Journal of Bioethical Inquiry最新文献

Rising rates of female incarceration within the United States are incompatible with the lack of federal standards outlining the rights of incarcerated mothers and their children. A robust body of evidence demonstrates that prison nurseries, programmes designed for mothers to keep their infants under their care during detainment or incarceration, provide essential and beneficial care that could not otherwise be achieved within the current carceral infrastructure. These benefits include facilitation of breastfeeding, bonding during a critical period of child development, and decreased recidivism rates for participants. Legal precedent exists to support the rights of the mother to continue to parent their child but remains in stark opposition to current prison infrastructure that could allow them to do so. Existing state policies also have inconsistent mechanisms for determining child eligibility and should move to centre decision-making on a case-by-case basis. This work will demonstrate that a just society, supported by law and ensuring maternal-child welfare supports the establishment of prison nursery programmes as a part of the existing right to healthcare for incarcerated individuals.

I consider cases of multifetal pregnancy in which one fetus with a fatal birth defect poses a risk to the survival of another healthy fetus to show that the substance view anti-abortion position leads to a contradiction. In cases of complicated multifetal pregnancy, if intervention by selective abortion to terminate the defective fetus is not performed, both fetuses will die due to the conditions created by the defective fetus's fatal birth defect. Because abortion is wrong on the anti-abortion position, and a moderate anti-abortion position cannot make an exception for selective abortion in cases of complicated multifetal pregnancy if it operates on the substance view, choosing selective abortion must be wrong, so one must let both fetuses die. However, the substance view anti-abortion position must take letting both fetuses die to be wrong, otherwise it will undermine itself as an anti-abortion position. Further, the substance view provides grounds for why letting fetuses die would be wrong anyway. Thus, the substance view anti-abortion position must take both having an abortion and not having an abortion to be wrong, which is a contradiction. Therefore, cases of complicated multifetal pregnancy show that the substance view anti-abortion position is false.

The present paper argues that abortion ban advocates can justify an exception for rape. Recently, Blackshaw offered an interesting argument that if abortion ban advocates modified their position along the lines of Thomson's analysis of rights, they could make an exception for rape. However, doing so would require making concessions they would be unlikely to make, the crucial one being subscribing to an absurd view that abortion in the case of rape is permissible but only if it is performed in a certain way, that is, in a way that withdraws life support from the fetus. Agreeing first with Blackshaw's premises, we argue that the view in question is hardly absurd. Thus, relying on Boonin's acknowledgment that although very rare, a position according to which abortion should be legal but only if it is performed in a way that lets the fetus die rather than kills it is a possible position, we argue, first, that it is Blackshaw's position that is inconsistent, second, that since deontology sees permissibility of a given result as path-dependent, deontologically oriented abortion ban advocates should find the view in question appealing rather than absurd and, third, that although there are indeed scenarios in which withdrawing life support is morally equivalent to killing, extraction abortions in the case of rape are not amongst them. Since in the case of rape the fetus is not entitled to life support, extraction abortions are better classified as permissible non-omissive allowings than impermissible killings. Thus, there is nothing absurd in the view that abortion in the case of rape is permissible but only if it is performed in a certain way. Accordingly, adopting this view does not seem to be much of a concession for abortion ban advocates who can therefore make an exception for rape.

Principlism appears to be the prevailing applied ethical framework in bioethics. Despite the view's various strengths, critics point out that since the principles are ad hoc, conflicts indubitably emerge leading to inconsistency. There is debate around whether principlism can provide definitive action-guiding moral prescriptions or only help structure intelligent analyses and justifications of moral choices. In this paper, I contend that applying concepts of moral symmetry and moral asymmetry allows us to modify one of principlism's principles-the principle of beneficence-into what I will call the principle of compassion. I argue that the principle of compassion can function as an arbitrating or primary principle within the principlist framework. The result is a view we might call compassionate principlism. Arguably, compassionate principlism leads to fewer inconsistencies and provides more acceptable action-guiding moral prescriptions than traditional principlism.

The prevalence of obesity, metabolic syndrome, and the associated long-term chronic diseases (cardiovascular disease, type II diabetes, cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, depression) have reached epidemic levels in the United States and Western nations. In response to this public health calamity, the author of this paper presents and defends a novel bioethical argument: the consistency argument for outlawing SSBs (sugar-sweetened beverages) for child consumption (the “consistency argument”). This argument’s radical conclusion states that the government is justified in outlawing SSBs consumption for child consumption. The reasoning is as follows: if one accepts that the physical harm caused by chronic alcohol consumption justifies the government outlawing alcoholic beverages for child consumption, and there is strong evidence that comparable physical harms result from chronic SSBs consumption, then, mutatis mutandis, the government is also justified in outlawing child consumption of SSBs. To support this argument, the author provides extensive evidence based on epidemiological observational studies, interventional studies, controlled trials, large meta-analyses, and the pathophysiology and biological mechanisms of action behind SSBs and chronic disease. Chronic consumption of large doses of SSBs and alcoholic beverages both drive the same diseases: obesity and insulin resistance, cardiovascular disease, hypertension, and cancer. Chronic SSB consumption carries the additional risk of Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, and depression. The author concludes this paper by considering prominent objections to the consistency argument, and then demonstrating that each objection is unsound.

In the last decade literature focused on a "less is more" approach has been primarily represented by clinical cases describing the excesses of an aggressive, redundant, non-personalized, and non-respectful medicine. Most of these articles focus on a "more is worse" approach and centre around the downstream negative consequences of medical overuse. Having identified a gap in the literature on the experience and practice of less, rather than the harms of excess, we carried out an exploratory qualitative study into how a "less is more" approach works in practice. A hermeneutic phenomenological approach was adopted to allow us to examine the realm of lived experience as a valid data source and as a path from which to understand a "less is more" approach "from the bedside." A Phenomenology of Practice was chosen as a more specific frame for this research because of its added focus on action and practical application in professional settings. Seventy stories written by physicians, patients, nurses, caregivers, and other health professionals have been received and analysed. These stories were gathered as part of a project called "Slow Stories" which aimed to collect clinical cases that have been positively resolved by adopting a "less is more" approach to patient care. After having conducted an in-depth analysis, separately and as a group, the researchers identified five key phenomenological themes; Time to relate is time to heal; Doing more does not mean doing better; Settings for a slow medicine; Slow care at the end of life; and Personalized vs. standardized treatment. Each of these themes offers insights into how a "less is more" approach can be used in practice and illustrates how a "less is more" strategy can play a significant role in positively resolving certain clinical cases.

A fundamental criterion considered essential to deem the procedure of vital organ procurement for transplantation ethical is that the donor must be dead, as per the Dead Donor Rule (DDR). In the case of Donation after Circulatory Death (DCD), is the donor genuinely dead? The main aim of this article is to clarify this uncertainty, which primarily arises from the fact that in DCD, death is determined based on cardiac criteria (Circulatory Death, CD), rather than neurological criteria (Brain Death, BD), and that to allow the procurement procedure, physicians reperfuse the organs in an assisted manner. To ensure that the cessation of circulation leads to the irreversible loss of brain functions, DCD regulations require that physicians wait a certain period after CD before commencing vital organ procurement. However, during this "no-touch period," the organs are at risk of damage, potentially rendering them unsuitable for transplantation. When DCD is performed on patients whose CD follows a Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment (WLST) (DCD Maastricht III category), how long should the no-touch period last? Does its existence really make sense? Does beginning the procedure of vital organ procurement immediately after WLST constitute a violation of the DDR that can be ethically justified? The discussion aims to provide arguments in support of the non-absoluteness of the DDR.

“The Humanitarian Exit Dilemma” by Chin Ruamps explores the complex ethical challenges faced by humanitarian organizations when exiting projects in crisis settings, particularly armed conflict situations. The humanitarian exit dilemma arises in contexts where humanitarian assistance may generate an overall negative, rather than positive impact on affected populations due to potential entanglement in conflict situations. Yet, the book rejects a simplistic consequentialist account that focuses on maximizing harm-reduction and proposes a refreshing values-focused perspective. The book’s values-focused perspective emphasizes the importance of special relationships, distinct dependence, and reasonable expectations as essential considerations in the decision-making process on whether humanitarian organizations should stay and remain engaged or exit the conflict setting. In addition, the book proposes new humanitarian principles organizations could adopt, including the principles of vulnerability, causality, appropriateness, trust, and culpability. Humanitarian practitioners and policymakers, as well as (bio)ethicists, will find compelling insights of real-world policy on how value-based considerations can be incorporated when dealing with difficult trade-offs for vulnerable populations.

Medicine-and specifically surgery and surgical ethics-have long been part of the history of science. Surgical ethics play a pivotal role in ensuring successful outcomes and maintaining the highest standards of patient care. It includes the ethics of surgeons, the responsibility of surgeons, surgical errors, and the competence of a surgeon. Many works have been written about surgery, including during Iran's Safavid period (1501 to 1736)-a period in which a surgeon needed to have a set of moral principles in addition to practical surgical skills. One of the most valuable is Dhakhīrıh Kāmılıh, written by military surgeon Hakim Mohammad in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In this work, Ḥakim Muhāmmad dedicates a chapter specifically to the topic of surgical ethics, aiming to provide moral and legal recommendations for surgeons in addition to explaining surgical techniques and methods. Some of these recommendations include improving surgical skills through observation and practical training, paying attention to hygiene to prevent the spread of infection, and giving patients hope for recovery. Dhakhīrıh Kāmılıh is a landmark text in the history of surgical ethics.

With the increasing prevalence of artificial intelligence (AI) and other digital technologies in healthcare, the ethical debate surrounding their adoption is becoming more prominent. Here I consider the issue of gaining informed patient consent to AI-enhanced care from the vantage point of the United Kingdom's National Health Service setting. I build my discussion around two claims from the World Health Organization: that healthcare services should not be denied to individuals who refuse AI-enhanced care and that there is no precedence to seeking patient consent to AI-enhanced care. I discus U.K. law relating to patient consent and the General Data Protection Regulation to show that current standards relating to patient consent are adequate for AI-enhanced care. I then suggest that in the future it may not be possible to guarantee patient access to non-AI-enhanced healthcare, in a similar way to how we do not offer patients manual alternatives to automated healthcare processes. Throughout my discussion I focus on the issues of patient choice and veracity in the patient-clinician relationship. Finally, I suggest that the best way to protect patients from potential harms associated with the introduction of AI to patient care is not via an overly burdensome patient consent process but via evaluation and regulation of AI technologies.