Pub Date : 2025-10-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107567
Carl Hsin-han Shen , Hao Zhang
We examine whether insiders’ pledging of company stock as collateral for personal loans influences a company’s debt contracting. We attempt to identify causality through difference-in-differences analyses of an unexpected legislative change that exogenously reduced board directors’ pledging incentives. We find that firms with higher initial pledging levels, which subsequently experienced a significant decline in pledging ratios due to the regulation, benefited from lower loan spreads and less stringent non-price loan terms. We further hypothesize and provide evidence that the positive impact of insider pledging on corporate borrowing costs is less pronounced in closely held firms. Examining the mechanisms, we find that share pledging is positively related to earnings management, firm risk-taking behaviors, and agency problems. Overall, these findings suggest that banks perceive insider share pledging as engendering significant risks.
{"title":"Share pledging of insiders and corporate debt contracting","authors":"Carl Hsin-han Shen , Hao Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107567","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107567","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine whether insiders’ pledging of company stock as collateral for personal loans influences a company’s debt contracting. We attempt to identify causality through difference-in-differences analyses of an unexpected legislative change that exogenously reduced board directors’ pledging incentives. We find that firms with higher initial pledging levels, which subsequently experienced a significant decline in pledging ratios due to the regulation, benefited from lower loan spreads and less stringent non-price loan terms. We further hypothesize and provide evidence that the positive impact of insider pledging on corporate borrowing costs is less pronounced in closely held firms. Examining the mechanisms, we find that share pledging is positively related to earnings management, firm risk-taking behaviors, and agency problems. Overall, these findings suggest that banks perceive insider share pledging as engendering significant risks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 107567"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145364645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107562
Na Ding , Panpan Feng , Jianjun Liu , Zhaoyue Ren , Xueyong Zhang
This study investigates how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects venture capital (VC) contract terms. Using a unique database of contracts between VCs and entrepreneurial firms in China, we provide evidence that EPU positively affects the presence of investor-friendly covenants in VC contracts. Our mechanism analysis shows that screening for high-quality startups and VCs’ increased bargaining power are potential channels. Furthermore, we find that including more investor-friendly covenants mitigates the negative effect of EPU on VC exit performance.
{"title":"Economic policy uncertainty and covenants in venture capital contracts","authors":"Na Ding , Panpan Feng , Jianjun Liu , Zhaoyue Ren , Xueyong Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107562","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107562","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects venture capital (VC) contract terms. Using a unique database of contracts between VCs and entrepreneurial firms in China, we provide evidence that EPU positively affects the presence of investor-friendly covenants in VC contracts. Our mechanism analysis shows that screening for high-quality startups and VCs’ increased bargaining power are potential channels. Furthermore, we find that including more investor-friendly covenants mitigates the negative effect of EPU on VC exit performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 107562"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145364160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-28DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107561
Sonny Biswas , Neslihan Ozkan , Junyang Yin
We find that in the leveraged loan sector, firms borrowing from non-banks have lower profitability following loan originations, compared to firms borrowing from banks, after controlling for observable factors. As non-bank borrowers experience less intense monitoring than bank borrowers, they engage in more risk-taking, which could explain their lower profitability following loan issuance. Using the leveraged lending guidance as a plausibly exogenous shock, which resulted in the migration of borrowers from banks to non-banks, we provide causal evidence corroborating our main results. Overall, our findings suggest that macroprudential policies which exclusively target the traditional banking sector may have negative consequences.
{"title":"Non-bank lending and firm performance: Evidence from the syndicate loan market","authors":"Sonny Biswas , Neslihan Ozkan , Junyang Yin","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107561","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107561","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We find that in the leveraged loan sector, firms borrowing from non-banks have lower profitability following loan originations, compared to firms borrowing from banks, after controlling for observable factors. As non-bank borrowers experience less intense monitoring than bank borrowers, they engage in more risk-taking, which could explain their lower profitability following loan issuance. Using the leveraged lending guidance as a plausibly exogenous shock, which resulted in the migration of borrowers from banks to non-banks, we provide causal evidence corroborating our main results. Overall, our findings suggest that macroprudential policies which exclusively target the traditional banking sector may have negative consequences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 107561"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145270368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-27DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107559
Steven Xianglong Chen , Zhangfan Cao , Xiaolan Zheng
This study investigates the effect of trade secret protection on corporate investment in human capital. By leveraging the staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by U.S. states as an exogenous shock that significantly reduces talent mobility, we find that IDD adoption results in firms overinvesting in human capital, suggesting that firms strategically engage in precautionary human capital hoarding in response to the reduced talent supply in the labor market and increased labor adjustment costs. Our cross-sectional analyses show that the effect of IDD adoption on human capital investment is more pronounced for (1) firms in high-skill industries and (2) firms facing higher levels of product market competition. Finally, further analyses reveal that, in the context of a limited talent supply under IDD restrictions, high-skill firms with human capital reserves enjoy superior performance to those without such reserves. Overall, our study reveals an unintended consequence of growing trade secret protection in shifting the focus of firms’ human capital investment from “head-hunting” talent from rivals to “internal cultivation” of existing human capital within firms and has implications for both managers and policymakers amid the increasingly knowledge-intensive economic environment.
{"title":"Does trade secret protection spur human capital investment? Evidence from the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine","authors":"Steven Xianglong Chen , Zhangfan Cao , Xiaolan Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107559","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107559","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates the effect of trade secret protection on corporate investment in human capital. By leveraging the staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by U.S. states as an exogenous shock that significantly reduces talent mobility, we find that IDD adoption results in firms overinvesting in human capital, suggesting that firms strategically engage in precautionary human capital hoarding in response to the reduced talent supply in the labor market and increased labor adjustment costs. Our cross-sectional analyses show that the effect of IDD adoption on human capital investment is more pronounced for (1) firms in high-skill industries and (2) firms facing higher levels of product market competition. Finally, further analyses reveal that, in the context of a limited talent supply under IDD restrictions, high-skill firms with human capital reserves enjoy superior performance to those without such reserves. Overall, our study reveals an unintended consequence of growing trade secret protection in shifting the focus of firms’ human capital investment from “head-hunting” talent from rivals to “internal cultivation” of existing human capital within firms and has implications for both managers and policymakers amid the increasingly knowledge-intensive economic environment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 107559"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145325866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-27DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107558
Hong Chen , Zhao Jin , Yanfei Tang
This paper investigates how the regulation of bank wealth management products (WMPs) affects corporate innovation. We build a concise model linking firms’ assets allocation decisions to regulatory variables affecting banks. The model suggests that current WMP regulation can enhance formal lending and stimulate innovation among state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while having no impact on innovation in private enterprises (PEs). Empirically, we identify firms’ exposure to bank regulation by examining the number of WMPs issued by banks in 2017 and the distance between banks and firms. Our results indicate that innovation output significantly increased for highly exposed SOEs, while there was no significant change for PEs. Using city-level data, we further observe that regulation fosters innovation in regions with higher exposure. Our findings suggest that regulation exerts heterogeneous effects on the real economy by banks’ credit allocation and firms’ investment strategies.
{"title":"The innovation effects of regulation on bank wealth management products: Theory and evidence from China","authors":"Hong Chen , Zhao Jin , Yanfei Tang","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107558","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107558","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates how the regulation of bank wealth management products (WMPs) affects corporate innovation. We build a concise model linking firms’ assets allocation decisions to regulatory variables affecting banks. The model suggests that current WMP regulation can enhance formal lending and stimulate innovation among state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while having no impact on innovation in private enterprises (PEs). Empirically, we identify firms’ exposure to bank regulation by examining the number of WMPs issued by banks in 2017 and the distance between banks and firms. Our results indicate that innovation output significantly increased for highly exposed SOEs, while there was no significant change for PEs. Using city-level data, we further observe that regulation fosters innovation in regions with higher exposure. Our findings suggest that regulation exerts heterogeneous effects on the real economy by banks’ credit allocation and firms’ investment strategies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 107558"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145270370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-20DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107553
Alina Arefeva
This paper examines the drivers of housing market volatility through dynamic search-and-matching models that incorporate auctions. Two versions of the model are developed: one in which buyers visit homes randomly and another where search is directed by seller reserve prices. The analysis demonstrates that granular shocks and microstructure frictions—arising from the interaction of idiosyncratic and infrequent transactions, search frictions, and auctions-based pricing—generate persistent volatility, even in large markets such as Los Angeles. The paper also identifies systematic weekly patterns in housing activity, which account for up to 60% of monthly variation in sales and listings due to calendar composition. Recognizing and filtering out these predictable fluctuations ensures that the model targets economically meaningful sources of volatility. Together, granular shocks, microstructure frictions, and weekly patterns explain 70%–80% of sales and listings volatility, with the remainder driven by exogenous shocks. These findings underscore the importance of auctions, granular shocks, microstructure frictions, and weekly patterns in understanding housing market dynamics.
{"title":"Housing markets: Auctions, granular shocks, and microstructure frictions","authors":"Alina Arefeva","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107553","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107553","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the drivers of housing market volatility through dynamic search-and-matching models that incorporate auctions. Two versions of the model are developed: one in which buyers visit homes randomly and another where search is directed by seller reserve prices. The analysis demonstrates that granular shocks and microstructure frictions—arising from the interaction of idiosyncratic and infrequent transactions, search frictions, and auctions-based pricing—generate persistent volatility, even in large markets such as Los Angeles. The paper also identifies systematic weekly patterns in housing activity, which account for up to 60% of monthly variation in sales and listings due to calendar composition. Recognizing and filtering out these predictable fluctuations ensures that the model targets economically meaningful sources of volatility. Together, granular shocks, microstructure frictions, and weekly patterns explain 70%–80% of sales and listings volatility, with the remainder driven by exogenous shocks. These findings underscore the importance of auctions, granular shocks, microstructure frictions, and weekly patterns in understanding housing market dynamics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 107553"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145158326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-19DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107544
Ting Bai , Jens Hilscher , Anna Scherbina
We show that, rather than maintaining a constant style, active equity funds alter their factor loadings over time. Style changes are larger following quarters in which funds either substantially under- or out-perform other funds based on returns or fund flows, which is explained by managers both not correcting the resulting passive style drift and deliberately reallocating a portion of the portfolio. Motivated by this observation, we identify a new measure of manager skill, which we call “tactical investment skill.” It captures a manager’s ex-ante observable ability to increase future returns through loadings changes. We show that high-skill managers outperform their low-skill peers in the following month in terms of raw returns and alphas. This outperformance is more pronounced following quarters with large loadings changes.
{"title":"Unencumbered by style: Why do funds change factor loadings, and does it help?","authors":"Ting Bai , Jens Hilscher , Anna Scherbina","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107544","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107544","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We show that, rather than maintaining a constant style, active equity funds alter their factor loadings over time. Style changes are larger following quarters in which funds either substantially under- or out-perform other funds based on returns or fund flows, which is explained by managers both not correcting the resulting passive style drift and deliberately reallocating a portion of the portfolio. Motivated by this observation, we identify a new measure of manager skill, which we call “tactical investment skill.” It captures a manager’s ex-ante observable ability to increase future returns through loadings changes. We show that high-skill managers outperform their low-skill peers in the following month in terms of raw returns and alphas. This outperformance is more pronounced following quarters with large loadings changes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 107544"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145160422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-17DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107556
Christine Bangsgaard, Thomas Kokholm
VIX futures market makers can hedge their volatility exposure by trading SPX options and futures. We use the daily VIX futures demand by VIX ETP issuers as an estimate of the end-of-day shock to market makers’ net position and find that the demand impacts the SPX futures market in the direction consistent with the VIX futures hedging channel. The VIX ETP demand is a strong predictor of the end-of-day SPX futures return in-sample and out-of-sample. We find evidence of a subsequent reversal, suggesting that VIX futures hedging activities can move the SPX futures market for reasons unrelated to price discovery.
{"title":"The stock market impact of volatility hedging: Evidence from end-of-day trading by VIX ETPs","authors":"Christine Bangsgaard, Thomas Kokholm","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107556","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107556","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>VIX futures market makers can hedge their volatility exposure by trading SPX options and futures. We use the daily VIX futures demand by VIX ETP issuers as an estimate of the end-of-day shock to market makers’ net position and find that the demand impacts the SPX futures market in the direction consistent with the VIX futures hedging channel. The VIX ETP demand is a strong predictor of the end-of-day SPX futures return in-sample and out-of-sample. We find evidence of a subsequent reversal, suggesting that VIX futures hedging activities can move the SPX futures market for reasons unrelated to price discovery.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 107556"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145096487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107539
Jiantao Ma , Yuanyi Zhang
We introduce implied variance asymmetry () — the weighted difference between out-of-the-money call and put option prices — as a predictor of cross-sectional option returns. We find that negatively predicts future delta-hedged call returns and positively predicts future delta-hedged put returns. These predictive relationships reflect distinct investor behaviors: retail investors drive the overpricing of high- call options through speculative demand, whereas informed short-sellers bid up prices of low- puts as substitutes for constrained stock short-selling. Furthermore, stocks and put options characterized by low and high short-sale costs experience significantly lower subsequent excess returns. This pattern suggests that low- put buyers pay a premium and they correctly anticipate future stock price declines. In contrast, high- call options exhibit temporary mispricing driven by uninformed speculation, which rapidly reverses.
{"title":"Option price asymmetry, speculation and stock short-sale cost","authors":"Jiantao Ma , Yuanyi Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107539","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107539","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce <em>implied variance asymmetry</em> (<span><math><mrow><mi>I</mi><mi>V</mi><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span>) — the weighted difference between out-of-the-money call and put option prices — as a predictor of cross-sectional option returns. We find that <span><math><mrow><mi>I</mi><mi>V</mi><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span> negatively predicts future delta-hedged call returns and positively predicts future delta-hedged put returns. These predictive relationships reflect distinct investor behaviors: retail investors drive the overpricing of high-<span><math><mrow><mi>I</mi><mi>V</mi><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span> call options through speculative demand, whereas informed short-sellers bid up prices of low-<span><math><mrow><mi>I</mi><mi>V</mi><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span> puts as substitutes for constrained stock short-selling. Furthermore, stocks and put options characterized by low <span><math><mrow><mi>I</mi><mi>V</mi><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span> and high short-sale costs experience significantly lower subsequent excess returns. This pattern suggests that low-<span><math><mrow><mi>I</mi><mi>V</mi><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span> put buyers pay a premium and they correctly anticipate future stock price declines. In contrast, high-<span><math><mrow><mi>I</mi><mi>V</mi><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span> call options exhibit temporary mispricing driven by uninformed speculation, which rapidly reverses.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 107539"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145118572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107545
Markus Broman , Jon Fulkerson
Using a worldwide sample of 3250 global equity funds, we provide out-of-sample evidence of active share as a strong return predictor. However, a global fund’s within-region active share predicts superior performance in Europe and Asia-Pacific, but not in the United States. We reconcile this difference by showing that highly active global managers (whether based in the U.S. or elsewhere) have outperformed both in U.S. and international markets primarily when they are also betting on equity anomalies. The weak return predictability of active share alone in the U.S. stems from domestic anomalies and is not generalizable to global markets.
{"title":"Variation in the value of active share across regions of investments: Evidence from global equity funds","authors":"Markus Broman , Jon Fulkerson","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107545","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107545","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using a worldwide sample of 3250 global equity funds, we provide out-of-sample evidence of active share as a strong return predictor. However, a global fund’s within-region active share predicts superior performance in Europe and Asia-Pacific, but not in the United States. We reconcile this difference by showing that highly active global managers (whether based in the U.S. or elsewhere) have outperformed both in U.S. and international markets primarily when they are also betting on equity anomalies. The weak return predictability of active share alone in the U.S. stems from domestic anomalies and is not generalizable to global markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 107545"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}