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The shocks matter: Labor mobility and the welfare cost of a currency union 这些冲击很重要：劳动力流动性和货币联盟的福利成本
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106132
Sihao Chen , David Cook , Haichao Fan , Juanyi Xu
In this paper, we study the impact of labor mobility on the welfare cost of a currency union in an open economy New Keynesian model. We find that the relationship between labor mobility and exchange rate flexibility depends on the source of asymmetric regional shocks. With demand shocks, labor mobility reduces the welfare cost of a union by reducing the cost of shifting labor to concentrated areas of high demand. With supply shocks, flexible exchange rates can work in conjunction with higher labor mobility to reallocate the factors of production to higher productivity regions of potential currency areas. Therefore, higher labor mobility can widen the welfare gap between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, implying areas with high inter-regional labor mobility may benefit more from exchange rate flexibility.
本文研究了开放经济新凯恩斯模型下劳动力流动对货币联盟福利成本的影响。研究发现，劳动力流动性与汇率弹性之间的关系取决于不对称区域冲击的来源。在需求冲击下，劳动力流动降低了劳动力向高需求集中地区转移的成本，从而降低了工会的福利成本。在供给冲击的情况下，灵活的汇率可以与更高的劳动力流动性相结合，将生产要素重新分配到潜在货币区生产率更高的地区。因此，较高的劳动力流动性会扩大固定汇率制度和灵活汇率制度之间的福利差距，这意味着区域间劳动力流动性高的地区可能从汇率灵活性中受益更多。
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引用次数: 0
Bank runs and interventions with wholesale funding 银行挤兑和大规模融资干预
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106143
Luis Araujo , Ryuichiro Izumi , Fabrizio Mattesini
We study how access to wholesale funding affects bank fragility when policymakers can intervene efficiently during a run. In a Diamond-Dybvig environment with a wholesale market, banks can refinance rather than liquidate assets. We show that the effect of wholesale borrowing on fragility depends both on the cost of funds and on the allocation of seniority among creditors. When wholesale lenders are senior, the availability of funds decreases fragility when borrowing is inexpensive; while when borrowing is costly, greater access to wholesale funding increases fragility because it delays intervention and increases depositors’ incentives to run. In contrast, when depositors are senior, wholesale borrowing always decreases fragility. These findings highlight that seniority allocation is a key determinant of how wholesale funding shapes policy responses and bank fragility. In particular, although recent episodes suggest that wholesale investors typically hold seniority, our findings suggest that granting priority to depositors could make the banking system less fragile.
我们研究了当政策制定者能够在挤兑期间有效干预时，获得批发融资如何影响银行的脆弱性。在钻石批发市场的环境中，银行可以再融资，而不是清算资产。我们表明，批发借贷对脆弱性的影响既取决于资金成本，也取决于债权人之间的优先级分配。当批发贷款机构处于优先地位时，当借贷成本低廉时，资金的可获得性降低了脆弱性；而当借贷成本高昂时，更容易获得批发融资会增加脆弱性，因为这会推迟干预，增加储户的挤兑动机。相反，当存款人处于优先级时，批发借贷总是会降低脆弱性。这些发现突出表明，资历分配是大规模融资如何影响政策反应和银行脆弱性的关键决定因素。特别是，尽管最近的事件表明，批发投资者通常持有优先级，但我们的研究结果表明，给予储户优先权可能会使银行体系不那么脆弱。
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引用次数: 0
Random allocations of multiple objects with incomplete information 具有不完全信息的多对象随机分配
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106131
Xu Lang , Zaifu Yang
We propose a condition under which a system of linear inequalities can be found to characterize ex post and interim allocation mechanisms that assign multiple heterogeneous indivisible objects to many agents and also satisfy complex distributional constraints in an incomplete information environment. This condition is called total unimodularity, a well-recognized and rich class of matrices whose entries are −1, 0, or 1. The condition is so general as to extend and unify a number of well-known results, offer new and general results, and cover such as hierarchies, bihierarchies, adjacency, dependence chains, M♮-concavity, 1-substitutes, and paramodularity. We also provide several applications of practical interest.
我们提出了一个条件，在此条件下，可以找到一个线性不等式系统来表征事后和临时分配机制，该机制将多个异构不可分割的对象分配给许多代理，并满足不完全信息环境中复杂的分布约束。这个条件被称为全单模性，这是一类公认的丰富的矩阵，其元素为−1,0或1。该条件是如此普遍，以至于可以扩展和统一一些已知的结果，提供新的和一般的结果，并涵盖了诸如层次，双层，邻接，依赖链，M -凹性，1-替代和副模性。我们还提供了一些实际的应用。
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引用次数: 0
A model of network formation for the overnight interbank market: When is core-periphery an illusion? 隔夜银行间市场网络形成模型：什么时候核心-外围是一种幻觉？
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106126
Mikhail Anufriev , Andrea Deghi , Valentyn Panchenko , Paolo Pin
We develop a theoretical model of network formation in the overnight interbank market, where banks manage liquidity under reserve uncertainty by strategically forming bilateral lending relationships. The model incorporates counterparty risk and the central bank’s corridor system, yielding endogenously determined equilibrium networks. A key result, relevant for systemic stability policy, is that the equilibrium network is bipartite: active banks act either as lenders or borrowers, and no strategic (interbank) intermediation arises. We also show that, via temporal aggregation of equilibrium networks, apparent intermediation and a core-periphery structure emerge. We validate these predictions using e-MID market data, showing that the model reconciles the frequency-dependent network features documented in the empirical literature for this market.
我们开发了银行间隔夜市场网络形成的理论模型，在该模型中，银行通过战略性地形成双边贷款关系来管理准备金不确定性下的流动性。该模型考虑了交易对手风险和中央银行的走廊系统，产生了内生决定的均衡网络。与系统稳定政策相关的一个关键结果是，均衡网络是由两部分组成的：活跃的银行要么充当贷款人，要么充当借款人，不会出现战略（银行间）中介。我们还表明，通过均衡网络的时间聚合，出现了明显的中介和核心-外围结构。我们使用e-MID市场数据验证了这些预测，表明该模型符合该市场经验文献中记录的频率相关网络特征。
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引用次数: 0
Robust product design and pricing 稳健的产品设计和定价
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106112
Kyungmin Kim , Nenad Kos
We study design and pricing by a monopolist who has no information about the distribution of consumers’ tastes and maximizes her profit under the worst-case scenario. We show that her optimal strategy takes a simple form of dividing the taste space into a finite number of equal-length intervals and serving consumers on a randomly chosen interval. We obtain this result by studying the dual problem of finding a distribution of consumers’ tastes that minimizes the seller’s profit and establishing strong duality. The profit-minimizing distributions exhibit a uniformity property, assigning equal probability mass to a finite number of partition cells of equal width. Through the dual, we also determine the seller’s lowest profit in the Bayesian setting, establish that it is strictly positive, and derive the set of achievable profits.
我们研究垄断者的设计和定价，他不知道消费者的口味分布，并在最坏的情况下最大化她的利润。我们表明，她的最优策略采用了一种简单的形式，即将味觉空间划分为有限数量的等长间隔，并在随机选择的间隔上为消费者提供服务。我们通过研究寻找使卖方利润最小的消费者口味分布的对偶问题和建立强对偶性得到了这一结果。利润最小化分布表现出均匀性，为有限数量的等宽分区单元分配等概率质量。通过对偶，我们还确定了贝叶斯条件下卖方的最低利润，确定其为严格正的，并导出了可实现利润集。
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引用次数: 0
Competitive price discrimination, imperfect information, and consumer search 竞争性价格歧视、不完全信息和消费者搜索
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106133
Carl-Christian Groh
I study a homogeneous goods’ model in which a consumer attains consumption opportunities via sequential search. Whenever a firm is visited by the consumer, the firm observes a private signal about the consumer’s valuation and price discriminates based on this information. If the signal is sufficiently precise and search costs are at intermediate levels, an equilibrium in which the consumer visits multiple firms with positive probability emerges. At low search costs, firms offer low prices to deter search, and the consumer does not visit multiple firms. The equilibrium prices are minimal if search costs are negligible and, if the signal is sufficiently precise, the equilibrium prices are maximal at intermediate levels of search costs.
我研究了一个同质商品模型，其中消费者通过顺序搜索获得消费机会。每当消费者拜访一家公司时，该公司就会观察到一个关于消费者估值的私人信号，并根据该信息进行价格歧视。如果信号足够精确且搜索成本处于中间水平，那么消费者以正概率访问多个公司的均衡就会出现。在低搜索成本的情况下，公司提供低价来阻止搜索，消费者不会访问多个公司。如果搜索成本可以忽略不计，那么均衡价格是最小的；如果信号足够精确，那么在搜索成本的中间水平上均衡价格是最大的。
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引用次数: 0
Corrigendum to “The screening role of market tightness in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection” [Journal of Economic Theory 225 (2025) 105995] “市场紧度在逆向选择竞争搜索均衡中的筛选作用”的勘误表[经济理论学报225 (2025)105995]
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106124
Hung-Chi Chang , Yiting Li
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引用次数: 0
Optimal screening with securities 证券最优筛选
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106125
Nicolas Figueroa , Nicolas Inostroza
A liquidity-constrained asset owner screens an informed investor using financial securities. Information-insensitive securities reduce the investor’s information rents. The optimal screening mechanism consists of a monotone debt menu where more optimistic investor types purchase larger amounts of debt. Interestingly, the issuer may benefit from trading with a better informed investor. For any monotone debt menu, as the asset’s cash flows more accurately describe the investor’s private information (Lehmann, 1988), the trade surplus unambiguously increases. Further, fixing the optimal debt menu, when the investor’s private information originates from location experiments, increasing accuracy decreases (increases) information rents for low (high) types. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee that the issuer strictly benefits from trading with a better informed investor. Our results imply that selling debt is an effective approach to raise funds in financial markets even when investors hold superior private information and provide a novel rationale for the emergence of venture debt.
流动性受限的资产所有者使用金融证券筛选知情的投资者。信息不敏感证券降低了投资者的信息租金。最优的筛选机制包括一个单调的债务菜单，更乐观的投资者类型购买更多的债务。有趣的是，发行人可能会从与更知情的投资者进行交易中受益。对于任何单调债务菜单，随着资产的现金流更准确地描述投资者的私人信息（Lehmann, 1988），贸易顺差无疑会增加。进一步，确定最优债务菜单，当投资者的私人信息来源于位置实验时，准确性的提高会降低（增加）低（高）类型的信息租金。我们提供充分的条件，保证发行人从与消息更灵通的投资者进行交易中严格获益。我们的研究结果表明，即使投资者拥有优越的私人信息，出售债务也是在金融市场上筹集资金的有效方法，并为风险债务的出现提供了新的理由。
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引用次数: 0
Partially constructed sequential equilibrium 部分构造序贯均衡
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106111
Joel Watson
This article identifies sufficient conditions under which a partial construction of sequential equilibrium—characterizing beliefs and behavior for only a subset of the information sets—is sufficient for the existence of a sequential equilibrium that coincides with the partial construction in a suitable way. Illustrative applications are also presented.
本文确定了序列均衡的部分构造（仅表征信息集子集的信念和行为）足以使序列均衡以适当的方式与部分构造相吻合的充分条件。并给出了实例应用。
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引用次数: 0
The multiple-volunteers principle 多志愿者原则
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106114
Susanne Goldlücke , Thomas Tröger
We present a class of simple transfer-free rules for assigning an unpleasant task among a group of agents: agents decide simultaneously whether or not to volunteer; if the number of volunteers exceeds a threshold number, the task is assigned to a volunteer; otherwise, the task is assigned to a non-volunteer. In particular, the rule may ask for multiple volunteers although one agent is sufficient to perform the task. In a setting in which agents care about who performs the task, any multiple-volunteers rule yields a strict interim Pareto improvement over random task assignment. Some volunteers rule is utilitarian optimal across all transfer-free binary mechanisms, and a rule with a large threshold reaches the first-best approximately if the group is large. Similar results hold for the problem of assigning a pleasant task. In that case, the task is assigned to a volunteer if and only if there are sufficiently few volunteers.
我们提出了一类简单的无转移规则，用于在一组智能体之间分配不愉快的任务：智能体同时决定是否自愿；如果志愿者人数超过阈值，则将任务分配给志愿者；否则，该任务将分配给非志愿者。特别是，该规则可能要求多个志愿者，尽管一个代理足以执行任务。在代理关心谁执行任务的情况下，任何多志愿者规则都比随机任务分配产生严格的临时帕累托改进。一些志愿者规则在所有无转移二元机制中都是功利最优的，当群体规模较大时，阈值较大的规则近似达到最优。类似的结果也适用于分配令人愉快的任务的问题。在这种情况下，当且仅当志愿者足够少时，将任务分配给志愿者。
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