Journal of Bioethical Inquiry最新文献

Feelings of guilt are human emotions that may arise if a person committed an action that contradicts basic moral mores or failed to commit an action that is considered moral according to their ethical standards and values. Psychological scholarship distinguishes between altruistic guilt (AG) and deontological guilt (DG). AG results from having caused harm to an innocent victim, either by acting or failing to act, whereas DG is caused by violating a moral principle. Although physicians may be expected to experience frequent feelings of guilt in their demanding and intensive work, it is surprising to find that this issue has not been explored in the professional literature on medical ethics. To that end, we conducted a qualitative study that included personal in-depth interviews with Sunni Muslim gynaecologists. These doctors provide underground infertility care and perform religiously forbidden treatments involving sex selection and gamete donation. They opened their hearts and spoke about the emotionally taxing pangs of conscience they suffer. Analysing their narratives led us to characterize their feelings of guilt as DG. We discuss the causes for their plight and the way they cope with it, compare DG to the concept of moral distress, and call for future research on clinicians' feelings of guilt and pangs of conscience.

Rapid developments in science and technology have resulted in novel discoveries, leading to new questions particularly related to human values and ethics. Every discovery and technology has positive and negative implications and affects human lives either directly or indirectly, involving all walks of life. Bioethical discourse in Malaysia must consider the multiracial and multireligious background of Malaysia and especially the Islamic view as the majority of Malaysians are Muslims and Islam is the religion of the federation. This article discusses several selected bioethical issues in Malaysia by studying the application of maṣlaḥah (the public good) and mafsadah (evil and harms) in Malaysian Islamic rulings (fatwas). This article uses the critical interpretation approach, as this is an ethical, interpretive, textual, and contextual analysis. In a situation when there is a conflict between maṣlaḥah and avoidance of mafsadah, it is preferred to attempt to address both needs. However, if maṣlaḥah and avoidance of mafsadah are mutually exclusive, the decision to choose must be made by weighing (tarjīḥ) and choosing the one which is superior. The maṣlaḥah and mafsadah concepts play vital and significant roles in bioethical discourse to realize human essential interests, namely faith, life, lineage, intellect, and property, thus achieving maqāṣid al-sharī'ah (the ultimate goal of sharia). This concept helps in guiding bioethical discussions, especially in determining the priority between achieving benefits and avoiding harms. The application of this concept will also assist Malaysian authorities in formulating appropriate rulings, especially bioethical issues related to Malaysian Muslims' lives.

Suppose COVID-19 is the runaway tram in the famous moral thought experiment, known as the "Bystander at the Switch." Consider the two differentiated responses of governments around the world to this new threat, namely the option of quarantine/lockdown and herd immunity. Can we contrast the hypothetical with the real scenario? What do the institutional decisions and strategies for dealing with the virus, in the beginning of 2020, signify in a normative moral framework? This paper investigates these possibilities in order to highlight the similarities and, more importantly, the differences that exist between utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Analysis shows that the hypothetical scenario can never be fully compared to the complex multifactorial nature of the real world. But if a comparison is attempted, the most obvious difference between the two governmental strategies is the concept of duty within the Kantian perspective. Ultimately, it is a matter of comparing freedom and life. Attributing a moral "priority ticket" to one or the other can be analysed through interpersonal aggregation.

Oral healthcare is attracting much attention after decades of neglect from policymakers. Recent studies have shown a strong association between oral and overall health, which can lead to serious health problems. Availability of oral healthcare services is an essential part of ensuring universal healthcare coverage. More importantly, current gaps in its accessibility by minority or marginalized population groups are crucial public health as well as ethical concerns. One notable effort to address this issue comes from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which offer oral healthcare services for non-insured refugees. However, the challenge remains that these care services are not comprehensive, which has implications for the refugees' oral and general health. In this article, we discuss this complex issue in the German healthcare context by including ethical reflections. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to discuss the ethical challenges related to oral healthcare services provided by NGOs for refugees in Germany. First, we will introduce the general oral healthcare context worldwide and in Germany. Second, we will provide a general description of the oral healthcare services provided by NGOs for refugees in Germany, as well as an overview of existing gaps. This will provide us with the context for our third and most important task-discussing the ethical implications of the gaps. In doing so, and since the ethical implications can be several, we demarcate the scope of our analysis by focusing on the specific ethical issues of justice, harm, and autonomy. Finally, we offer some recommendations for how to move forward.

In order to study early human development while avoiding the burdens associated with human embryo research, scientists are redirecting their efforts towards so-called human embryo-like structures (hELS). hELS are created from clusters of human pluripotent stem cells and seem capable of mimicking early human development with increasing accuracy. Notwithstanding, hELS research finds itself at the intersection of historically controversial fields, and the expectation that it might be received as similarly sensitive is prompting proactive law reform in many jurisdictions, including the Netherlands. However, studies on the public perception of hELS research remain scarce. To help guide policymakers and fill this gap in the literature, we conducted an explorative qualitative study aimed at mapping the range of perspectives in the Netherlands on the creation and research use of hELS. This article reports on a subset of our findings, namely those pertaining to (the degrees of and requirements for) confidence in research with hELS and its regulation. Despite commonly found disparities in confidence on emerging biotechnologies, we also found wide consensus regarding the requirements for having (more) confidence in hELS research. We conclude by reflecting on how these findings could be relevant to researchers and (Dutch) policymakers when interpreted within the context of their limitations.

Actions to prepare for and prevent pandemics are a common topic for bioethical analysis. However, little attention has been paid to global catastrophic biological risks more broadly, including pandemics with artificial origins, the creation of agents for biological warfare, and harmful outcomes of human genome editing. What's more, international policy discussions often focus on economic arguments for state action, ignoring a key potential set of reasons for states to mitigate global catastrophic biological risks: moral reasons. In this paper, I frame the mitigation of such risks as a global public good, and I explore three possible categories of moral reasons that might motivate states to provide this global public good: nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and interstate obligations. Whilst there are strong objections to moral nationalism as a reason for states to act, moral cosmopolitanism may provide a broad reason which is further supplemented for individual states through the elaboration of interstate moral obligations. The obligations I consider are moral leadership, fairness, and reciprocity. Moral reasons for individual states action may more effectively or more appropriately motivate states to mitigate global catastrophic biological risks.

On June 5, 2024, the Australian Capital Territory passed a law to permit voluntary assisted dying ("VAD"). The Australian Capital Territory became the first Australian jurisdiction to permit nurse practitioners to assess eligibility for VAD. Given evidence of access barriers to VAD in Australia, including difficulty finding a doctor willing to assist, the Australian Capital Territory's approach should prompt consideration of whether the role of nurses in VAD should be expanded in other Australian jurisdictions. Drawing on lessons from Canada, which currently permits nurse practitioners to assess patient eligibility, we argue that the time has come for Australian jurisdictions to expand the role of nurses in VAD systems. This would be an important step in ensuring access to VAD for patients in practice. Attention, however, must also be paid to ensuring adequate remuneration of nurses (and doctors) if this goal of promoting access is to be achieved in practice.

Human organs available for transplant are in short supply. One way to increase the supply of organs consists in legalizing a live donor market. Such a market is, however, controversial. This article is about an objection to live donor organ markets made by Simon Rippon. Rippon's objection is that the presence of a market option creates new social and legal pressures that harm the poor. Legalizing the option of selling your organs transforms into a harmful, and morally indefensible, social, and legal pressure to sell on the financially desperate. This article defends the conclusion that Rippon's argument fails as an objection to live donor organ markets. It fails because it has implausibly expansive implications about which markets are morally problematic. In short, Rippon's argument proves too much. Sections one and two introduce Rippon's argument. Sections three and four contain the argument against Rippon. The main argumentative move is that the features of an organ market that, according to Rippon, justify a ban on such a market are features that also characterize several other markets that are normally considered unproblematic, for example, markets where individuals sell their labour abroad in jobs that are dangerous. So, if an organ market should be legally impermissible, so should these labour markets. Section five considers several objections to the argument against Rippon. It is argued that these objections fail. Section six is a conclusion that sums up the findings of the article.

The struggle over legal abortion access in the United States is a religious controversy, not a scientific debate. Religious activists who believe that meaningful individual life (i.e., "personhood") begins at a specific "moment-of-conception" are attempting to pass laws that force this view upon all pregnant persons, irrespective of their medical circumstances, individual preferences, or personal religious beliefs. This paper argues that such actions promote a constitutionally prohibited "establishment of religion." Abortion policy in a secular state must be based upon scientifically accurate biology, not unprovable theological presuppositions. The scientific facts regarding human pregnancy do not support the position that personhood begins with fertilization-at which point a pregnancy does not yet even exist. Abortion policy should regard the embryo/fetus as part of the pregnant individual's body until delivery. We argue that individual "personhood" only begins when the latent potentialities of the fetal nervous system are actualized in the newborn after delivery. The paper argues that instantiating non-scientific beliefs concerning embryonic/fetal "personhood" into the law as the basis for abortion policy establishes a state-sponsored religion. The protection of religious liberty requires that abortion be decriminalized. Abortion should be treated like any other medical procedure and regulated similarly. To protect both religious freedom and sound medical practice, individual legal personhood should be recognized as beginning only at birth.