Public Opinion Quarterly最新文献

Although the recruitment of online survey participants through paid social media advertisements is becoming increasingly common among survey researchers, we know little about how the content of advertisements influences the recruitment process. Our study systematically compares the effects of several approaches-being vague or explicit about the survey theme and offering material incentives-relying on 23 advertisements conducted in Turkey and Spain between May 2021 and June 2022, recruiting more than 30,000 respondents. Our article documents the important trade-offs that the content of an advertisement creates regarding cost and sample composition. We find that incentive-based advertisements can produce samples much closer to national population benchmarks; however, this also depends on the type of incentive. Thematic advertisements, which mention the political content of a survey, consistently return the cheapest samples, yet certain groups are overrepresented in these samples. Incentive-based advertisements also produce a generally higher response quality. We conclude our article by providing practical advice on which kind of advertisement to use, discussing the generalizability of our findings to other countries, and listing the main limitations of our study.

This article seeks to understand the public opinion formation among women of color in America. How do identity-based factors, such as linked fate with women of color (WoC), shape political evaluations? Expanding on social identity theory and intersectionality frameworks, we investigate the political influences of WoC identification and WoC intersectional linked fate. We argue that intersectional linked fate represents a deeper sense of shared experiences and interconnected outcomes across race and gender, making this both a conceptually distinct construct and a politically consequential extension of WoC identity. Further, we theorize that women of color's perceptions of intersectional linked fate drive their cross-racial support for real-world WoC in politics. We analyze data from the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey to test how intersectional linked fate correlates with evaluations of prominent WoC political figures such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ayanna Pressley, and Michelle Obama among Black, Latina, and Asian American women. Our findings reveal that intersectional linked fate has a stronger and more consistent influence on these political evaluations than either WoC identity or racial linked fate, fostering solidarity and support for WoC politicians across racial boundaries. The results highlight the critical role of intersectional linked fate in shaping public opinion with important implications for understanding future elections, especially as candidates, politics, and the electorate continue to diversify in the United States.

The relationship between personality traits and political attitudes has been studied extensively. However, existing accounts largely study personality's links to liberal-conservative divisions on social and economic issues. We know far less about its attitudinal influences when politics is organized around other issue domains, particularly ethnonational conflicts. Addressing this gap, we examine the relationship between the Big Five personality traits, policy preferences, and political orientation in Israel, where the main ideological cleavage involves the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Using original survey data, we find that the known relationships with social and economic attitudes operate only partly and more weakly in this context. Unlike these domains, conflict-related preferences in Israel correlate primarily with greater conscientiousness, largely through authoritarian tendencies. General Left-Right orientations mimic this relationship, reflecting conflict-related views rather than social or economic inclinations. These findings expand the scope of current debates about personality and political attitudes and underscore the importance of national ideological contexts for future research.

What shapes public support for withdrawal from an ongoing military intervention? While there is a vast literature on the public's support for new military interventions and its approval of interventions that are underway, there is very little research on public opinion around the explicit question of ending a military campaign on foreign soil and "going home." This is surprising, given the salience of questions about terminating military interventions in contemporary world politics, from Afghanistan to Ukraine and beyond. In this research note, we argue that the public's expressed appetite for exiting from an intervention is influenced in crucial ways by framing choices made by public opinion pollsters. In particular, we contend that whether pollsters frame withdrawal as an enemy victory or not and the alternate response options they provide around it can strongly impact its appeal. To test these ideas, we pair an observational analysis of public opinion polls over time on American support for military withdrawals from 1946 to 2021 with an original survey experiment conducted about the 2021 NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. The results reveal that both the enemy victory frame and what we call the middle ground frame exert a powerful influence on public support for withdrawal, and do so across people with different partisan and foreign policy predispositions. These results help provide insight into when people support going home in war, while also extending the considerable literature on framing choices in opinion polling in new ways.

While citizens typically favor welfare policies, the electoral consequences of retrenching the welfare state are often minimal for parties implementing the reforms. Using two structural reforms in Finland as a natural quasi-experiment, we show that voters' policy preferences shift in response to welfare reform measures initiated by their preferred parties. In December 2020, the Finnish center-left government enacted two reforms: one reducing social protection by removing entitlements for laid-off older workers to receive income-based unemployment benefits, and the other increasing social spending by extending the compulsory education age from 16 to 18. Using a two-wave panel survey conducted before and after the government actions, the results indicate that government voters became considerably more supportive of both reforms, despite their initial low support for welfare retrenchment and its contradiction with the established ideological profile of their parties. Moreover, the shift in voters' policy preferences was substantively greater compared to their opposition counterparts and not affected by ideology and economic self-interest. Hence, voters' policy preferences show dynamic adaptability to match the party line, thereby reducing grounds for holding the parties accountable.

Recent research has mapped levels of affective polarization worldwide. However, our current knowledge of the longitudinal patterns of in- and out-party affect, the two constitutive terms of affective polarization, remains limited. This manuscript expands the comparative and longitudinal scope of existing studies using national election study data from 143 elections across 12 Western democracies collected since the 1960s. The analysis expands previous descriptive accounts of levels of in- and out-party affect, reports levels of in-party love and out-party hate, and inspects longitudinal changes in the polarity of affect with a composite measure tapping the relative weight of in- and out-party feelings. The findings show a generalized decline of out-party evaluations and a growing prevalence of out-party hate versus in-party love over time. While citizens may not be more polarized than before in most Western democracies, contemporary affective polarization is more heavily characterized by a disproportionate weight of out-group dislike.

Gender disparities in Japanese government are consistently high, but evidence of voter bias against female politicians is mixed. We argue that this discrepancy arises because some researchers measure Japanese voters' first-order preferences (who they personally support) while other researchers measure Japanese voters' second-order preferences (who they expect other voters to support). We call this gap between voters' own preferences and expectations regarding others' preferences the preference-expectation gap. Since this gap is a key mechanism of strategic discrimination, we test our argument using an experimental design modelled after research on strategic discrimination in the 2020 US Democratic primary elections. Based on two online conjoint survey experiments in Japan, our findings demonstrate the presence of a preference-expectation gap in Japanese public opinion on female politicians. Exploratory analyses of moderation effects reveal that female participants and those with more liberal views toward gender roles have larger preference-expectation gaps.

Are individual perceptions about racial discrimination relatively stable or are they influenced by external cues? Does belief stability on racial discrimination items offer some explanation for the inconsistent findings on the relationship between perceptions about discrimination and political behavior for racial minorities identified in the past literature? This study highlights the case of Asian Americans and the rise of anti-Asian hate during the COVID pandemic as an opportunity to understand how Asian Americans report discrimination against their group in response to surrounding events. Using an original three-wave study of Asian American respondents collected over 2020, we find that perceptions of discrimination were relatively stable over 2020. At the same time, we find that a respondent's preexisting attitudes about racial discrimination held prior to the pandemic informed their assessment of discrimination during the pandemic. We also find that a respondent's preexisting discrimination beliefs moderate the relationship between their assessment about discrimination during the pandemic and 2020 presidential candidate choice. This study offers new interventions into existing assumptions about the link between discrimination and political behavior.

Incivility, oversimplification, lying, inaccessible language: there is widespread concern and controversy about the disrespectful ways politicians communicate. The reasoning underlying these worries is that such communication violates widely shared communicative norms, and that exposure to it may lead to adverse consequences in the wider public. However, widespread support for respect-based norms among citizens is generally presupposed, and little is known about the extent to which norm support matters in how people react when witnessing disrespectful politicians. Using Belgian survey data (N = 2,030), we investigate whether citizens differ in the degree to which they support different respect-based norms for mediated elite communication, and whether differing levels of norm support moderate the relationship between perceived norm violations and several political outcomes (affect toward politicians; political trust; talking about politics; political information seeking). The results reveal substantial variation in norm support across the population, with differences based on sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., education level) and political attitudes (cynical, populist, polarized attitudes). This variation, moreover, matters. While depending on the outcome and norms we study, several findings show that citizens supporting respect-based norms react more negatively when perceiving norm violations more frequently, as compared to citizens caring less about these norms. Yet, whether and in what way this moderating effect occurs can differ for different types of disrespect. As such, besides showing that respectful communication is not equally important to everyone and that not everyone reacts to norm breaking in the same way, this study also underlines that not all shades of disrespect should be tarred with the same brush.

Scholarship on "Christian nationalism" often frames it as antithetical to progressive politics. Yet recent studies find that historically disadvantaged racial minorities often espouse more progressive political views as Christian nationalism increases. Building on an understanding that American religion and politics are fundamentally racialized and drawing on nationally representative data from a nonprobability sample with a Christian nationalism scale incorporating ideology and self-identification, we examine how racial identity moderates the link between Christian nationalism and how much Americans identify with the terms "woke" and "progressive." Results reveal racial divergence. As Christian nationalism increases, White Americans are either no different or less likely to affirm progressive identities, while Black Americans become more likely to identify as "woke," and both Black and Hispanic Americans become more likely to identify as "progressive." Patterns are also consistent across partisan identity. Results further affirm how race moderates Christian nationalist views and demonstrate how endorsing progressive identities is differentially shaped by race and religion.