Mmwr Recommendations and Reports最新文献

These guidelines for the treatment of persons who have or are at risk for sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) were updated by CDC after consultation with a group of professionals knowledgeable in the field of STDs who met in Atlanta on April 30-May 2, 2013. The information in this report updates the Sexually Transmitted Diseases Treatment Guidelines, 2010 (MMWR Recomm Rep 2010;59 [No. RR-12]). These updated guidelines discuss 1) alternative treatment regimens for Neisseria gonorrhoeae; 2) the use of nucleic acid amplification tests for the diagnosis of trichomoniasis; 3) alternative treatment options for genital warts; 4) the role of Mycoplasma genitalium in urethritis/cervicitis and treatment-related implications; 5) updated HPV vaccine recommendations and counseling messages; 6) the management of persons who are transgender; 7) annual testing for hepatitis C in persons with HIV infection; 8) updated recommendations for diagnostic evaluation of urethritis; and 9) retesting to detect repeat infection. Physicians and other health-care providers can use these guidelines to assist in the prevention and treatment of STDs.

This report outlines recommendations for the clinical use of the three smallpox vaccines stored in the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile for persons who are exposed to smallpox virus or at high risk for smallpox infection during a postevent vaccination program following an intentional or accidental release of the virus. No absolute contraindications exist for smallpox vaccination in a postevent setting. However, several relative contraindications exist among persons with certain medical conditions. CDC recommendations for smallpox vaccine use were developed in consideration of the risk for smallpox infection, risk for an adverse event following vaccination, and benefit from vaccination. Smallpox vaccines are made from live vaccinia viruses that protect against smallpox disease. They do not contain variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox. The three smallpox vaccines stockpiled are ACAM2000, Aventis Pasteur Smallpox Vaccine (APSV), and Imvamune. Surveillance and containment activities including vaccination with replication-competent smallpox vaccine (i.e., vaccine viruses capable of replicating in mammalian cells such as ACAM2000 and APSV) will be the primary response strategy for achieving epidemic control. Persons exposed to smallpox virus are at high risk for developing and transmitting smallpox and should be vaccinated with a replication-competent smallpox vaccine unless severely immunodeficient. Because of a high likelihood of a poor immune response and an increased risk for adverse events, smallpox vaccination should be avoided in persons with severe immunodeficiency who are not expected to benefit from vaccine, including bone marrow transplant recipients within 4 months of transplantation, persons infected with HIV with CD4 cell counts <50 cells/mm3, and persons with severe combined immunodeficiency, complete DiGeorge syndrome, and other severely immunocompromised states requiring isolation. If antivirals are not immediately available, it is reasonable to consider the use of Imvamune in the setting of a smallpox virus exposure in persons with severe immunodeficiency. Persons without a known smallpox virus exposure might still be at high risk for developing smallpox infection depending on the magnitude of the outbreak and the effectiveness of the public health response. Such persons will be defined by public health authorities and should be screened for relative contraindications to smallpox vaccination. Relative contraindications include atopic dermatitis (eczema), HIV infection (CD4 cell counts of 50-199 cells/mm3), other immunocompromised states, and vaccine or vaccine-component allergies. Persons with relative contraindications should be vaccinated with Imvamune when available and authorized for use by the Food and Drug Administration. These recommendations will be updated as new data on smallpox vaccines become available and further clinical guidance for other medical countermeasures including antivirals is developed.

Chronic diseases are an important public health problem, which can result in morbidity, mortality, disability, and decreased quality of life. Chronic diseases represented seven of the top 10 causes of death in the United States in 2010 (Murphy SL, Xu J, Kochanek KD. Deaths: final data for 2010. Natl Vital Stat Rep 2013;6. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf Adobe PDF file). Chronic diseases and risk factors vary by geographic area such as state and county, where essential public health interventions are implemented. The chronic disease indicators (CDIs) were established in the late 1990s through collaboration among CDC, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, and the Association of State and Territorial Chronic Disease Program Directors (now the National Association of Chronic Disease Directors) to enable public health professionals and policymakers to retrieve data for chronic diseases and risk factors that have a substantial impact on public health. This report describes the latest revisions to the CDIs, which were developed on the basis of a comprehensive review during 2011-2013. The number of indicators is increasing from 97 to 124, with major additions in systems and environmental indicators and additional emphasis on high-impact diseases and conditions as well as emerging topics.

The complexities of planning for and responding to the emergence of novel influenza viruses emphasize the need for systematic frameworks to describe the progression of the event; weigh the risk of emergence and potential public health impact; evaluate transmissibility, antiviral resistance, and severity; and make decisions about interventions. On the basis of experience from recent influenza responses, CDC has updated its framework to describe influenza pandemic progression using six intervals (two prepandemic and four pandemic intervals) and eight domains. This updated framework can be used for influenza pandemic planning and serves as recommendations for risk assessment, decision-making, and action in the United States. The updated framework replaces the U.S. federal government stages from the 2006 implementation plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (US Homeland Security Council. National strategy for pandemic influenza: implementation plan. Washington, DC: US Homeland Security Council; 2006. Available at http://www.flu.gov/planning-preparedness/federal/pandemic-influenza-implementation.pdf). The six intervals of the updated framework are as follows: 1) investigation of cases of novel influenza, 2) recognition of increased potential for ongoing transmission, 3) initiation of a pandemic wave, 4) acceleration of a pandemic wave, 5) deceleration of a pandemic wave, and 6) preparation for future pandemic waves. The following eight domains are used to organize response efforts within each interval: incident management, surveillance and epidemiology, laboratory, community mitigation, medical care and countermeasures, vaccine, risk communications, and state/local coordination. Compared with the previous U.S. government stages, this updated framework provides greater detail and clarity regarding the potential timing of key decisions and actions aimed at slowing the spread and mitigating the impact of an emerging pandemic. Use of this updated framework is anticipated to improve pandemic preparedness and response in the United States. Activities and decisions during a response are event-specific. These intervals serve as a reference for public health decision-making by federal, state, and local health authorities in the United States during an influenza pandemic and are not meant to be prescriptive or comprehensive. This framework incorporates information from newly developed tools for pandemic planning and response, including the Influenza Risk Assessment Tool and the Pandemic Severity Assessment Framework, and has been aligned with the pandemic phases restructured in 2013 by the World Health Organization.

This report summarizes the epidemiology of human papillomavirus (HPV) and associated diseases, describes the licensed HPV vaccines, provides updated data from clinical trials and postlicensure safety studies, and compiles recommendations from CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) for use of HPV vaccines. Persistent infection with oncogenic HPV types can cause cervical cancer in women as well as other anogenital and oropharyngeal cancers in women and men. HPV also causes genital warts. Two HPV vaccines are licensed in the United States. Both are composed of type-specific HPV L1 protein, the major capsid protein of HPV. Expression of the L1 protein using recombinant DNA technology produces noninfectious virus-like particles (VLPs). Quadrivalent HPV vaccine (HPV4) contains four HPV type-specific VLPs prepared from the L1 proteins of HPV 6, 11, 16, and 18. Bivalent HPV vaccine (HPV2) contains two HPV type-specific VLPs prepared from the L1 proteins of HPV 16 and 18. Both vaccines are administered in a 3-dose series. ACIP recommends routine vaccination with HPV4 or HPV2 for females aged 11 or 12 years and with HPV4 for males aged 11 or 12 years. Vaccination also is recommended for females aged 13 through 26 years and for males aged 13 through 21 years who were not vaccinated previously. Males aged 22 through 26 years may be vaccinated. ACIP recommends vaccination of men who have sex with men and immunocompromised persons (including those with HIV infection) through age 26 years if not previously vaccinated. As a compendium of all current recommendations for use of HPV vaccines, information in this report is intended for use by clinicians, vaccination providers, public health officials, and immunization program personnel as a resource. ACIP recommendations are reviewed periodically and are revised as indicated when new information and data become available.

This report provides recommendations developed collaboratively by CDC and the Office of Population Affairs (OPA) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The recommendations outline how to provide quality family planning services, which include contraceptive services, pregnancy testing and counseling, helping clients achieve pregnancy, basic infertility services, preconception health services, and sexually transmitted disease services. The primary audience for this report is all current or potential providers of family planning services, including those working in service sites that are dedicated to family planning service delivery as well as private and public providers of more comprehensive primary care. The United States continues to face substantial challenges to improving the reproductive health of the U.S. population. Nearly one half of all pregnancies are unintended, with more than 700,000 adolescents aged 15-19 years becoming pregnant each year and more than 300,000 giving birth. One of eight pregnancies in the United States results in preterm birth, and infant mortality rates remain high compared with those of other developed countries. This report can assist primary care providers in offering family planning services that will help women, men, and couples achieve their desired number and spacing of children and increase the likelihood that those children are born healthy. The report provides recommendations for how to help prevent and achieve pregnancy, emphasizes offering a full range of contraceptive methods for persons seeking to prevent pregnancy, highlights the special needs of adolescent clients, and encourages the use of the family planning visit to provide selected preventive health services for women, in accordance with the recommendations for women issued by the Institute of Medicine and adopted by HHS.

Following extensive consultation and peer review, CDC and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists have revised and combined the surveillance case definitions for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection into a single case definition for persons of all ages (i.e., adults and adolescents aged ≥13 years and children aged <13 years). The revisions were made to address multiple issues, the most important of which was the need to adapt to recent changes in diagnostic criteria. Laboratory criteria for defining a confirmed case now accommodate new multitest algorithms, including criteria for differentiating between HIV-1 and HIV-2 infection and for recognizing early HIV infection. A confirmed case can be classified in one of five HIV infection stages (0, 1, 2, 3, or unknown); early infection, recognized by a negative HIV test within 6 months of HIV diagnosis, is classified as stage 0, and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) is classified as stage 3. Criteria for stage 3 have been simplified by eliminating the need to differentiate between definitive and presumptive diagnoses of opportunistic illnesses. Clinical (nonlaboratory) criteria for defining a case for surveillance purposes have been made more practical by eliminating the requirement for information about laboratory tests. The surveillance case definition is intended primarily for monitoring the HIV infection burden and planning for prevention and care on a population level, not as a basis for clinical decisions for individual patients. CDC and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists recommend that all states and territories conduct case surveillance of HIV infection using this revised surveillance case definition.

This report updates CDC's 2002 recommendations regarding screening tests to detect Chlamydia trachomatis and Neisseria gonorrhoeae infections (CDC. Screening tests to detect Chlamydia trachomatis and Neisseria gonorrhoeae infections-2002. MMWR 2002;51[No. RR-15]) and provides new recommendations regarding optimal specimen types, the use of tests to detect rectal and oropharyngeal C. trachomatis and N. gonorrhoeae infections, and circumstances when supplemental testing is indicated. The recommendations in this report are intended for use by clinical laboratory directors, laboratory staff, clinicians, and disease control personnel who must choose among the multiple available tests, establish standard operating procedures for collecting and processing specimens, interpret test results for laboratory reporting, and counsel and treat patients. The performance of nucleic acid amplification tests (NAATs) with respect to overall sensitivity, specificity, and ease of specimen transport is better than that of any of the other tests available for the diagnosis of chlamydial and gonococcal infections. Laboratories should use NAATs to detect chlamydia and gonorrhea except in cases of child sexual assault involving boys and rectal and oropharyngeal infections in prepubescent girls and when evaluating a potential gonorrhea treatment failure, in which case culture and susceptibility testing might be required. NAATs that have been cleared by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the detection of C. trachomatis and N. gonorrhoeae infections are recommended as screening or diagnostic tests because they have been evaluated in patients with and without symptoms. Maintaining the capability to culture for both N. gonorrhoeae and C. trachomatis in laboratories throughout the country is important because data are insufficient to recommend nonculture tests in cases of sexual assault in prepubescent boys and extragenital anatomic site exposure in prepubescent girls. N. gonorrhoeae culture is required to evaluate suspected cases of gonorrhea treatment failure and to monitor developing resistance to current treatment regimens. Chlamydia culture also should be maintained in some laboratories to monitor future changes in antibiotic susceptibility and to support surveillance and research activities such as detection of lymphogranuloma venereum or rare infections caused by variant or mutated C. trachomatis.

This report compiles and summarizes all recommendations from CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding prevention and control of Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) disease in the United States. As a comprehensive summary of previously published recommendations, this report does not contain any new recommendations; it is intended for use by clinicians, public health officials, vaccination providers, and immunization program personnel as a resource. ACIP recommends routine vaccination with a licensed conjugate Hib vaccine for infants aged 2 through 6 months (2 or 3 doses, depending on vaccine product) with a booster dose at age 12 through 15 months. ACIP also recommends vaccination for certain persons at increased risk for Hib disease (i.e., persons who have early component complement deficiencies, immunoglobulin deficiency, anatomic or functional asplenia, or HIV infection; recipients of hematopoietic stem cell transplant; and recipients of chemotherapy or radiation therapy for malignant neoplasms). This report summarizes current information on Hib epidemiology in the United States and describes Hib vaccines licensed for use in the United States. Guidelines for antimicrobial chemoprophylaxis of contacts of persons with Hib disease also are provided.

This report contains CDC guidance that augments the 2011 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) for evaluating hepatitis B protection among health-care personnel (HCP) and administering post-exposure prophylaxis. Explicit guidance is provided for persons working, training, or volunteering in health-care settings who have documented hepatitis B (HepB) vaccination years before hire or matriculation (e.g., when HepB vaccination was received as part of routine infant [recommended since 1991] or catch-up adolescent [recommended since 1995] vaccination). In the United States, 2,890 cases of acute hepatitis B were reported to CDC in 2011, and an estimated 18,800 new cases of hepatitis B occurred after accounting for underreporting of cases and asymptomatic infection. Although the rate of acute hepatitis B virus (HBV) infections have declined approximately 89% during 1990-2011, from 8.5 to 0.9 cases per 100,000 population in the United States, the risk for occupationally acquired HBV among HCP persists, largely from exposures to patients with chronic HBV infection. ACIP recommends HepB vaccination for unvaccinated or incompletely vaccinated HCP with reasonably anticipated risk for blood or body fluid exposure. ACIP also recommends that vaccinated HCP receive postvaccination serologic testing (antibody to hepatitis B surface antigen [anti-HBs]) 1-2 months after the final dose of vaccine is administered (CDC. Immunization of health-care personnel: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 2011;60 [No. RR-7]). Increasing numbers of HCP have received routine HepB vaccination either as infants (recommended since 1991) or as catch-up vaccination (recommended since 1995) in adolescence. HepB vaccination results in protective anti-HBs responses among approximately 95% of healthy-term infants. Certain institutions test vaccinated HCP by measuring anti-HBs upon hire or matriculation, even when anti-HBs testing occurs greater than 2 months after vaccination. This guidance can assist clinicians, occupational health and student health providers, infection-control specialists, hospital and health-care training program administrators, and others in selection of an approach for assessing HBV protection for vaccinated HCP. This report emphasizes the importance of administering HepB vaccination for all HCP, provides explicit guidance for evaluating hepatitis B protection among previously vaccinated HCP (particularly those who were vaccinated in infancy or adolescence), and clarifies recommendations for postexposure management of HCP exposed to blood or body fluids.