Cognition & Emotion最新文献

This study investigates the temporal dynamics and affective associations related to executive function (EF) performance in primary school classrooms using an intensive longitudinal design. Data were collected from 35 students aged 8.9 to 11.4 years. Participants reported their affective experiences and completed EF measures three times daily following a fixed sampling schedule. The data collection spanned two consecutive school weeks across three primary school classrooms. Utilising Dynamic Structural Equation Modeling (DSEM), we examined 505 measurements of EF tasks and self-reported affective states over two weeks. The findings reveal significant within-person variability in EF, accounting for 52% of the observed variance, with performance declining later in the day and week. At the within-person level, positive affect was associated with improved EF performance, while negative affect was associated with poorer EF. No significant between-person relationships were found. These results underscore the importance of considering within-person processes and affective experiences in educational settings and highlight the need for further research employing intensive longitudinal methods to better understand the nuanced dynamics of affect and EF in real-world classroom environments.

People remember disgusting stimuli better than fearful stimuli, but do disgust's memory-enhancing effects extend to involuntary memory? This question is important because disgust reactions occur following trauma, and trauma-related involuntary memories are a hallmark of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms. In two experiments, we presented participants (n = 88 Experiment 1; n = 106 Experiment 2) with disgust, fear, and neutral images during an attention-monitoring task. Participants then completed an undemanding vigilance task, responding any time an image involuntarily came to mind. We measured the frequency and characteristics of these involuntary memories (e.g. emotional intensity) immediately after encoding and over a 24-hour delay (Experiment 2 only). Our main findings were mixed: participants experienced similarly frequent (Experiment 2) - or more (Experiment 1) - disgust as fear involuntary memories. Therefore, when controlling for memory-enhancing confounds (e.g. distinctiveness), in-laboratory disgust memory enhancement does not extend to involuntary memory. Disgust memories were more emotionally intense than fear memories over the 24-hour delay- but not immediately after encoding - suggesting disgust elicits additional consolidation processes to fear. Participants paid more attention towards the disgust images, but the attention did not account for the memory of disgust. In sum, disgust and fear have both similar and distinct cognitive effects.

Substantial research indicates that individuals with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) remember more negative information compared to neutral and positive information. This phenomenon is commonly attributed to attentional biases toward negative over neutral and positive information. A recent attentional resources model suggests that in MDD, negative cues not only capture attention, but also lead to deeper processing of subsequent information, irrespective of its content. This study aimed to replicate findings supporting this attentional resources model and go beyond it by investigating the effect of negative cues on encoding and retrieval processes. Forty-one participants with MDD and no comorbid diagnoses, and 42 healthy-controls completed the emotional recall task with negative or positive videos presented during encoding and retrieval stages of a neutral word-list memory test. During encoding, only the MDD group exhibited a difference between negative and positive videos, such that for negative videos memory recall was improved and for positive words it was reduced. Emotional videos had no effect when presented during retrieval. These results suggest that in MDD, encountering emotional cues not only biases retrieval processes toward recalling more negative content, but rather fundamentally alters the depth of information processing, while not leading to a broad-spectrum recruitment of cognitive resources.

Despite the tight link between the visibility of the iris and pupil, the perceived effects of these two have been studied largely in isolation. We demonstrate, across two experimental studies, that the effects of perceived pupil size are dependent on the visibility of the iris. In a first study, our participants donated more and had more positive impressions of portraits of non-human primates when these were manipulated to appear having larger pupils. Post-hoc inspection of our data suggested that the difference was greater for species with more conspicuous irises. In a second study, we concomitantly manipulated iris brightness and pupil size. Brighter irises and larger pupils elicited greater donations. Participants rated photographs with brighter irises as cuter, more attractive and friendlier, but only when they had dilated pupils. Our results have methodological implications for studies manipulating eye appearance, and help interpret results from previous studies.

Empathy plays a fundamental role in successful social interactions. However, most tasks currently available for measuring empathy have limited ecological validity and therefore may not elicit true emotional responses in observers. To address this gap, we developed the Empathic Measure of True Emotion (EMOTE), the first emotion stimuli set to include footage of genuine positive and negative emotions unfolding in naturalistic contexts. We validated the EMOTE in a sample of 216 participants. The EMOTE demonstrated acceptable internal consistency, construct validity, and alternate forms reliability for both cognitive and affective empathy. We also found that, relative to conventional empathy measures, the EMOTE elicited stronger affective empathy ratings in observers, and the stimuli were rated higher in both genuineness and emotional intensity. Together, these findings demonstrate that the EMOTE is a reliable and valid measure of cognitive and affective empathy with enhanced ecological validity, providing a valuable new tool for measuring empathy in both clinical and research settings.

Emotional states are believed to broaden or to narrow the focus of attention. However, numerous inconsistent findings call for renewed efforts to understand the conditions under which such effects occur. We conducted a pair of high-powered web experiments. Emotional states were manipulated across valence categories and appraisal dimensions using autobiographical recall (Experiment 1) and emotional images (Experiment 2). Breadth of attention was assessed using the Navon task coupled with induction sensitivity and mouse tracking analyses. We did not find robust evidence for emotional effects on breadth of attention. Negative images led surprisingly to slightly broader attention in Experiment 2, but this may reflect the slow release of cognitive resources from preceding negative stimuli amplifying the global precedence effect. Breadth of attention also had very small positive relationships with goal-congruence appraisal in the first and control appraisal in the second experiment. We also found no evidence for moderation by mood or personality. Taken together, our findings add to the growing list of failures to observe emotional modulation of breadth of attention and call for continued efforts to chart the boundary conditions of these effects.

We are continuously exposed to what others think and feel about content online. How do others' evaluations shared in this medium influence our own beliefs and emotional responses? In two pre-registered studies, we investigated the social transmission of threat and safety evaluations in a paradigm that mimicked online social media platforms. In Study 1 (N = 103), participants viewed images and indicated how distressed they made them feel. Participants then categorised these images as threatening or safe for others to see, while seeing how "previous participants" ostensibly categorised them (these values were actually manipulated across images). We found that participants incorporated both peers' categorisations of the images and their own distress ratings when categorizing images as threatening or safe. Study 2 (N = 115) replicated these findings and further demonstrated that peers' categorisations shifted how distressed these images made them feel. Taken together, our results indicate that people integrate their own and others' experiences when exposed to emotional content and that social information can influence both our perceptions of things as threatening or safe, as well as our own emotional responses to them. Our findings provide replicable experimental evidence that social information is a powerful conduit for the transmission of affective evaluations and experiences.

Three studies were designed to explore a major criticism of sacrificial dilemmas, namely that their potential humorous aspects may distort moral decision-making. We collected moral responses (i.e. moral judgment and choice of action) but also asked participants to rate the funniness of moral dilemmas, in order to combine humour assessment and moral responses. In addition, the emotional responses to moral dilemmas were recorded for both men and women (including emotions related to humour), and the potential effect of individuals' need for humour was also considered. Overall, three main results were reported. Firstly, the dilemmas used in our studies were not rated as funny at all. Secondly, reading moral dilemmas increased negative emotions (i.e. sadness, disgust, guilt) and decreased positive emotions associated with humour (i.e. joy, amusement, and mirth), with gender effects since women experienced stronger negative emotions than men. Thirdly, funniness ratings of sacrificial dilemmas did not vary according to gender and need for humour. This series of studies does not report empirical evidence to support the humorous aspects of trolley-type dilemmas, but invites a more systematic examination of how sacrificial dilemmas are perceived by participants who have to produce moral responses.

Individuals high in depressive symptom severity show probability bias: they believe negative events are relatively probable, and positive events relatively improbable, compared to those with less severe symptoms. However, this has only ever been demonstrated using self-report measures, in which participants explicitly estimate events' probabilities: this leaves open the risk that "probability bias" is merely an artefact of response bias. We tested the veracity of probability bias using an indirect behavioural measure, based on a sentence-reading task. Study 1 tested 112 Turkish students; Study 2 tested 117 international users of online groups for people with depressive and anxiety disorders. As predicted, participants with higher depressive symptom scores responded relatively quickly to sentences stating negative events might occur, and relatively slowly to sentences stating positive events might occur, compared to those with lower scores. This effect was only marginal in Study 1, but reached significance in Study 2. However, contrary to predictions, this effect was not moderated by the probability level stated in the sentence. This makes our findings difficult to interpret, and we must present these studies as a failure to convincingly demonstrate depression-related probability bias. We hope this stimulates more work on the nature and veracity of probability bias.

The approach-avoidance task (AAT) probes tendencies contributing to unwanted behaviours, like excessive snacking, by measuring RT differences between approach and avoidance responses to different stimuli. It retrains such tendencies using repeated avoidance of appetitive stimuli and approach of healthy alternatives. The most common paradigm, the irrelevant-feature AAT, conceals these stimulus-response contingencies by requiring approach or avoidance based on features irrelevant to the tendencies (e.g. frame colour). Unfortunately, it is an unreliable measure and not always successful as a training, likely because the stimuli can be ignored. In the novel dual-feature AAT, the combination of stimulus and irrelevant feature determines responses: participants approach foods and avoid objects surrounded by frame A, and vice versa given frame B. We trained 219 online participants to approach fruit and avoid chocolate using active (7:1 stimulus-to-frame contingency) and sham (1:1 stimulus-to-frame contingency) versions of these two trainings. Compared to sham, active irrelevant-feature training was associated with more selection and desire to eat fruit, and active dual-feature training increased approach bias for fruit. Participants' perceived rate of approaching fruit versus chocolate correlated with many outcome measures, suggesting contingency awareness plays a major role in AAT training effectiveness, challenging implicit accounts. While the dual-feature paradigm shows potential, its high error rates, RTs, and difficulty mandate improvement.