Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science最新文献

Teacher motivation is considred as one of the most decisive factorts infulencing teacher functioing as well as students' achievement. Many variable can develop teacher motoivation. In this study, it is presumed that teacher engagement, comprising three facets of emotional, behavioral, and cognitive influence teacher motivation. To examine this hypothesis, this study takes the initiative to utiliuze an innovative artificial intelliengce (AI)-inspired approach called Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) technique. ACO is an artificial intelligence (AI) algorithm originating from natural phenomena. The concept originates from biology and physics and specifically from ants' movements. ACO has the ability to find the connections between inputs and outputs, and it can find the most influencing inputs. Motivation was the output of the study, and the inputs were three different engagement factors. Based on the results, ACO reached a high R-value meaning that it could predict the output with a high accuracy. The findings of this study substantiate the wide-ranging and multifacsted potentials of AI, in particular ACO, in studying and predicting human functioning in academic settings.

Although no one disputes that the transmission of culture depends on social learning, a capacity that has enabled humans, unlike other animals, to modify cultural practices across generations, this review argues that cultural change can also be evoked by environmental events leading to an alteration in the configuration of an habitual behavioural repertoire. An evoked mechanism allows latent or normally suppressed behaviour to emerge. Cannibalism and warfare are put forward as examples. Evoked mechanisms have largely been ignored by one of the few attempts to reconcile biology and culture, namely cumulative cultural evolution (CCE). This review endorses CCE's aim of developing a biocultural conceptual framework but criticises this model for failing to produce a credible analysis of culture into 'units' or 'variants'. The critique of CCE is situated within a discussion of the long-standing separation within academia of science and arts disciplines, each focusing at different levels of analysis and with different aims. It is suggested that the main obstacle to developing a biocultural framework can be attributed to an incompatibility between nomothetic and idiographic research methods, the former being typical of the biological sciences, the latter of the arts. A successful biocultural conceptual framework would therefore have to accommodate the particular and the general. It is suggested that progress in this direction would be made if agreement could be reached on ways of observing or inferring behaviours rather than pursuing an analysis in terms of hypothetical constructs such as mental representations or units of 'cultural information'.

Otherness is a complex and polysemic notion that is conceptualized in both philosophy and psychology. The paper examines otherness as a universal phenomenon of the human psyche that manifests in relation to oneself and interpersonal relationships with others. Philosophical ideas, including those of Hegel, Lévinas and Waldenfels, are introduced as providing essential theoretical background for psychological studies of otherness. The psychological section deals with otherness from various perspectives, with emphasis on internal processes of an individual, drawing on theories within psychoanalytical and intrapsychic traditions, as well as the intersection of otherness and identity. Otherness is introduced as a variable influencing complex individual and social processes, such as the perception of individuals and groups. Finally, a taxonomy of otherness is proposed that reflects the multifaceted nature of the concept and could help navigate the existing literature as well as guide new studies.

The biological foundations of language reflect assumptions about the way language and biology relate to one another, and with the rise of biological studies of language, we appear to have come closer to a deep understanding of linguistic cognition-the part of cognition constituted by language. This article argues that relations of neurobiological and genetic instantiation between linguistic cognition and the underlying biological substrate are ultimately irrelevant to understanding the higher-level structure and form of language. Linguistic patterns and those that make up the character of cognition constituted by language do not simply arise from the biological substrate because higher-level structures typically assume forms based on constraints that only emerge once these new levels are constructed. The goal is not to show how the mapping problem between linguistic cognition and neurobiology can be solved. Rather, the goal is to show the mapping problem ceases to exist once a different understanding of language-(neuro)biology relations is embraced. With this goal, this article first uncovers a number of logical and conceptual fallacies in strategies deployed in understanding language-(neuro)biology relations. After having shown these flaws, the article offers an alternative view of language-biology relations that shows how biological constraints shape language (nature and form), making it what it is.

Dualism has long been part of human sciences, including psychology and its sub-discipline of motivation. In psychology, such dualism is reflected in the rationalism-empiricism dichotomy. This dichotomy has resulted in two seemingly contradictory perspectives, including empiricism and rationalism. From empiricism perspective, the primary contact between subject and object is the passive reception of inputs from the environment. From rationalism perspective, the primary contact is through the match between conceptual forms and empirical observations. Relying on the notion of "being-in-the-world", activity theories reconcile these discrepancies by stressing the role of individual's activity in the contact between individual and the world. Similarly, in the motivation literature, such duality is highlighted by the dissection of motivation into intrinsic and extrinsic categories. It has resulted in three contrasting streams on the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. The first stream by reinforcement theories argues that these two motivational mechanisms act in an additive way. The second stream by undermining theories posits that they interact in a negative way. Yet, the third stream by contingency theories postulates that the simultaneous effect of these motivational mechanisms depends on reward salience. These theoretical streams either implicitly or explicitly give priority to one type of motivation over the other. Emphasizing a dialectical stance, motivational congruence theory gives equal weight to both types of motivation. It stipulates that the perceived congruence between motivational mechanisms and context determines overall motivation and performance. The theory goes beyond the dualistic approach in motivation and resolves discrepancies that have long afflicted the literature.

In this comment paper on von Fircks (2023a), I would like to focus on four issues and offer some reflections on them: first, what is happening in the process of a new I arising through mindfulness meditation practice? I would like to supplement the dialogue between Buber and Rogers in 1957 on the dynamism of I and Me, which is the basis of Mead's theory of self formation, in which I and Me separate, discover and meet a new self. The second, is that meditation, which at first glance appears to be an internal meditation practice and a personal activity, leads to a semiotic mediated social process. The Tao and early Buddhist ideas that form the background to the experiential process of mindfulness meditation will be reviewed, and the significance of people experiencing the interdependence of non-human nature and the environment through the practice will be discussed. Third, connecting this to the idea of Umwelt (Uexküll) and the semiosphere (Lotman), an attempt is made to extend the otherness as a collating body of self formation to Umwelt. Fourth, mindfulness meditation focuses attention on the breath. In relation to Mead's focus on the environment under the skin, i.e. corporeality, I will supplement the psychological meaning of cultivating the body's sense of interoception through the sensing of repetitive movements of tension and relaxation. Through the above, what kind of semiotic mediating function does mindfulness meditation have in relation to the construction of the new I, and how does it lead to the creation of social meaning? We would like to discuss these points. CLINICAL TRIAL REGISTRATION: The article does not contain any studies with clinical trial. This, clinical Trial registration is not applicable.

While religion constituted one of the main topics of interest for early social scientists, faith traditions have silently slipped from this central role. When religion now appears in psychological research, it is usually relegated to the position of either the object of psychological investigation (which psychology purports to "explain") or a static piece in the empirical puzzle (as one variable among many when explaining clinical or social outcomes). In either case, religion is generally no longer seen as an equal partner to the social sciences in our attempts to better understand of the human condition. However, there are and have been voices within psychology that see this as unnecessarily myopic. James Jackson Putnam (1846-1918), an early supporter of the emerging field of psychoanalysis, advocated that psychology take seriously philosophy, metaphysics, and religion. Putnam's objections to the narrowing of our view of human life in the spirit of scientism fell largely on deaf ears, and his call for psychology to include that which lies beyond the walls of empirical naturalism and reductionism remains relevant today. In as far as theoretical innovation in psychology is more of a creative recognition than true scientific discovery, philosophy and religion constitute tremendously rich, and unfortunately underappreciated, fonts of inspiration. Putnam saw in religion the "dim recognition" of "the creative spirit of the universe." We briefly reflect on the example of obsessive-compulsive disorder and the much older religious concept of scruples, including approaches to mindfulness. This example is suggestive of the richness of psychological insights to be found in religion.

The purpose of this article is to understand the distinctively human behavior from Aristotelian ethics and evolutionary science to offer a perspective of what it means to act rationally. We argue that this way of acting is characterized by a decision informed by the analysis of whether or not it is worth pursuing an end, and by certain means, which takes place through a weighting of consequences from the body of knowledge that the person has so far We also argue that such a process can occur quickly (and requiring a less cognitive effort) or slowly (and demanding more cognitive effort), depending on whether or not the person has previous experiences of choices that have generated good consequences in the type of context presented; What does it mean for a person to have or not rational heuristics established in their minds, which are those that are connected to the most current network of "whys" and that has been consolidated precisely because they have proven effective in pointing out what is best to do in that kind of context. Finally, we apply the perspective we are offering to evidence three imprecise notions about "acting rationally".

Neuroscience has convinced people that much of their behavior is determined by causes unknown to them and beyond their control. However, are advances in neuroscience truly a prerequisite for such beliefs? Robert Kane's theory of ultimate responsibility is libertarian theory. Its innovative nature makes it possible to discuss the neurophysiological basis of its postulates. Using the functions of the midbrain dopaminergic system as an example, this article provides an overview of this neurophysiological basis. According to Kane, if we are to be ultimately responsible for our wills as well as for our actions, some actions in our lives must lack sufficient motives and causes. These are self-forming actions. Dopamine is hypothesized to mediate self-forming action execution. Dopamine not only mediates action but also ensures synaptic plasticity in the brain, that is, learning from action; hence, dopamine changes the acting individual and provides the formation of our own wills. The basal ganglia, which are the main target of dopamine in the brain, act through parallel pathways and are involved in decision-making processes. Dopamine is also involved in the regulation of the neurodynamical properties of prefrontal cortex networks with random spiking noise. It can be assumed that the activity of the dopaminergic system is closely related to the physiological basis of free will.