Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology最新文献

Background: Health providers frequently probe patients' recall of current and/or remote news events to determine the extent of memory loss. Impaired memory for transient events (ie, in the news for a circumscribed time) may provide information regarding the onset of cognitive impairment.

Objective: To use the Transient News Events Test (TNET) to explore how memory changes over time in both older adults with cognitive impairment (CI) and noncognitively impaired (NCI) older adults. We also investigated the role of episodic and semantic memory on TNET performance.

Method: Sixty-seven older adults completed the TNET as part of a comprehensive neuropsychological assessment. Analyses included t tests to evaluate group differences for TNET score and correlations between TNET and neuropsychological measures, including episodic and semantic memory tests.

Results: NCI adults demonstrated better memory for TNET items than adults with CI. The NCI and CI groups did not differ regarding memory for remote events; however, the CI group exhibited worse memory for recent events. There was a significant association between TNET score and the capacity for episodic and semantic memory in the CI group. In the NCI group, TNET score was significantly associated with episodic memory.

Conclusion: Findings support the use of transient news events to assess remote memories in older adults. Novel remote memory measures broaden the scope of memory assessment far beyond what is feasible with traditional neuropsychological assessment and may provide insight into the onset of memory changes.

Background: Diagnosis of manifest Huntington disease (HD) is based primarily on motor symptoms, but premanifest HD (preHD) is often associated with subtle cognitive decline. The Loewenstein-Acevedo Scales for Semantic Interference and Learning (LASSI-L) is a validated verbal learning test that can be used to detect early cognitive decline.

Objective: To determine the utility of the LASSI-L for detecting early cognitive decline in individuals with preHD and to compare the results of the LASSI-L with those of commonly used neuropsychological tests in HD.

Method: We administered the LASSI-L to 13 individuals with preHD and 13 healthy controls matched for age, sex, and education as part of a longitudinal study of disease progression. For comparison purposes, we administered the Mini-Mental State Examination; Stroop Color and Word Test; Symbol Digit Modalities Test; Trail-Making Test, Parts A and B; and category fluency (animals) task.

Results: Five of the seven sections on the LASSI-L captured group differences: Proactive Semantic Interference (PSI; P < 0.001), Failure to Recover From PSI ( P = 0.038), Retroactive Semantic Interference (RSI; P = 0.013), Delayed Recall ( P < 0.001), and B1 Cued Recall Intrusions ( P = 0.036). Using a false discovery rate of <0.05, PSI, RSI, and Delayed Recall remained significant.

Conclusion: The LASSI-L is a sensitive instrument for detecting early interference effects in individuals with preHD that outperforms commonly used neuropsychological tests. The LASSI-L could be a useful addition to clinical and research protocols involving individuals with preHD.

Episodic memory, the ability to remember specific events from one's personal past, has been the subject of research for several decades, with a particular emphasis on its relationship with consciousness. In the December 2022 issue of Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology , Budson, Richman, and Kensinger shed new light on this complex topic with a comprehensive exploration of consciousness. In this commentary, I present three propositions about the relationship between episodic memory and consciousness: (1) Episodic memory is usually associated with conscious retrieval; (2) it is possible to have consciousness without episodic memory; and (3) episodic memory can be accessed without conscious retrieval. Drawing from studies conducted with nonhuman animals, I provide evidence to support each of these propositions and discuss how they relate to the theory presented by Budson et al (2000). Although some of my propositions differ from their views, their work has been valuable in stimulating ongoing discussions to advance our understanding of memory.

Background: The ability of the autonomic nervous system's stress response to impair aspects of cognitive flexibility is known. However, the ability to modulate the sympathetic response and improve these cognitive impairments via nonpharmacological intervention, such as paced breathing (PB), requires further investigation.

Objective: To better elucidate the effects of PB on cognition.

Method: We employed a PB protocol in a total of 52 healthy men and women and measured performance on convergent and divergent cognitive tasks, perceived stress, and physiological measures (eg, blood pressure, heart rate). Participants attended two experimental sessions consisting of either PB or normal breathing followed by cognitive assessments including convergent (compound remote associate, anagram) and divergent (alternate use, fluency) tasks. Experiment 2 consisted of more difficult versions of cognitive tasks compared with Experiment 1.

Results: In Experiment 1, PB significantly reduced the female participants' systolic and diastolic blood pressure immediately after the breathing protocol without affecting their cognition. In Experiment 2, PB significantly reduced perceived stress immediately after the breathing protocol, regardless of sex. There was no effect on cognition in Experiment 2, but a correlation was observed between perceived stress change and anagram number solved change.

Conclusion: While PB modulates sympathetic activity in females, there was a lack of improvement in cognitive flexibility performance. At least for a single trial of PB, cognitive flexibility did not improve.

Background: Studies have reported an increase in the incidence of impulse control disorders (ICDs) in patient groups treated with dopamine agonists (DAAs), especially in Parkinson disease (PD). However, very few studies have reported on ICDs in individuals with a prolactinoma who were treated with DAAs.

Objective: To see whether a DAA by itself causes ICDs in individuals with a prolactinoma by controlling the susceptibility to impulsivity by excluding individuals with other risk factors for ICDs.

Method: We compared the performance of 31 individuals with a prolactinoma receiving DAA therapy (DAA+) on various behavioral scales and the Iowa gambling task (IGT), a neuropsychological instrument that measures risky decision-making, with the performance of 20 individuals with a prolactinoma who were not on DAA therapy (DAA-) and 30 healthy controls (HC).

Results: There was no significant difference among the groups concerning performance on the Zuckerman Sensation Seeking Scale-V, Minnesota Impulse Disorders Interview, Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11, or IGT. No correlation was found between the scores on these scales and the duration or dose of DAA in the DAA+ group. The incidence of ICDs was 25.8% in the DAA+ group, 15% in the DAA- group, and 16.7% in the HC. The differences among the groups did not reach statistical significance.

Conclusion: Individuals who are under treatment with low-dose, D 2 -selective DAAs for a prolactinoma do not face an increased risk for ICDs, especially when they are carefully screened for any psychiatric comorbidity that may also display impulsivity.

Philosophical theories have attempted to shed light on the intricate relationships between consciousness and memory since long before this became a major theme in psychology and neuroscience. In the December 2022 issue of Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology , Budson, Richman, and Kensinger (2022) introduced a comprehensive theoretical framework pertaining to the origins of consciousness in relation to the memory system, its implications on our real-time perception of the world, and the neuroanatomical correlates underlying these phenomena. Throughout their paper, Budson et al (2022) focus on their theory's explanatory value regarding several clinical syndromes and experimental findings. In this commentary, we first summarize the theory presented by Budson and colleagues (2022). Then, we suggest a complementary approach of studying the relationships between consciousness and memory through the concept of the human self and its protracted representation through time (so-called mental time travel). Finally, we elaborate on Budson and colleagues' (2022) neuroanatomical explanation to their theory and suggest that adding the concepts of brain networks and cortical gradients may contribute to their theory's interpretability.

The dehumanization of others is a major scourge of mankind; however, despite its significance, physicians have little understanding of the neurobiological mechanisms for this behavior. We can learn much about dehumanization from its brain-behavior localization and its manifestations in people with brain disorders. Dehumanization as an act of denying to others human qualities includes two major forms. Animalistic dehumanization (also called infrahumanization) results from increased inhibition of prepotent tendencies for emotional feelings and empathy for others. The mechanism may be increased activity in the inferior frontal gyrus. In contrast, mechanistic dehumanization results from a loss of perception of basic human nature and decreased mind-attribution. The mechanism may be hypofunction of a mentalization network centered in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and adjacent subgenual anterior cingulate cortex. Whereas developmental factors may promote animalistic dehumanization, brain disorders, such as frontotemporal dementia, primarily promote mechanistic dehumanization. The consideration of these two processes as distinct, with different neurobiological origins, could help guide efforts to mitigate expression of this behavior.

Sensory impairments such as age-related hearing loss and poor eyesight have been associated with a negative impact on cognitive screening test scores. Many researchers use cognitive tests and consider factors such as vision and cardiac issues but do not account for hearing loss. We reviewed published literature in the field of gerontology to determine if hearing loss was considered in human subjects research that involved the administration of a cognitive battery or screening test. We present evidence for the need to consider hearing loss when administering cognitive screening tests, as well as recommendations for practitioners and researchers.