Pub Date : 2024-03-13DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.5
Pavel Hlavinka
In Being and Time it is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of release ( Freisein ) and freedom ( Freiheit ). The term "release" refers to the facticity of Dasein, that is, the provision of a field of orientation for Dasein in being-in-the-world, and "freedom" refers to its existentiality, that is, the authentic grasping of this field in the form of one's own projection ( Entwurf ). There seems to be no place for the traditional notion of freedom. In spite of this impression, the author of Being and Time leaves us in no doubt that the notion of freedom in the sense of liberum arbitrium is inseparable from existential analytics. After the turn in Heidegger's thought, Being ( Sein ) is no longer thought from the position of a modern subjectivism transformed into Dasein. It is not we who think Be-ing ( Seyn ), but Be-ing itself thinks us. It is not we who are free, but Be-ing itself realizes its freedom through us.
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Pub Date : 2024-03-13DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.8
Maria Teresa Russo
The aim of this article is to show how the inseparability of its objective and subjective dimensions renders pain such a complex phenomenon that it poses a challenge for both the biomedical sciences and philosophy. Neurophysiology has ascertained the variability of the relationship between damage and pain, showing that it is the result of interaction between the sensory and affective-emotional constituents of the human being. However, the process of defining the clinical concept of suffering appears comprehensively laborious and ongoing. Philosophy, while declaring the impossibility of identifying the essence of pain, makes a valuable contribution to the discovery of the singularity of the experience, thanks to the phenomenology of the homo patiens . Finally, we examine the debate on the possibility and the different ways of narrating and appraising suffering, a need with obvious ethical implications, perceived more and more within the field of care, also given the chronicity of many medical conditions.
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Pub Date : 2024-03-13DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.6
Sreetama Misra
This paper explores the realm of Heidegger’s writings to examine how moral ideas intersect with non-human creatures from a phenomenological standpoint. The human-animal dilemma becomes more urgent over time, and our future becomes less predictable. The paper commences by examining the significance of attending to the particularities of Dasein , as understood in the Heideggerian framework. This entails moving beyond the limited boundaries of contemporary scientific and technocratic paradigms and illuminating the potential for investigating not only human experiences but also those of animals. This study examines Heidegger’s phenomenological understanding of animals, focusing on the post-humanist emotional aspects of human morality. It acknowledges the presence of intersubjectivity and investigates the underlying intersectionality. Additionally, it suggests potential directions for future research and inquiry.
{"title":"Heidegger, Moral Values, and Non-Human Animals: Philosophical Intersections","authors":"Sreetama Misra","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.6","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the realm of Heidegger’s writings to examine how moral ideas intersect with non-human creatures from a phenomenological standpoint. The human-animal dilemma becomes more urgent over time, and our future becomes less predictable. The paper commences by examining the significance of attending to the particularities of Dasein , as understood in the Heideggerian framework. This entails moving beyond the limited boundaries of contemporary scientific and technocratic paradigms and illuminating the potential for investigating not only human experiences but also those of animals. This study examines Heidegger’s phenomenological understanding of animals, focusing on the post-humanist emotional aspects of human morality. It acknowledges the presence of intersubjectivity and investigates the underlying intersectionality. Additionally, it suggests potential directions for future research and inquiry.","PeriodicalId":502748,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia","volume":"96 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140247245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-13DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.7
Giulia Codognato
MacIntyre’s
麦金太尔的
{"title":"Human Flourishing, Human Nature, and Practices: Macintyre’s Ethics Still Requires a More Thomistic Metaphysics","authors":"Giulia Codognato","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.7","url":null,"abstract":"MacIntyre’s","PeriodicalId":502748,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia","volume":"86 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140247397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-13DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.2
Juan José Rodríguez
J
J
{"title":"The “Juncture” of Being: A New Assessment of the Schellingian Distinction between Ground and Existence","authors":"Juan José Rodríguez","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.2","url":null,"abstract":"J","PeriodicalId":502748,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia","volume":"77 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140247579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-13DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.1
Philip Kitcher
I argue that the currently confused talk about “values in science” should be understood in terms of schemes of values. The new demarcation problem is then formulated as asking “Which scheme(s) of values should scientists adopt?” I defend the view that my title provides the answer.
{"title":"The Scientist, Qua Scientist, Is an Ethical Agent","authors":"Philip Kitcher","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.1","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that the currently confused talk about “values in science” should be understood in terms of schemes of values. The new demarcation problem is then formulated as asking “Which scheme(s) of values should scientists adopt?” I defend the view that my title provides the answer.","PeriodicalId":502748,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia","volume":"2018 44","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140246022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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