Shana Kushner Gadarian, Sara Wallace Goodman, Thomas B Pepinsky
A wide range of empirical scholarship has documented a partisan gap in health behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, but the political foundations and temporal dynamics of these partisan gaps remain poorly understood. Using an original six-wave individual panel study (n = 3,000) of Americans throughout the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that at the individual level, partisan differences in health behavior grew rapidly in the early months of the pandemic and are explained almost entirely by individual support for or opposition to President Trump. Our results comprise powerful evidence that Trump support (or opposition), rather than ideology or simple partisan identity, explains partisan gaps in health behavior in the United States. In a time of populist resurgence around the world, public health efforts must consider the impact of charismatic authority in addition to entrenched partisanship.
{"title":"Trump Support Explains COVID-19 Health Behaviors in the United States","authors":"Shana Kushner Gadarian, Sara Wallace Goodman, Thomas B Pepinsky","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad062","url":null,"abstract":"A wide range of empirical scholarship has documented a partisan gap in health behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, but the political foundations and temporal dynamics of these partisan gaps remain poorly understood. Using an original six-wave individual panel study (n = 3,000) of Americans throughout the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that at the individual level, partisan differences in health behavior grew rapidly in the early months of the pandemic and are explained almost entirely by individual support for or opposition to President Trump. Our results comprise powerful evidence that Trump support (or opposition), rather than ideology or simple partisan identity, explains partisan gaps in health behavior in the United States. In a time of populist resurgence around the world, public health efforts must consider the impact of charismatic authority in addition to entrenched partisanship.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Traditional realignment theory has fallen out of fashion among political scientists, yet the popular press talk about political realignments with great regularity. However, in this research note we show that political science should reconsider realignment theory because over the last decade American politics has dramatically realigned—but only for white Americans. Specifically, we demonstrate that income has gone from a highly polarizing factor to one in which there is little to no polarization at all, while at the same time education polarization has increased dramatically to become the prominent demographic cleavage in the white segment of the electorate. However, no such realignment has occurred among Black or Latino voters. These differences across racial groups show how it is essential to consider race in theories of realignment, particularly because of the different experiences across racial groups. Realignment theory is quite viable in the twenty-first century, but the lens of race is the key to seeing the white realignment.
{"title":"The Crucial Role of Race in Twenty-First Century US Political Realignment","authors":"Michael Barber, Jeremy C Pope","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad063","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional realignment theory has fallen out of fashion among political scientists, yet the popular press talk about political realignments with great regularity. However, in this research note we show that political science should reconsider realignment theory because over the last decade American politics has dramatically realigned—but only for white Americans. Specifically, we demonstrate that income has gone from a highly polarizing factor to one in which there is little to no polarization at all, while at the same time education polarization has increased dramatically to become the prominent demographic cleavage in the white segment of the electorate. However, no such realignment has occurred among Black or Latino voters. These differences across racial groups show how it is essential to consider race in theories of realignment, particularly because of the different experiences across racial groups. Realignment theory is quite viable in the twenty-first century, but the lens of race is the key to seeing the white realignment.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"James N. Druckman. Experimental Thinking: A Primer on Social Science Experiments","authors":"John V Kane","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfae002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfae002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140423789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Robert J. Norris, William D. Hicks, and Kevin J. Mullinix. The Politics of Innocence: How Wrongful Convictions Shape Public Opinion","authors":"Ethan D Boldt","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfae003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfae003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140419522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kristin Lunz Trujillo, Jon Green, Alauna Safarpour, David Lazer, Jennifer Lin, Matthew Motta
Even amid the unprecedented public health challenges attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, opposition to vaccinating against the novel coronavirus has been both prevalent and politically contentious in American public life. In this paper, we theorize that attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccination might “spill over” to shape attitudes toward “postpandemic” vaccination programs and policy mandates for years to come. We find this to be the case using evidence from a large, original panel study, as well as two observational surveys, conducted on American adults during the pandemic. Specifically, we observe evidence of COVID-19 vaccine spillover onto general vaccine skepticism, flu shot intention, and attitudes toward hypothetical vaccines (i.e., vaccines in development), which do not have preexisting attitudinal connotations. Further, these spillover effects vary by partisanship and COVID-19 vaccination status, with the political left and those who received two or more COVID-19 vaccine doses becoming more provaccine, while the political right and the unvaccinated became more anti-vaccine. Taken together, these results point to the salience and politicization of the COVID-19 vaccine impacting non-COVID vaccine attitudes. We end by discussing the implications of this study for effective health messaging.
{"title":"COVID-19 Spillover Effects onto General Vaccine Attitudes","authors":"Kristin Lunz Trujillo, Jon Green, Alauna Safarpour, David Lazer, Jennifer Lin, Matthew Motta","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad059","url":null,"abstract":"Even amid the unprecedented public health challenges attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, opposition to vaccinating against the novel coronavirus has been both prevalent and politically contentious in American public life. In this paper, we theorize that attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccination might “spill over” to shape attitudes toward “postpandemic” vaccination programs and policy mandates for years to come. We find this to be the case using evidence from a large, original panel study, as well as two observational surveys, conducted on American adults during the pandemic. Specifically, we observe evidence of COVID-19 vaccine spillover onto general vaccine skepticism, flu shot intention, and attitudes toward hypothetical vaccines (i.e., vaccines in development), which do not have preexisting attitudinal connotations. Further, these spillover effects vary by partisanship and COVID-19 vaccination status, with the political left and those who received two or more COVID-19 vaccine doses becoming more provaccine, while the political right and the unvaccinated became more anti-vaccine. Taken together, these results point to the salience and politicization of the COVID-19 vaccine impacting non-COVID vaccine attitudes. We end by discussing the implications of this study for effective health messaging.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Weaving It In: How Political Radio Reacts to Events","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad058","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139161356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Devin Caughey and Christopher Warshaw. Dynamic Democracy: Public Opinion, Elections, and Policymaking in the American States.","authors":"Nicholas O Howard","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad055","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138995318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Media coverage of affective polarization—partisans disliking and distrusting out-partisans while liking and trusting in-partisans—is abundant, both creating and reflecting a belief among the public that partisans are more affectively polarized than they are. These trends suggest that affective polarization among partisans could be viewed as socially desirable, which may then shape partisans’ expressed attitudes and behavior. To examine this, I run four original surveys and study two broad research questions: (1) Does this social desirability exist?; and (2) Can it influence partisans’ expressed affective polarization? I find that affective polarization among partisans is indeed socially desirable and that, largely motivated by self-presentation desires, this social desirability can shape partisans’ expressed affective polarization. However, my results also suggest that affective polarization responses are rather ingrained in partisans, and that while partisans are aware of this social desirability and its effect on their behavior, small changes in survey context do not necessarily produce large changes in affective polarization responses. Overall, the results offer necessary nuance to our understanding of affective polarization, implying that social desirability—which can be shifted by contexts—can alter how affectively polarized people act.
{"title":"Social Desirability and Affective Polarization","authors":"Elizabeth C Connors","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad053","url":null,"abstract":"Media coverage of affective polarization—partisans disliking and distrusting out-partisans while liking and trusting in-partisans—is abundant, both creating and reflecting a belief among the public that partisans are more affectively polarized than they are. These trends suggest that affective polarization among partisans could be viewed as socially desirable, which may then shape partisans’ expressed attitudes and behavior. To examine this, I run four original surveys and study two broad research questions: (1) Does this social desirability exist?; and (2) Can it influence partisans’ expressed affective polarization? I find that affective polarization among partisans is indeed socially desirable and that, largely motivated by self-presentation desires, this social desirability can shape partisans’ expressed affective polarization. However, my results also suggest that affective polarization responses are rather ingrained in partisans, and that while partisans are aware of this social desirability and its effect on their behavior, small changes in survey context do not necessarily produce large changes in affective polarization responses. Overall, the results offer necessary nuance to our understanding of affective polarization, implying that social desirability—which can be shifted by contexts—can alter how affectively polarized people act.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138679953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What policy changes do people expect from elections, and how do these expectations influence the decision to vote? This paper seeks to understand the relationship between people’s expectations and their subsequent voting behavior by examining beliefs about what candidates would actually do if given political power. I start with a survey of political scientists and compare their forecasts about what presidential candidates will accomplish to those of the general population. Public respondents expected much more legislation to result from the 2020 election. This comparison suggests an underestimation by the public of the impediments that the separation of powers poses to passing legislation. The study further reveals that voters expected much more policy change than nonvoters did, with high expectations serving as a strong predictor of validated voter turnout. These results support explanations for the decision to vote that center on the policy benefits that people believe their preferred candidate will deliver.
{"title":"Expectations for Policy Change and Participation","authors":"Curtis Bram","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad047","url":null,"abstract":"What policy changes do people expect from elections, and how do these expectations influence the decision to vote? This paper seeks to understand the relationship between people’s expectations and their subsequent voting behavior by examining beliefs about what candidates would actually do if given political power. I start with a survey of political scientists and compare their forecasts about what presidential candidates will accomplish to those of the general population. Public respondents expected much more legislation to result from the 2020 election. This comparison suggests an underestimation by the public of the impediments that the separation of powers poses to passing legislation. The study further reveals that voters expected much more policy change than nonvoters did, with high expectations serving as a strong predictor of validated voter turnout. These results support explanations for the decision to vote that center on the policy benefits that people believe their preferred candidate will deliver.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138679972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we analyze trends in Americans’ immigration attitudes and policy preferences nationally and across partisan and racial/ethnic groups. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Democrats and Republicans shared similarly negative attitudes toward immigrants and high levels of support for restrictionist immigration policies. Beginning in the 2010s and continuing through the early 2020s, however, Democrats’ aggregate immigration opinions liberalized considerably. We observed increasingly liberal immigration preferences among Democrats of all racial and ethnic backgrounds after 2016, but this trend was especially pronounced among white Democrats. Among Republicans, opinion on immigration remained mostly stable over this period, although in some cases it became more conservative (e.g., border security) and more liberal on others (e.g., amnesty). The marked liberalization in immigration opinion among Democrats has left partisans more divided on immigration than at any point since national surveys began consistently measuring immigration opinion in the late twentieth century.
{"title":"The Asymmetric Polarization of Immigration Opinion in the United States","authors":"Trent Ollerenshaw, Ashley Jardina","doi":"10.1093/poq/nfad048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad048","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we analyze trends in Americans’ immigration attitudes and policy preferences nationally and across partisan and racial/ethnic groups. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Democrats and Republicans shared similarly negative attitudes toward immigrants and high levels of support for restrictionist immigration policies. Beginning in the 2010s and continuing through the early 2020s, however, Democrats’ aggregate immigration opinions liberalized considerably. We observed increasingly liberal immigration preferences among Democrats of all racial and ethnic backgrounds after 2016, but this trend was especially pronounced among white Democrats. Among Republicans, opinion on immigration remained mostly stable over this period, although in some cases it became more conservative (e.g., border security) and more liberal on others (e.g., amnesty). The marked liberalization in immigration opinion among Democrats has left partisans more divided on immigration than at any point since national surveys began consistently measuring immigration opinion in the late twentieth century.","PeriodicalId":51359,"journal":{"name":"Public Opinion Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138580944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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