Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science最新文献

While religion constituted one of the main topics of interest for early social scientists, faith traditions have silently slipped from this central role. When religion now appears in psychological research, it is usually relegated to the position of either the object of psychological investigation (which psychology purports to "explain") or a static piece in the empirical puzzle (as one variable among many when explaining clinical or social outcomes). In either case, religion is generally no longer seen as an equal partner to the social sciences in our attempts to better understand of the human condition. However, there are and have been voices within psychology that see this as unnecessarily myopic. James Jackson Putnam (1846-1918), an early supporter of the emerging field of psychoanalysis, advocated that psychology take seriously philosophy, metaphysics, and religion. Putnam's objections to the narrowing of our view of human life in the spirit of scientism fell largely on deaf ears, and his call for psychology to include that which lies beyond the walls of empirical naturalism and reductionism remains relevant today. In as far as theoretical innovation in psychology is more of a creative recognition than true scientific discovery, philosophy and religion constitute tremendously rich, and unfortunately underappreciated, fonts of inspiration. Putnam saw in religion the "dim recognition" of "the creative spirit of the universe." We briefly reflect on the example of obsessive-compulsive disorder and the much older religious concept of scruples, including approaches to mindfulness. This example is suggestive of the richness of psychological insights to be found in religion.

The purpose of this article is to understand the distinctively human behavior from Aristotelian ethics and evolutionary science to offer a perspective of what it means to act rationally. We argue that this way of acting is characterized by a decision informed by the analysis of whether or not it is worth pursuing an end, and by certain means, which takes place through a weighting of consequences from the body of knowledge that the person has so far We also argue that such a process can occur quickly (and requiring a less cognitive effort) or slowly (and demanding more cognitive effort), depending on whether or not the person has previous experiences of choices that have generated good consequences in the type of context presented; What does it mean for a person to have or not rational heuristics established in their minds, which are those that are connected to the most current network of "whys" and that has been consolidated precisely because they have proven effective in pointing out what is best to do in that kind of context. Finally, we apply the perspective we are offering to evidence three imprecise notions about "acting rationally".

Neuroscience has convinced people that much of their behavior is determined by causes unknown to them and beyond their control. However, are advances in neuroscience truly a prerequisite for such beliefs? Robert Kane's theory of ultimate responsibility is libertarian theory. Its innovative nature makes it possible to discuss the neurophysiological basis of its postulates. Using the functions of the midbrain dopaminergic system as an example, this article provides an overview of this neurophysiological basis. According to Kane, if we are to be ultimately responsible for our wills as well as for our actions, some actions in our lives must lack sufficient motives and causes. These are self-forming actions. Dopamine is hypothesized to mediate self-forming action execution. Dopamine not only mediates action but also ensures synaptic plasticity in the brain, that is, learning from action; hence, dopamine changes the acting individual and provides the formation of our own wills. The basal ganglia, which are the main target of dopamine in the brain, act through parallel pathways and are involved in decision-making processes. Dopamine is also involved in the regulation of the neurodynamical properties of prefrontal cortex networks with random spiking noise. It can be assumed that the activity of the dopaminergic system is closely related to the physiological basis of free will.

This article addresses the implications of ´Understanding the process of Taoistic-informed mindfulness from a Meadian perspective´, a work by von Fircks (2023) published in this journal, which represents a vindication of the historic, philosophic, and subjective dimensions of research in psychology. From my perspective as an indigenous researcher, I share my own experience of how deceitful distinctions between more or less scientific research topics are fostered by the omission of those dimensions. I also introduce the indigenous understanding of well-being to emphasize the relational nature of this phenomenon and similarities with some conclusions arising from the autoethnographic approach of the author. Moreover, the trivialization of well-being and epistemic violence toward the indigenous corpus of knowledge are signaled as consequences of reductionism in psychological research and the pursuit of scientific status. In this vein, the lack of a critical perspective in psychology is considered functional to the order in which possibilities for well-being are seriously constrained.

This article aims to renew the discussion about meaning in the field of psychology. A model is presented that, contrary to the classical view of meaning as an entity taken for granted, explains the dynamics through which it comes to be constituted, opening itself to the possibility of being experienced, as a psychological reality. The autoethnographic analysis carried out by von Fircks (IBPS 53(4):632-643, 2023) is used as example to show how such a model enables an understanding of local phenomena through the comprehension of the semiotic dynamics underlying them. Finally, this paper offers insights into the mechanisms that underlie the field of possibility of meaning-making processes, thus of human experience.

Building on Fircks (2023), who aims at integrating the theoretical and historical roots of mindfulness into psychology through a bridge between Taoism, relying on the polarity of life and wu wei (the principle of not-forcing) and Mead's Social Psychology, this commentary seeks to further explore how mindfulness, meditation and self-transcendence plays a role in the personal needs hierarchy of the human organism. This is done in the framework of Abraham Maslow's theory of human motivation and his hierarchy of needs, where a model that introduces a new layer in the hierarchy of needs, the need for self-transcendence, is presented. This model containing the new hierarchy of self-transcendence is based on Maslow's own notion of peak-experiences, as well as related to William James' notion of mystical experiences. Fircks' (2023) autoethnographic meditative experience is conceptualized as a peak-experience and analyzed to show how human beings strive to experience this state of being.

In this introduction to a thematic issue dealing with free will, some possibilities of free will in different physical, social, and technological worlds, as well as discussions of the possibilities are considered. What are the possibilities and limitations of free will in various other worlds differing from our world? What are the possibilities and limitations of free will in different species, both in our world and in other hypothetical worlds, including future species, naturally evolving, and artificially modified? What are the possibilities and limitations of free will related to the development of AI? How can the diversity of free will levels in an agent be related to possible levels (depth) of its self-knowledge? What can agents differing in levels of self-knowledge know and think about the issue of free will? How do different societies (social worlds) support and inhibit different manifestations of free will in different areas? What is the role of hard neurodeterminism and "mindless neuroscience" in general neuroscience? What are ethical aspects of the questions, including the initial one: "If a neuroscientist denies free will, how can they write a text of voluntary informed consent and propose to sign it?".

In recent years, neurophysiological research has pushed the concept of free will towards a reductionist interpretation, largely avoiding the concept of a freely willing agent. This paper explores the ongoing debate surrounding free will, highlighting the contrasting perspectives of determinism, indeterminism (libertarianism), and compatibilism. It questions how individuals, particularly those adhering to deterministic viewpoints, can ethically navigate a world defined by causal relationships. The paper argues that reductionist approaches struggle to account for ethical responsibility and the human experience of making choices. While compatibilism offers a middle ground, asserting that actions in line with one's desires are free and thus ethically accountable, this stance is scrutinized for its potential limitations in answering questions about personal responsibility. Specifically, it is argued that compatibilism may not be the ideal framework for a neurophysiologist confronted with ethical dilemmas, thus leaving room for the re-examination of indeterminism. Through this discussion, the paper aims to contribute to a nuanced understanding of free will that incorporates both the scientific and philosophical dimensions of human decision-making.

Free will plays a critical role in human motivation. Recent advances in science and technologies have had a significant impact on free will. They have raised serious concerns regarding the threatening effects of such advancements on perceived autonomy. However, there is still a longstanding debate on the existence of free will, known as the problem of free will. Philosophers have provided contrasting views regarding the existence of free will and its relationship with causal determination and mental causation problems. These problems are related to the underlying dualistic approach between mental and physical factors. Similar to the philosophy literature, the motivation literature is concerned with the problem of free will and its influence on motivation and performance. Cognitive evaluation and self-determination theories are the most renowned theories which assert the effect of autonomy (i.e., free will) on intrinsic motivation. However, these theories have mainly focused on the effect of the need for autonomy as an underlying driver of intrinsic motivation. They have not been able to address the fundamental question about the existence of actual free will and its effect on motivation and performance. This is mainly due to their dualistic approach in the form of intrinsic/extrinsic motivation dichotomization. Motivational congruence theory addresses the problem of free will and substantiates its effect by going beyond such a dualistic approach and resolving the related problems of mental causation and causal determination. The theory does this by taking a cotextualist and dialectical approach to the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivational mechanisms and context.

The current article explores the meaning of neuroscientific evidence in the legal domain. It takes a social-psychological perspective to discuss how group-based stereotypes affect legal decision-making critically. Examining how any interpretation is anchored and objectified is interesting as evidence is interpreted in the context. Dominantly, with the ubiquity of neuroscience in different domains, the brain is positioned as an authentic source of nurturing authenticity. It is observed that sometimes unquestionable scientific knowledge may surpass the rationality and intuition of judges. In one way, it is a boon; in another, it is shaping the whole framework of our knowledge system, where knowledge from brain studies reifies our understanding of human actions and thinking.