Pub Date : 2025-08-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101798
Ingolf Dittmann , Amy Yazhu Li , Stefan Obernberger , Jiaqi (Jacky) Zheng
We examine whether CEOs use share repurchases to sell their equity at inflated prices. We document that share repurchases, like equity-based compensation, are affected by the corporate calendar—the firm's schedule of earnings announcements and insider trading restrictions. The corporate calendar can fully explain why share repurchases and equity-based compensation coincide. The alignment with the corporate calendar is stricter in firms with strong internal governance or high external monitoring. When CEOs sell equity, firms are actually less likely to repurchase. Our findings reconcile earlier studies and highlight the importance of the corporate calendar for the timing of share repurchases.
{"title":"Equity-based compensation and the timing of share repurchases: the role of the corporate calendar","authors":"Ingolf Dittmann , Amy Yazhu Li , Stefan Obernberger , Jiaqi (Jacky) Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101798","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101798","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine whether CEOs use share repurchases to sell their equity at inflated prices. We document that share repurchases, like equity-based compensation, are affected by the corporate calendar—the firm's schedule of earnings announcements and insider trading restrictions. The corporate calendar can fully explain why share repurchases and equity-based compensation coincide. The alignment with the corporate calendar is stricter in firms with strong internal governance or high external monitoring. When CEOs sell equity, firms are actually less likely to repurchase. Our findings reconcile earlier studies and highlight the importance of the corporate calendar for the timing of share repurchases.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101798"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143903124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101799
Laura Griffin , John McInnis
Roughly two decades ago, standard setters mandated recognition of two controversial expenses: stock-based compensation (SBC) and amortization of intangibles from acquisitions (AMT). Today, most firms “undo” GAAP by excluding these recurring expenses from earnings as part of their non-GAAP reporting. Do investors agree? Using short-window returns around quarterly earnings announcements, we find investors react similarly to unexpected SBC/AMT, regardless of firms' exclusion reporting. Further, among excluders, earnings that include SBC or AMT explain investor reaction better than earnings stripped of these items. Thus, these excluded expenses are an important exception to the well-known regularity that investors find non-GAAP earnings more useful than GAAP earnings. Additional tests reveal that exclusion is not informative about future persistence. Overall, our findings suggest that, in general, investors ignore firms’ exclusion of recurring expenses, which may offer reassurance to standard setters.
{"title":"Gone but not forgotten: Investor reaction to “excluded” recurring expenses","authors":"Laura Griffin , John McInnis","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101799","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101799","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Roughly two decades ago, standard setters mandated recognition of two controversial expenses: stock-based compensation (SBC) and amortization of intangibles from acquisitions (AMT). Today, most firms “undo” GAAP by excluding these recurring expenses from earnings as part of their non-GAAP reporting. Do investors agree? Using short-window returns around quarterly earnings announcements, we find investors react similarly to unexpected SBC/AMT, regardless of firms' exclusion reporting. Further, among excluders, earnings that include SBC or AMT explain investor reaction better than earnings stripped of these items. Thus, these excluded expenses are an important exception to the well-known regularity that investors find non-GAAP earnings more useful than GAAP earnings. Additional tests reveal that exclusion is not informative about future persistence. Overall, our findings suggest that, in general, investors ignore firms’ exclusion of recurring expenses, which may offer reassurance to standard setters.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101799"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144887009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101756
Lisa Hillmann , Martin Jacob
This paper examines the corporate investment effect of a time limit on the use of net operating losses (NOLs). We predict that when countries limit the use of NOLs to a few years instead of allowing indefinite use, managers of loss-making firms have an incentive to increase investments to utilize NOLs before they expire. Using exogenous shocks to profitability from two earthquakes in Italy and variation in the tax treatment of NOLs over time, we find support for this prediction: when the use of NOLs is time-restricted, firms facing losses increase investment. Moreover, this effect is more significant for firms with shorter investment horizons and those in more profitable industries. We provide external validity for this finding using a large panel of firms from European Union countries exploiting variation in tax regimes. These results indicate that restricting loss offsets can increase investments of loss-making firms.
{"title":"The effect of limited tax loss carryforwards on corporate investment","authors":"Lisa Hillmann , Martin Jacob","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101756","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101756","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the corporate investment effect of a time limit on the use of net operating losses (NOLs). We predict that when countries limit the use of NOLs to a few years instead of allowing indefinite use, managers of loss-making firms have an incentive to increase investments to utilize NOLs before they expire. Using exogenous shocks to profitability from two earthquakes in Italy and variation in the tax treatment of NOLs over time, we find support for this prediction: when the use of NOLs is time-restricted, firms facing losses increase investment. Moreover, this effect is more significant for firms with shorter investment horizons and those in more profitable industries. We provide external validity for this finding using a large panel of firms from European Union countries exploiting variation in tax regimes. These results indicate that restricting loss offsets can increase investments of loss-making firms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101756"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144887351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101781
João Granja , Fabian Nagel
We use data from TransUnion, a large U.S. credit bureau covering millions of individual consumer loans, to examine the transition to the Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) accounting standard and to provide novel evidence about the impact that raising reserve requirements has on banks’ pricing and lending decisions in the U.S. consumer lending market. We find that greater reserve requirements following the adoption of CECL induce a statistically significant but economically moderate increase in loan interest rates. The effects are more pronounced for weakly-capitalized banks and even more so for underprivileged individuals borrowing from weakly-capitalized banks. Our evidence informs the ongoing policy debate between standard setters and members of the financial industry about the potential effects of CECL on credit markets.
{"title":"Current Expected Credit Losses and consumer loans","authors":"João Granja , Fabian Nagel","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101781","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101781","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We use data from TransUnion, a large U.S. credit bureau covering millions of individual consumer loans, to examine the transition to the Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) accounting standard and to provide novel evidence about the impact that raising reserve requirements<span><span> has on banks’ pricing and lending decisions in the U.S. consumer lending market. We find that greater reserve requirements following the adoption of CECL induce a statistically significant but economically moderate increase in loan interest rates. The effects are more pronounced for weakly-capitalized banks and even more so for underprivileged individuals borrowing from weakly-capitalized banks. Our evidence informs the ongoing policy debate between standard setters and members of the financial </span>industry about the potential effects of CECL on credit markets.</span></div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101781"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143678332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101782
Jeremy Bertomeu , Yupeng Lin , Yibin Liu , Zhenghui Ni
This paper explores how the emergence of generative artificial intelligence is reshaping the information environment in capital markets. Leveraging an unexpected ban on ChatGPT in Italy, we examine its impact on the information processing capabilities of market participants. We employ metrics for AI-generated text detection to show that the ban coincides with decreased AI usage by domestic financial analysts and fewer earnings forecasts issued relative to foreign analysts covering the same firm. The negative effects are more pronounced among analysts whose pre-ban reports are more consistent with AI use or analysts with a technical background. The ban also diminishes forecast accuracy, increases reliance on industry-specific information, and reduces information efficiency. Furthermore, investor reactions to earnings announcements become more pronounced, and bid–ask spreads widen, reflecting lower market efficiency.
{"title":"The impact of generative AI on information processing: Evidence from the ban of ChatGPT in Italy","authors":"Jeremy Bertomeu , Yupeng Lin , Yibin Liu , Zhenghui Ni","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101782","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101782","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores how the emergence of generative artificial intelligence is reshaping the information environment in capital markets. Leveraging an unexpected ban on ChatGPT in Italy, we examine its impact on the information processing<span> capabilities of market participants. We employ metrics for AI-generated text detection to show that the ban coincides with decreased AI usage by domestic financial analysts and fewer earnings forecasts issued relative to foreign analysts covering the same firm. The negative effects are more pronounced among analysts whose pre-ban reports are more consistent with AI use or analysts with a technical background. The ban also diminishes forecast accuracy, increases reliance on industry-specific information, and reduces information efficiency. Furthermore, investor reactions to earnings announcements become more pronounced, and bid–ask spreads widen, reflecting lower market efficiency.</span></div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101782"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144887087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101797
Christine Cuny , Ken Li , Anya Nakhmurina , Edward M. Watts
This paper examines which municipal disclosures provide informational value to investors. Using the entire universe of post-issuance financial and event disclosures from 2009 to 2022, we find that most municipal bonds do not trade in the weeks following a disclosure. However, some disclosures do provide enough new information to increase trading. Investors trade more on credit-relevant disclosures, such as adverse credit event disclosures, and less on required annual financial statements. Trading after disclosures also increases more when a bond is large or risky. Moreover, we find that credit rating agencies respond to disclosures, lending support to the idea that some disclosures have informational value. In further analyses, we find that trading before the disclosure, lack of timeliness, illiquidity, and information processing constraints contribute to the limited trading on the average disclosure. The findings suggest that reconsidering a one-size-fits-all approach to regulating post-issuance municipal disclosures may be worthwhile.
{"title":"Muni Disclosure: All talk and no trade?","authors":"Christine Cuny , Ken Li , Anya Nakhmurina , Edward M. Watts","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101797","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101797","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines which municipal disclosures provide informational value to investors. Using the entire universe of post-issuance financial and event disclosures from 2009 to 2022, we find that most municipal bonds do not trade in the weeks following a disclosure. However, some disclosures do provide enough new information to increase trading. Investors trade more on credit-relevant disclosures, such as adverse credit event disclosures, and less on required annual financial statements. Trading after disclosures also increases more when a bond is large or risky. Moreover, we find that credit rating agencies respond to disclosures, lending support to the idea that some disclosures have informational value. In further analyses, we find that trading before the disclosure, lack of timeliness, illiquidity, and information processing constraints contribute to the limited trading on the average disclosure. The findings suggest that reconsidering a one-size-fits-all approach to regulating post-issuance municipal disclosures may be worthwhile.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101797"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143903139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101783
Brian Bratten , Meng Huang , Nicole Thorne Jenkins , Hong Xie
We examine the effect of disclosure requirements on managers' stock repurchase decisions. In 2003, the SEC amended Rule 10b-18, significantly increasing the disclosure requirements for and transparency of stock repurchases for all issuers. While stock repurchases are often used by firms to efficiently return capital to shareholders, they can also be used opportunistically to increase earnings per share. We find that the 2003 SEC amendment enables investors to detect and discount opportunistic repurchases, curtails the extent to which firms use opportunistic repurchases, and reduces or eliminates the negative real effects stemming from opportunistic repurchases (reduced employment, reduced capital expenditures, and reduced R&D expenditures). Our evidence suggests that disclosures aimed at increasing the transparency of firms’ activities can significantly reduce the extent to which firms use these activities opportunistically to manage earnings, thereby reducing the accompanying real consequences of opportunistic behavior.
{"title":"Mandatory disclosures and opportunism: Evidence from repurchases","authors":"Brian Bratten , Meng Huang , Nicole Thorne Jenkins , Hong Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101783","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101783","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the effect of disclosure requirements on managers' stock repurchase decisions. In 2003, the SEC amended Rule 10b-18, significantly increasing the disclosure requirements for and transparency of stock repurchases for all issuers. While stock repurchases are often used by firms to efficiently return capital to shareholders, they can also be used opportunistically to increase earnings per share. We find that the 2003 SEC amendment enables investors to detect and discount opportunistic repurchases, curtails the extent to which firms use opportunistic repurchases, and reduces or eliminates the negative real effects stemming from opportunistic repurchases (reduced employment, reduced capital expenditures, and reduced R&D expenditures). Our evidence suggests that disclosures aimed at increasing the transparency of firms’ activities can significantly reduce the extent to which firms use these activities opportunistically to manage earnings, thereby reducing the accompanying real consequences of opportunistic behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101783"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143744706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ratings shopping is a well-documented cause for ratings inflation by credit rating agencies (CRAs). Its unobservability makes it difficult for market participants to undo it. In this paper, we exploit a unique regulation in India that requires CRAs to disclose ratings that were solicited but were eventually rejected by issuers. This regulation, which aims to enhance the transparency in the ratings process, allows us to empirically examine whether these disclosures influence ratings shopping and, consequently, ratings inflation. We find that the disclosure requirements result in an increase in the incidence of future downgrades and type 1 errors and a decrease in the occurrence of type 2 errors. These results are consistent with the view that the enhanced disclosure requirement did not reduce shopping and instead led to unintended consequences, such as an increase in implicit shopping, where issuers selectively engage lenient CRAs to obtain favorable ratings.
{"title":"Does observability of ratings shopping improve ratings quality?","authors":"Sanjay Kallapur , Abdul Khizer , Hariom Manchiraju , Rajesh Vijayaraghavan","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101800","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101800","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Ratings shopping is a well-documented cause for ratings inflation by credit rating agencies (CRAs). Its unobservability makes it difficult for market participants to undo it. In this paper, we exploit a unique regulation in India that requires CRAs to disclose ratings that were solicited but were eventually rejected by issuers. This regulation, which aims to enhance the transparency in the ratings process, allows us to empirically examine whether these disclosures influence ratings shopping and, consequently, ratings inflation. We find that the disclosure requirements result in an increase in the incidence of future downgrades and type 1 errors and a decrease in the occurrence of type 2 errors. These results are consistent with the view that the enhanced disclosure requirement did not reduce shopping and instead led to unintended consequences, such as an increase in implicit shopping, where issuers selectively engage lenient CRAs to obtain favorable ratings.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101800"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144133752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101769
Matthias Breuer , Christian Leuz , Steven Vanhaverbeke
We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe's regulation, we find that forcing firms to disclose financial statements reduces the number of innovating firms and the average firm's innovation spending, but it does not reduce industry-wide total innovation spending. Our results suggest that the regulation imposes proprietary costs on firms, which discourages innovation activity, especially by smaller firms. We also show that the regulation provides positive information spillovers to other firms (e.g., competitors, suppliers, and customers), especially larger ones. We complement our analysis with alternative innovation measures, including patents, and corroborate the results with an analysis of reporting changes due to an enforcement reform in Germany. In sum, the European reporting regulation has aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation. Importantly, it appears to concentrate innovative activities among fewer, mostly larger firms, which could reflect institutional features of our setting or more general economic forces.
{"title":"Reporting regulation and corporate innovation","authors":"Matthias Breuer , Christian Leuz , Steven Vanhaverbeke","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101769","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101769","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe's regulation, we find that forcing firms to disclose financial statements reduces the number of innovating firms and the average firm's innovation spending, but it does not reduce industry-wide total innovation spending. Our results suggest that the regulation imposes proprietary costs on firms, which discourages innovation activity, especially by smaller firms. We also show that the regulation provides positive information spillovers<span> to other firms (e.g., competitors, suppliers, and customers), especially larger ones. We complement our analysis with alternative innovation measures, including patents, and corroborate the results with an analysis of reporting changes due to an enforcement reform in Germany. In sum, the European reporting regulation has aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation. Importantly, it appears to concentrate innovative activities among fewer, mostly larger firms, which could reflect institutional features of our setting or more general economic forces.</span></div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101769"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144887076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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