Cognitive Psychology最新文献

The use of abstract higher-level knowledge (also called overhypotheses) allows humans to learn quickly from sparse data and make predictions in new situations. Previous research has suggested that humans may be the only species capable of abstract knowledge formation, but this remains controversial. There is also mixed evidence for when this ability emerges over human development. Kemp et al. (2007) proposed a computational model of how overhypotheses could be learned from sparse examples. We provide the first direct test of this model: an ecologically valid paradigm for testing two species, capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.) and 4- to 5-year-old human children. We presented participants with sampled evidence from different containers which suggested that all containers held items of uniform type (type condition) or of uniform size (size condition). Subsequently, we presented two new test containers and an example item from each: a small, high-valued item and a large but low-valued item. Participants could then choose from which test container they would like to receive the next sample – the optimal choice was the container that yielded a large item in the size condition or a high-valued item in the type condition. We compared performance to a priori predictions made by models with and without the capacity to learn overhypotheses. Children's choices were consistent with the model predictions and thus suggest an ability for abstract knowledge formation in the preschool years, whereas monkeys performed at chance level.

Dependency theories of causal reasoning, such as causal Bayes net accounts, postulate that the strengths of individual causal links are independent of the causal structure in which they are embedded; they are inferred from dependency information, such as statistical regularities. We propose a psychological account that postulates that reasoners’ concept of causality is richer. It predicts a systematic influence of causal structure knowledge on causal strength intuitions. Our view incorporates the notion held by dispositional theories that causes produce effects in virtue of an underlying causal capacity. Going beyond existing normative dispositional theories, however, we argue that reasoners’ concept of causality involves the idea that continuous causes spread their capacity across their different causal pathways, analogous to fluids running through pipe systems. Such a representation leads to the prediction of a structure-dependent dilution of causal strength: the more links are served by a cause, the weaker individual links are expected to be. A series of experiments corroborate the theory. For continuous causes with continuous effects, but not in causal structures with genuinely binary variables that can only be present or absent, reasoners tend to think that link strength decreases with the number of links served by a cause. The effect reflects a default notion reasoners have about causality, but it is moderated by assumptions about the amount of causal capacity causes are assumed to possess, and by mechanism knowledge about how a cause generates its effect(s). We discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of our findings.

In conflict tasks, such as the Simon, Eriksen flanker, or Stroop task, the congruency effect is often reduced after an incongruent compared to a congruent trial: the congruency sequence effect (CSE). It was suggested that the CSE may reflect increased processing of task-relevant information and/or suppression of task-irrelevant information after experiencing an incongruent relative to a congruent trial. In the present study, we contribute to this discussion by applying the Diffusion Model for Conflict tasks (DMC) framework in the context of CSEs to flanker and Simon tasks. We argue that DMC independently models the task-relevant and task-irrelevant information and thus is a first good candidate for disentangling their unique contributions. As a first approach, we fitted DMC conjointly or separately to previously congruent or incongruent trials, using four empirical flanker and two Simon data sets. For the flanker task, we fitted the classical DMC version. For the Simon task, we fitted a generalized DMC version which allows the task-irrelevant information to undershoot when swinging back to zero. After considering the model fits, we present a second approach, where we implemented a cognitive control mechanism to simulate the influence of increased processing of task-relevant information or increased suppression of task-irrelevant information. Both approaches demonstrate that the suppression of task-irrelevant information is essential to create the typical CSE pattern. Increased processing of task-relevant information, however, could rarely describe the CSE accurately.

Face perception and recognition are important processes for social interaction and communication among humans, so understanding how faces are mentally represented and processed has major implications. At the same time, faces are just some of the many stimuli that we encounter in our everyday lives. Therefore, more general theories of how we represent objects might also apply to faces. Contemporary research on the mental representation of faces has centered on two competing theoretical frameworks that arose from more general categorization research: prototype-based face representation and exemplar-based face representation. Empirically distinguishing between these frameworks is difficult and neither one has been ruled out. In this paper, we advance this area of research in three ways. First, we introduce two additional frameworks for mental representation of categories, varying abstraction and ideal representation, which have not been applied to face perception and recognition before. Second, we fit formal computational models of all four of these theories to human perceptual judgments of the typicality and attractiveness (a strong correlate of typicality) of 100 young adult Caucasian female faces, with the models expressed within a face space derived from facial similarity judgments via multidimensional scaling. Third, we predict the perceived typicality and attractiveness of the faces using these models and compare the predictive performance of each to the empirical data. We found that of all four models, the ideal representation model provided the best account of perceived typicality and attractiveness for the present set of faces, although all models showed discrepancies from the empirical data. These findings demonstrate the relevance of mental categorization processes for representing faces.

Research on causal cognition has largely focused on learning and reasoning about contingency data aggregated across discrete observations or experiments. However, this setting represents only the tip of the causal cognition iceberg. A more general problem lurking beneath is that of learning the latent causal structure that connects events and actions as they unfold in continuous time. In this paper, we examine how people actively learn about causal structure in a continuous-time setting, focusing on when and where they intervene and how this shapes their learning. Across two experiments, we find that participants’ accuracy depends on both the informativeness and evidential complexity of the data they generate. Moreover, participants’ intervention choices strike a balance between maximizing expected information and minimizing inferential complexity. People time and target their interventions to create simple yet informative causal dynamics. We discuss how the continuous-time setting challenges existing computational accounts of active causal learning, and argue that metacognitive awareness of one’s inferential limitations plays a critical role for successful learning in the wild.

This study explores the connection between language and social cognition by empirically testing different typological analyses of various demonstrative systems. Linguistic typology classifies demonstrative systems as distance-oriented or person-oriented, depending on whether they indicate the location of a referent relative only to the speaker, or to both the speaker and the listener. From the perspective of social cognition, speakers of languages with person-oriented systems must monitor their listener’s spatial location in order to accurately use their demonstratives, while speakers of languages with distance-oriented systems can use demonstratives from their own, egocentric perspective. Resolving an ongoing controversy around the nature of the Spanish demonstrative system, the results of Experiment 1 confirmed that this demonstrative system is person oriented, while the English system is distance oriented. Experiment 2 revealed that not all three-way demonstrative systems are person oriented, with Japanese speakers showing sensitivity to the listener’s spatial location, while Turkish speakers did not show such an effect in their demonstrative choice. In Experiment 3, Catalan-Spanish bilinguals showed sensitivity to listener position in their choice of the Spanish distal form, but not in their choice of the medial form. These results were interpreted as a transfer effect from Catalan, which revealed analogous results to English. Experiment 4 investigated the use of demonstratives to redirect a listener’s attention to the intended referent, which is a universal function of demonstratives that also hinges on social cognition. Japanese and Spanish speakers chose between their proximal and distal demonstratives flexibly, depending on whether the listener was looking closer or further from the referent, whereas Turkish speakers chose their medial form for attention correction. In conclusion, the results of this study support the view that investigating how speakers of different languages jointly use language and social cognition in communication has the potential to unravel the deep connection between these two fundamentally human capacities.

In various cultures and at all spatial scales, humans produce a rich complexity of geometric shapes such as lines, circles or spirals. Here, we propose that humans possess a language of thought for geometric shapes that can produce line drawings as recursive combinations of a minimal set of geometric primitives. We present a programming language, similar to Logo, that combines discrete numbers and continuous integration to form higher-level structures based on repetition, concatenation and embedding, and we show that the simplest programs in this language generate the fundamental geometric shapes observed in human cultures. On the perceptual side, we propose that shape perception in humans involves searching for the shortest program that correctly draws the image (program induction). A consequence of this framework is that the mental difficulty of remembering a shape should depend on its minimum description length (MDL) in the proposed language. In two experiments, we show that encoding and processing of geometric shapes is well predicted by MDL. Furthermore, our hypotheses predict additive laws for the psychological complexity of repeated, concatenated or embedded shapes, which we confirm experimentally.

Delay discounting (DD) indexes an individual’s preference for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards, and is considered a form of cognitive impulsivity. Cross-sectional studies have demonstrated that DD peaks in adolescence; longitudinal studies are needed to validate this putative developmental trend, and to determine whether DD assesses a temporary state, or reflects a more stable behavioral trait. In this study, 140 individuals aged 9–23 completed a delay discounting (DD) task and cognitive battery at baseline and every-two years thereafter, yielding five assessments over approximately 10 years. Models fit with the inverse effect of age best approximated the longitudinal trajectory of two DD measures, hyperbolic discounting (log[k]) and area under the indifference-point curve (AUC). Discounting of future rewards increased rapidly from childhood to adolescence and appeared to plateau in late adolescence for both models of DD. Participants with greater verbal intelligence and working memory displayed reduced DD across the duration of the study, suggesting a functional interrelationship between these domains and DD from early adolescence to adulthood. Furthermore, AUC demonstrated good to excellent reliability across assessment points that was superior to log(k), with both measures demonstrating acceptable stability once participants reached late adolescence. The developmental trajectories of DD we observed from childhood through young adulthood suggest that DD may index cognitive control more than reward sensitivity, and that despite modest developmental changes with maturation, AUC may be conceptualized as a trait variable related to cognitive control vs impulsivity.

Knowing which features are frequent among a biological kind (e.g., that most zebras have stripes) shapes people’s representations of what category members are like (e.g., that typical zebras have stripes) and normative judgments about what they ought to be like (e.g., that zebras should have stripes). In the current work, we ask if people’s inclination to explain why features are frequent is a key mechanism through which what “is” shapes beliefs about what “ought” to be. Across four studies (N = 591), we find that frequent features are often explained by appeal to feature function (e.g., that stripes are for camouflage), that functional explanations in turn shape judgments of typicality, and that functional explanations and typicality both predict normative judgments that category members ought to have functional features. We also identify the causal assumptions that license inferences from feature frequency and function, as well as the nature of the normative inferences that are drawn: by specifying an instrumental goal (e.g., camouflage), functional explanations establish a basis for normative evaluation. These findings shed light on how and why our representations of how the natural world is shape our judgments of how it ought to be.

I evaluated three models for the representation of numbers in memory. These were integrated with the diffusion decision model to explain accuracy and response time (RT) data from a recognition memory experiment in which the stimuli were two-digit numbers. The integrated models accounted for distance/confusability effects: when a test number was numerically close to a studied number, accuracy was lower and RTs were longer than when a test number was numerically far from a studied number. For two of the models, the representations of numbers are distributed over number (with Gaussian or exponential distributions) and the overlap between the distributions of a studied number and a test number provides the evidence (drift rate) on which a decision is made. For the third, the exponential gradient model, drift rate is an exponential function of the numerical distance between studied and test numbers. The exponential gradient model fit the data slightly better than the two overlap models. Monte Carlo simulations showed that the variability in the important parameter estimates from fitting data collected over 30–40 min is smaller than the variability among individuals, allowing differences among individuals to be studied. A second experiment compared number memory and number discrimination tasks and results showed different distance effects. Number memory had an exponential-like distance-effect and number discrimination had a linear function which shows radically different representations drive the two tasks.