Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2025-11-09DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106108
Marc Dordal i Carreras , Seung Joo Lee
This paper develops a model of business cycles with endogenous volatility at the zero lower bound (ZLB) and central-bank forward guidance. We deliver three main results. First, a credible commitment to future stabilization curbs excess volatility at the ZLB. Second, pledging not to stabilize later can shift the economy onto more favorable equilibrium paths, exposing a trade-off between future stabilization and reduced aggregate volatility at the ZLB. Third, keeping the timing of future stabilization uncertain strictly dominates other forward-guidance strategies.
{"title":"Higher-order forward guidance","authors":"Marc Dordal i Carreras , Seung Joo Lee","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106108","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106108","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper develops a model of business cycles with endogenous volatility at the zero lower bound (ZLB) and central-bank forward guidance. We deliver three main results. First, a credible commitment to future stabilization curbs excess volatility at the ZLB. Second, pledging not to stabilize later can shift the economy onto more favorable equilibrium paths, exposing a trade-off between future stabilization and reduced aggregate volatility at the ZLB. Third, keeping the timing of future stabilization uncertain strictly dominates other forward-guidance strategies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106108"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145694215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2025-12-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106113
Chao Gu , Lu Wang , Randall Wright
We study dynamics in frictional markets with intermediated trade, where middlemen can buy goods or assets from sellers, hold them as inventory, and sell when contacting appropriate buyers. Importantly, buyers have heterogeneous match-specific valuations, letting us characterize equilibrium in terms of reservation trading strategies (related papers with homogeneous valuations imply bang-bang solutions that are awkward for the economics and mathematics). Using bifurcation theory, we show there are equilibria where market participation, volume, prices, liquidity and other variables fluctuate as self-fulfilling prophecies. The dynamics emerge from strategic considerations, not mechanical assumptions, like increasing returns or other such devices in related models.
{"title":"Middlemen, inventories and economic dynamics","authors":"Chao Gu , Lu Wang , Randall Wright","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106113","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106113","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study dynamics in frictional markets with intermediated trade, where middlemen can buy goods or assets from sellers, hold them as inventory, and sell when contacting appropriate buyers. Importantly, buyers have heterogeneous match-specific valuations, letting us characterize equilibrium in terms of reservation trading strategies (related papers with homogeneous valuations imply bang-bang solutions that are awkward for the economics and mathematics). Using bifurcation theory, we show there are equilibria where market participation, volume, prices, liquidity and other variables fluctuate as self-fulfilling prophecies. The dynamics emerge from strategic considerations, not mechanical assumptions, like increasing returns or other such devices in related models.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106113"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2025-12-05DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106127
Jingfeng Lu , Wenbo Zhao
This paper studies when and how intertemporal bundling arises in optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-period setting, where two objects (A and B) are sequentially available for sale. When the buyer’s values of the two objects (vA and vB respectively) are independent, in contrast to conventional insight from simultaneous sales, we find in our setting that there is no loss in relying on separate sales for optimal design. This result extends under widely adopted regularity conditions when the values are positively correlated in the sense that vB is stochastically increasing in vA. However, if vB is stochastically decreasing in vA, separate sales are no longer optimal, and the optimal integrated design features intertemporal bundling. When it is always efficient to provide each good, the optimal selling mechanism is implemented by offering a menu of intertemporal bundles with different prices, where each bundle consists of the second object together with a probabilistic proportion of the first object. In particular, if the buyer’s virtual value of the first good is always non-negative, pure bundling becomes optimal.
{"title":"Intertemporal bundling","authors":"Jingfeng Lu , Wenbo Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106127","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106127","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies when and how intertemporal bundling arises in optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-period setting, where two objects (<em>A</em> and <em>B</em>) are sequentially available for sale. When the buyer’s values of the two objects (<em>v<sub>A</sub></em> and <em>v<sub>B</sub></em> respectively) are independent, in contrast to conventional insight from simultaneous sales, we find in our setting that there is no loss in relying on separate sales for optimal design. This result extends under widely adopted regularity conditions when the values are positively correlated in the sense that <em>v<sub>B</sub></em> is stochastically increasing in <em>v<sub>A</sub></em>. However, if <em>v<sub>B</sub></em> is stochastically decreasing in <em>v<sub>A</sub></em>, separate sales are no longer optimal, and the optimal integrated design features intertemporal bundling. When it is always efficient to provide each good, the optimal selling mechanism is implemented by offering a menu of intertemporal bundles with different prices, where each bundle consists of the second object together with a probabilistic proportion of the first object. In particular, if the buyer’s virtual value of the first good is always non-negative, pure bundling becomes optimal.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106127"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nguyen et al. (2016) introduce the Bundled Probabilistic Serial and Bundled Probabilistic Serial under Limited Complementarities mechanisms for allocating bundles of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences over bundles. They present efficiency, fairness, and incentive properties of the two mechanisms, showing both to be ordinally efficient, weakly envy-free, weakly strategy-proof, and asymptotically strategy-proof. We provide counterexamples demonstrating that the Bundled Probabilistic Serial mechanism is not weakly strategy-proof and the Bundled Probabilistic Serial under Limited Complementarities mechanism is not weakly envy-free, weakly strategy-proof, or asymptotically strategy-proof. We also revise proofs for the remaining properties.
Nguyen et al.（2016）引入了有限互补下的捆绑概率序列和捆绑概率序列机制，用于在顺序偏好下分配不可分割对象束。他们提出了两种机制的效率、公平和激励性质，证明了两种机制都是通常有效的、弱无嫉妒的、弱策略证明的和渐近策略证明的。我们提供了反例，证明了捆绑概率序列机制不是弱策略证明，有限互补机制下的捆绑概率序列不是弱无嫉妒、弱策略证明或渐近策略证明。我们还修改了其余性质的证明。
{"title":"Comment on “Assignment problems with complementarities” [J. Econ. Theory 165 (2016) 209-241]","authors":"Daniel Kornbluth , Alexey Kushnir , Thanh Nguyen , Rakesh Vohra","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106130","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106130","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Nguyen et al. (2016) introduce the <em>Bundled Probabilistic Serial</em> and <em>Bundled Probabilistic Serial under Limited Complementarities</em> mechanisms for allocating bundles of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences over bundles. They present efficiency, fairness, and incentive properties of the two mechanisms, showing both to be ordinally efficient, weakly envy-free, weakly strategy-proof, and asymptotically strategy-proof. We provide counterexamples demonstrating that the Bundled Probabilistic Serial mechanism is not weakly strategy-proof and the Bundled Probabilistic Serial under Limited Complementarities mechanism is not weakly envy-free, weakly strategy-proof, or asymptotically strategy-proof. We also revise proofs for the remaining properties.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106130"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-09-26DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106094
Simon Essig Aberg , Brian Baisa
We study multi-unit auctions for homogeneous goods in a private-value setting where bidders have multi-unit demand and non-negative wealth effects. When bidders have quasilinear preferences, the Vickrey auction implements an efficient outcome in dominant strategies. When bidders have positive wealth effects, recent impossibility results find that no auction implements an efficient outcome.
We quantify the worst-case inefficiency of the Vickrey auction and other multi-unit auctions when bidders have positive wealth effects. We measure an auction's worst-case inefficiency as the largest compensating variation associated with any Pareto improvement over an undominated auction outcome. We show that the Vickrey auction is ‘nearly’ efficient when the strength of bidder wealth effects is sufficiently small. This result follows because the set of undominated bids in the Vickrey auction collapses to truthfully reporting demand as bidder wealth effects become small. We also compare the worst-case inefficiency of the Vickrey auction with that of the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions.
{"title":"Quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions for normal goods","authors":"Simon Essig Aberg , Brian Baisa","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106094","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106094","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study multi-unit auctions for homogeneous goods in a private-value setting where bidders have multi-unit demand and non-negative wealth effects. When bidders have quasilinear preferences, the Vickrey auction implements an efficient outcome in dominant strategies. When bidders have positive wealth effects, recent impossibility results find that no auction implements an efficient outcome.</div><div>We quantify the worst-case inefficiency of the Vickrey auction and other multi-unit auctions when bidders have positive wealth effects. We measure an auction's worst-case inefficiency as the largest compensating variation associated with any Pareto improvement over an undominated auction outcome. We show that the Vickrey auction is ‘nearly’ efficient when the strength of bidder wealth effects is sufficiently small. This result follows because the set of undominated bids in the Vickrey auction collapses to truthfully reporting demand as bidder wealth effects become small. We also compare the worst-case inefficiency of the Vickrey auction with that of the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106094"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145227584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-11-04DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106104
Eungsik Kim, Jiayi Li
This paper investigates the implications of incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting preferences and extending the economic lifespan for the emergence of endogenous business cycles. Using a three-period overlapping generations model, we examine how quasi-hyperbolic discounting influences the dynamics of deterministic cycles and local sunspot equilibria. The presence of a middle-aged generation plays a key role in generating an elasticity of intertemporal substitution that is lower than the inverse of risk aversion, interacting with consumers’ time-inconsistent behavior. A lower EIS strengthens gross complementarity between dated goods and thereby contributes to the existence of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling, belief-driven fluctuations. We show that our three-period model with time-inconsistent preferences makes two-period cycles and local indeterminacy more plausible than in a standard two-period framework with exponential discounting, as it expands the set of parameter values under which such endogenous fluctuations can arise.
{"title":"Endogenous business cycles in overlapping generations models with time inconsistency","authors":"Eungsik Kim, Jiayi Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106104","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106104","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the implications of incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting preferences and extending the economic lifespan for the emergence of endogenous business cycles. Using a three-period overlapping generations model, we examine how quasi-hyperbolic discounting influences the dynamics of deterministic cycles and local sunspot equilibria. The presence of a middle-aged generation plays a key role in generating an elasticity of intertemporal substitution that is lower than the inverse of risk aversion, interacting with consumers’ time-inconsistent behavior. A lower EIS strengthens gross complementarity between dated goods and thereby contributes to the existence of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling, belief-driven fluctuations. We show that our three-period model with time-inconsistent preferences makes two-period cycles and local indeterminacy more plausible than in a standard two-period framework with exponential discounting, as it expands the set of parameter values under which such endogenous fluctuations can arise.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106104"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145578787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-10-25DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106102
Maria Titova , Kun Zhang
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare them with commitment outcomes in information design. We provide conditions under which a commitment outcome is an equilibrium outcome and identify environments in which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. Our findings offer insights into the interchangeability of verifiability and commitment in applied settings.
{"title":"Persuasion with verifiable information","authors":"Maria Titova , Kun Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106102","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106102","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare them with commitment outcomes in information design. We provide conditions under which a commitment outcome is an equilibrium outcome and identify environments in which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. Our findings offer insights into the interchangeability of verifiability and commitment in applied settings.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106102"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145474272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-10-26DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106101
Michael Sockin
A key function of financial intermediaries is to borrow in financial markets and lend to firms. I show that this creates informational linkages between repo and corporate bond markets. My key result is improving transparency in either market may lower welfare even if funding liquidity improves. My model’s predictions are consistent with the bond and repo market dysfunction during the 2008 global financial and COVID-19 crises, and the impact of the introduction of TRACE on bond markets in 2002. Central to my findings is that bond prices serve as useful signals that minimize firm’s aggregate distress costs by coordinating their borrowing and intermediaries’ lending activities.
{"title":"Informational frictions in funding and credit markets","authors":"Michael Sockin","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106101","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106101","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A key function of financial intermediaries is to borrow in financial markets and lend to firms. I show that this creates informational linkages between repo and corporate bond markets. My key result is improving transparency in either market may lower welfare even if funding liquidity improves. My model’s predictions are consistent with the bond and repo market dysfunction during the 2008 global financial and COVID-19 crises, and the impact of the introduction of TRACE on bond markets in 2002. Central to my findings is that bond prices serve as useful signals that minimize firm’s aggregate distress costs by coordinating their borrowing and intermediaries’ lending activities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106101"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145424473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-10-30DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106105
Felix Kubler
This paper examines constrained optimal carbon pricing in a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets. A carbon policy consists of state-dependent carbon taxes and a sharing rule for tax revenue recycling. The social cost of carbon (SCC) is defined as the present value of the future marginal costs of additional CO2 emissions, discounted at (personalized) prices. For the case of complete markets, we state simple, sufficient conditions that ensure that setting carbon taxes equal to the SCC results in a Pareto-efficient competitive equilibrium. When markets are incomplete, constrained Pareto-efficient carbon taxes generically differ from the SCC. To examine the potential quantitative importance of these differences, we consider an Aiyagari [1994]-style model with a climate change externality. We prove that (i) the SCC cannot be estimated from aggregate damage functions and market prices alone, and (ii) the deviations of constrained optimal carbon taxes from the SCC can be arbitrarily large.
{"title":"Incomplete financial markets, the social cost of carbon and constrained efficient carbon pricing","authors":"Felix Kubler","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106105","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106105","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines constrained optimal carbon pricing in a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets. A carbon policy consists of state-dependent carbon taxes and a sharing rule for tax revenue recycling. The social cost of carbon (SCC) is defined as the present value of the future marginal costs of additional CO2 emissions, discounted at (personalized) prices. For the case of complete markets, we state simple, sufficient conditions that ensure that setting carbon taxes equal to the SCC results in a Pareto-efficient competitive equilibrium. When markets are incomplete, constrained Pareto-efficient carbon taxes generically differ from the SCC. To examine the potential quantitative importance of these differences, we consider an Aiyagari [1994]-style model with a climate change externality. We prove that (i) the SCC cannot be estimated from aggregate damage functions and market prices alone, and (ii) the deviations of constrained optimal carbon taxes from the SCC can be arbitrarily large.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145474218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-10-29DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106106
Gregor Boehl
Building on automatic differentiation, I propose a robust and efficient solution method for perfect-foresight transition dynamics in heterogeneous agent models with many aggregate equations. Compared with existing methods, it allows to capture strong nonlinearities, including, e.g., occasionally binding constraints, and dynamics that deviate significantly from the steady state. A powerful and user friendly open-source reference implementation is provided, which efficiently computes nonlinear solutions to the canonical HANK model within seconds, including the transition dynamics of the full distribution. I challenge this method by studying a permanent shift in redistribution policy in a medium-scale two-asset HANK model featuring many aggregate frictions. The results indicate that, as firms seek to deplete their capital stock, the transition path is characterized by a prolonged deflationary episode, the severity of which depends on the interaction between nonlinear constraints, such as the interest rate lower bound and downward nominal wage rigidity.
{"title":"HANK on speed: Robust nonlinear solutions using automatic differentiation","authors":"Gregor Boehl","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106106","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106106","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Building on automatic differentiation, I propose a robust and efficient solution method for perfect-foresight transition dynamics in heterogeneous agent models with many aggregate equations. Compared with existing methods, it allows to capture strong nonlinearities, including, e.g., occasionally binding constraints, and dynamics that deviate significantly from the steady state. A powerful and user friendly open-source reference implementation is provided, which efficiently computes nonlinear solutions to the canonical HANK model within seconds, including the transition dynamics of the full distribution. I challenge this method by studying a permanent shift in redistribution policy in a medium-scale two-asset HANK model featuring many aggregate frictions. The results indicate that, as firms seek to deplete their capital stock, the transition path is characterized by a prolonged deflationary episode, the severity of which depends on the interaction between nonlinear constraints, such as the interest rate lower bound and downward nominal wage rigidity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106106"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145474271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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