Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101718
Bradford F. Hepfer , Hannah W. Judd , Sarah C. Rice
Using the IPO setting, we test whether firms signal the quality of their investments in innovation activities by claiming R&D tax credits. We find the presence and amount of the R&D credit are each associated with lower information asymmetry and with higher investor demand at IPO. Conservatively, we estimate that sample firms realize additional IPO proceeds of 32–45 percent of their creditable R&D expenditures, indicating economically significant non-tax benefits associated with the R&D credit. We verify the R&D credit signal by showing its positive association with firms’ future patenting activity, patent citations, and post-IPO stock returns. Results from these tests are concentrated among firms limited in their ability to obtain tax benefits from R&D credits, consistent with the R&D credit providing nontax benefits as a signal of innovation investment quality.
{"title":"Signaling innovation: The nontax benefits of claiming R&D tax credits","authors":"Bradford F. Hepfer , Hannah W. Judd , Sarah C. Rice","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101718","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101718","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using the IPO setting, we test whether firms signal the quality of their investments in innovation activities by claiming R&D tax credits. We find the presence and amount of the R&D credit are each associated with lower information asymmetry and with higher investor demand at IPO. Conservatively, we estimate that sample firms realize additional IPO proceeds of 32–45 percent of their creditable R&D expenditures, indicating economically significant non-tax benefits associated with the R&D credit. We verify the R&D credit signal by showing its positive association with firms’ future patenting activity, patent citations, and post-IPO stock returns. Results from these tests are concentrated among firms limited in their ability to obtain tax benefits from R&D credits, consistent with the R&D credit providing nontax benefits as a signal of innovation investment quality.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101718"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143508659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101709
Ana Albuquerque , Mary Ellen Carter , Zhe (Michael) Guo , Luann J. Lynch
This paper examines complexity in CEO compensation contracts. We develop a measure of compensation complexity and provide empirical evidence that complexity has increased substantially over time. We document that complexity results not only from factors reflecting efficient contracting, but also from external pressures from compensation consultants, institutional investors, proxy advisors, and attempts to benchmark to peers, with these external factors having greater impact in more recent years. Examining consequences of contract complexity, we find an association with lower future firm performance that is related to the influence of external factors on compensation design. We further find this relation is partially mitigated when a contract's performance metrics are more highly correlated, consistent with information processing costs hampering decision-making. Collectively, these findings confirm concerns raised by investors and the media regarding compensation complexity and can inform boards in their design of CEO pay packages.
{"title":"Complexity of CEO compensation packages","authors":"Ana Albuquerque , Mary Ellen Carter , Zhe (Michael) Guo , Luann J. Lynch","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101709","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101709","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines complexity in CEO compensation contracts. We develop a measure of compensation complexity and provide empirical evidence that complexity has increased substantially over time. We document that complexity results not only from factors reflecting efficient contracting, but also from external pressures from compensation consultants, institutional investors, proxy advisors, and attempts to benchmark to peers, with these external factors having greater impact in more recent years. Examining consequences of contract complexity, we find an association with lower future firm performance that is related to the influence of external factors on compensation design. We further find this relation is partially mitigated when a contract's performance metrics are more highly correlated, consistent with information processing costs hampering decision-making. Collectively, these findings confirm concerns raised by investors and the media regarding compensation complexity and can inform boards in their design of CEO pay packages.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101709"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141556930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101707
Kathy Rupar , Sean Wang , Hayoung Yoon
We find that the adverse impact of bad news on analysts’ valuations is 57% larger when the CEO is Non-White, resulting in more pessimistic valuations for Non-White CEOs relative to their White counterparts. Non-White CEO firms are more likely to surpass analysts’ valuation targets in the subsequent 12 months, suggesting that this racial gap lacks economic justification. To provide further evidence of a racial bias: (1) we triangulate our empirical findings with corroborating evidence from a controlled experiment and (2) we provide evidence that analysts’ valuation disparities towards Non-White CEO firms become larger when race relations are worse. Increases in CEO familiarity attenuate these disparities, suggesting the bias we document appears to be subconscious. Our findings suggest that resources allocated towards educating a firm’s stakeholders about the potential impact of implicit racial biases and increasing self-awareness may be impactful in promoting equality within capital markets.
{"title":"Do sell-side analysts react too pessimistically to bad news for minority-led firms? Evidence from target price valuations","authors":"Kathy Rupar , Sean Wang , Hayoung Yoon","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101707","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101707","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We find that the adverse impact of bad news on analysts’ valuations is 57% larger when the CEO is Non-White, resulting in more pessimistic valuations for Non-White CEOs relative to their White counterparts. Non-White CEO firms are more likely to surpass analysts’ valuation targets in the subsequent 12 months, suggesting that this racial gap lacks economic justification. To provide further evidence of a racial bias: (1) we triangulate our empirical findings with corroborating evidence from a controlled experiment and (2) we provide evidence that analysts’ valuation disparities towards Non-White CEO firms become larger when race relations are worse. Increases in CEO familiarity attenuate these disparities, suggesting the bias we document appears to be subconscious. Our findings suggest that resources allocated towards educating a firm’s stakeholders about the potential impact of implicit racial biases and increasing self-awareness may be impactful in promoting equality within capital markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101707"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141931485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101732
Michael Minnis , Andrew G. Sutherland , Felix W. Vetter
Using a dataset covering 3 million commercial borrower financial statements, we document a substantial, nearly monotonic decline in banks’ use of attested financial statements (AFS) in lending over the past two decades. Two market forces help explain this trend. First, technological advances provide lenders with access to a growing array of borrower information sources that can substitute for AFS. Second, banks are increasingly competing with nonbank lenders that rely less on AFS in screening and monitoring. Our results illustrate how technology adoption and changes in credit market structure can render AFS less efficient than alternative information sources for screening and monitoring.
{"title":"Financial statements not required","authors":"Michael Minnis , Andrew G. Sutherland , Felix W. Vetter","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101732","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101732","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using a dataset covering 3 million commercial borrower financial statements, we document a substantial, nearly monotonic decline in banks’ use of attested financial statements (AFS) in lending over the past two decades. Two market forces help explain this trend. First, technological advances provide lenders with access to a growing array of borrower information sources that can substitute for AFS. Second, banks are increasingly competing with nonbank lenders that rely less on AFS in screening and monitoring. Our results illustrate how technology adoption and changes in credit market structure can render AFS less efficient than alternative information sources for screening and monitoring.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 2","pages":"Article 101732"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101720
Stephen Glaeser, Mark Lang
We review the accounting literature on innovation, focusing on the economic attributes of innovation that collectively differentiate innovation from other assets: novelty, nonrivalry, and partial excludability. These attributes help innovation drive economic growth but create unique information-based challenges that accounting information and researchers are well suited to address. We discuss the definition and measurement of innovation and highlight common mistakes researchers make when measuring innovation and when using sources of plausibly exogenous variation. We then review the accounting literatures on the disclosure, management, financial reporting, taxation, and contracting and financing of innovation. For each of these literatures we identify challenges and opportunities for future research.
{"title":"Measuring innovation and navigating its unique information issues: A review of the accounting literature on innovation","authors":"Stephen Glaeser, Mark Lang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101720","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101720","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We review the accounting literature on innovation, focusing on the economic attributes of innovation that collectively differentiate innovation from other assets: novelty, nonrivalry, and partial excludability. These attributes help innovation drive economic growth but create unique information-based challenges that accounting information and researchers are well suited to address. We discuss the definition and measurement of innovation and highlight common mistakes researchers make when measuring innovation and when using sources of plausibly exogenous variation. We then review the accounting literatures on the disclosure, management, financial reporting, taxation, and contracting and financing of innovation. For each of these literatures we identify challenges and opportunities for future research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 2","pages":"Article 101720"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141852422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101717
Atif Ellahie
A signal that identifies asset pricing bubbles would be valuable so investors could reposition their portfolios to weather the bubble, yet ex ante bubble identification has proven illusory. Arif and Sul (2024) study whether industry-level investment in net operating asset (NOA) accruals is an ex ante accounting-based signal that predicts bubbles. Using industry-level price run-ups across 49 countries, they find that NOA accruals predict a higher likelihood of a future crash, lower future returns, and larger analyst forecast errors, especially following run-up periods. The authors attribute these patterns to sentiment-driven overinvestment. My discussion summarizes the contributions of Arif and Sul's findings to the asset pricing bubbles, behavioral finance, and aggregate accruals literatures. I also outline empirical challenges faced by studies investigating bubbles and recommend approaches to further strengthen inferences. Finally, I propose opportunities for future research to integrate deeper accounting knowledge into bubble research.
一个能识别资产定价泡沫的信号将是非常有价值的，这样投资者就可以调整投资组合以抵御泡沫，然而事实证明事前识别泡沫是不切实际的。Arif 和 Sul（2024 年）研究了行业层面的净运营资产（NOA）应计投资是否是一种能预测泡沫的事前会计信号。他们利用 49 个国家的行业级价格上涨情况，发现净运营资产应计预测了未来崩盘的更高可能性、更低的未来回报率和更大的分析师预测误差，尤其是在价格上涨时期之后。作者将这些模式归因于情绪驱动的过度投资。我的讨论总结了 Arif 和 Sul 的发现对资产定价泡沫、行为金融学和总应计项目文献的贡献。我还概述了研究泡沫所面临的经验挑战，并提出了进一步加强推论的方法。最后，我提出了未来研究的机会，以便将更深层次的会计知识融入泡沫研究中。
{"title":"Accounting for bubbles: A discussion of Arif and Sul (2024)","authors":"Atif Ellahie","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101717","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101717","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A signal that identifies asset pricing bubbles would be valuable so investors could reposition their portfolios to weather the bubble, yet ex ante bubble identification has proven illusory. Arif and Sul (2024) study whether industry-level investment in net operating asset (NOA) accruals is an ex ante accounting-based signal that predicts bubbles. Using industry-level price run-ups across 49 countries, they find that NOA accruals predict a higher likelihood of a future crash, lower future returns, and larger analyst forecast errors, especially following run-up periods. The authors attribute these patterns to sentiment-driven overinvestment. My discussion summarizes the contributions of Arif and Sul's findings to the asset pricing bubbles, behavioral finance, and aggregate accruals literatures. I also outline empirical challenges faced by studies investigating bubbles and recommend approaches to further strengthen inferences. Finally, I propose opportunities for future research to integrate deeper accounting knowledge into bubble research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 2","pages":"Article 101717"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142704284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101711
Salman Arif , Edward Sul
Economists have long observed that stock price bubbles are associated with corporate overinvestment. We study the ex-ante identification of bubbles (i.e. stock price booms followed by busts) by examining industry-level investments in net operating asset (NOA) accruals and stock returns for 49 countries around the world. Consistent with overinvestment in operating assets being key to bubble formation, we document five findings: (1) NOA accruals positively forecast the eventual crash of an industry price run-up; (2) NOA accruals negatively forecast stock returns following a run-up; (3) NOA accruals are positively associated with investor sentiment; (4) higher NOA accruals forecast more disappointing earnings relative to analysts’ expectations for run-up industries; and (5) NOA accruals are sharply stronger predictors of crashes, returns and analyst forecast errors following run-ups compared to other periods. Our results provide the first evidence that accounting information identifies stock price bubbles and suggest that financial statements are important for detecting and anticipating industry- and market-level inefficiencies.
{"title":"Does accounting information identify bubbles for Fama? Evidence from accruals","authors":"Salman Arif , Edward Sul","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101711","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101711","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Economists have long observed that stock price bubbles are associated with corporate overinvestment. We study the ex-ante identification of bubbles (i.e. stock price booms followed by busts) by examining industry-level investments in net operating asset (NOA) accruals and stock returns for 49 countries around the world. Consistent with overinvestment in operating assets being key to bubble formation, we document five findings: (1) NOA accruals positively forecast the eventual crash of an industry price run-up; (2) NOA accruals negatively forecast stock returns following a run-up; (3) NOA accruals are positively associated with investor sentiment; (4) higher NOA accruals forecast more disappointing earnings relative to analysts’ expectations for run-up industries; and (5) NOA accruals are sharply stronger predictors of crashes, returns and analyst forecast errors following run-ups compared to other periods. Our results provide the first evidence that accounting information identifies stock price bubbles and suggest that financial statements are important for detecting and anticipating industry- and market-level inefficiencies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 2","pages":"Article 101711"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141688738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101736
Anne Beyer, Junyoung Jeong
We discuss Feng et al. (2024), which studies a dynamic model of delegated investment. The paper provides novel insights into the optimal contract between a principal and an agent who obtains private information about both the timing and profitability of investment opportunities. While the analytical analysis provides interesting findings, we have concerns about the validity of the paper’s empirical predictions. We extend the “conceptual” and “operational” levels of Libby boxes by adding an “analytical” level to offer a tool for assessing and developing the link between theoretical models and empirical tests.
{"title":"The unicorn quest: Deriving empirical predictions from theory","authors":"Anne Beyer, Junyoung Jeong","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101736","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101736","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We discuss Feng et al. (2024), which studies a dynamic model of delegated investment. The paper provides novel insights into the optimal contract between a principal and an agent who obtains private information about both the timing and profitability of investment opportunities. While the analytical analysis provides interesting findings, we have concerns about the validity of the paper’s empirical predictions. We extend the “conceptual” and “operational” levels of Libby boxes by adding an “analytical” level to offer a tool for assessing and developing the link between theoretical models and empirical tests.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 2","pages":"Article 101736"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142144479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101738
Felix Zhiyu Feng , Robin Yifan Luo , Beatrice Michaeli
We study the optimal dynamic contract that provides incentives for an agent (e.g., SPAC sponsor, VC general partner, CTO) to exploit investment opportunities/targets that arrive randomly over time via a costly search process. The agent is privy to the arrival as well as to the quality of the target and can take advantage of this for rent extraction during the search process and the ensuing production. The optimal contract provides the agent with incentives for timely and truthful reporting via a time-varying threshold for investment and an internal charge for the time spent on search. In the equilibrium, as time elapses, the charge becomes progressively higher while the investment threshold is progressively lower, resulting in overinvestment at a time-varying degree. Our model generates empirically testable predictions regarding investments (such as M&As, hedge fund activism, VC investing, SPACs, and internal innovations), linking the degree of overinvestment to observable firm and industry characteristics.
{"title":"In search of a unicorn: Dynamic agency with endogenous investment opportunities","authors":"Felix Zhiyu Feng , Robin Yifan Luo , Beatrice Michaeli","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101738","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101738","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the optimal dynamic contract that provides incentives for an agent (e.g., SPAC sponsor, VC general partner, CTO) to exploit investment opportunities/targets that arrive randomly over time via a costly search process. The agent is privy to the arrival as well as to the quality of the target and can take advantage of this for rent extraction during the search process and the ensuing production. The optimal contract provides the agent with incentives for timely and truthful reporting via a time-varying threshold for investment and an internal charge for the time spent on search. In the equilibrium, as time elapses, the charge becomes progressively higher while the investment threshold is progressively lower, resulting in overinvestment at a time-varying degree. Our model generates empirically testable predictions regarding investments (such as M&As, hedge fund activism, VC investing, SPACs, and internal innovations), linking the degree of overinvestment to observable firm and industry characteristics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 2","pages":"Article 101738"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142144477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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