American Journal of Political Science最新文献

How does legislature size impact public service provision? Despite the importance of institutional design for democratic governance, the effect of legislative features on citizen welfare remains little understood. In this article, we use a formal model to show that increasing legislature size improves public goods delivery. We argue that changes in bargaining costs depend on whether additional legislators share the executive's party affiliation: More opposition members reduce the equilibrium public goods provision, while more government-aligned members increase it. We test this theory by exploiting sharp discontinuities in city-council size in Brazil. We show that an additional city councilor has a 91% chance of belonging to the mayoral coalition, and this significantly improves primary school enrollment and infant mortality rates. To explore possible mechanisms, we surveyed 174 former city councilors and analyzed 346,553 bills proposed between 2005 and 2008. This article has implications for the design of representative institutions.

A common understanding emphasizes the destructive effects of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) on social cohesion and community life. Stressing the agency of survivors, we present an alternative argument. Our theory predicts that survivors seek to counteract the stigma attached to CRSV by contributing to the community in the form of civic engagement. Drawing on three original surveys from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Sri Lanka and relying on list experiments to reduce underreporting bias, we find that survivors of CRSV indeed show increased levels of civic engagement. This civic effect is consistent across the three contexts and very likely causal. We also rule out an alternative mechanism based on posttraumatic growth and dispel concerns that increased civic engagement comes at the expense of decreased intergroup relations. However, looking at sex differences, our results are more sobering. While in line with our prediction, they do not support the optimistic notion that survivors' mobilization results in female empowerment and the closing of existing gender gaps in civic behavior. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of CRSV, the legacy of violent conflict, and the gendered nature of politics.

How do UN peacekeeping missions enforce peace agreements, and what effect do higher rates of enforcement have on agreement implementation and conflict termination? Peace agreement enforcement forms a central component of peacekeeping effectiveness, yet missions are often mandated to enforce a minority of agreement provisions, and they vary across both time and space in the ways in which they do so. I identify the three dimensions along which enforcement operates—the proportion and type of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, alongside their mandated level of involvement in their implementation—and theorize about their positive effects on agreement implementation and conflict termination. Analyzing the Peacekeeping Enforcement Dataset, an original data set of the enforcement patterns of all UN peacekeeping missions (1989–2015), I find that each dimension of enforcement has, at various time points, a distinct impact on agreement implementation and preventing conflict recidivism.

Despite record numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) globally, we know little about the causal effects of intergroup contact between migrants and locals in active conflict settings. We conduct a randomized controlled trial of a vocational skills-training program implemented by Mercy Corps that enrolled 2597 locals and migrants in near equal numbers in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where IDPs face daily prejudice and discrimination. Courses lasting up to 6 months emphasized collaborative learning and soft skills development. We surveyed participants at endline and followed up 8 months later. While the program provided the most sustained duration of intergroup contact (360–720 h) experimentally evaluated to date, we find no evidence of reported behavioral or attitudinal change by locals (N = 1276) toward migrants generally, regardless of classroom demographics or course duration. Our findings suggest that prolonged contact through vocational training programs is insufficient to improve relations in conflict settings.

Affirmative action is standardly pursued in relation to admissions to prestigious universities, in hiring for prestigious jobs, and when it comes to being elected to parliament. Central to these forms of affirmative action is that they have to do with competitive goods. A good is competitive when, if we improve A's chances of obtaining the good, we reduce B's chances of obtaining the good. I call this Competitive Affirmative Action. I distinguish this from Noncompetitive Affirmative Action. The latter has to do with noncompetitive goods, for example, being granted early parole or freedom from arbitrary arrest. I argue that some of the most prominent objections against affirmative action—in particular, the reverse discrimination objection and the merit objection—speak less against Noncompetitive Affirmative Action. And that some of the most prominent arguments in favor of affirmative action, insofar as they justify Competitive Affirmative Action, also justify Noncompetitive Affirmative Action.

When grievance shocks have heavy tails, large sudden increases in grievances coordinate behavior far more effectively into protests than a sequence of small grievance shocks that generate the same final distribution of grievances in society. That is, society as a whole behaves like the legendary boiling frog, even though each individual does not. An implication is a strong form of path-dependence in collective action. To assess a society's potential for protest, it is not enough to know the current distribution of antiregime sentiments; we also need to know how they came about: suddenly or gradually. The theory also provides a rationale for the classic J-curve theory of revolution. We provide a quantitative analysis of the relationship between grievance shocks and protests in Chile in 2014–2019. Consistent with the theory, results suggest that, even after controlling for grievance levels, large grievance shocks increased the number of protests.

Viewing the relationship between politicians and voters as a principal–agent interaction afflicted by moral hazard, we examine how political careers are shaped by the incentives that voters provide incumbents to work in the public interest. When moral hazard binds, the optimal way for voters to hold politicians accountable is to provide re-election incentives that evolve dynamically over their careers in office. Under these incentives, first-term politicians are among the most electorally vulnerable and the hardest-working; politician effort rises with electoral vulnerability; electoral security increases following good performance and decreases following bad performance; and both effort and electoral vulnerability tend to decline with tenure. In extensions, we study limited voter commitment, voluntary retirement from politics, and adverse selection.

Are banks sensitive to risk and reward in following global corporate transparency rules? Using a worldwide field experiment, this study evaluates competing predictions from expected utility, behavioralist, and institutionalist accounts. We incorporated a dozen companies around the world to make over 15,000 email solicitations asking for corporate accounts from 5000 of the world's internationally connected banks. Treatments randomize the risk profiles of different companies—by their countries’ association with corruption, terrorism, and tax evasion—and vary rewards by stating differing amounts of business revenues. The outcomes are the rates at which banks offer accounts and comply with rules on customer identification. The results suggest that banks are moderately responsive to risk—though not reward—but the magnitude of the effects is small, providing mixed evidence for conventional models and suggestive support for institutionalist accounts.

An extensive literature links the rise of populist radical right (PRR) parties to immigration. We argue that another demographic trend is also significant: emigration. The departure of citizens due to internal and international emigration is a major phenomenon affecting elections via two complementary mechanisms. Emigration alters the composition of electorates, but also changes the preferences of the left behind. Empirically, we establish a positive correlation between PRR vote shares and net-migration loss at the subnational level across Europe. A more fine-grained panel analysis of precincts in Sweden demonstrates that the departure of citizens raises PRR vote shares in places of emigration and that the Social Democrats are the principal losers from emigration. Elite interviews and newspaper analyses explore how emigration produces material and psychological grievances on which populists capitalize and that established parties do not effectively address. Emigration and the frustrations it generates emerge as important sources of populist success.

According to many, the US Congress desperately needs reform because its capacity to govern has declined. Congressional capacity cannot be understood without examining how the expertise available to members is fostered or discouraged. We present a theory of expertise acquisition and apply it to the problem of overseeing the Executive. We use this theory to organize a dataset of congressional staff employment merged with new records of invitations, applications, and attendance at training sessions produced by three nonprofit organizations in Washington, DC. We find that staffers are more likely to acquire expertise when their jobs are more secure and there are more opportunities to use their expertise in careers outside of Congress—most notably, when their party takes control of the presidency. Our analysis suggests that oversight expertise is generally not sufficiently valuable outside of Congress to entice many staffers to acquire it without subsidies.