Demography最新文献

Recent research indicates that immigrants are more likely to experience chronic conditions and disabilities than natives at older ages, yet they continue to exhibit lower overall mortality, thus suggesting a morbidity-mortality paradox. We utilize the IPUMS National Health Interview Survey 2002-2018 with linked mortality data through 2019 (n = 405,270) to comprehensively investigate how this paradox unfolds with age for various groups of immigrants. The analysis shows that immigrants' advantages in chronic conditions and disabilities narrow or even disappear at old ages, whereas their mortality advantages continuously increase with age. These patterns exist for immigrants of different ethnoracial, sex, and educational groups. The decomposition analysis reveals that the narrowing disability gap is due to immigrants' increasing prevalence of mental illness and diabetes, shrinking advantages in lung diseases and musculoskeletal conditions, and increasing vulnerability to the disabling effects of major chronic conditions. However, immigrants are less likely to die from chronic diseases and disabilities, and this advantage strengthens with age, widening the nativity gap in mortality risk with age. We suggest that health-based selection might simultaneously postpone the onset of chronic diseases and disabilities to later ages for immigrants and better enable them to weather the mortality consequences of the diseases and disabilities.

Over the past few decades, U.S. cities have changed dramatically, largely because of two major trends: the fall of violence and the rise of urban inequality. Despite the attention given to each of these trends, little research has assessed how they are related to each other. This study is the first to generate causal evidence on the impact of violent crime on economic residential segregation. We document the effect of the crime drop on economic segregation in 500 U.S. cities between 1990 and 2010, using exogenous shocks to city crime rates to identify causal effects. We find that declining violent and property crime reduced low-income household segregation but had no effect on affluent households. Our findings indicate that the crime decline has not overturned the trend toward rising economic segregation but has slowed its pace. Additional analyses suggest that declining crime reduced low-income household segregation by drawing more White and college-educated residents to the poorest neighborhoods of 1990. We also find suggestive evidence that declining violence led poor households to migrate out of low-income neighborhoods, reflecting a pattern of gentrification. Descriptive analyses of tract-level data from five cities show that neighborhoods with sharper declines in violence became less socioeconomically disadvantaged. Despite continued rising economic inequality, the crime decline has had its greatest impact on concentrated poverty, long seen as one of the most harmful dimensions of urban inequality.

Parenting styles are often the focus of interventions aimed at mitigating disparities in children's well-being. Although research has sought to establish parenting differences across income groups, the extent to which income itself drives such differences is disputed. Little attention has focused on income volatility, despite its secular rise and recent salience and the links between volatility and parenting drawn by theories across the social and developmental sciences. I investigate whether and how income volatility affects parenting styles using data from the 2009-2022 UK Household Longitudinal Study and an empirical approach that addresses measured and unmeasured common causes of volatility and parenting. Self-reports of parenting styles are differently associated with income instability across income groups. Mothers with higher but more unstable household and labor incomes report lower warmth. When households accumulate benefit income, reports of harsh or more permissive practices become more frequent among mothers with higher incomes and less frequent among those with lower incomes. Despite instability due to labor income losses, fathers with lower incomes report higher warmth in their interactions with their children, whereas fathers with higher incomes report the opposite. These findings suggest that theories, public debates, and policies could be retailored to address the role of income changes in family life.

The forced return of migrants is an important part of migration policy toolkits. An increased risk of deportation, politicians argue, will deter subsequent irregular migration. We explore this argument for the case of forced removals from the United States and find that rather than operating as a deterrent for future migrants, this policy had a boomerang effect. The forced return of migrants with a track record of crime generated negative externalities in the form of higher violence in their countries of origin, counteracting the deterrence effect of higher deportation risk. We apply mediation analysis to a panel of Latin American and Caribbean countries and decompose the effect of deportations on emigration into three coefficients of interest: a total effect of deportations on later emigration, an effect of deportations on the mediator variable of violence, and an effect of violence on emigration. We address the endogeneity of our key explanatory variables-deportations and violence-using migrants' exposure to the unequal and staggered implementation of policies intended to facilitate deportations at the level of U.S. states as a source of exogenous variation. We show that migration intentions and asylum requests increase in response to deportation threats. This effect is mediated through increased violence and is strongly driven by dynamics in Central America. Although the total number of apprehensions at the U.S. southern border in response to deportation threats does not show a clear pattern, we observe an increase in the share of unaccompanied minors and the share of entire family units among those apprehended, suggesting a shift in migration strategies and composition.

The fertility expectations of older women and men are becoming increasingly important for understanding fertility dynamics, given the increasing share of births after age 30. Because most health conditions deteriorate with age, understanding the relationship between health and fertility expectations is essential. We investigate whether changes in self-assessed general, physical, and mental health are linked to revised fertility expectations and how these associations vary over the life course. Drawing on a large longitudinal dataset for Australia, we demonstrate that across each health indicator, self-assessed poor health corresponds to lower fertility expectations and that a deterioration (or improvement) in self-assessed health coincides with a decrease (or increase) in men's and women's expectations of having a child. Individuals adapt their expectations more in response to physical health changes if they are older, and mental health conditions at younger ages appear relevant to men's fertility intentions. The results highlight that general, physical, and mental health are crucial drivers of changes in fertility plans, emphasizing the importance of integrating health considerations into future theoretical frameworks and empirical analyses of fertility.

A growing literature investigates the levels, trends, causes, and effects of lifespan inequality. This work is typically based on measures that combine partial cohort histories into a synthetic cohort, most frequently in a period life table, or focus on single (completed) cohort analysis. We introduce a new cohort-based method-the overlapping cohorts perspective-that preserves individual cohort histories and aggregates them in a population-level measure. We apply these new methods to describe levels and trends in lifespan inequality and to assess temporary and permanent mortality changes in several case studies, including the surge of violent deaths in Colombia in the 1990s and 2000s and cause-deleted exercises for top mortality causes such as cardiovascular diseases and cancer. The results from our approach differ from those of existing methods in the timing, trends, and levels of the impact of these mortality developments on lifespan inequality, bringing new insights to the study of lifespan inequality.

We analyze and quantify the ways the COVID-19 pandemic affected other causes of death in Brazil in 2020 and 2021. We decompose age-standardized mortality rate time series for 2010-2021 into three additive components: trend, seasonal, and remainder. Given the long-term trend and historical seasonal variation, we assume that most of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic will be left in the remainder. We use a regression model to test this assumption. We decompose the contributions of COVID-19 deaths (direct effect) and those of other causes (indirect effects) to the annual change in life expectancy at birth (e0) from 2017 to 2021. The COVID-19 pandemic not only increased rates for other causes of death but also decreased rates for some causes. Broadly, the remainders mirror the COVID-19 pandemic waves. The direct effects of the pandemic reduced e0 by 1.88 years in 2019-2020 and by 1.77 in 2020-2021. Indirect effects increased e0 by 0.44 in 2019-2020 and had virtually no effect on e0 in 2020-2021. Whether the trajectories of mortality rates and annual gains in e0 will return to prepandemic levels and their interregional gradients depend on whether a nonnegligible number of patients who recovered from COVID-19 will suffer premature mortality.

This study introduces a demographic framework to analyze the social division of care work time, defined as the sum of paid and unpaid care work time provided to children and adults in a population. Combining data from the American Heritage Time Use Survey (AHTUS) and the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC), we focus on routine interactive care and analyze how the volume and social division of this care work has evolved in the United States over a half century (1965-2018). Results reveal relative stability in the division of care work across domains (paid vs. unpaid and child vs. adult) but substantial change across social groups (by gender and race). The share of total care work provided by paid caregivers remained stable, challenging expectations about defamilialization, whereas the share of total care work going to adults increased over time. Gender and race inequality in total care work time experienced notable declines. Analyses show that these changes are driven by men's increased involvement in unpaid childcare and non-White women's declined involvement in some paid care jobs, respectively. Our framework provides new tools to examine how demographic, social, and economic changes impact the social organization of care work time.

Future fertility is a key input when charting the sustainability of social security systems, and declining fertility is often expected to put pressure on economic indicators, such as pension burden. Such expectations are based on a narrow view of the impact of fertility on the economy, focusing on age structure. Dynamic impacts-for instance, the potential for increased human capital for smaller cohorts-are mostly ignored. We use a dynamic longitudinal microsimulation model to explore the extent to which investments in human capital could offset the adverse economic impact of low fertility. Our research context is Finland, the fastest aging European country and the site of dramatic fertility declines and stagnant educational levels in the 2020s. We find that an ambitious but simple human capital investment strategy that keeps the total investment constant despite declining cohort size, thereby increasing per capita investment, can offset the negative impact of a smaller labor force on the pension burden. Human capital investment not only reduces pension burden but also increases working years, pension income, retirement years, and longevity. Policies focusing on human capital investment are likely a viable strategy to maintain economic sustainability.

Immigrant-native intermarriage has been shown to improve immigrant labor force outcomes. A parallel line of research demonstrates that immigrant employment outcomes are strongly influenced by the sociopolitical climate and overall reception immigrants receive upon arrival in the host society. Our research spans both strands of literature to address unresolved questions about how the association between immigrant-native intermarriage and foreign-born occupational status changes across host societies on the basis of their national-level polices and views toward outsiders. To assess this, we analyze substantive changes in immigrant occupational attainment across twenty European Union countries from 2008 to 2018 using individual-level, cross-sectional data from the European Union Labor Force Survey on occupational attainment merged with country-level data from the European Social Survey on attitudes toward outsiders and the Migrant Integration Policy Index on integration policies. Our findings show that the association between intermarriage and immigrant occupation status is stronger in countries with more welcoming policies, whereas attitudes toward outsiders do not have a significant effect net of the moderating role of policy. The novel use of occupational status along with the moderating effect of policy provides further evidence that closed societies impede immigrant integration while deepening immigrant marginalization.