Journal of Accounting & Economics最新文献

We combine U.S. Census data with SEC enforcement actions to examine employees' outcomes, such as wages and turnover, before, during, and after periods of fraudulent financial reporting. We find that fraud firms’ employees lose about 50% of cumulative annual wages, compared to a matched sample, and the separation rate is much higher after fraud periods. Yet, employment growth at fraud firms is positive during fraud periods; these firms overbuild and hire new, lower-paid employees concurrent with the fraud, unlike firms in distress which tend to contract. When the fraud is revealed, firms shed workers, unwinding this abnormal growth and resulting in most of the negative wage consequences. Wage outcomes are particularly unfavorable in thin labor markets, and lower-wage employees, though unlikely to have perpetrated the fraud, experience more severe wage losses compared to higher-wage employees.

Previous studies find mixed evidence on whether institutional investors exploit capital market anomalies. Examining a large sample of accounting-based anomalies, we find that institutions trade in the wrong direction of overreaction anomalies, but in the right direction of underreaction anomalies. These heterogenous trading patterns, rather than reflecting institutions' differential anomaly trading skills, can be simply explained by institutions’ tendency to trade in the same direction as the sentiment of news. Examining earnings news and a comprehensive sample of newswire releases, we find strong support for this explanation. Finally, institutional trading appears to exacerbate (mitigate) mispricing associated with overreaction (underreaction) anomalies.

Sell-side quantitative equity research analysts (Quants) conduct econometric analyses of stock returns to uncover market anomalies and assist equity analysts and institutional clients with stock selection. We present novel evidence that establishes their role in helping analysts and mutual fund clients discover market anomalies and capital markets evolve toward greater pricing efficiency. Specifically, we find that analysts and mutual fund clients with greater access to Quants make recommendations and trades that reveal greater knowledge of anomalous cross-sectional return predictability. More importantly, cross-sectional return predictability is weaker in stocks that have higher coverage (ownership) by analysts (mutual fund clients) with access to Quants, and strengthens when quasi-exogenous brokerage house closures reduce the availability of Quants.

We use a proprietary database with detailed, employee-specific compensation contract information for rank-and-file corporate accountants who are directly involved in the financial reporting process to assess their influence on their firms' financial reporting quality. Theory predicts that paying above-market wages can both attract employees with more human capital and subsequently encourage better performance. Consistent with audit committees structuring accountants' compensation to mitigate financial misreporting that might otherwise occur, we find that firms with relatively well-paid accountants tend to issue higher-quality financial reports. Moreover, this relationship is more pronounced when firms’ senior executives have stronger contractual incentives to misreport and when the audit committee is more independent from management.

Using labor supply shocks from the 150-Hour Rule, I find that a reduction in the labor supply of accountants increases audit firms' mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and the audit market concentration. These M&A deals connect audit firms serving clients in the same states and lead to greater industry specialization of the merging firms. Although both small and large auditors generally engage in labor supply–driven M&A deals, large audit firms’ engagement in M&A is restricted to markets with a tight supply of accounting labor. Attenuations of the labor supply restrictions tend to limit the heightened M&A activities and mitigate the rise in the audit-market concentration from the 150-Hour Rule. I conclude that labor supply reductions affect the boundaries of audit firms, potentially changing the structure of the entire audit market.

Prior research finds that auditors' social connections with their clients harms audit quality. We examine auditors' social connections with members of their clients' business community, a setting in which auditors' connections may improve audit quality. While social ties within a client's business community should improve auditor competency, they also threaten auditor independence. We test the effects of auditors' network connections on audit quality using data from China, where data on social connections and individual auditors are available. Auditors' business connections should be particularly beneficial in a relational economy like China, where clients heavily rely on social networks for contracting. We find that auditors with strong local business and government connections deliver higher quality audits as evidenced by fewer financial irregularities among their clients. Our findings are consistent with the improved competency that arises from auditors' business connections outweighing the potential costs of impaired auditor independence.