Christian nationalism, the fusion of religious and national identities, has emerged as an important factor shaping public opinion on a range of issues. However, debates in the existing literature on the motivations behind support for Christian nationalism remain unresolved: Is Christian nationalism a response to secularization and/or a cover for discomfort with racial diversity and equality? Is Christian nationalism rooted in fear of social change, disgust about social change, or something else? We use an experiment embedded in a national survey of adults to isolate the effects of knowledge of both religious and racial demographic change among White Christians. Our analysis suggests that exposure to religious demographic change shifts support for Christian nationalism and perceptions of discrimination against Whites and Christians, but exposure to racial demographic change has limited impact. This effect is mediated by emotion—religious demographic change increases fear and disgust, which then influence support for Christian nationalism and perceptions of discrimination against Whites and Christians. Although our treatment suggesting exposure to racial demographic change had null effects, we note that racial attitudes do independently influence support for Christian nationalism and perceptions of discrimination against Whites and Christians.
{"title":"Fear and Loathing: How Demographic Change Affects Support for Christian Nationalism","authors":"Brooklyn Walker, Donald P Haider-Markel","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfae005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfae005","url":null,"abstract":"Christian nationalism, the fusion of religious and national identities, has emerged as an important factor shaping public opinion on a range of issues. However, debates in the existing literature on the motivations behind support for Christian nationalism remain unresolved: Is Christian nationalism a response to secularization and/or a cover for discomfort with racial diversity and equality? Is Christian nationalism rooted in fear of social change, disgust about social change, or something else? We use an experiment embedded in a national survey of adults to isolate the effects of knowledge of both religious and racial demographic change among White Christians. Our analysis suggests that exposure to religious demographic change shifts support for Christian nationalism and perceptions of discrimination against Whites and Christians, but exposure to racial demographic change has limited impact. This effect is mediated by emotion—religious demographic change increases fear and disgust, which then influence support for Christian nationalism and perceptions of discrimination against Whites and Christians. Although our treatment suggesting exposure to racial demographic change had null effects, we note that racial attitudes do independently influence support for Christian nationalism and perceptions of discrimination against Whites and Christians.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140601897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adam J Berinsky, Alejandro Frydman, Michele F Margolis, Michael W Sances, Diana Camilla Valerio
The surge in online self-administered surveys has given rise to an extensive body of literature on respondent inattention, also known as careless or insufficient effort responding. This burgeoning literature has outlined the consequences of inattention and made important strides in developing effective methods to identify inattentive respondents. However, differences in terminology, as well as a multiplicity of different methods for measuring and correcting for inattention, have made this literature unwieldy. We present an overview of the current state of this literature, highlighting commonalities, emphasizing key debates, and outlining open questions deserving of future research. Additionally, we emphasize the key considerations that survey researchers should take into account when measuring attention.
{"title":"Measuring Attentiveness in Self-Administered Surveys","authors":"Adam J Berinsky, Alejandro Frydman, Michele F Margolis, Michael W Sances, Diana Camilla Valerio","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfae004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfae004","url":null,"abstract":"The surge in online self-administered surveys has given rise to an extensive body of literature on respondent inattention, also known as careless or insufficient effort responding. This burgeoning literature has outlined the consequences of inattention and made important strides in developing effective methods to identify inattentive respondents. However, differences in terminology, as well as a multiplicity of different methods for measuring and correcting for inattention, have made this literature unwieldy. We present an overview of the current state of this literature, highlighting commonalities, emphasizing key debates, and outlining open questions deserving of future research. Additionally, we emphasize the key considerations that survey researchers should take into account when measuring attention.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140601728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Flavio Rogerio Hickel, Kassra A R Oskooii, Loren Collingwood
Various polls suggest that Donald Trump has enjoyed the support of a sizable minority of the Latinx electorate despite his racially offensive rhetoric and support for some of the most restrictive immigration policies in recent memory. Building on Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory, we contend that some Latinxs harbor negative stereotypes about immigrants, blame them for the status devaluation of the Latinx community, and cognitively distinguish themselves from Latinx immigrants. Rather than viewing anti-immigrant policies, rhetoric, and politicians as a direct status threat, those exhibiting this “Latinx Immigrant Resentment (LIR)” may regard them as a means to enhance the status and interests of “prototypical” Latinxs by signaling their distinction from “atypical” Latinxs. To evaluate this theory, we use the 2020 American National Election Study (ANES) and 2016 Collaborative MultiRacial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) as a proof-of-concept to first confirm that negative immigrant stereotypes and cognitive intragroup distinctions are associated with increased support for Donald Trump and restrictive immigration policies. We then introduce a more refined measure of LIR by fielding online surveys of US Latinxs administered through Lucid in 2020–2021 (N = 1,164) and 2021/22 (N = 1,017). We demonstrate the validity of this measure and its predictive power for attitudes toward Donald Trump, Ron DeSantis, and restrictive immigration policies after accounting for a range of rival explanations.
{"title":"Social Mobility through Immigrant Resentment: Explaining Latinx Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies and Anti-immigrant Candidates","authors":"Flavio Rogerio Hickel, Kassra A R Oskooii, Loren Collingwood","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad066","url":null,"abstract":"Various polls suggest that Donald Trump has enjoyed the support of a sizable minority of the Latinx electorate despite his racially offensive rhetoric and support for some of the most restrictive immigration policies in recent memory. Building on Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory, we contend that some Latinxs harbor negative stereotypes about immigrants, blame them for the status devaluation of the Latinx community, and cognitively distinguish themselves from Latinx immigrants. Rather than viewing anti-immigrant policies, rhetoric, and politicians as a direct status threat, those exhibiting this “Latinx Immigrant Resentment (LIR)” may regard them as a means to enhance the status and interests of “prototypical” Latinxs by signaling their distinction from “atypical” Latinxs. To evaluate this theory, we use the 2020 American National Election Study (ANES) and 2016 Collaborative MultiRacial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) as a proof-of-concept to first confirm that negative immigrant stereotypes and cognitive intragroup distinctions are associated with increased support for Donald Trump and restrictive immigration policies. We then introduce a more refined measure of LIR by fielding online surveys of US Latinxs administered through Lucid in 2020–2021 (N = 1,164) and 2021/22 (N = 1,017). We demonstrate the validity of this measure and its predictive power for attitudes toward Donald Trump, Ron DeSantis, and restrictive immigration policies after accounting for a range of rival explanations.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"309 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140199965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop the first implicit association test (IAT) to measure general implicit extremist attitudes in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. We find that implicit extremist attitudes are positively but weakly correlated with existing explicit measures. This indicates that implicit measures capture different parts of the population, for example, cases in which associations are based on automated cognitive processes instead of conscious thought. Further results show that particularly the higher-educated and nonreligious respondents score higher on the implicit than on the explicit extremism measures. Our results highlight the importance of studying implicit attitudes of political extremism. We further provide novel insights into how to develop IATs for abstract concepts such as democracy and extremism, for the study of which we cannot use readily available images or concepts.
{"title":"Measuring Implicit Political Extremism through Implicit Association Tests","authors":"Sebastian Jungkunz, Marc Helbling, Mujtaba Isani","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad061","url":null,"abstract":"We develop the first implicit association test (IAT) to measure general implicit extremist attitudes in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. We find that implicit extremist attitudes are positively but weakly correlated with existing explicit measures. This indicates that implicit measures capture different parts of the population, for example, cases in which associations are based on automated cognitive processes instead of conscious thought. Further results show that particularly the higher-educated and nonreligious respondents score higher on the implicit than on the explicit extremism measures. Our results highlight the importance of studying implicit attitudes of political extremism. We further provide novel insights into how to develop IATs for abstract concepts such as democracy and extremism, for the study of which we cannot use readily available images or concepts.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140205454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Even among those who share the same partisan commitments, some people say they despise the opposing party while others report far less animosity. Why are some people more likely to express hostility toward the opposing political party? We explore how individual-level differences in feelings of self-confidence fuel out-party animosities. Drawing on responses to a module of the 2020 Cooperative Election Study, we show that higher levels of internal political efficacy are associated with greater affective polarization. Those who feel self-assured about their political abilities are more likely to admit severing social ties with those who disagree with them and are more tolerant of discrimination against partisan opponents. In a survey experiment, we confirm that those with greater internal efficacy are also more likely to accept discrimination against a member of the opposing party. Affective polarization is greatest among those who feel the most confident of their ability to influence politics.
{"title":"Political Self-Confidence and Affective Polarization","authors":"Carey E Stapleton, Jennifer Wolak","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad064","url":null,"abstract":"Even among those who share the same partisan commitments, some people say they despise the opposing party while others report far less animosity. Why are some people more likely to express hostility toward the opposing political party? We explore how individual-level differences in feelings of self-confidence fuel out-party animosities. Drawing on responses to a module of the 2020 Cooperative Election Study, we show that higher levels of internal political efficacy are associated with greater affective polarization. Those who feel self-assured about their political abilities are more likely to admit severing social ties with those who disagree with them and are more tolerant of discrimination against partisan opponents. In a survey experiment, we confirm that those with greater internal efficacy are also more likely to accept discrimination against a member of the opposing party. Affective polarization is greatest among those who feel the most confident of their ability to influence politics.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140199827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Shana Kushner Gadarian, Sara Wallace Goodman, Thomas B Pepinsky
A wide range of empirical scholarship has documented a partisan gap in health behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, but the political foundations and temporal dynamics of these partisan gaps remain poorly understood. Using an original six-wave individual panel study (n = 3,000) of Americans throughout the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that at the individual level, partisan differences in health behavior grew rapidly in the early months of the pandemic and are explained almost entirely by individual support for or opposition to President Trump. Our results comprise powerful evidence that Trump support (or opposition), rather than ideology or simple partisan identity, explains partisan gaps in health behavior in the United States. In a time of populist resurgence around the world, public health efforts must consider the impact of charismatic authority in addition to entrenched partisanship.
{"title":"Trump Support Explains COVID-19 Health Behaviors in the United States","authors":"Shana Kushner Gadarian, Sara Wallace Goodman, Thomas B Pepinsky","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad062","url":null,"abstract":"A wide range of empirical scholarship has documented a partisan gap in health behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, but the political foundations and temporal dynamics of these partisan gaps remain poorly understood. Using an original six-wave individual panel study (n = 3,000) of Americans throughout the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that at the individual level, partisan differences in health behavior grew rapidly in the early months of the pandemic and are explained almost entirely by individual support for or opposition to President Trump. Our results comprise powerful evidence that Trump support (or opposition), rather than ideology or simple partisan identity, explains partisan gaps in health behavior in the United States. In a time of populist resurgence around the world, public health efforts must consider the impact of charismatic authority in addition to entrenched partisanship.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Traditional realignment theory has fallen out of fashion among political scientists, yet the popular press talk about political realignments with great regularity. However, in this research note we show that political science should reconsider realignment theory because over the last decade American politics has dramatically realigned—but only for white Americans. Specifically, we demonstrate that income has gone from a highly polarizing factor to one in which there is little to no polarization at all, while at the same time education polarization has increased dramatically to become the prominent demographic cleavage in the white segment of the electorate. However, no such realignment has occurred among Black or Latino voters. These differences across racial groups show how it is essential to consider race in theories of realignment, particularly because of the different experiences across racial groups. Realignment theory is quite viable in the twenty-first century, but the lens of race is the key to seeing the white realignment.
{"title":"The Crucial Role of Race in Twenty-First Century US Political Realignment","authors":"Michael Barber, Jeremy C Pope","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad063","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional realignment theory has fallen out of fashion among political scientists, yet the popular press talk about political realignments with great regularity. However, in this research note we show that political science should reconsider realignment theory because over the last decade American politics has dramatically realigned—but only for white Americans. Specifically, we demonstrate that income has gone from a highly polarizing factor to one in which there is little to no polarization at all, while at the same time education polarization has increased dramatically to become the prominent demographic cleavage in the white segment of the electorate. However, no such realignment has occurred among Black or Latino voters. These differences across racial groups show how it is essential to consider race in theories of realignment, particularly because of the different experiences across racial groups. Realignment theory is quite viable in the twenty-first century, but the lens of race is the key to seeing the white realignment.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"80 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kristin Lunz Trujillo, Jon Green, Alauna Safarpour, David Lazer, Jennifer Lin, Matthew Motta
Even amid the unprecedented public health challenges attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, opposition to vaccinating against the novel coronavirus has been both prevalent and politically contentious in American public life. In this paper, we theorize that attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccination might “spill over” to shape attitudes toward “postpandemic” vaccination programs and policy mandates for years to come. We find this to be the case using evidence from a large, original panel study, as well as two observational surveys, conducted on American adults during the pandemic. Specifically, we observe evidence of COVID-19 vaccine spillover onto general vaccine skepticism, flu shot intention, and attitudes toward hypothetical vaccines (i.e., vaccines in development), which do not have preexisting attitudinal connotations. Further, these spillover effects vary by partisanship and COVID-19 vaccination status, with the political left and those who received two or more COVID-19 vaccine doses becoming more provaccine, while the political right and the unvaccinated became more anti-vaccine. Taken together, these results point to the salience and politicization of the COVID-19 vaccine impacting non-COVID vaccine attitudes. We end by discussing the implications of this study for effective health messaging.
{"title":"COVID-19 Spillover Effects onto General Vaccine Attitudes","authors":"Kristin Lunz Trujillo, Jon Green, Alauna Safarpour, David Lazer, Jennifer Lin, Matthew Motta","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad059","url":null,"abstract":"Even amid the unprecedented public health challenges attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, opposition to vaccinating against the novel coronavirus has been both prevalent and politically contentious in American public life. In this paper, we theorize that attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccination might “spill over” to shape attitudes toward “postpandemic” vaccination programs and policy mandates for years to come. We find this to be the case using evidence from a large, original panel study, as well as two observational surveys, conducted on American adults during the pandemic. Specifically, we observe evidence of COVID-19 vaccine spillover onto general vaccine skepticism, flu shot intention, and attitudes toward hypothetical vaccines (i.e., vaccines in development), which do not have preexisting attitudinal connotations. Further, these spillover effects vary by partisanship and COVID-19 vaccination status, with the political left and those who received two or more COVID-19 vaccine doses becoming more provaccine, while the political right and the unvaccinated became more anti-vaccine. Taken together, these results point to the salience and politicization of the COVID-19 vaccine impacting non-COVID vaccine attitudes. We end by discussing the implications of this study for effective health messaging.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Weaving It In: How Political Radio Reacts to Events","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad058","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"11 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139161356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Devin Caughey and Christopher Warshaw. Dynamic Democracy: Public Opinion, Elections, and Policymaking in the American States.","authors":"Nicholas O Howard","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad055","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"85 s376","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138995318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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