Pub Date : 2024-11-19DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101701
Benjamin Kowialiewski, Steve Majerus
Extra free time improves working memory (WM) performance. This free-time benefit becomes larger across successive serial positions, a phenomenon recently labeled the "fanning-out effect". Different mechanisms can account for this phenomenon. In this study, we implemented these mechanisms computationally and tested them experimentally. We ran three experiments that varied the time people were allowed to encode items, as well as the order in which they recalled them. Experiment 1 manipulated the free-time benefit in a paradigm in which people recalled items either in forward or backward order. Experiment 2 used the same forward-backward recall paradigm coupled with a distractor task at the end of encoding. Experiment 3 used a cued recall paradigm in which items were tested in random order. In all three experiments, the best-fitting model of the free-time benefit included (1) a consolidation mechanism whereby a just-encoded item continues to be re-encoded as a function of the total free-time available and (2) a stabilization mechanism whereby items become more resistant to output interference with extra free time. Mechanisms such as decay and refreshing, as well as models based on the replenishment of encoding-resources, were not supported by our data.
{"title":"Free time, sharper mind: A computational dive into working memory improvement.","authors":"Benjamin Kowialiewski, Steve Majerus","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101701","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101701","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Extra free time improves working memory (WM) performance. This free-time benefit becomes larger across successive serial positions, a phenomenon recently labeled the \"fanning-out effect\". Different mechanisms can account for this phenomenon. In this study, we implemented these mechanisms computationally and tested them experimentally. We ran three experiments that varied the time people were allowed to encode items, as well as the order in which they recalled them. Experiment 1 manipulated the free-time benefit in a paradigm in which people recalled items either in forward or backward order. Experiment 2 used the same forward-backward recall paradigm coupled with a distractor task at the end of encoding. Experiment 3 used a cued recall paradigm in which items were tested in random order. In all three experiments, the best-fitting model of the free-time benefit included (1) a consolidation mechanism whereby a just-encoded item continues to be re-encoded as a function of the total free-time available and (2) a stabilization mechanism whereby items become more resistant to output interference with extra free time. Mechanisms such as decay and refreshing, as well as models based on the replenishment of encoding-resources, were not supported by our data.</p>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"155 ","pages":"101701"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142683034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-19DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101682
David Kinney , Tania Lombrozo
A given causal system can be represented in a variety of ways. How do agents determine which variables to include in their causal representations, and at what level of granularity? Using techniques from Bayesian networks, information theory, and decision theory, we develop a formal theory according to which causal representations reflect a trade-off between compression and informativeness, where the optimal trade-off depends on the decision-theoretic value of information for a given agent in a given context. This theory predicts that, all else being equal, agents prefer causal models that are as compressed as possible. When compression is associated with information loss, however, all else is not equal, and our theory predicts that agents will favor compressed models only when the information they sacrifice is not informative with respect to the agent’s anticipated decisions. We then show, across six studies reported here (N=2,364) and one study reported in the supplemental materials (N=182), that participants’ preferences over causal models are in keeping with the predictions of our theory. Our theory offers a unification of different dimensions of causal evaluation identified within the philosophy of science (proportionality and stability), and contributes to a more general picture of human cognition according to which the capacity to create compressed (causal) representations plays a central role.
{"title":"Building compressed causal models of the world","authors":"David Kinney , Tania Lombrozo","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101682","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101682","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A given causal system can be represented in a variety of ways. How do agents determine which variables to include in their causal representations, and at what level of granularity? Using techniques from Bayesian networks, information theory, and decision theory, we develop a formal theory according to which causal representations reflect a trade-off between compression and informativeness, where the optimal trade-off depends on the decision-theoretic value of information for a given agent in a given context. This theory predicts that, all else being equal, agents prefer causal models that are as compressed as possible. When compression is associated with information loss, however, all else is not equal, and our theory predicts that agents will favor compressed models only when the information they sacrifice is not informative with respect to the agent’s anticipated decisions. We then show, across six studies reported here (<em>N</em>=2,364) and one study reported in the supplemental materials (N=182), that participants’ preferences over causal models are in keeping with the predictions of our theory. Our theory offers a unification of different dimensions of causal evaluation identified within the philosophy of science (proportionality and stability), and contributes to a more general picture of human cognition according to which the capacity to create compressed (causal) representations plays a central role.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"155 ","pages":"Article 101682"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142479847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-07DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101692
Claudia G. Sehl, Stephanie Denison, Ori Friedman
People often find simple explanations more satisfying than complex ones. Across seven preregistered experiments, we provide evidence that this simplicity preference is not specific to explanations and may instead arises from a broader tendency to prefer completing goals in efficient ways. In each experiment, participants (total N=2820) learned of simple and complex methods for producing an outcome, and judged which was more appealing—either as an explanation why the outcome happened, or as a process for producing it. Participants showed similar preferences across judgments. They preferred simple methods as explanations and processes in tasks with no statistical information about the reliability or pervasiveness of causal elements. But when this statistical information was provided, preferences for simple causes often diminished and reversed in both kinds of judgments. Together, these findings suggest that people may assess explanations much in the same ways they assess methods for completing goals, and that both kinds of judgments depend on the same cognitive mechanisms.
{"title":"Doing things efficiently: Testing an account of why simple explanations are satisfying","authors":"Claudia G. Sehl, Stephanie Denison, Ori Friedman","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101692","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101692","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>People often find simple explanations more satisfying than complex ones. Across seven preregistered experiments, we provide evidence that this simplicity preference is not specific to explanations and may instead arises from a broader tendency to prefer completing goals in efficient ways. In each experiment, participants (total <em>N</em>=2820) learned of simple and complex methods for producing an outcome, and judged which was more appealing—either as an explanation why the outcome happened, or as a process for producing it. Participants showed similar preferences across judgments. They preferred simple methods as explanations and processes in tasks with no statistical information about the reliability or pervasiveness of causal elements. But when this statistical information was provided, preferences for simple causes often diminished and reversed in both kinds of judgments. Together, these findings suggest that people may assess explanations much in the same ways they assess methods for completing goals, and that both kinds of judgments depend on the same cognitive mechanisms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"154 ","pages":"Article 101692"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142394949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-13DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101691
Adrian Staub, Harper McMurray, Anthony Wickett
Both everyday experience and laboratory research demonstrate that readers often fail to notice errors such as an omitted or repeated function word. This phenomenon challenges central tenets of reading and sentence processing models, according to which each word is lexically processed and incrementally integrated into a syntactic representation. One solution would propose that apparent failure to notice such errors reflects post-perceptual inference; the reader does initially perceive the error, but then unconsciously ’corrects’ the perceived string. Such a post-perceptual account predicts that when readers fail to explicitly notice an error, the error will nevertheless disrupt reading, at least fleetingly. We present a large-scale eyetracking experiment investigating whether disruption is detectable in the eye movement record when readers fail to notice an omitted or repeated two-letter function word in naturalistic sentences. Readers failed to notice both omission and repetition errors over 36% of the time. In an analysis that included all trials, both omission and repetition resulted in pronounced eye movement disruption, compared to reading of grammatical control sentences. But in an analysis including only trials on which readers failed to notice the errors, neither type of error disrupted eye movements on any measure. Indeed, there was evidence in some measures that reading was relatively fast on the trials on which errors were missed. It does not appear that when an error is not consciously noticed, it is initially perceived, and then later corrected; rather, linguistic knowledge influences what the reader perceives.
{"title":"Perceptual inference corrects function word errors in reading: Errors that are not noticed do not disrupt eye movements","authors":"Adrian Staub, Harper McMurray, Anthony Wickett","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101691","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101691","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Both everyday experience and laboratory research demonstrate that readers often fail to notice errors such as an omitted or repeated function word. This phenomenon challenges central tenets of reading and sentence processing models, according to which each word is lexically processed and incrementally integrated into a syntactic representation. One solution would propose that apparent failure to notice such errors reflects post-perceptual inference; the reader does initially perceive the error, but then unconsciously ’corrects’ the perceived string. Such a post-perceptual account predicts that when readers fail to explicitly notice an error, the error will nevertheless disrupt reading, at least fleetingly. We present a large-scale eyetracking experiment investigating whether disruption is detectable in the eye movement record when readers fail to notice an omitted or repeated two-letter function word in naturalistic sentences. Readers failed to notice both omission and repetition errors over 36% of the time. In an analysis that included all trials, both omission and repetition resulted in pronounced eye movement disruption, compared to reading of grammatical control sentences. But in an analysis including only trials on which readers failed to notice the errors, neither type of error disrupted eye movements on any measure. Indeed, there was evidence in some measures that reading was relatively fast on the trials on which errors were missed. It does not appear that when an error is not consciously noticed, it is initially perceived, and then later corrected; rather, linguistic knowledge influences what the reader perceives.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"154 ","pages":"Article 101691"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142230119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-01DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101683
Shuyuan Chen , Erik D. Reichle , Yanping Liu
The direct-lexical-control hypothesis stipulates that some aspect of a word’s processing determines the duration of the fixation on that word and/or the next. Although the direct lexical control is incorporated into most current models of eye-movement control in reading, the precise implementation varies and the assumptions of the hypothesis may not be feasible given that lexical processing must occur rapidly enough to influence fixation durations. Conclusive empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis is therefore lacking. In this article, we report the results of an eye-tracking experiment using the boundary paradigm in which native speakers of Chinese read sentences in which target words were either high- or low-frequency and preceded by a valid or invalid preview. Eye movements were co-registered with electroencephalography, allowing standard analyses of eye-movement measures, divergence point analyses of fixation-duration distributions, and fixated-related potentials on the target words. These analyses collectively provide strong behavioral and neural evidence of early lexical processing and thus strong support for the direct-lexical-control hypothesis. We discuss the implications of the findings for our understanding of how the hypothesis might be implemented, the neural systems that support skilled reading, and the nature of eye-movement control in the reading of Chinese versus alphabetic scripts.
{"title":"Direct lexical control of eye movements in Chinese reading: Evidence from the co-registration of EEG and eye tracking","authors":"Shuyuan Chen , Erik D. Reichle , Yanping Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101683","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101683","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The <em>direct-lexical-control hypothesis</em> stipulates that some aspect of a word’s processing determines the duration of the fixation on that word and/or the next. Although the direct lexical control is incorporated into most current models of eye-movement control in reading, the precise implementation varies and the assumptions of the hypothesis may not be feasible given that lexical processing must occur rapidly enough to influence fixation durations. Conclusive empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis is therefore lacking. In this article, we report the results of an eye-tracking experiment using the boundary paradigm in which native speakers of Chinese read sentences in which target words were either high- or low-frequency and preceded by a valid or invalid preview. Eye movements were co-registered with electroencephalography, allowing standard analyses of eye-movement measures, divergence point analyses of fixation-duration distributions, and fixated-related potentials on the target words. These analyses collectively provide strong behavioral and neural evidence of early lexical processing and thus strong support for the direct-lexical-control hypothesis. We discuss the implications of the findings for our understanding of how the hypothesis might be implemented, the neural systems that support skilled reading, and the nature of eye-movement control in the reading of Chinese versus alphabetic scripts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"153 ","pages":"Article 101683"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142095702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-07DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101672
Chenxu Hao , Richard L. Lewis
Understanding the systematic ways that human decision making departs from normative principles has been important in the development of cognitive theory across multiple decision domains. We focus here on whether such seemingly “irrational” decisions occur in ethical decisions that impose difficult tradeoffs between the welfare and interests of different individuals or groups. Across three sets of experiments and in multiple decision scenarios, we provide clear evidence that contextual choice reversals arise in multiples types of ethical choice settings, in just the way that they do in other domains ranging from economic gambles to perceptual judgments (Trueblood et al., 2013; Wedell, 1991). Specifically, we find within-participant evidence for attraction effects in which choices between two options systematically vary as a function of features of a third dominated and unchosen option—a prima facie violation of rational choice axioms that demand consistency. Unlike economic gambles and most domains in which such effects have been studied, many of our ethical scenarios involve features that are not presented numerically, and features for which there is no clear majority-endorsed ranking. We provide empirical evidence and a novel modeling analysis based on individual differences of feature rankings within attributes to show that such individual variations partly explains observed variation in the attraction effects. We conclude by discussing how recent computational analyses of attraction effects may provide a basis for understanding how the observed patterns of choices reflect boundedly rational decision processes.
{"title":"Ethical choice reversals","authors":"Chenxu Hao , Richard L. Lewis","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101672","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101672","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Understanding the systematic ways that human decision making departs from normative principles has been important in the development of cognitive theory across multiple decision domains. We focus here on whether such seemingly “irrational” decisions occur in <em>ethical</em> decisions that impose difficult tradeoffs between the welfare and interests of different individuals or groups. Across three sets of experiments and in multiple decision scenarios, we provide clear evidence that <em>contextual choice reversals</em> arise in multiples types of ethical choice settings, in just the way that they do in other domains ranging from economic gambles to perceptual judgments (Trueblood et al., 2013; Wedell, 1991). Specifically, we find within-participant evidence for <em>attraction effects</em> in which choices between two options systematically vary as a function of features of a third dominated and unchosen option—a <em>prima facie</em> violation of rational choice axioms that demand consistency. Unlike economic gambles and most domains in which such effects have been studied, many of our ethical scenarios involve features that are not presented numerically, and features for which there is no clear majority-endorsed ranking. We provide empirical evidence and a novel modeling analysis based on individual differences of feature rankings within attributes to show that such individual variations partly explains observed variation in the attraction effects. We conclude by discussing how recent computational analyses of attraction effects may provide a basis for understanding how the observed patterns of choices reflect boundedly rational decision processes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"153 ","pages":"Article 101672"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028524000434/pdfft?md5=926f8d9e7adc9dcf68b990858a416020&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028524000434-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141908213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-03DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101681
Joseph R. Coffey, Jesse Snedeker
The words that children learn change over time in predictable ways. The first words that infants acquire are generally ones that are both frequent and highly imageable. Older infants also learn words that are more abstract and some that are less common. It is unclear whether this pattern is attributable to maturational factors (i.e., younger children lack sufficiently developed cognitive faculties needed to learn abstract words) or linguistic factors (i.e., younger children lack sufficient knowledge of their language to use grammatical or contextual cues needed to figure out the meaning of more abstract words). The present study explores this question by comparing vocabulary acquisition in 53 preschool-aged children (M = 51 months, range = 30–76 months) who were adopted from China and Eastern Europe after two and half years of age and 53 vocabulary-matched infant controls born and raised in English speaking families in North America (M = 24 months, range = 16–33 months). Vocabulary was assessed using the MB-CDI Words and Sentences form, word frequency was estimated from the CHILDES database, and imageability was measured using adult ratings of how easily words could be pictured mentally. Both groups were more likely to know words that were both highly frequent and imageable (resulting in an over-additive interaction). Knowledge of a word was also independently affected by the syntactic category that it belongs to. Adopted preschoolers’ vocabulary was slightly less affected by imageability. These findings were replicated in a comparison with a larger sample of vocabulary-matched controls drawn from the MB-CDI norming study (M = 22 months, range = 16–30 months; 33 girls). These results suggest that the patterns of acquisition in children’s early vocabulary are primarily driven by the accrual of linguistic knowledge, but that vocabulary may also be affected by differences in early life experiences or conceptual knowledge.
{"title":"Disentangling the roles of age and knowledge in early language acquisition: A fine-grained analysis of the vocabularies of infant and child language learners","authors":"Joseph R. Coffey, Jesse Snedeker","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101681","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101681","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The words that children learn change over time in predictable ways. The first words that infants acquire are generally ones that are both frequent and highly imageable. Older infants also learn words that are more abstract and some that are less common. It is unclear whether this pattern is attributable to maturational factors (i.e., younger children lack sufficiently developed cognitive faculties needed to learn abstract words) or linguistic factors (i.e., younger children lack sufficient knowledge of their language to use grammatical or contextual cues needed to figure out the meaning of more abstract words). The present study explores this question by comparing vocabulary acquisition in 53 preschool-aged children (M = 51 months, range = 30–76 months) who were adopted from China and Eastern Europe after two and half years of age and 53 vocabulary-matched infant controls born and raised in English speaking families in North America (M = 24 months, range = 16–33 months). Vocabulary was assessed using the MB-CDI Words and Sentences form, word frequency was estimated from the CHILDES database, and imageability was measured using adult ratings of how easily words could be pictured mentally. Both groups were more likely to know words that were both highly frequent and imageable (resulting in an over-additive interaction). Knowledge of a word was also independently affected by the syntactic category that it belongs to. Adopted preschoolers’ vocabulary was slightly less affected by imageability. These findings were replicated in a comparison with a larger sample of vocabulary-matched controls drawn from the MB-CDI norming study (<em>M</em> = 22 months, range = 16–30 months; 33 girls). These results suggest that the patterns of acquisition in children’s early vocabulary are primarily driven by the accrual of linguistic knowledge, but that vocabulary may also be affected by differences in early life experiences or conceptual knowledge.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"153 ","pages":"Article 101681"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141890770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-01DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101671
Francesco Margoni , Lotte Thomsen
Research has shown that infants represent legitimate leadership and predict continued obedience to authority, but which cues they use to do so remains unknown. Across eight pre-registered experiments varying the cue provided, we tested if Norwegian 21-month-olds (N=128) expected three protagonists to obey a character even in her absence. We assessed whether bowing for the character, receiving a tribute from or conferring a benefit to the protagonists, imposing a cost on them (forcefully taking a resource or hitting them), or relative physical size were used as cues to generate the expectation of continued obedience that marks legitimate leadership. Whereas bowing sufficed in generating such an expectation, we found positive Bayesian evidence that all the other cues did not. Norwegian infants unlikely have witnessed bowing in their everyday life. Hence, bowing/prostration as cue for continued obedience may form part of an early-developing capacity to represent leadership built by evolution.
{"title":"How infants predict respect-based power","authors":"Francesco Margoni , Lotte Thomsen","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101671","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101671","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Research has shown that infants represent legitimate leadership and predict continued obedience to authority, but which cues they use to do so remains unknown. Across eight pre-registered experiments varying the cue provided, we tested if Norwegian 21-month-olds (N=128) expected three protagonists to obey a character even in her absence. We assessed whether bowing for the character, receiving a tribute from or conferring a benefit to the protagonists, imposing a cost on them (forcefully taking a resource or hitting them), or relative physical size were used as cues to generate the expectation of continued obedience that marks legitimate leadership. Whereas bowing sufficed in generating such an expectation, we found positive Bayesian evidence that all the other cues did not. Norwegian infants unlikely have witnessed bowing in their everyday life. Hence, bowing/prostration as cue for continued obedience may form part of an early-developing capacity to represent leadership built by evolution.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"152 ","pages":"Article 101671"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028524000422/pdfft?md5=d8e9bf2401d31c4cba6a51cfe7ad3b0c&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028524000422-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141856985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-01DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101673
Sashank Varma , Emily M. Sanford , Vijay Marupudi , Olivia Shaffer , R. Brooke Lea
Language understanding and mathematics understanding are two fundamental forms of human thinking. Prior research has largely focused on the question of how language shapes mathematical thinking. The current study considers the converse question. Specifically, it investigates whether the magnitude representations that are thought to anchor understanding of number are also recruited to understand the meanings of graded words. These are words that come in scales (e.g., Anger) whose members can be ordered by the degree to which they possess the defining property (e.g., calm, annoyed, angry, furious). Experiment 1 uses the comparison paradigm to find evidence that the distance, ratio, and boundary effects that are taken as evidence of the recruitment of magnitude representations extend from numbers to words. Experiment 2 uses a similarity rating paradigm and multi-dimensional scaling to find converging evidence for these effects in graded word understanding. Experiment 3 evaluates an alternative hypothesis – that these effects for graded words simply reflect the statistical structure of the linguistic environment – by using machine learning models of distributional word semantics: LSA, word2vec, GloVe, counterfitted word vectors, BERT, RoBERTa, and GPT-2. These models fail to show the full pattern of effects observed of humans in Experiment 2, suggesting that more is needed than mere statistics. This research paves the way for further investigations of the role of magnitude representations in sentence and text comprehension, and of the question of whether language understanding and number understanding draw on shared or independent magnitude representations. It also informs the role of machine learning models in cognitive psychology research.
{"title":"Recruitment of magnitude representations to understand graded words","authors":"Sashank Varma , Emily M. Sanford , Vijay Marupudi , Olivia Shaffer , R. Brooke Lea","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101673","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101673","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Language understanding and mathematics understanding are two fundamental forms of human thinking. Prior research has largely focused on the question of how language shapes mathematical thinking. The current study considers the converse question. Specifically, it investigates whether the magnitude representations that are thought to anchor understanding of number are also recruited to understand the meanings of graded words. These are words that come in scales (e.g., <em>Anger</em>) whose members can be ordered by the degree to which they possess the defining property (e.g., <em>calm</em>, <em>annoyed</em>, <em>angry</em>, <em>furious</em>). Experiment 1 uses the comparison paradigm to find evidence that the distance, ratio, and boundary effects that are taken as evidence of the recruitment of magnitude representations extend from numbers to words. Experiment 2 uses a similarity rating paradigm and multi-dimensional scaling to find converging evidence for these effects in graded word understanding. Experiment 3 evaluates an alternative hypothesis – that these effects for graded words simply reflect the statistical structure of the linguistic environment – by using machine learning models of distributional word semantics: LSA, word2vec, GloVe, counterfitted word vectors, BERT, RoBERTa, and GPT-2. These models fail to show the full pattern of effects observed of humans in Experiment 2, suggesting that more is needed than mere statistics. This research paves the way for further investigations of the role of magnitude representations in sentence and text comprehension, and of the question of whether language understanding and number understanding draw on shared or independent magnitude representations. It also informs the role of machine learning models in cognitive psychology research.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"153 ","pages":"Article 101673"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141879798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-13DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101670
Mirko Thalmann , Theo A.J. Schäfer , Stephanie Theves , Christian F. Doeller , Eric Schulz
Research from several areas suggests that mental representations adapt to the specific tasks we carry out in our environment. In this study, we propose a mechanism of adaptive representational change, task imprinting. Thereby, we introduce a computational model, which portrays task imprinting as an adaptation to specific task goals via selective storage of helpful representations in long-term memory. We test the main qualitative prediction of the model in four behavioral experiments using healthy young adults as participants. In each experiment, we assess participants’ baseline representations in the beginning of the experiment, then expose participants to one of two tasks intended to shape representations differently according to our model, and finally assess any potential change in representations. Crucially, the tasks used to measure representations differ in the amount that strategic, judgmental processes play a role. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 allow us to exclude the option that representations used in more perceptual tasks become biased categorically. The results of Experiment 4 make it likely that people strategically decide given the specific task context whether they use categorical information or not. One signature of representational change was however observed: category learning practice increased the perceptual sensitivity over and above mere exposure to the same stimuli.
{"title":"Task imprinting: Another mechanism of representational change?","authors":"Mirko Thalmann , Theo A.J. Schäfer , Stephanie Theves , Christian F. Doeller , Eric Schulz","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101670","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101670","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Research from several areas suggests that mental representations adapt to the specific tasks we carry out in our environment. In this study, we propose a mechanism of adaptive representational change, <em>task imprinting</em>. Thereby, we introduce a computational model, which portrays task imprinting as an adaptation to specific task goals via selective storage of helpful representations in long-term memory. We test the main qualitative prediction of the model in four behavioral experiments using healthy young adults as participants. In each experiment, we assess participants’ baseline representations in the beginning of the experiment, then expose participants to one of two tasks intended to shape representations differently according to our model, and finally assess any potential change in representations. Crucially, the tasks used to measure representations differ in the amount that strategic, judgmental processes play a role. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 allow us to exclude the option that representations used in more perceptual tasks become biased categorically. The results of Experiment 4 make it likely that people strategically decide given the specific task context whether they use categorical information or not. One signature of representational change was however observed: category learning practice increased the perceptual sensitivity over and above mere exposure to the same stimuli.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"152 ","pages":"Article 101670"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028524000410/pdfft?md5=af7b0524f6fb619e19c3f608734457b2&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028524000410-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141602082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}