Cognitive Psychology最新文献

Distributional models of lexical semantics have proven to be powerful accounts of how word meanings are acquired from the natural language environment (Günther, Rinaldi, & Marelli, 2019; Kumar, 2020). Standard models of this type acquire the meaning of words through the learning of word co-occurrence statistics across large corpora. However, these models ignore social and communicative aspects of language processing, which is considered central to usage-based and adaptive theories of language (Tomasello, 2003; Beckner et al., 2009). Johns (2021) recently demonstrated that integrating social and communicative information into a lexical strength measure allowed for benchmark fits to be attained for lexical organization data, indicating that the social world contains important statistical information for language learning and processing. Through the analysis of the communication patterns of over 330,000 individuals on the online forum Reddit, totaling approximately 55 billion words of text, the findings of the current article demonstrates that social information about word usage allows for unique aspects of a word’s meaning to be acquired, providing a new pathway for distributional model development.

Both 5-year-old children and adults infer the structure of a sentence as they are hearing it. Prior work, however, has found that children do not always make use of the same information that adults do to guide these inferences. Specifically, when hearing ambiguous sentences like “You can tickle the frog with the feather,” children seem to ignore the aspects of the referential context that adults rely on to resolve the ambiguity—e.g., are there two frogs in the scene, one with a feather and one without? Or is there only one frog to be tickled by using a feather? The present study explored two hypotheses about children’s failure to use high-level, top-down context cues to infer the structure of these ambiguous sentences: First, children may be less likely to use any top-down cue during comprehension. Second, children may only have difficulties with top-down cues that are unreliable predictors of which syntactic structure is being used. Thus, to disentangle these hypotheses, we conducted a visual world study of adults’ and children’s ambiguity resolution, manipulating a more reliable top-down cue (the plausibility of the interpretation) and pitting it against a robust bottom-up cue (lexical biases). We find that adults’ and children’s final interpretations are influenced by both sources of information: adults, however, give greater weight to the top-down cue, whereas children primarily rely on the bottom-up cue. Thus, children’s tendency to make minimal use of top-down information persists even when this information is highly valid and dominates adult comprehension. We propose that children have a systematic propensity to rely on bottom-up processing to a greater degree than adults, which could reflect differences in the architecture of the adult and child language comprehension systems or differences in processing speed.

Several current theories have essences as primary drivers of inductive potential: e.g., people infer dogs share properties because they share essences. We investigated the possibility that people take occupational roles as having robust inductive potential because of a different source: their position in stable social institutions. In Studies 1–4, participants learned a novel property about a target, and then decided whether two new individuals had the property (one with the same occupation, one without). Participants used occupational roles to robustly generalize rights and obligations, functional behaviors, personality traits, and skills. In Studies 5–6, we contrasted occupational roles (via label) with race/gender (via visual face cues). Participants reliably favored occupational roles over race/gender for generalizing rights and obligations, functional behaviors, personality traits, and skills (they favored race/gender for inferring leisure behaviors and physiological properties). Occupational roles supported inferences to the same extent as animal categories (Studies 4 and 6). In Study 7, we examined why members of occupational roles share properties. Participants did not attribute the inductive potential of occupational roles to essences, they attributed it to social institutions. In combination, these seven studies demonstrate that any theory of inductive potential must pluralistically allow for both essences and social institutions to form the basis of inductive potential.

Children rely on others’ explanations to learn scientific concepts, yet sometimes the explanations they receive are incomplete. Three studies explore how receiving incomplete or complete explanations influences children’s subsequent interest and engagement in learning behaviors to obtain additional information about a topic. Children ages 7–10 (N = 275; 49% female, 51% male; 55% white) viewed question-and-answer exchanges about animal behaviors that included either a complete causal explanation of the behavior or an explanation that was missing a key step. Children rated how knowledgeable they felt after hearing the explanation (Study 1) or how much information was missing from the explanation (Studies 2 and 3) and reported how interested they were in learning more about the topic. They also completed two measures of learning behaviors: a book choice task (all studies) and a card choice task (Studies 1 and 2). In the book choice task, children opted to learn about the topics of the incomplete explanations more frequently than the topics of the complete explanations. However, there was no evidence of selective learning behaviors in the card choice task and children’s self-reported interest in learning more about each animal behavior was not directly related to the type of explanation they had received. Individual differences in children’s interest and learning behaviors were linked to verbal intelligence and domain-specific biological knowledge. Implications for the information-gap theory of learning and children’s learning in multiple contexts are discussed.

This paper shows how identical skills can emerge either from instruction or discovery when both result in an understanding of the causal structure of the task domain. The paper focuses on the discovery process, extending the skill acquisition model of Anderson et al. (2019) to address learning by discovery. The discovery process involves exploring the environment and developing associations between discontinuities in the task and events that precede them. The growth of associative strength in ACT-R serves to identify potential causal connections. The model can derive operators from these discovered causal relations just as does with the instructed causal information. Subjects were given a task of learning to play a video game either with a description of the game’s causal structure (Instruction) or not (Discovery). The Instruction subjects learned faster, but successful Discovery subjects caught up. After 20 3-minute games the behavior of the successful subjects in the two groups was largely indistinguishable. The play of these Discovery subjects jumped in the same discrete way as did the behavior of simulated subjects in the model. These results show how implicit processes (associative learning, control tuning) and explicit processes (causal inference, planning) can combine to produce human learning in complex environments.

Self-derivation of novel facts through integration of memory content is fundamental to acquiring new knowledge and a means of building a semantic knowledge base. It involves combining memory content acquired across separate episodes of learning to generate new knowledge that was not explicitly taught in either episode. To self-derive, one needs to reactivate earlier learned memory content upon exposure to related content and then integrate the learning episodes. Previous research found developmental differences in the conditions under which integration occurs. Adults spontaneously integrate whereas 7- to 9-year-old children seemingly integrate only upon direct tests that verbally prompt for integration. Yet it is unclear whether children engage in the preliminary process of reactivation prior to the direct tests. To address this gap in the current research, we developed an eye-tracking paradigm and tested whether adults and 7- to 9-year-old children engage in the process of reactivation prior to direct tests. The direct tests verbally prompted for integration of memory content requiring self-derivation through both open-ended and forced-choice formats. Both adults and children engaged in reactivation prior to the direct tests. The extent of their reactivation predicted their performance on the direct tests. However, adults showed stronger evidence of reactivation and performed better than children on the direct tests. This work contributes to understandings of developmental differences in the underlying processes involved in the development of new knowledge.

In a sentence like Who does the artist think chased the chef?, the who at the beginning depends on the last bit of the sentence, chased the chef. This is an instance of a long-distance dependency. What is the nature of the cognitive process that allows speakers to produce sentences that include distant elements that form dependencies? In four experiments, speakers described drawings that elicited long-distance dependencies. Critically, speakers were sometimes primed to produce a that in sentences where that was ungrammatical due to a grammatical constraint known as the that-trace constraint (e.g.,*Who does the artist think that chased the chef). Results showed that, when primed to say an ungrammatical that, speakers were slower to start to speak. Because the that-trace constraint applies selectively to certain configurations of long-distance dependencies, this suggests that the grammatical details of the long-distance dependency are already planned before speakers start to speak the sentences involving long-distance dependencies. I propose a formal model that explains how speakers plan long-distance dependencies in advance of speaking them while also managing the cognitive pressure to speak sentences incrementally.

Across three studies (N = 607), we examined people’s use of a dichotomizing heuristic—the inference that characteristics belonging to one group do not apply to another group—when making judgments about novel social groups. Participants learned information about one group (e.g., “Zuttles like apples”), and then made inferences about another group (e.g., “Do Twiggums like apples or hate apples?”). Study 1 acted as a proof of concept: Eight-year-olds and adults (but not 5-year-olds) assumed that the two groups would have opposite characteristics. Learning about the group as a generic whole versus as specific individuals boosted the use of the heuristic. Study 2 and Study 3 (sample sizes, methods, and analyses pre-registered), examined whether the presence or absence of several factors affected the activation and scope of the dichotomizing heuristic in adults. Whereas learning about or treating the groups as separate was necessary for activating dichotomous thinking, intergroup conflict and featuring only two (versus many) groups was not required. Moreover, the heuristic occurred when participants made both binary and scaled decisions. Once triggered, adults applied this cognitive shortcut widely—not only to benign (e.g., liking apples) and novel characteristics (e.g., liking modies), but also to evaluative traits signaling the morals or virtues of a social group (e.g., meanness or intelligence). Adults did not, however, extend the heuristic to the edges of improbability: They failed to dichotomize when doing so would attribute highly unusual preferences (e.g., disliking having fun). Taken together, these studies indicate the presence of a dichotomizing heuristic with broad implications for how people make social group inferences.

The question of how people hold others responsible has motivated decades of theorizing and empirical work. In this paper, we develop and test a computational model that bridges the gap between broad but qualitative framework theories, and quantitative but narrow models. In our model, responsibility judgments are the result of two cognitive processes: a dispositional inference about a person’s character from their action, and a causal attribution about the person’s role in bringing about the outcome. We test the model in a group setting in which political committee members vote on whether or not a policy should be passed. We assessed participants’ dispositional inferences and causal attributions by asking how surprising and important a committee member’s vote was. Participants’ answers to these questions in Experiment 1 accurately predicted responsibility judgments in Experiment 2. In Experiments 3 and 4, we show that the model also predicts moral responsibility judgments, and that importance matters more for responsibility, while surprise matters more for judgments of wrongfulness.