Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science最新文献

This article addresses the implications of ´Understanding the process of Taoistic-informed mindfulness from a Meadian perspective´, a work by von Fircks (2023) published in this journal, which represents a vindication of the historic, philosophic, and subjective dimensions of research in psychology. From my perspective as an indigenous researcher, I share my own experience of how deceitful distinctions between more or less scientific research topics are fostered by the omission of those dimensions. I also introduce the indigenous understanding of well-being to emphasize the relational nature of this phenomenon and similarities with some conclusions arising from the autoethnographic approach of the author. Moreover, the trivialization of well-being and epistemic violence toward the indigenous corpus of knowledge are signaled as consequences of reductionism in psychological research and the pursuit of scientific status. In this vein, the lack of a critical perspective in psychology is considered functional to the order in which possibilities for well-being are seriously constrained.

This article aims to renew the discussion about meaning in the field of psychology. A model is presented that, contrary to the classical view of meaning as an entity taken for granted, explains the dynamics through which it comes to be constituted, opening itself to the possibility of being experienced, as a psychological reality. The autoethnographic analysis carried out by von Fircks (IBPS 53(4):632-643, 2023) is used as example to show how such a model enables an understanding of local phenomena through the comprehension of the semiotic dynamics underlying them. Finally, this paper offers insights into the mechanisms that underlie the field of possibility of meaning-making processes, thus of human experience.

Building on Fircks (2023), who aims at integrating the theoretical and historical roots of mindfulness into psychology through a bridge between Taoism, relying on the polarity of life and wu wei (the principle of not-forcing) and Mead's Social Psychology, this commentary seeks to further explore how mindfulness, meditation and self-transcendence plays a role in the personal needs hierarchy of the human organism. This is done in the framework of Abraham Maslow's theory of human motivation and his hierarchy of needs, where a model that introduces a new layer in the hierarchy of needs, the need for self-transcendence, is presented. This model containing the new hierarchy of self-transcendence is based on Maslow's own notion of peak-experiences, as well as related to William James' notion of mystical experiences. Fircks' (2023) autoethnographic meditative experience is conceptualized as a peak-experience and analyzed to show how human beings strive to experience this state of being.

In this introduction to a thematic issue dealing with free will, some possibilities of free will in different physical, social, and technological worlds, as well as discussions of the possibilities are considered. What are the possibilities and limitations of free will in various other worlds differing from our world? What are the possibilities and limitations of free will in different species, both in our world and in other hypothetical worlds, including future species, naturally evolving, and artificially modified? What are the possibilities and limitations of free will related to the development of AI? How can the diversity of free will levels in an agent be related to possible levels (depth) of its self-knowledge? What can agents differing in levels of self-knowledge know and think about the issue of free will? How do different societies (social worlds) support and inhibit different manifestations of free will in different areas? What is the role of hard neurodeterminism and "mindless neuroscience" in general neuroscience? What are ethical aspects of the questions, including the initial one: "If a neuroscientist denies free will, how can they write a text of voluntary informed consent and propose to sign it?".

In recent years, neurophysiological research has pushed the concept of free will towards a reductionist interpretation, largely avoiding the concept of a freely willing agent. This paper explores the ongoing debate surrounding free will, highlighting the contrasting perspectives of determinism, indeterminism (libertarianism), and compatibilism. It questions how individuals, particularly those adhering to deterministic viewpoints, can ethically navigate a world defined by causal relationships. The paper argues that reductionist approaches struggle to account for ethical responsibility and the human experience of making choices. While compatibilism offers a middle ground, asserting that actions in line with one's desires are free and thus ethically accountable, this stance is scrutinized for its potential limitations in answering questions about personal responsibility. Specifically, it is argued that compatibilism may not be the ideal framework for a neurophysiologist confronted with ethical dilemmas, thus leaving room for the re-examination of indeterminism. Through this discussion, the paper aims to contribute to a nuanced understanding of free will that incorporates both the scientific and philosophical dimensions of human decision-making.

Free will plays a critical role in human motivation. Recent advances in science and technologies have had a significant impact on free will. They have raised serious concerns regarding the threatening effects of such advancements on perceived autonomy. However, there is still a longstanding debate on the existence of free will, known as the problem of free will. Philosophers have provided contrasting views regarding the existence of free will and its relationship with causal determination and mental causation problems. These problems are related to the underlying dualistic approach between mental and physical factors. Similar to the philosophy literature, the motivation literature is concerned with the problem of free will and its influence on motivation and performance. Cognitive evaluation and self-determination theories are the most renowned theories which assert the effect of autonomy (i.e., free will) on intrinsic motivation. However, these theories have mainly focused on the effect of the need for autonomy as an underlying driver of intrinsic motivation. They have not been able to address the fundamental question about the existence of actual free will and its effect on motivation and performance. This is mainly due to their dualistic approach in the form of intrinsic/extrinsic motivation dichotomization. Motivational congruence theory addresses the problem of free will and substantiates its effect by going beyond such a dualistic approach and resolving the related problems of mental causation and causal determination. The theory does this by taking a cotextualist and dialectical approach to the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivational mechanisms and context.

The current article explores the meaning of neuroscientific evidence in the legal domain. It takes a social-psychological perspective to discuss how group-based stereotypes affect legal decision-making critically. Examining how any interpretation is anchored and objectified is interesting as evidence is interpreted in the context. Dominantly, with the ubiquity of neuroscience in different domains, the brain is positioned as an authentic source of nurturing authenticity. It is observed that sometimes unquestionable scientific knowledge may surpass the rationality and intuition of judges. In one way, it is a boon; in another, it is shaping the whole framework of our knowledge system, where knowledge from brain studies reifies our understanding of human actions and thinking.

I will in this article use Fircks as a point of departure for trying to understand the complexities involved in the use of the concept of mindfulness. As will be seen, mindfulness can be traced to a decoupling from a religious background and subsequent appropriation within several Western contexts. This will then be used for a discussion of how to deal with the historicity of the phenomena studied within cultural psychology. Here two reminders will be suggested, namely understanding phenomena through a context-sensibility and at the same time being aware of any disciplinary parochialism.

von Fircks' (Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science 1-20, 2003) essay on the experience of meditation is rich in stimuli and insights. This paper aims at extrapolating and developing a germinal element from it: Semiotic mediation constitutes the core of the religious nature of the human psyche. It represents both the drive for transformation in the transcendence of the relational process and the search for stability and fixedness in the immanence of the experience of the present moment. The religiosity of the mind can be considered the expression of a transcendent function of semiosis in the very act of looking at an elsewhere in the present moment. The semiotic mediation of the religious psyche seeks meaning in the very act of creating it.

In the recent years, mindfulness-based research has experienced a boom. Yet, the majority of those studies treat mindfulness in a positivistic way, thus solely as a variable. Within such a lens of inquiry, we ignore the theoretical and historical underpinnings of mindfulness that are still important, nowadays. For that purpose, I instance a theoretical and historical framework of mindfulness grounded within Taoism - relying on the notion of the polarity of life and wu wei (the principle of not-forcing) and try to bridge that focus with Mead's Social Psychology. By means of an autoethnography, I show that mindfulness-based activities such as meditation unfold the power of an individual to experience and own a new I which then acts in a new fashion upon the demands of the (social) environment (Me). In this process, a new personality is born that integrates wholistically the polar sides of life within himself/herself.