Pub Date : 2018-12-13DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2020.1756285
J. Bruggeman, R. Sprik, Rick Quax
ABSTRACT Cooperation for public goods poses a dilemma, where individuals are tempted to free ride on others’ contributions. Classic solutions involve monitoring, reputation maintenance and costly incentives, but there are important collective actions based on simple and cheap cues only, for example, unplanned protests and revolts. This can be explained by an Ising model with the assumption that individuals in uncertain situations tend to conform to the local majority in their network. Among initial defectors, noise such as rumors or opponents’ provocations causes some of them to cooperate accidentally. At a critical level of noise, these cooperators trigger a cascade of cooperation. We find an analytic relationship between the phase transition and the asymmetry of the Ising model, which in turn reflects the asymmetry of cooperation and defection. This study thereby shows that in principle, the dilemma of cooperation can be solved by nothing more than a portion of random noise, without rational decision-making.
{"title":"Spontaneous cooperation for public goods","authors":"J. Bruggeman, R. Sprik, Rick Quax","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2020.1756285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2020.1756285","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Cooperation for public goods poses a dilemma, where individuals are tempted to free ride on others’ contributions. Classic solutions involve monitoring, reputation maintenance and costly incentives, but there are important collective actions based on simple and cheap cues only, for example, unplanned protests and revolts. This can be explained by an Ising model with the assumption that individuals in uncertain situations tend to conform to the local majority in their network. Among initial defectors, noise such as rumors or opponents’ provocations causes some of them to cooperate accidentally. At a critical level of noise, these cooperators trigger a cascade of cooperation. We find an analytic relationship between the phase transition and the asymmetry of the Ising model, which in turn reflects the asymmetry of cooperation and defection. This study thereby shows that in principle, the dilemma of cooperation can be solved by nothing more than a portion of random noise, without rational decision-making.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"45 1","pages":"183 - 191"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2020.1756285","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43986387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-12DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2018.1545769
K. Sawyer, André F. Gygax
ABSTRACT This paper constructs a new theory of social networks based on reputation. The model assumes that reputation is an asset and that individuals connect by buying options on the reputation of others. In networking, individuals construct portfolios of call options to leverage the reputations of others and put options to hedge the connections with others. A network then consists of portfolios of reputation options. The option model confers advantages not present in existing models. First, the payoff to connecting is the payoff on a portfolio of reputation options. Second, the network forms as individuals take option positions; the network evolves as individuals adjust those positions. Third, networking strategies become option strategies. The model allows for insights into network structure, the price of connecting and the value of connecting.
{"title":"An option-theoretic model of a reputation network","authors":"K. Sawyer, André F. Gygax","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2018.1545769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1545769","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper constructs a new theory of social networks based on reputation. The model assumes that reputation is an asset and that individuals connect by buying options on the reputation of others. In networking, individuals construct portfolios of call options to leverage the reputations of others and put options to hedge the connections with others. A network then consists of portfolios of reputation options. The option model confers advantages not present in existing models. First, the payoff to connecting is the payoff on a portfolio of reputation options. Second, the network forms as individuals take option positions; the network evolves as individuals adjust those positions. Third, networking strategies become option strategies. The model allows for insights into network structure, the price of connecting and the value of connecting.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"43 1","pages":"123 - 146"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1545769","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49605525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-15DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2018.1531398
I. Kozitsin, A. Belolipetskii
ABSTRACT In this paper, a rigorous mathematical analysis of the Krasnoshchekov model is presented. We have shown that in case a community does not contain any group of people having zero resistance to interpersonal influence, which are moreover isolated from the pressure of the rest of community, the Krasnoshchekov opinion readjustment procedure can be reduced to the Friedkin–Johnsen dynamics. In turn, if one repeats the Krasnoshchekov opinion updating rule, the corresponding dynamics forces individuals’ opinions to converge eventually to some terminal opinions, which are a consensus under the same conditions as in the French–Harary–DeGroot dynamics. Otherwise, the Krasnoshchekov dynamics exhibits patterns, which are much closer to the behavior of electrons in the superconductivity state.
{"title":"Opinion convergence in the Krasnoshchekov model","authors":"I. Kozitsin, A. Belolipetskii","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2018.1531398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1531398","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper, a rigorous mathematical analysis of the Krasnoshchekov model is presented. We have shown that in case a community does not contain any group of people having zero resistance to interpersonal influence, which are moreover isolated from the pressure of the rest of community, the Krasnoshchekov opinion readjustment procedure can be reduced to the Friedkin–Johnsen dynamics. In turn, if one repeats the Krasnoshchekov opinion updating rule, the corresponding dynamics forces individuals’ opinions to converge eventually to some terminal opinions, which are a consensus under the same conditions as in the French–Harary–DeGroot dynamics. Otherwise, the Krasnoshchekov dynamics exhibits patterns, which are much closer to the behavior of electrons in the superconductivity state.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"43 1","pages":"104 - 121"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1531398","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43416214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-10DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2017.1343826
G. Jasso
ABSTRACT Are there things that ordinary people can do in their private lives to reduce economic inequality? And, if so, how would these things work? To be sure, there are macro societal mechanisms for reducing inequality. But are there micro mechanisms for reducing inequality? This article first examines inequality measures and behavioral models that produce inequality effects, identifying five sets of inequality mechanisms which lead to levers that ordinary people can use to reduce income inequality, and next discusses the levers, with special attention to their feasibility, ease of use, and side effects. The five levers highlight transfers, equal additions, negative assortative mating, wage schedules that reward multiple personal characteristics, and compensation procedures with voting rules, many voters, diversity of thought, and secret ballots. This work raises new questions for research, such as the sources of diversity of thought.
{"title":"What can you and I do to reduce income inequality?","authors":"G. Jasso","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2017.1343826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1343826","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Are there things that ordinary people can do in their private lives to reduce economic inequality? And, if so, how would these things work? To be sure, there are macro societal mechanisms for reducing inequality. But are there micro mechanisms for reducing inequality? This article first examines inequality measures and behavioral models that produce inequality effects, identifying five sets of inequality mechanisms which lead to levers that ordinary people can use to reduce income inequality, and next discusses the levers, with special attention to their feasibility, ease of use, and side effects. The five levers highlight transfers, equal additions, negative assortative mating, wage schedules that reward multiple personal characteristics, and compensation procedures with voting rules, many voters, diversity of thought, and secret ballots. This work raises new questions for research, such as the sources of diversity of thought.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"42 1","pages":"186 - 204"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1343826","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46211133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-10DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2017.1416371
Kazuhiro Kezuka
ABSTRACT The aim of this study is to explore the mechanism behind how the spread of individualism, the prevalence of love matches, and the increase in search costs affect late marriages in Japan. To this end, I construct a search-theoretic model, which is a combination of the Markov decision process and the evolution of preferences. I present three results. 1) The spread of individualism is driven by those who moderately consider the social status of their family. 2) The spread of individualism and the prevalence of love matches delay the average marriage timing, but its effect is limited. 3) The diversity of individualism prevents people from switching from love matches to arranged marriages, while the search costs are rising.
{"title":"Late marriage and transition from arranged marriages to love matches: A search-theoretic approach","authors":"Kazuhiro Kezuka","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2017.1416371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1416371","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The aim of this study is to explore the mechanism behind how the spread of individualism, the prevalence of love matches, and the increase in search costs affect late marriages in Japan. To this end, I construct a search-theoretic model, which is a combination of the Markov decision process and the evolution of preferences. I present three results. 1) The spread of individualism is driven by those who moderately consider the social status of their family. 2) The spread of individualism and the prevalence of love matches delay the average marriage timing, but its effect is limited. 3) The diversity of individualism prevents people from switching from love matches to arranged marriages, while the search costs are rising.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"42 1","pages":"237 - 256"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1416371","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45950955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-10DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2017.1371148
Shinya Obayashi
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the dynamics of collective action through collective reputation, which indicates the extent to which groups succeed. Many previous works introduced psychological traits such as irrationality and a sense of fairness to explain the diffusion of collective action. However, this paper analyzes the relationship between cooperation and dynamic change in group size using game-theoretic models. The results show the sets of parameters in which positive feedback between cooperation and group size occurs. In these parameter sets, cooperation creates a good collective image (reputation) and encourages outsiders to join the group. In turn, the group expansion gives them incentives to cooperate. Additionally, when this positive feedback functions, punishment is found to be unnecessary for cooperation.
{"title":"Self-organizing collective action: group dynamics by collective reputation","authors":"Shinya Obayashi","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2017.1371148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1371148","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the dynamics of collective action through collective reputation, which indicates the extent to which groups succeed. Many previous works introduced psychological traits such as irrationality and a sense of fairness to explain the diffusion of collective action. However, this paper analyzes the relationship between cooperation and dynamic change in group size using game-theoretic models. The results show the sets of parameters in which positive feedback between cooperation and group size occurs. In these parameter sets, cooperation creates a good collective image (reputation) and encourages outsiders to join the group. In turn, the group expansion gives them incentives to cooperate. Additionally, when this positive feedback functions, punishment is found to be unnecessary for cooperation.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"42 1","pages":"205 - 221"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1371148","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45480654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-10DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2018.1442403
J. Skvoretz
The papers in this special issue were presented at the Sixth Joint Japan–US Conference on Mathematical Sociology and Rational Choice held on August 2016 in Seattle, WA. The conference was cosponsored by two sections of the American Sociological Association (Mathematical Sociology and Rationality and Society) and by the Japanese Association for Mathematical Sociology. Professors Jun Kobayashi (Seikei University), Masayuki Kanai (Senshu University), Kikuko Nagayoshi (Tohoku University), John Skvoretz (University of South Florida), and Douglas Heckathorn (Cornell University) were the conference organizers. The four papers in this special issue are a subset of the papers that were invited for the issue, and these in turn were a subset of all the papers presented. Invited papers were selected by the organizers with an eye toward the generality of problem and depth of mathematical content. All submitted papers were peer reviewed as per the standard review procedures of the journal. Three of the papers are very much in the tradition of rational choice: “Late Marriage and Transition from Arranged Marriages to Love Matches” (Kezuka), “The Survival of Inefficient and Efficient Norms” (Kira), and “Self-organizing Collective Action” (Obayashi). Actors are assumed to gain utility from their actions but how much depends on the actions of others and on parametric factors of theoretical interest. Actors are presumed to maximize utility. Their behavioral strategies include first-order actions (such as cooperate or not) and possible higher-order actions that are sanctioning reactions to lower-order behaviors by others. The aim of analysis, generally, is to derive equilibrium conditions. The problems addressed in the Kira and Obayashi papers are quite broad, namely, collective action and the survival of norms of cooperation. The Kezuka paper is motivated by an empirical puzzle in developed countries with the specific example of Japan, in which there is increasing delay in first marriage. The fourth paper, “What Can You and I Do to Reduce Income Inequality?” (Jasso), differs from the others in several ways. There is no formal model of actors nor functional specification of the factors on which their utility depends. The point of paper is not to assume some action set available to actors and look for equilibrium conditions expressed as stable probabilities over strategies, but rather to develop an understanding of what actions are available to actors if they were to seek to reduce income inequality. In “Late Marriage and Transition from Arranged Marriages to Love Matches,” Kezuka links the delay to a change in the basis of marriage from arranged matches to love matches, a change that is driven in turn by a change in value system from traditional to individualistic. An important background element is the division of the actor population into different social classes because arranged matches can only occur between actors of the same class. Love matches can occur even i
{"title":"Inequality, cooperation, collective action, and delayed marital unions: papers from the Sixth Joint Japan–US Conference on Mathematical Sociology and Rational Choice","authors":"J. Skvoretz","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2018.1442403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1442403","url":null,"abstract":"The papers in this special issue were presented at the Sixth Joint Japan–US Conference on Mathematical Sociology and Rational Choice held on August 2016 in Seattle, WA. The conference was cosponsored by two sections of the American Sociological Association (Mathematical Sociology and Rationality and Society) and by the Japanese Association for Mathematical Sociology. Professors Jun Kobayashi (Seikei University), Masayuki Kanai (Senshu University), Kikuko Nagayoshi (Tohoku University), John Skvoretz (University of South Florida), and Douglas Heckathorn (Cornell University) were the conference organizers. The four papers in this special issue are a subset of the papers that were invited for the issue, and these in turn were a subset of all the papers presented. Invited papers were selected by the organizers with an eye toward the generality of problem and depth of mathematical content. All submitted papers were peer reviewed as per the standard review procedures of the journal. Three of the papers are very much in the tradition of rational choice: “Late Marriage and Transition from Arranged Marriages to Love Matches” (Kezuka), “The Survival of Inefficient and Efficient Norms” (Kira), and “Self-organizing Collective Action” (Obayashi). Actors are assumed to gain utility from their actions but how much depends on the actions of others and on parametric factors of theoretical interest. Actors are presumed to maximize utility. Their behavioral strategies include first-order actions (such as cooperate or not) and possible higher-order actions that are sanctioning reactions to lower-order behaviors by others. The aim of analysis, generally, is to derive equilibrium conditions. The problems addressed in the Kira and Obayashi papers are quite broad, namely, collective action and the survival of norms of cooperation. The Kezuka paper is motivated by an empirical puzzle in developed countries with the specific example of Japan, in which there is increasing delay in first marriage. The fourth paper, “What Can You and I Do to Reduce Income Inequality?” (Jasso), differs from the others in several ways. There is no formal model of actors nor functional specification of the factors on which their utility depends. The point of paper is not to assume some action set available to actors and look for equilibrium conditions expressed as stable probabilities over strategies, but rather to develop an understanding of what actions are available to actors if they were to seek to reduce income inequality. In “Late Marriage and Transition from Arranged Marriages to Love Matches,” Kezuka links the delay to a change in the basis of marriage from arranged matches to love matches, a change that is driven in turn by a change in value system from traditional to individualistic. An important background element is the division of the actor population into different social classes because arranged matches can only occur between actors of the same class. Love matches can occur even i","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"42 1","pages":"183 - 185"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1442403","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43981426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-10DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2017.1390745
Yosuke Kira
ABSTRACT Although meta-norms have been considered as the key to sustaining cooperation norms, this study argues that the meta-norms also facilitate the survival of inefficient norms. The opportunistic norm violation strategy is proposed as an alternative mechanism to motivate costly punishments. A repeated norm enforcing game, in which the externality of the normative action can be negative or positive, is analyzed. This game is equivalent to a social dilemma if the externality is large enough. The ranges of externalities that support tit-for-tat, meta-norm, and opportunism equilibria are compared. The meta-norm equilibrium has the highest stability; however, it can persist in negative externalities. Finally, the opportunism equilibrium is more stable than the tit-for-tat equilibrium, but it breaks down when the externality is small.
{"title":"The survival of inefficient and efficient norms: Equilibria with and without meta-norms in a repeated norm enforcing game","authors":"Yosuke Kira","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2017.1390745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1390745","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Although meta-norms have been considered as the key to sustaining cooperation norms, this study argues that the meta-norms also facilitate the survival of inefficient norms. The opportunistic norm violation strategy is proposed as an alternative mechanism to motivate costly punishments. A repeated norm enforcing game, in which the externality of the normative action can be negative or positive, is analyzed. This game is equivalent to a social dilemma if the externality is large enough. The ranges of externalities that support tit-for-tat, meta-norm, and opportunism equilibria are compared. The meta-norm equilibrium has the highest stability; however, it can persist in negative externalities. Finally, the opportunism equilibrium is more stable than the tit-for-tat equilibrium, but it breaks down when the externality is small.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"42 1","pages":"222 - 236"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1390745","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44781164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-24DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2018.1496917
F. Lillo, José Augusto Molina Garay
ABSTRACT Remittances are flows of money between immigrants and their relatives. A scarcely addressed topic related to human migration is the application of Network Flow Analysis (NFA) in the study of remittances. This study provides both a theoretical and empirical macro-level study of worldwide remittance flows. Theoretically, a remittance model used by the World Bank is probabilistically analyzed and useful probability bounds are derived. Empirically, a weighted graph model built from World Bank data delivers important insight on the remittance generative process, the highest remittance flow values and inflow–outflow remittance variations. This manuscript concludes by postulating that remittances potentially result from a multiplicative process and that techniques based on NFA provide novel ways of approaching remittance dynamics problems.
{"title":"The global remittance network: an inflow and outflow analysis","authors":"F. Lillo, José Augusto Molina Garay","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2018.1496917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1496917","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Remittances are flows of money between immigrants and their relatives. A scarcely addressed topic related to human migration is the application of Network Flow Analysis (NFA) in the study of remittances. This study provides both a theoretical and empirical macro-level study of worldwide remittance flows. Theoretically, a remittance model used by the World Bank is probabilistically analyzed and useful probability bounds are derived. Empirically, a weighted graph model built from World Bank data delivers important insight on the remittance generative process, the highest remittance flow values and inflow–outflow remittance variations. This manuscript concludes by postulating that remittances potentially result from a multiplicative process and that techniques based on NFA provide novel ways of approaching remittance dynamics problems.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":"43 1","pages":"59 - 75"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1496917","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44682910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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