Pub Date : 2017-10-08DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2017.1396985
C. Butts
ABSTRACT Generation of deviates from random graph models with nontrivial edge dependence is an increasingly important problem. Here, we introduce a method which allows perfect sampling from random graph models in exponential family form (“exponential family random graph” models), using a variant of Coupling From The Past. We illustrate the use of the method via an application to the Markov graphs, a family that has been the subject of considerable research. We also show how the method can be applied to a variant of the biased net models, which are not exponentially parameterized.
{"title":"A perfect sampling method for exponential family random graph models","authors":"C. Butts","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2017.1396985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1396985","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Generation of deviates from random graph models with nontrivial edge dependence is an increasingly important problem. Here, we introduce a method which allows perfect sampling from random graph models in exponential family form (“exponential family random graph” models), using a variant of Coupling From The Past. We illustrate the use of the method via an application to the Markov graphs, a family that has been the subject of considerable research. We also show how the method can be applied to a variant of the biased net models, which are not exponentially parameterized.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"42 1","pages":"17 - 36"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1396985","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44099728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2017.1382165
Zack W. Almquist
{"title":"Illuminating Dark Networks: The Study of Clandestine Groups and Organizations by Luke M. Gerdes","authors":"Zack W. Almquist","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2017.1382165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1382165","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"41 1","pages":"248 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1382165","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43041665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2017.1387857
Naoki Sudo
ABSTRACT Analyses of data from the World Values Survey show that generalized trust in highly democratic societies is stable and strong, but it is also strong in highly authoritarian societies. The goal of this study is to specify the mechanism of the relationship between generalized trust and political institutions. I categorize generalized trust as two types: democratic trust and authoritarian trust. When a society features a mixture of democratic and authoritarian trust, generalized trust tends to be weaker because of conflicts between democratic and authoritarian values. As a result, with diffusing democratic values, generalized trust in a society will first be temporally weakened, but eventually it will strengthen.
{"title":"Social networks of trust based on social values: An explanation of curvilinear relationships between generalized trust and democracy","authors":"Naoki Sudo","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2017.1387857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1387857","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Analyses of data from the World Values Survey show that generalized trust in highly democratic societies is stable and strong, but it is also strong in highly authoritarian societies. The goal of this study is to specify the mechanism of the relationship between generalized trust and political institutions. I categorize generalized trust as two types: democratic trust and authoritarian trust. When a society features a mixture of democratic and authoritarian trust, generalized trust tends to be weaker because of conflicts between democratic and authoritarian values. As a result, with diffusing democratic values, generalized trust in a society will first be temporally weakened, but eventually it will strengthen.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"41 1","pages":"193 - 219"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1387857","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42389937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2017.1388235
E. Accinelli, Filipe Martins, J. Oviedo, A. Pinto, L. Quintas
ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model.
{"title":"Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption","authors":"E. Accinelli, Filipe Martins, J. Oviedo, A. Pinto, L. Quintas","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2017.1388235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1388235","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"41 1","pages":"220 - 247"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1388235","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42789709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2017.1387858
B. Zijlstra
ABSTRACT In common models for dyadic network regression, the density and reciprocity parameters are dependent on each other. Here, the j1 and j2 models are introduced with a density parameter that represents the log odds of a single tie. Consequently, the density and reciprocity parameters are independent and the interpretation of both parameters more straightforward. Estimation procedures and simulation results for these new models are discussed as well as an illustrative example.
{"title":"Regression of directed graphs on independent effects for density and reciprocity","authors":"B. Zijlstra","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2017.1387858","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1387858","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In common models for dyadic network regression, the density and reciprocity parameters are dependent on each other. Here, the j1 and j2 models are introduced with a density parameter that represents the log odds of a single tie. Consequently, the density and reciprocity parameters are independent and the interpretation of both parameters more straightforward. Estimation procedures and simulation results for these new models are discussed as well as an illustrative example.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"41 1","pages":"185 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1387858","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47913994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-09-22DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2018.1427091
D. Haw, John Hogan
ABSTRACT We consider Schelling’s bounded neighborhood model (BNM) of unorganized segregation, from the perspective of modern dynamical systems theory. We carry out a complete quantitative analysis of the system for linear tolerance schedules. We derive a fully predictive model and associate each term with a social meaning. We recover and generalize Schelling’s qualitative results. For the case of unlimited population movement, we derive exact formulae for regions in parameter space where stable integrated population mixes can occur, and show how neighborhood tipping can be explained in terms of basins of attraction. When population movement is limited, we derive exact criteria for the occurrence of new population mixes. For nonlinear tolerance schedules, we illustrate our approach with numerical simulations.
{"title":"A dynamical systems model of unorganized segregation","authors":"D. Haw, John Hogan","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2018.1427091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1427091","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We consider Schelling’s bounded neighborhood model (BNM) of unorganized segregation, from the perspective of modern dynamical systems theory. We carry out a complete quantitative analysis of the system for linear tolerance schedules. We derive a fully predictive model and associate each term with a social meaning. We recover and generalize Schelling’s qualitative results. For the case of unlimited population movement, we derive exact formulae for regions in parameter space where stable integrated population mixes can occur, and show how neighborhood tipping can be explained in terms of basins of attraction. When population movement is limited, we derive exact criteria for the occurrence of new population mixes. For nonlinear tolerance schedules, we illustrate our approach with numerical simulations.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"42 1","pages":"113 - 127"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1427091","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49045410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2017.1356828
J. Gómez-Aguilar
ABSTRACT A model of one unilingual component and one bilingual component of a population is studied using fractional derivatives with Mittag-Leffler kernel in Liouville-Caputo sense. Numerical simulations were obtained using iterative schemes. We studied in detail the existence and uniqueness of the solutions. Numerical simulations for different values of the fractional order were obtained.
{"title":"New bilingualism model based on fractional operators with Mittag-Leffler kernel","authors":"J. Gómez-Aguilar","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2017.1356828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1356828","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A model of one unilingual component and one bilingual component of a population is studied using fractional derivatives with Mittag-Leffler kernel in Liouville-Caputo sense. Numerical simulations were obtained using iterative schemes. We studied in detail the existence and uniqueness of the solutions. Numerical simulations for different values of the fractional order were obtained.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"41 1","pages":"172 - 184"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1356828","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45114838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-21DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2017.1335723
Cailin O’Connor
ABSTRACT Why do minority groups tend to be discriminated against when it comes to situations of bargaining and resource division? In this article, I explore an explanation for this disadvantage that appeals solely to the dynamics of social interaction between minority and majority groups—the cultural Red King effect (Bruner, 2017). As I show, in agent-based models of bargaining between groups, the minority group will tend to get less as a direct result of the fact that they frequently interact with majority group members, while majority group members meet them only rarely. This effect is strengthened by certain psychological phenomenon—risk aversion and in-group preference—is robust on network models, and is strengthened in cases where preexisting norms are discriminatory. I will also discuss how this effect unifies previous results on the impacts of institutional memory on bargaining between groups.
{"title":"The cultural Red King effect","authors":"Cailin O’Connor","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2017.1335723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1335723","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Why do minority groups tend to be discriminated against when it comes to situations of bargaining and resource division? In this article, I explore an explanation for this disadvantage that appeals solely to the dynamics of social interaction between minority and majority groups—the cultural Red King effect (Bruner, 2017). As I show, in agent-based models of bargaining between groups, the minority group will tend to get less as a direct result of the fact that they frequently interact with majority group members, while majority group members meet them only rarely. This effect is strengthened by certain psychological phenomenon—risk aversion and in-group preference—is robust on network models, and is strengthened in cases where preexisting norms are discriminatory. I will also discuss how this effect unifies previous results on the impacts of institutional memory on bargaining between groups.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"41 1","pages":"155 - 171"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1335723","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41362305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-07DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2017.1328680
Neng-pin Lu
ABSTRACT Eigenvector centrality is a popular measure that uses the principal eigenvector of the adjacency matrix to distinguish importance of nodes in a graph. To find the principal eigenvector, the power method iterating from a random initial vector is often adopted. In this article, we consider the adjacency matrix of a directed graph and choose suitable initial vectors according to strongly connected components of the graph instead so that nonnegative eigenvectors, including the principal one, can be found. Consequently, for aggregating nonnegative eigenvectors, we propose a weighted measure of centrality, called the aggregated-eigenvector centrality. Weighting each nonnegative eigenvector by the reachability of the associated strongly connected component, we can obtain a measure that follows a status hierarchy in a directed graph.
{"title":"Aggregating nonnegative eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix as a measure of centrality for a directed graph","authors":"Neng-pin Lu","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2017.1328680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1328680","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Eigenvector centrality is a popular measure that uses the principal eigenvector of the adjacency matrix to distinguish importance of nodes in a graph. To find the principal eigenvector, the power method iterating from a random initial vector is often adopted. In this article, we consider the adjacency matrix of a directed graph and choose suitable initial vectors according to strongly connected components of the graph instead so that nonnegative eigenvectors, including the principal one, can be found. Consequently, for aggregating nonnegative eigenvectors, we propose a weighted measure of centrality, called the aggregated-eigenvector centrality. Weighting each nonnegative eigenvector by the reachability of the associated strongly connected component, we can obtain a measure that follows a status hierarchy in a directed graph.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"41 1","pages":"139 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1328680","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49301820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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