Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101819
Katherine Schipper
{"title":"Discussion of “Accounting standards and antidumping investigations” by Stephen Teng Sun, Shang-Jin Wei and Jin Xie","authors":"Katherine Schipper","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101819","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101819","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101819"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145521198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101815
Dain C. Donelson , Christian M. Hutzler , Adrienne Rhodes
This study examines how recent government antitrust enforcement against potentially illegal interlocking directorates (“competitor interlocks”) reshaped boards. After the first major enforcement announcement, competitor-interlocked directors were more likely than other directors to leave boards and were replaced by individuals with less industry experience. Further, newly appointed directors were less likely to form competitor interlocks. The resulting reduction in relevant board industry experience and competitor interlocks is likely to affect firm outcomes. In their advisory role, competitor-interlocked directors with more industry experience have historically produced higher profit margins, likely due to superior R&D investment advice. In their monitoring role, competitor-interlocked directors with greater industry experience are more likely to hold CEOs accountable for restatements and poor performance. Overall, our results highlight that corporate governance may be weakened if competitor-interlocked directors with substantial industry experience are replaced by directors without such experience.
{"title":"Does antitrust enforcement against interlocking directorates impair corporate governance?","authors":"Dain C. Donelson , Christian M. Hutzler , Adrienne Rhodes","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101815","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101815","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines how recent government antitrust enforcement against potentially illegal interlocking directorates (“competitor interlocks”) reshaped boards. After the first major enforcement announcement, competitor-interlocked directors were more likely than other directors to leave boards and were replaced by individuals with less industry experience. Further, newly appointed directors were less likely to form competitor interlocks. The resulting reduction in relevant board industry experience and competitor interlocks is likely to affect firm outcomes. In their advisory role, competitor-interlocked directors with more industry experience have historically produced higher profit margins, likely due to superior R&D investment advice. In their monitoring role, competitor-interlocked directors with greater industry experience are more likely to hold CEOs accountable for restatements and poor performance. Overall, our results highlight that corporate governance may be weakened if competitor-interlocked directors with substantial industry experience are replaced by directors without such experience.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101815"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145521200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101816
Mary Ellen Carter
Donelson, Hutzler, and Rhodes (this issue) examine the impact on firms’ corporate governance of increased government antitrust enforcement against competitor interlocking directors. While these directors could facilitate collusion among firms, raising antitrust concerns, they also bring crucial industry expertise that enhances corporate governance. The authors find enhanced enforcement led to voluntary reductions in these directors. Given that these directors are associated with improved firm performance, investment efficiency, and CEO monitoring, the authors suggest that this enforcement will impair corporate governance. I discuss concerns around the narrow definition of director experience that limits the interpretation of the findings. I also discuss several open questions raised by the study and the opportunity this study provides to contribute to research on common ownership. Throughout I propose questions that future research might explore which would enhance our understanding of competitor interlocking directorates.
{"title":"What director experience matters: A discussion of Donelson, Hutzler and Rhodes (2025)","authors":"Mary Ellen Carter","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101816","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101816","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Donelson, Hutzler, and Rhodes (this issue) examine the impact on firms’ corporate governance of increased government antitrust enforcement against competitor interlocking directors. While these directors could facilitate collusion among firms, raising antitrust concerns, they also bring crucial industry expertise that enhances corporate governance. The authors find enhanced enforcement led to voluntary reductions in these directors. Given that these directors are associated with improved firm performance, investment efficiency, and CEO monitoring, the authors suggest that this enforcement will impair corporate governance. I discuss concerns around the narrow definition of director experience that limits the interpretation of the findings. I also discuss several open questions raised by the study and the opportunity this study provides to contribute to research on common ownership. Throughout I propose questions that future research might explore which would enhance our understanding of competitor interlocking directorates.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101816"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144664956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101810
Stephen Teng Sun , Shang-Jin Wei , Jin Xie
We uncover a new real effect of harmonizing accounting standards on international trade: following a mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards, exporters experiencing a greater change in reporting requirements become more successful in defending against foreign antidumping cases. The effect is also stronger with better reporting enforcement and is robust to excluding exporters from non-market economies. We discuss channels through which accounting-standards globalization facilitates efficient trade by either mitigating importing countries’ protectionism or curtailing exporters’ dumping activities.
{"title":"Accounting standards and antidumping investigations","authors":"Stephen Teng Sun , Shang-Jin Wei , Jin Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101810","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101810","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We uncover a new real effect of harmonizing accounting standards on international trade: following a mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards, exporters experiencing a greater change in reporting requirements become more successful in defending against foreign antidumping cases. The effect is also stronger with better reporting enforcement and is robust to excluding exporters from non-market economies. We discuss channels through which accounting-standards globalization facilitates efficient trade by either mitigating importing countries’ protectionism or curtailing exporters’ dumping activities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101810"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145521199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101809
Harald J. Amberger , Jaron H. Wilde , Yuchen Wu
We exploit the staggered adoption of beneficial ownership registers in the EU to study (i) whether and how the requirement to disclose information on an entity's ultimate human owner (ownership transparency) shapes cross-border investment, (ii) whether ownership transparency deters “potentially illicit” versus “likely legitimate” activity, and (iii) which types of firms try to avoid ownership disclosure. We find that investment from non-EU financial havens into the EU declines significantly after countries adopt ownership registers. Public scrutiny and enforcement emerge as key factors shaping this decline. Further, potentially illicit actors do not appear to alter their investment behavior. Instead, they appear less likely to comply with the transparency regulation. Our findings provide insights relevant to regulation aimed at enhancing ownership transparency.
{"title":"Cross-border investment, deterrence, and compliance effects of ownership transparency","authors":"Harald J. Amberger , Jaron H. Wilde , Yuchen Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101809","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101809","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We exploit the staggered adoption of beneficial ownership registers in the EU to study (i) whether and how the requirement to disclose information on an entity's ultimate human owner (ownership transparency) shapes cross-border investment, (ii) whether ownership transparency deters “potentially illicit” versus “likely legitimate” activity, and (iii) which types of firms try to avoid ownership disclosure. We find that investment from non-EU financial havens into the EU declines significantly after countries adopt ownership registers. Public scrutiny and enforcement emerge as key factors shaping this decline. Further, potentially illicit actors do not appear to alter their investment behavior. Instead, they appear less likely to comply with the transparency regulation. Our findings provide insights relevant to regulation aimed at enhancing ownership transparency.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101809"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145521162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101821
Qiang Cheng, Pengkai Lin, Yue Zhao
In this paper, we use ChatGPT outages to provide early evidence on whether investors rely on generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) to perform professional tasks and the associated impact on stock price informativeness. We document a significant decline in stock trading volume during ChatGPT outages. The effect is stronger for firms with corporate news released immediately before or during the outages and for firms with higher ownership held by transient institutional investors. We then document declines in short-run price impact and return variance during the outage periods, consistent with reduced informed trading. Lastly, we document a positive effect of GenAI-assisted trading on long-run stock price informativeness. Overall, our findings indicate that a significant number of investors use ChatGPT in ways that influence their trading decisions and market outcomes. Future research can investigate the mechanisms underlying these GenAI effects and the potential risks of using GenAI for trading.
{"title":"Does generative AI facilitate investor Trading? Early evidence from ChatGPT outages","authors":"Qiang Cheng, Pengkai Lin, Yue Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101821","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101821","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we use ChatGPT outages to provide early evidence on whether investors rely on generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) to perform professional tasks and the associated impact on stock price informativeness. We document a significant decline in stock trading volume during ChatGPT outages. The effect is stronger for firms with corporate news released immediately before or during the outages and for firms with higher ownership held by transient institutional investors. We then document declines in short-run price impact and return variance during the outage periods, consistent with reduced informed trading. Lastly, we document a positive effect of GenAI-assisted trading on long-run stock price informativeness. Overall, our findings indicate that a significant number of investors use ChatGPT in ways that influence their trading decisions and market outcomes. Future research can investigate the mechanisms underlying these GenAI effects and the potential risks of using GenAI for trading.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101821"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144924020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101813
Jinhwan Kim , Terrence Tianshuo Shi , Rodrigo S. Verdi
We examine how judicial efficiency, defined as a court’s ability to resolve patent cases quickly and in a manner that is mutually agreeable to both parties in the lawsuit, impacts corporate innovation. To do so, we exploit the Patent Pilot Program (PPP) introduced by the U.S. Congress in 2011, which allowed judges with expertise and resources (as opposed to randomly selected judges) to preside over more patent cases to facilitate efficient ruling. We find firms headquartered in counties subject to the PPP increase patent-based innovation by 6.9%, relative to firms in counties not under the program. The increase is driven both by greater investments in R&D as well as firms strategically transitioning their trade secrets to patents. Moreover, patents filed after the PPP exhibit higher patent disclosure quality, consistent with the PPP providing a reliable enforcement mechanism that curbs competitors from illegally exploiting patent information. Our results are concentrated among firms with high legal costs and uncertainty: firms that engage in innovation with “fuzzy boundaries”, that have high litigation risk, and that are small and private. Probing further, we find that small private firms are significantly better at safeguarding their intellectual property (IP) using the judicial system, which in turn, helps them attract more venture capital investments after the PPP. Taken together, our findings underscore the important role of judicial efficiency in facilitating innovation and IP protection.
{"title":"The innovation consequences of judicial efficiency","authors":"Jinhwan Kim , Terrence Tianshuo Shi , Rodrigo S. Verdi","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101813","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101813","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine how judicial efficiency, defined as a court’s ability to resolve patent cases quickly and in a manner that is mutually agreeable to both parties in the lawsuit, impacts corporate innovation. To do so, we exploit the Patent Pilot Program (PPP) introduced by the U.S. Congress in 2011, which allowed judges with expertise and resources (as opposed to randomly selected judges) to preside over more patent cases to facilitate efficient ruling. We find firms headquartered in counties subject to the PPP increase patent-based innovation by 6.9%, relative to firms in counties not under the program. The increase is driven both by greater investments in R&D as well as firms strategically transitioning their trade secrets to patents. Moreover, patents filed after the PPP exhibit higher patent disclosure quality, consistent with the PPP providing a reliable enforcement mechanism that curbs competitors from illegally exploiting patent information. Our results are concentrated among firms with high legal costs and uncertainty: firms that engage in innovation with “fuzzy boundaries”, that have high litigation risk, and that are small and private. Probing further, we find that small private firms are significantly better at safeguarding their intellectual property (IP) using the judicial system, which in turn, helps them attract more venture capital investments after the PPP. Taken together, our findings underscore the important role of judicial efficiency in facilitating innovation and IP protection.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101813"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145521201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101814
Thomas Rauter
Amberger, Wilde, and Wu (2025, AWW) examine the impact of EU beneficial ownership transparency (BOT) regulation on cross-border investment. They find that BOT is associated with reductions in investments from non-EU financial havens into the EU and that BOT unintentionally discourages legitimate investments without deterring illicit actors. My discussion evaluates AWW's evidence, positions the paper within the existing literature, and discusses its contributions. I particularly focus on challenges in measuring illicit activities and the impact of voluntary FDI data reporting by EU countries. I also assess how privacy concerns and recent legal decisions have shaped the evolving landscape of beneficial ownership mandates and how they may affect the public scrutiny mechanism going forward. To contextualize the paper's findings, I provide new survey evidence on private firms' disclosure practices and interview-based insights into the practical use of BOT registries. I conclude with suggestions for future research.
{"title":"The promises and pitfalls of mandated ownership transparency: A discussion of Amberger, Wilde, and Wu (2025)","authors":"Thomas Rauter","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101814","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101814","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Amberger, Wilde, and Wu (2025, AWW) examine the impact of EU beneficial ownership transparency (BOT) regulation on cross-border investment. They find that BOT is associated with reductions in investments from non-EU financial havens into the EU and that BOT unintentionally discourages legitimate investments without deterring illicit actors. My discussion evaluates AWW's evidence, positions the paper within the existing literature, and discusses its contributions. I particularly focus on challenges in measuring illicit activities and the impact of voluntary FDI data reporting by EU countries. I also assess how privacy concerns and recent legal decisions have shaped the evolving landscape of beneficial ownership mandates and how they may affect the public scrutiny mechanism going forward. To contextualize the paper's findings, I provide new survey evidence on private firms' disclosure practices and interview-based insights into the practical use of BOT registries. I conclude with suggestions for future research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101814"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144621771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101807
Stephen G. Ryan
Basu, Roychowdhury, and Sinha (BRS, this issue) examine effects of U.S. bank regulators’ provision of guidance regarding the incorporation of the current expected credit loss (CECL) approach in capital regulation two and a half years after the issuance of ASU 2016-13. BRS argue and provide evidence that, for CECL-adopting banks and their borrowers in syndicated corporate loans, this lagged provision of guidance adversely affected (1) the amounts and interest rates for more affected term loan As (TLAs) typically held by originating banks compared to less affected term loan Bs (TLBs) typically sold to institutional lenders; and (2) investments by TLA-dependent borrowers compared to other borrowers. In this discussion, I highlight BRS’s importance and attractive research-design features, making a few criticisms and suggestions. I discuss the lack of alternatives to the provision of lagged guidance and the limited generalizability of the study’s setting, approach, and results beyond banks and ASU 2016-13.
{"title":"Discussion of “real effects of lagged guidance from prudential regulators on CECL”","authors":"Stephen G. Ryan","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101807","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101807","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Basu, Roychowdhury, and Sinha (BRS, this issue) examine effects of U.S. bank regulators’ provision of guidance regarding the incorporation of the current expected credit loss (CECL) approach in capital regulation two and a half years after the issuance of ASU 2016-13. BRS argue and provide evidence that, for CECL-adopting banks and their borrowers in syndicated corporate loans, this lagged provision of guidance adversely affected (1) the amounts and interest rates for more affected term loan As (TLAs) typically held by originating banks compared to less affected term loan Bs (TLBs) typically sold to institutional lenders; and (2) investments by TLA-dependent borrowers compared to other borrowers. In this discussion, I highlight BRS’s importance and attractive research-design features, making a few criticisms and suggestions. I discuss the lack of alternatives to the provision of lagged guidance and the limited generalizability of the study’s setting, approach, and results beyond banks and ASU 2016-13.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101807"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145521163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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