Public Opinion Quarterly最新文献

Quantitative forecasts have become increasingly prominent as tools for aiding public understanding of sociopolitical trends. But how much, and what, do people learn from quantitative forecasts? In this note, we show through a preregistered survey experiment that real forecasts of the 2022 French presidential election significantly affect expectations of the election result. The direction of that effect hinges on how the forecast is presented. Voters become more accurate and precise in their predictions of each candidate's vote share when given forecast information in the form of projected vote share. Forecasts presented as numerical probabilities make such expectations less accurate and less precise. When combined, the effects of both forms on vote share expectations tend to cancel out, but jointly boost voters' ability to identify likely winners. Our findings have implications for the public communication of quantitative information.

We investigate whether a real-world episode of physical violence committed in October 2023 against Thierry Baudet, leader of the Dutch far-right FvD, conditioned a differential support for political violence among different voters: voters ideologically close to the target of the attack (in-group) and voters experiencing partisan Schadenfreude toward the party of the target (out-group). The unexpectedness of the attack makes it an excellent case of exogenous treatment in a natural experiment ("Unexpected Event during Survey Design). The fact that the attack occurred in the midst of a survey unfolding a rolling cross-section design yields likely more robust estimations than usually found in similar natural experiments. Our results indicate that the attack against Baudet slightly normalized political violence in the short term. While no specific uptick of support for violence was measured among respondents close to the FvD, in the short and medium term the attack furthermore slightly increased support for violence among respondents who dislike the FvD and experience partisan Schadenfreude.

Comparative research on affective polarization provides evidence that this phenomenon is present also in parliamentary democracies. Although it has been typically understood as the difference in levels of affect toward in- and out-parties, more recent research has established the relevance of polarized feelings toward party leaders as objects of affective polarization also in parliamentary systems. While several studies have cross-sectionally examined the effect of affective polarization on turnout, recent research has taken an innovative approach by systematically comparing the impact of polarized feelings toward parties and candidates in the probability of turning out in US presidential elections, showing the primacy of the latter in predicting patterns of electoral participation. We expand the contribution of those studies by providing the first longitudinal account of the relationship between affective polarization and turnout in multi-party systems, as well as the first systematic comparison of the effects of party and leader affective polarization on turnout beyond the United States. Using post-electoral survey data covering 87 elections from 13 Western parliamentary democracies collected between 1980 and 2019, our results confirm that polarized feelings toward both parties and leaders are positively associated with turnout in parliamentary democracies. More importantly, our findings highlight the growing relevance of leader affective polarization in accounting for patterns of electoral participation. These results are robust to the use of self-reported and validated measures of turnout in selected countries, as well as different model specifications. Our conclusions contribute both theoretically and methodologically to the literature on affective polarization.

There is a growing worry about the health of American democracy, and political scientists and pundits alike are looking for possible explanations. Surveys conducted during the Trump presidency showed considerable citizen support for liberal democratic norm erosions, especially among Republicans. However, recent experimental research also shows that voters of both parties are more tolerant of norm erosion committed by politicians of the party they prefer. In this note, we aim to reconcile these contradictory findings by analyzing surveys spanning from 2006 to 2021 on the public's tolerance of executive concentration of power. We also collect original data under both the Trump and Biden administrations gauging support for a broad array of liberal democratic norm erosions. Support for such erosions, in fact, has been relatively similar across Democrats and Republicans once we account for the party of the president. Support for executive aggrandizement has been prevalent among supporters of the president's party at least since the second term of the Bush administration. Increased checks and balances on the executive, through divided government, amplifies this effect further. Taken together, these findings suggest that universal support for the liberal democratic status quo has been weaker among those who support the president's party, well before and since the Trump presidency.

Electoral misinformation, where citizens believe false or misleading claims about the electoral process and electoral institutions-sometimes actively and strategically spread by political actors-is a challenge to public confidence in elections specifically and democracy more broadly. In this article, we analyze a combination of 42 million clicks in links and apps from behavioral tracking data of 2,200 internet users and a four-wave panel survey to investigate how different kinds of online news and media use relate to beliefs in electoral misinformation during a contentious political period-the 2022 Brazilian presidential elections. We find that, controlling for other factors, using news from legacy news media is associated with belief in fewer claims of electoral misinformation over time. We find null or inconsistent effects for using digital-born news media and various digital platforms, including Facebook and WhatsApp. Furthermore, we find that trust in news plays a significant role as a moderator. Belief in electoral misinformation, in turn, undermines trust in news. Overall, our findings document the important role of the news media as an institution in curbing electoral misinformation, even as they also underline the precarity of trust in news during contentious political periods.

Do Donald Trump's attacks on voting by mail influence how some Canadians view mail-in ballots? The Trump effect on views and behaviors surrounding voting by mail has been well documented in the United States. North of the border, more Canadians than ever voted by mail in the last general election. In this study, we consider how right-wing populism is associated with trust in voting by mail among Canadians. Specifically, we seek to test two main hypotheses. First, we consider whether Canadians holding populist views-and, in particular, those holding right-wing populist views (would-be Trump supporters)-are less trusting of voting by mail. Second, we consider whether political media exposure amplifies this association. We analyze data from both the 2021 Canadian Election Study and Democracy Checkup Survey. We find that those who hold populist views clearly have less trust in voting by mail. This is especially true among right-leaning individuals. Furthermore, as in the United States, this effect is moderated by one's level of political media exposure, with higher levels of political media exposure amplifying the effect of populist views on trust in voting by mail. Our findings, therefore, suggest that the politicization of mail-in voting by President Trump has important implications for the legitimacy of the electoral system not only in the United States, but also in Canada and potentially in other parts of the world.

How do electoral turnovers shape citizen perceptions of election quality in competitive authoritarian regimes? We argue that electoral outcomes are crucial for determining perceptions of electoral quality. While detailed evaluation of electoral trust is complex in competitive autocracies with institutional uncertainty and polarized electoral environments, turnovers send strong and unequivocal signals about election quality. Previous literature has noted a strong partisan divide in electoral trust in competitive authoritarian regimes, but turnovers can boost trust among both incumbent and opposition supporters. We test this argument in the case of Zambia's 2021 election, a case where a ruling party lost despite electoral manipulation and strong control over the Election Management Body (EMB). Empirically, we leverage the first-ever panel survey carried out during Zambian elections. Comparing trust in elections before and after the election, we find that perceived election quality increased after the 2021 electoral turnover among both losers and winners. We find that trust in elections increased the most among winning opposition supporters. Moreover, despite the outgoing president's attempt to portray the election as fraudulent, losing ruling-party supporters also increased their trust in elections after the turnover. The study has important implications for the literature on democratic consolidation and institutional trust.