American Journal of Political Science最新文献

We develop a theory of policy advice that focuses on the relationship between the competence of the advisor (e.g., an expert bureaucracy) and the quality of advice that the leader may expect. We describe important tensions between these features present in a wide class of substantively important circumstances. These tensions point to the presence of a trade-off between receiving advice more often and receiving more informative advice. The optimal realization of this trade-off for the leader sometimes induces her to prefer advisors of limited competence—a preference that, we show, is robust under different informational assumptions. We consider how institutional tools available to leaders affect preferences for advisor competence and the quality of advice they may expect to receive in equilibrium.

We examine how fiscal legibility, the ability of central authorities to observe local conditions for the purposes of taxation, shapes political centralization and state development. When rulers lack information about the periphery, they may benefit from ceding autonomy to tax-collecting intermediaries to encourage fiscal performance. As information quality improves, rulers become better able to monitor and sanction local officials, allowing them to tighten control over taxation and establish more direct state presence. Centralization, in turn, encourages investment in improving fiscal legibility, leading to long-term divergence in state development. We study the consequences of a technological innovation that dramatically improved the Spanish Crown's fiscal legibility in colonial Mexico: the discovery of the patio process to refine silver. We show that political centralization differentially accelerated in affected districts and that these areas subsequently saw disproportionate state investment in informational capacity, altering the trajectory of state development.

This paper studies a model of “pivotal protesting,” in which citizens act in order to change the outcome rather than to collect private benefits. We show that, when citizens face repeated opportunities to protest against a regime, pivotal protesting entails complex dynamic considerations: The continuation value of the status quo influences the citizens' willingness to protest today. Thus, a mere change in expectations about the future may trigger a revolt. The same logic often induces a pattern of protest cycles, driven by a novel source of inefficiency: An expectation that a protest will take place tomorrow can excessively sap incentives to coordinate on protesting today. Thus, potential protests crowd each other out. This can lead to a form of collective procrastination: Access to more opportunities to protest can lower the citizens' welfare, as collective action becomes inefficiently delayed.

Does the ethnic media promote the political engagement of minority ethnic immigrants? This is a salient question in Western democracies, where the political incorporation of immigrants is a continuous challenge. Prevailing accounts place the media as a primary cause of growing public disengagement. In contrast, this article argues that the entry of community-centered ethnic media can increase immigrants' political engagement by changing their informational environment and their representation in media and state institutions. In 2004, the UK Parliament enacted the Community Radio Order to allow the licensing of community radio stations. Leveraging the introduction of this law and geographical variation in the distribution of licenses with a difference-in-differences approach, this article shows that the exposure of minority ethnic immigrants to radio programming targeted at their community substantively increases their turnout in local elections. The results suggest that immigrants' participation in politics is stimulated by accommodating diversity within common institutions.

Despite the centrality of the loyalty–competence framework in research on authoritarian politics, scholars have only focused on material aspects of what elites do in their service to the dictator. Yet nonmaterial aspects such as sycophantically praising the autocrat in speech—a common, everyday practice under authoritarianism, have been ignored. We propose a novel theory to explain under what conditions elites “overpraise” the ruler and imitate his rhetoric, and whether they will be rewarded. We test the empirical implications through semisupervised text analysis and an original dataset of almost 1000 annual legislative addresses of Russian governors. Contrary to common assumptions that sycophancy is uniform across elites, we find that governors who are politically and economically vulnerable and without alternative career paths behave more sycophantically and show that they survive in office longer. Our results have important implications for how personality cults develop and how dictators navigate the loyalty–competence trade-off.

A significant observational literature identifies a link between collective victimhood and conflict-enhancing attitudes, though results from experimental work increasing victimhood's salience vary. This article thus revisits this question in two studies in a context in which increased salience is especially likely to shift attitudes. Study 1 exploits the happenstance fielding of 12 surveys over Israel's Holocaust Memorial Day between 1979 and 2021. Using all 192 available estimates assessing hawkishness, preferences for out-group exclusion, and in-group solidarity, it fails to detect statistically significant effects of a state-led effort to increase the salience of Israel's collective victimhood narrative in a natural setting 90% of the time. Study 2 replicates the null findings across multiple comparisons and outcomes in a companion harmonized panel and survey experiment. Substantively, the findings suggest that it may be harder to use short-term manipulations of collective victimhood to shift attitudes than often assumed.

Is public policy responsive to demographically and ideologically unrepresentative comments given at public meetings? I investigate this possibility using a novel data set of over 40,000 comments made at the San Francisco Planning Commission between 1998 and 2021, matched to information about proposed developments discussed in hearings and administrative data on commenters. I document four stylized facts: First, commenters at public meetings are unrepresentative of the public along racial, gender, age, and homeownership lines; second, distance to the proposed development predicts commenting behavior, but only among those in opposition; third, commission votes are correlated with commenters’ preferences; finally, the alignment of White commenters (vs. other racial groups) and neighborhood group representatives and the general public (vs. other interest groups) better predict project approvals.

Communication technology helps protesters organize, but also allows the government to monitor and repress their actions. We study this trade-off in a model where protesters want to show up at the same time and place, but also want to avoid government forces. If leaders of a movement can send messages observed only by other protesters, they can successfully coordinate on a variety of sites and force the government to spread resources thin, helping the success of the movement. If the government always observes the messages too, protesters can do no better than always going to a “focal site” knowing that the government will send all resources there as well, and thus experience higher levels of repression for the sake of coordinating tactics. Intermediate cases where messages are partially observed generate dynamics where new technologies and media that are relatively known to other protesters and not the government are used until the government can reliably infiltrate them and the protesters move on to a new medium. When some protesters are more informed than others, the model can explain protest tactics observed in recent prominent cases like having smaller “parallel” protests at the same time but different location of the main gathering.

Recent research emphasizes social media's potential for citizens to express shared grievances. In active conflict, however, social media posts indicating political loyalties can pose severe risks to civilians. We develop a theory that explains how civilians modify their online behavior as part of efforts to improve their security during conflict. After major changes in territorial control, civilians should be more likely to post positive content, and more content that supports the winning side. We study social media behavior during and after the siege of Aleppo in November 2016. We match Aleppo-based Twitter users with users from other parts of Syria and use large language models to analyze changes in online behavior after the regime's retaking of the city. Results show that users in Aleppo post more positive and pro-Assad content, but only when self-disclosing their location. The findings have important implications for our understanding of digital communication in civil conflict.

The tendency for political appointees to assimilate into the bureaucratic agencies that they lead is a recurring source of tension between appointees and the executives who appoint them. This paper employs a formal model to explore how appointees come around to the views of the civil servants whom they oversee. We conceptualize a bureaucrat as providing a cheap-talk message about privately known, policy-relevant conditions to an appointee who uses that information to update her beliefs and set two types of policy. Though the bureaucrat's and appointee's preferences are aligned conditional on beliefs, the appointee's prior beliefs about the likelihood of various states of the world differ from the bureaucrat's. In equilibrium, truthful reporting and inducing belief convergence may be at odds and we identify when the bureaucrat will strategically choose to issue false reports. We apply the model's insights to the budget process and agency recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic.