Thomas Tichelbaecker, Noam Gidron, Will Horne, James Adams
Abstract Measures of affective polarization—that is, dislike and hostility across party lines—have been developed and validated in the context of America’s two-party system. Yet increasingly, affective polarization is examined comparatively. We address this issue by introducing a novel dataset that measures aspects of partisan affect in 10 countries with diverse party systems. We detect associations between partisan affect toward out-parties versus affect toward out-parties’ supporters, but their strength varies across countries. We discuss measurement reasons for this variation and consider the implications of our findings for the emerging comparative affective polarization literature.
{"title":"What Do We Measure When We Measure Affective Polarization across Countries?","authors":"Thomas Tichelbaecker, Noam Gidron, Will Horne, James Adams","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Measures of affective polarization—that is, dislike and hostility across party lines—have been developed and validated in the context of America’s two-party system. Yet increasingly, affective polarization is examined comparatively. We address this issue by introducing a novel dataset that measures aspects of partisan affect in 10 countries with diverse party systems. We detect associations between partisan affect toward out-parties versus affect toward out-parties’ supporters, but their strength varies across countries. We discuss measurement reasons for this variation and consider the implications of our findings for the emerging comparative affective polarization literature.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135060240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Individuals seeking news content face a variety of options in the current media landscape, yet scholarly research provides little evidence regarding the conditions under which they might become more or less open to different partisan news outlets. Drawing on the case of Donald Trump’s critiques of Fox News, I argue that elite rhetoric plays an important role in this process for members of both parties. I first conduct an original content analysis of Trump’s tweets from 2017 to 2020 and find that he increasingly attacked Fox News on this platform. Notably, Trump’s increasingly critical rhetoric about Fox correlates significantly with decreases in both Fox’s daytime and prime-time ratings. Two survey experiments shed light on how individuals respond to this intraparty conflict, and I find that Trump’s rhetoric affects both Republicans and Democrats. Republicans view Fox as less conservative and more critical of Trump when exposed to his critiques of the outlet. However, Republicans do not change their viewing habits until Trump promotes an alternative to Fox like OANN. Democrats respond to Trump’s rhetoric by updating their perceptions of Fox’s coverage and ideology as well as increasing their willingness to watch the channel, both in isolation and relative to an alternative like OANN. The results suggest that elite rhetoric is instrumental in shaping views of and demand for partisan outlets among members of both parties and can elevate more ideologically extreme sources among followers. Thus, elite rhetoric serves as a meaningful cue for individuals navigating an increasingly fragmented partisan media landscape.
{"title":"The Effects of Elite Attacks on Copartisan Media: Evidence from Trump and Fox News","authors":"Allison M N Archer","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Individuals seeking news content face a variety of options in the current media landscape, yet scholarly research provides little evidence regarding the conditions under which they might become more or less open to different partisan news outlets. Drawing on the case of Donald Trump’s critiques of Fox News, I argue that elite rhetoric plays an important role in this process for members of both parties. I first conduct an original content analysis of Trump’s tweets from 2017 to 2020 and find that he increasingly attacked Fox News on this platform. Notably, Trump’s increasingly critical rhetoric about Fox correlates significantly with decreases in both Fox’s daytime and prime-time ratings. Two survey experiments shed light on how individuals respond to this intraparty conflict, and I find that Trump’s rhetoric affects both Republicans and Democrats. Republicans view Fox as less conservative and more critical of Trump when exposed to his critiques of the outlet. However, Republicans do not change their viewing habits until Trump promotes an alternative to Fox like OANN. Democrats respond to Trump’s rhetoric by updating their perceptions of Fox’s coverage and ideology as well as increasing their willingness to watch the channel, both in isolation and relative to an alternative like OANN. The results suggest that elite rhetoric is instrumental in shaping views of and demand for partisan outlets among members of both parties and can elevate more ideologically extreme sources among followers. Thus, elite rhetoric serves as a meaningful cue for individuals navigating an increasingly fragmented partisan media landscape.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135257271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Belinda Robnett and Katherine Tate. 2023. Gendered Pluralism Get access Belinda Robnett Katherine Tate. Gendered Pluralism. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 2023. 200 pp. $65.00 (cloth). $49.95 (ebook). Hanna K Brant Hanna K Brant SUNY Geneseo hbrant@geneseo.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Public Opinion Quarterly, nfad040, https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad040 Published: 17 September 2023
{"title":"Belinda Robnett and Katherine Tate. 2023. <i>Gendered Pluralism</i>","authors":"Hanna K Brant","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad040","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Belinda Robnett and Katherine Tate. 2023. Gendered Pluralism Get access Belinda Robnett Katherine Tate. Gendered Pluralism. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 2023. 200 pp. $65.00 (cloth). $49.95 (ebook). Hanna K Brant Hanna K Brant SUNY Geneseo hbrant@geneseo.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Public Opinion Quarterly, nfad040, https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad040 Published: 17 September 2023","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135258096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, we consider the role of personality as a component of motivation in promoting or inhibiting the tendency to exhibit the satisficing response styles of midpoint, straightlining, and Don’t Know responding. We assess whether respondents who are low on the Conscientiousness and Agreeableness dimensions of the Big Five Personality Inventory are more likely to exhibit these satisficing response styles. We find large effects of these personality dimensions on the propensity to satisfice in both face-to-face and self-administration modes and in probability and nonprobability samples. People who score high on Conscientiousness and Agreeableness were less likely to be in the top decile of straightlining and midpoint distributions. The findings for Don’t Know responding were weaker and only significant for Conscientiousness in the nonprobability sample. We also find large effects across all satisficing indicators for a direct measure of cognitive ability, where existing studies have mostly relied on proxy measures of ability such as educational attainment. Sensitivity analysis suggests the personality effects are likely to be causal in nature.
{"title":"Personality and Survey Satisficing","authors":"Patrick Sturgis, Ian Brunton-Smith","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we consider the role of personality as a component of motivation in promoting or inhibiting the tendency to exhibit the satisficing response styles of midpoint, straightlining, and Don’t Know responding. We assess whether respondents who are low on the Conscientiousness and Agreeableness dimensions of the Big Five Personality Inventory are more likely to exhibit these satisficing response styles. We find large effects of these personality dimensions on the propensity to satisfice in both face-to-face and self-administration modes and in probability and nonprobability samples. People who score high on Conscientiousness and Agreeableness were less likely to be in the top decile of straightlining and midpoint distributions. The findings for Don’t Know responding were weaker and only significant for Conscientiousness in the nonprobability sample. We also find large effects across all satisficing indicators for a direct measure of cognitive ability, where existing studies have mostly relied on proxy measures of ability such as educational attainment. Sensitivity analysis suggests the personality effects are likely to be causal in nature.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135258464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Michael Hoffman. Faith in Numbers: Religion, Sectarianism, and Democracy Get access Michael Hoffman. Faith in Numbers: Religion, Sectarianism, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2021. 212 pp. $125.00 (cloth). Vineeta Yadav Vineeta Yadav Pennsylvania State University vyadav@psu.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Public Opinion Quarterly, nfad041, https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad041 Published: 17 September 2023
{"title":"Michael Hoffman. <i>Faith in Numbers: Religion, Sectarianism, and Democracy</i>","authors":"Vineeta Yadav","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad041","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Michael Hoffman. Faith in Numbers: Religion, Sectarianism, and Democracy Get access Michael Hoffman. Faith in Numbers: Religion, Sectarianism, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2021. 212 pp. $125.00 (cloth). Vineeta Yadav Vineeta Yadav Pennsylvania State University vyadav@psu.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Public Opinion Quarterly, nfad041, https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad041 Published: 17 September 2023","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"129 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135257274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Social scientists employ survey methods to explore the contours of human behavior. Today there are more opportunities to collect survey data than at any time in recent history. Yet sample quality varies dramatically due in part to the availability of nonprobability samples (NPSs) from commercial survey organizations. While these kinds of surveys have advantages in terms of cost and accessibility, the proprietary nature of the data can be problematic. In this synthesis, we describe situations in which researchers typically employ NPSs and consider whether these data are fit for purpose. Next, we discuss use cases that are not widespread but may be appropriate for these data. We conclude that potential utility of NPSs will remain out of reach unless scholars confront the tension between the operation of online survey organizations and the goals of transparent research.
{"title":"Are Nonprobability Surveys Fit for Purpose?","authors":"Jennifer Jerit, Jason Barabas","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad037","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Social scientists employ survey methods to explore the contours of human behavior. Today there are more opportunities to collect survey data than at any time in recent history. Yet sample quality varies dramatically due in part to the availability of nonprobability samples (NPSs) from commercial survey organizations. While these kinds of surveys have advantages in terms of cost and accessibility, the proprietary nature of the data can be problematic. In this synthesis, we describe situations in which researchers typically employ NPSs and consider whether these data are fit for purpose. Next, we discuss use cases that are not widespread but may be appropriate for these data. We conclude that potential utility of NPSs will remain out of reach unless scholars confront the tension between the operation of online survey organizations and the goals of transparent research.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135438374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A hallmark of the Trump presidency was a stream of false statements, many of which were repeated dozens or even hundreds of times. But whether (and to what extent) this repetition translates into public misperceptions remains an open question. We address this question by leveraging the most comprehensive data on Trump’s repetition of misleading claims during his presidency. In a national survey asking Americans to evaluate the truth of claims from this database, we find a clear partisan asymmetry. An increase in the number of repetitions of a falsehood corresponded with increased belief among Republicans but decreased belief among Democrats. We also find an important moderating role of media consumption. The effects of repetition were larger when people consumed more right-leaning cable news and when falsehoods were mostly repeated on Twitter. We discuss implications of these findings for misinformation research.
{"title":"All the President’s Lies: Repeated False Claims and Public Opinion","authors":"Raunak M Pillai, Eunji Kim, Lisa K Fazio","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A hallmark of the Trump presidency was a stream of false statements, many of which were repeated dozens or even hundreds of times. But whether (and to what extent) this repetition translates into public misperceptions remains an open question. We address this question by leveraging the most comprehensive data on Trump’s repetition of misleading claims during his presidency. In a national survey asking Americans to evaluate the truth of claims from this database, we find a clear partisan asymmetry. An increase in the number of repetitions of a falsehood corresponded with increased belief among Republicans but decreased belief among Democrats. We also find an important moderating role of media consumption. The effects of repetition were larger when people consumed more right-leaning cable news and when falsehoods were mostly repeated on Twitter. We discuss implications of these findings for misinformation research.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135438376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Support for democracy in the United States, once thought to be solid, has now been shown to be somewhat shaky. One of the most concerning aspects of this declining attachment to democracy is a marked age gap, with younger Americans less supportive of democracy than their older compatriots. Using age-period-cohort analysis of 12 national surveys collected between 1995 and 2019, we show that this age gap is largely a function of a long-term generational decline in support for democracy, with little evidence of an independent life-cycle effect apparent. The combination of generational decline without a positive and counterbalancing life-cycle effect offers a sober prognosis of how support for democracy in the United States might look in the future.
{"title":"Public Support for Democracy in the United States Has Declined Generationally","authors":"Christopher Claassen, Pedro C Magalhães","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad039","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Support for democracy in the United States, once thought to be solid, has now been shown to be somewhat shaky. One of the most concerning aspects of this declining attachment to democracy is a marked age gap, with younger Americans less supportive of democracy than their older compatriots. Using age-period-cohort analysis of 12 national surveys collected between 1995 and 2019, we show that this age gap is largely a function of a long-term generational decline in support for democracy, with little evidence of an independent life-cycle effect apparent. The combination of generational decline without a positive and counterbalancing life-cycle effect offers a sober prognosis of how support for democracy in the United States might look in the future.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135438381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract When individuals picture the two parties, what do they think of? Given the dominant understanding of partisanship as a social identity, understanding the content of these mental images—individuals’ stereotypes of the two parties—is essential, as stereotypes play an important role in how identity affects attitudes and behaviors, perceptions of others, and inter-group relations. The existing literature offers three answers to this question: one that claims that people picture the two parties in terms of their constituent social groups, a second that claims that people picture the two parties in terms of policy positions, and a third that claims that people view the two parties in terms of individual traits they associate with partisans. While not mutually exclusive, these theories have different implications for the effects of partisanship and the roots of partisan animosity. This paper adjudicates between these theories by employing a new method that measures stereotype content at the collective and individual level using a conjoint experiment. An important advantage of the conjoint measure is that it allows for the direct comparison of the importance of different attributes, and different kinds of attributes, to the stereotype. Using a pre-registered 2,909-person survey, I evaluate the relative importance of issues, groups, and traits to stereotypes of partisans. I find strong evidence that issue positions and ideological labels are the central elements of partisan stereotypes. I also find that individuals who hold issue- or ideology-based stereotypes are more affectively polarized than those whose stereotypes are rooted in groups or traits.
{"title":"Issues, Groups, or Idiots? Comparing Theories of Partisan Stereotypes","authors":"C Daniel Myers","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad038","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When individuals picture the two parties, what do they think of? Given the dominant understanding of partisanship as a social identity, understanding the content of these mental images—individuals’ stereotypes of the two parties—is essential, as stereotypes play an important role in how identity affects attitudes and behaviors, perceptions of others, and inter-group relations. The existing literature offers three answers to this question: one that claims that people picture the two parties in terms of their constituent social groups, a second that claims that people picture the two parties in terms of policy positions, and a third that claims that people view the two parties in terms of individual traits they associate with partisans. While not mutually exclusive, these theories have different implications for the effects of partisanship and the roots of partisan animosity. This paper adjudicates between these theories by employing a new method that measures stereotype content at the collective and individual level using a conjoint experiment. An important advantage of the conjoint measure is that it allows for the direct comparison of the importance of different attributes, and different kinds of attributes, to the stereotype. Using a pre-registered 2,909-person survey, I evaluate the relative importance of issues, groups, and traits to stereotypes of partisans. I find strong evidence that issue positions and ideological labels are the central elements of partisan stereotypes. I also find that individuals who hold issue- or ideology-based stereotypes are more affectively polarized than those whose stereotypes are rooted in groups or traits.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"206 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135437593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Do elections increase responsiveness of legislators to their constituents? Previous studies that examine the effect of electoral proximity have been unable to hold the roll-call agenda constant and control for differences in unobserved covariates between legislators. This paper utilizes a natural experiment in four state legislatures—Arkansas, Illinois, Florida, and Texas—where term length was randomly assigned. This design compares the responsiveness to constituency opinion of those randomly assigned to a two-year term to those assigned a four-year term on different issue areas, like the economy, environment, and crime. I find no evidence for an electoral proximity effect on responsiveness. In addition, in the Illinois State Senate, the causal effect of electoral proximity on responsiveness is measured on several individual roll-call votes, including the legalization of medical marijuana and gay marriage.
{"title":"Electoral Proximity and Issue-Specific Responsiveness","authors":"Michael Pomirchy","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Do elections increase responsiveness of legislators to their constituents? Previous studies that examine the effect of electoral proximity have been unable to hold the roll-call agenda constant and control for differences in unobserved covariates between legislators. This paper utilizes a natural experiment in four state legislatures—Arkansas, Illinois, Florida, and Texas—where term length was randomly assigned. This design compares the responsiveness to constituency opinion of those randomly assigned to a two-year term to those assigned a four-year term on different issue areas, like the economy, environment, and crime. I find no evidence for an electoral proximity effect on responsiveness. In addition, in the Illinois State Senate, the causal effect of electoral proximity on responsiveness is measured on several individual roll-call votes, including the legalization of medical marijuana and gay marriage.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136024299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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