict and find that the presence of a peer recognition system has a greater positive effect on in-group versus out-group helping. Results suggest this occurs because peer recognition systems, by formalizing the opportunity for social approval, sensitize employees to preexisting social expectations. I also predict that the incremental benefit of adding rewards to a peer recognition system will be greater for out-group versus in-group helping because the rewards will strengthen the perceived value of recognition among out-group members but simply replace in-group members’ social motivation. Statistical support for this prediction is weak, however. My findings provide insight into when peer recognition systems are effective in motivating helping behavior.

The paper seeks to enhance our understanding of the interaction between the development of disciplinary power in western liberal society and Foucault's writings on governmentality, through examination of the political processes resulting from the largest public scandal in the UK, the Poulson scandal of the early 1970s. The first research motive is to uncover any additional insights or hidden understandings that can be derived by applying Foucauldian historiographical and governmental perspectives as strengthened by Dean's (2010) analytics of government to the history of corporate governance in English local authorities over the forty years following Poulson. We argue that the continual process of intervention, investigation and prescription by central government set in motion by the scandal resulted in an increase in disciplinary power within local government by changing the expectations of council officials, elected representatives and politicians in Westminster through the normalisation of these intrusions and the spirit of dependency and compliance which resulted. Secondly, the paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of the analytics approach in a complex situation involving many genealogical disruptions to the status quo over a long time-period; and whilst the paper found the method helpful, limitations emerged regarding its claims to empirical certainty through precise questioning. Finally, the paper examines the significance of countering corruption as a motivating factor in the rise of disciplinary power in English local government, which it finds as limited.

We introduce a novel Big Data analytics model to detect upward revenue misreporting. The model uses freely available Google searches of firm products to provide external entity business state (EBS) evidence. The veracity of the reported numbers is enhanced when auditors can obtain external EBS evidence congruent with the reported numbers. The Google search volume index (SVI) of firm products is a good candidate for such EBS evidence because it nowcasts (i.e. predicts present) firm sales and is independent of management control. A large discrepancy such as a high sales growth together with a large decline in the SVI suggests possible manipulation upwards of revenues. We find that an indicator variable, MUP, of a firm in the top sales growth quartile and bottom ΔSVI quartile in each industry-quarter predicts revenue misstatements incrementally to the F_Score, Discretionary-Revenues model, two alternative upward revenue manipulation identifiers, and analyst and media coverages. MUP predictability is stronger in end-user industries and in interim quarters relative to the fourth quarter. We also find corroborating evidence that MUP firms have lower sales growth persistence, larger increases in accounts receivables, and lower allowances for bad debts, consistent with their lower revenue quality.

We examine whether the desire to maintain sociopolitical legitimacy with critical stakeholders affects sales targets set by Chinese firms. Drawing from institutional theory, we argue that enterprises owned by local government (local-SOEs) feel greater pressure to maintain their legitimacy with the local government relative to private firms (non-SOEs), leading to a stronger association between the provincial GDP target (a legitimate benchmark) and firm-level targets. Results from manually collected data support this conjecture and are robust to alternate measures and samples. Increases in the demand for legitimacy -- measured using exogenous shocks and sample characteristics -- strengthen the association. Finally, changes in the coverage in the official press and changes in target achievement rates document the real effects of this strategy. Our findings demonstrate the effects of institutional pressures on corporate decisions and enrich our understanding on the socially constructed as well as instrumental rationality role of management accounting.

Consulting services have returned to prominence among Big 4 accounting firms in the United States. I find that this shift did not happen unexpectedly, but as a result of changes in audit firm leadership and culture. Specifically, I document that the U.S. Big 4 firms have recently appointed an increasing percentage of advisory office managing partners (OMPs). Using a generalized difference-in-differences design, I find an increase in non-audit services (NAS) and decrease in audit quality among audit clients following advisory OMP appointments, particularly after an audit predecessor. Additional analyses suggest that consulting firm acquisitions, office-level NAS, and non-audit hiring practices also increase following advisory OMP appointments. Importantly though, I find that the NAS and audit quality effects following advisory OMP appointments are stronger when these other initiatives have not yet materialized in the office and appear somewhat muted when these shifts have already occurred. Consistent with expectations, supplemental tests reveal that the effects of advisory OMP appointments are more pronounced in small audit offices and when clients purchase more NAS or have weaker audit committee oversight. Overall, these results suggest that OMP appointments play a prominent role in setting culture and executing strategy within an audit office.

Recent regulatory and professional developments have increased the frequency with which public accountants interact with professionals from other accounting firms. Archival findings in accounting indicate that when the same firm provides both audit and non-audit tax services, audit quality is better than when different firms provide these services, which is attributed to differential communication of audit knowledge, or a “knowledge spillover” effect that occurs between professionals from the same firm. However, empirical research that examines how information is communicated across engagement teams is limited. Using social identity theory, we predict that the communication decisions of accounting professionals could be biased when multiple firms perform accounting services and that this has potential negative implications for audit quality. We conduct an experiment in settings where professional services are split across different accounting engagement teams and find that both tax and audit professionals are more likely to disclose information about possible financial statement errors to auditors from their own firm compared to those from a rival firm. We also find that tax professionals are more willing to communicate errors to a client when another firm is responsible for the error compared to their own firm, but we do not observe this effect for auditors. We believe that these results have important implications for audit quality and provide new insights into the effects of inter-firm collaboration of accountant knowledge sharing.