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The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long Founding Moment 内战期间宪法:长期建国时期的联邦制
IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2014-03-05 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2228335
Alison L. LaCroix
Today, the mechanism of the spending power drives the gears of the modern federal machine. But early nineteenth century constitutional debates demonstrate that the spending power is essentially a workaround, and a recent one at that – a tool by which Congress achieves certain political and legal ends while respecting the formal boundaries set by Article I and the Tenth Amendment. This “interbellum” period was enormously significant for American constitutional law, in particular the constellation of related doctrines concerning congressional power that we now place under the general heading of “federalism”: the spending power, the enumerated powers of Article I, and the anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment. As a historical matter, political and legal actors in the early nineteenth century believed themselves to be living in what this Article argues was a long founding moment, in which the fundamental terms of the federal-state relationship were still open to debate. Constitutional scholars have mistakenly overlooked the constitutional creativity of the period. As a normative matter, I argue for an approach to millennial constitutional interpretation that recognizes the ever-changing nature of the landscape of constitutional permissibility, and that offers documentary evidence of the precise contours of that change. Studying the evolution of the spending power over time, especially where the text itself remains constant, demonstrates that ideas about federal structure are not fixed. Therefore, constitutional federalism itself is not fixed – a particularly important insight in an area of constitutional doctrine that is dominated by originalist approaches.
今天,消费能力的机制驱动着现代联邦机器的齿轮。但19世纪早期的宪法辩论表明,支出权本质上是一种变通办法,而且是最近的一种变通办法——国会在尊重宪法第一条和第十修正案规定的正式界限的情况下实现某些政治和法律目的的工具。这段“内战”时期对美国宪法有着极其重要的意义,尤其是我们现在称之为“联邦制”的一系列有关国会权力的学说:支出权、第一条列举的权力和第十修正案的反强占原则。作为一个历史问题,19世纪早期的政治和法律行为者相信他们生活在本文所说的一个漫长的建国时刻,在这个时刻,联邦-国家关系的基本条款仍有争议。宪法学者错误地忽视了这一时期的宪法创造性。作为一个规范性问题,我主张在千禧年的宪法解释中采用一种方法,这种方法认识到宪法可容许性的不断变化的本质,并提供有关这种变化的精确轮廓的书面证据。研究消费能力随时间的演变,特别是在文本本身保持不变的情况下,表明关于联邦结构的想法并不是固定的。因此,宪法联邦制本身并不是固定不变的——这是在由原旨主义方法主导的宪法理论领域中一个特别重要的见解。
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引用次数: 5
Compulsory sexuality. 强制性。
IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2014-02-01
Elizabeth F Emens

Asexuality is an emerging identity category that challenges the common assumption that everyone is defined by some type of sexual attraction. Asexuals--those who report feeling no sexual attraction to others--constitute one percent of the population, according to one prominent study. In recent years, some individuals have begun to identify as asexual and to connect around their experiences interacting with a sexual society. Asexuality has also become a protected classification under the antidiscrimination law of one state and several localities, but legal scholarship has thus far neglected the subject. This Article introduces asexuality to the legal literature as a category of analysis, an object of empirical study, and a phenomenon of medical science. It then offers a close examination of the growing community of self-identified asexuals. Asexual identity has revealing intersections with the more familiar categories of gender, sexual orientation, and disability, and inspires new models for understanding sexuality. Thinking about asexuality also sheds light on our legal system. Ours is arguably a sexual law, predicated on the assumption that sex is important. This Article uses asexuality to develop a framework for identifying the ways that law privileges sexuality. Across various fields, these interactions include legal requirements of sexual activity, special carve-outs to shield sexuality from law, legal protections from others' sexuality, and legal protections for sexual identity. Applying this framework, the Article traces several ways that our sexual law burdens, and occasionally benefits, asexuals. This Article concludes by closely examining asexuality's prospects for broader inclusion into federal, state, and local antidiscrimination laws.

无性恋是一种新兴的身份类别,它挑战了每个人都被某种性吸引力所定义的普遍假设。根据一项著名的研究,无性恋者——那些声称对他人没有性吸引力的人——占人口的1%。近年来,一些人开始认同自己是无性恋者,并将他们与性社会互动的经历联系起来。在一个州和几个地方的反歧视法下,无性恋也成为一种受保护的分类,但法律学术界迄今为止忽视了这一主题。本文将无性恋作为一种分析范畴、实证研究对象和医学现象引入法学文献。然后,它提供了一个不断增长的自我认同的无性恋群体的仔细检查。无性身份与我们更熟悉的性别、性取向和残疾等类别有着明显的交集,并激发了理解性的新模式。对无性恋的思考也有助于了解我们的法律体系。我们的法律可以说是一部性法律,它建立在性很重要的假设之上。本文以无性恋为例,建立了一个框架,用以识别法律赋予性特权的方式。在各个领域,这些相互作用包括性行为的法律要求,保护性行为不受法律约束的特殊规定,对他人性行为的法律保护,以及对性身份的法律保护。运用这一框架,文章追溯了我们的性法律给无性恋者带来负担(有时也会带来好处)的几个方面。本文的最后,将仔细研究无性恋在联邦、州和地方反歧视法中更广泛纳入的前景。
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引用次数: 0
Compulsory sexuality. 强制性。
IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2014-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2218783
Elizabeth F. Emens
Asexuality is an emerging identity category that challenges the common assumption that everyone is defined by some type of sexual attraction. Asexuals--those who report feeling no sexual attraction to others--constitute one percent of the population, according to one prominent study. In recent years, some individuals have begun to identify as asexual and to connect around their experiences interacting with a sexual society. Asexuality has also become a protected classification under the antidiscrimination law of one state and several localities, but legal scholarship has thus far neglected the subject. This Article introduces asexuality to the legal literature as a category of analysis, an object of empirical study, and a phenomenon of medical science. It then offers a close examination of the growing community of self-identified asexuals. Asexual identity has revealing intersections with the more familiar categories of gender, sexual orientation, and disability, and inspires new models for understanding sexuality. Thinking about asexuality also sheds light on our legal system. Ours is arguably a sexual law, predicated on the assumption that sex is important. This Article uses asexuality to develop a framework for identifying the ways that law privileges sexuality. Across various fields, these interactions include legal requirements of sexual activity, special carve-outs to shield sexuality from law, legal protections from others' sexuality, and legal protections for sexual identity. Applying this framework, the Article traces several ways that our sexual law burdens, and occasionally benefits, asexuals. This Article concludes by closely examining asexuality's prospects for broader inclusion into federal, state, and local antidiscrimination laws.
无性恋是一种新兴的身份类别,它挑战了每个人都被某种性吸引力所定义的普遍假设。根据一项著名的研究,无性恋者——那些声称对他人没有性吸引力的人——占人口的1%。近年来,一些人开始认同自己是无性恋者,并将他们与性社会互动的经历联系起来。在一个州和几个地方的反歧视法下,无性恋也成为一种受保护的分类,但法律学术界迄今为止忽视了这一主题。本文将无性恋作为一种分析范畴、实证研究对象和医学现象引入法学文献。然后,它提供了一个不断增长的自我认同的无性恋群体的仔细检查。无性身份与我们更熟悉的性别、性取向和残疾等类别有着明显的交集,并激发了理解性的新模式。对无性恋的思考也有助于了解我们的法律体系。我们的法律可以说是一部性法律,它建立在性很重要的假设之上。本文以无性恋为例,建立了一个框架,用以识别法律赋予性特权的方式。在各个领域,这些相互作用包括性行为的法律要求,保护性行为不受法律约束的特殊规定,对他人性行为的法律保护,以及对性身份的法律保护。运用这一框架,文章追溯了我们的性法律给无性恋者带来负担(有时也会带来好处)的几个方面。本文的最后,将仔细研究无性恋在联邦、州和地方反歧视法中更广泛纳入的前景。
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引用次数: 27
BIOMEDICAL PATENTS AT THE SUPREME COURT: A PATH FORWARD. 最高法院的生物医学专利:一条前进的道路。
IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2013-10-11
Arti K Rai
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引用次数: 0
The Exergen and Therasense Effects Exergen和Therasense效应
IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2013-05-29 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2271837
R. D. Swanson
This Article empirically investigates the effects of the Federal Circuit’s Exergen and Therasense decisions. It makes three main findings: First, the rate at which accused infringers won a final merits determination of inequitable conduct was 0.23 immediately preceding Exergen, dropping to 0.12 for cases between Exergen and Therasense, and then declining to 0.09 for cases post-Therasense. Second, inequitable conduct was plead in approximately 17 percent of patent cases before Exergen, 14 percent of cases between Exergen and Therasense, and 7.5 percent of cases after Therasense. Third, when courts decline to find inequitable conduct, they most often hold that proof of intent, rather than proof of materiality, is lacking. Based on these results, this Article argues that the Federal Circuit went too far in Therasense. A better formulation of inequitable conduct doctrine would be the test advocated by the dissent in Therasense, which embraced the PTO’s Rule 56 definition of materiality.
本文实证研究了联邦巡回上诉法院的紧急情况判决和治疗判决的影响。它得出了三个主要结论:首先,被指控侵权人赢得对不公平行为的最终裁决的比率在Exergen之前是0.23,在Exergen和Therasense之间的案件中下降到0.12,然后在Therasense之后的案件中下降到0.09。其次,在Exergen之前,大约17%的专利案件中存在不公平行为,在Exergen和Therasense之间的案件中占14%,在Therasense之后的案件中占7.5%。第三,当法院拒绝发现不公平行为时,他们通常认为缺乏意图证据,而不是缺乏实质性证据。基于这些结果,本文认为联邦巡回法院在Therasense案中做得太过分了。不公平行为原则的一个更好的表述应该是Therasense一案中持不同意见的人所倡导的检验方法,该方法采纳了专利商标局第56条规则对重要性的定义。
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引用次数: 1
Attorney Advertising and the Contingency Fee Cost Paradox 律师广告与应急费用成本悖论
IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2013-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2259302
N. Engstrom
It has long been taken as gospel that attorney advertising drives down the cost of legal services. The Supreme Court assumed it when first permitting attorney advertising in the landmark First Amendment case, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. And, in the decades following Bates, courts, commentators, the ABA, and the FTC have followed suit, frequently touting advertising’s ability to cut consumer costs. The price effect of attorney advertising is thus both seemingly settled and also deeply embedded in its judicial justification.But there is a wrinkle. Though it appears advertising did drive down prices for routine legal services in the years immediately following Bates, in the intervening decades, there has been a decided, yet heretofore unexplored, shift. Contemporary attorney advertising is now mostly the province of the personal injury bar. Yet there is scant evidence that attorney advertising reduces the contingency fees personal injury lawyers charge. To the contrary, the best, most sophisticated, most comprehensive study of legal fees and attorney advertising ever conducted found that, unlike for most basic legal services (e.g., wills, personal bankruptcies, uncontested divorces), those who advertised personal injury legal services charged higher prices than their non-advertising counterparts. Other evidence likewise shows contingency fees have not dropped, even while personal injury lawyers’ ad expenditures have soared. This fact has been all but ignored, though it is of enormous consequence for both the legality of attorney advertising and the delivery of legal services more generally. This Article aims to reopen and reorient the “settled” attorney advertising debate, in light of the particularities of personal injury practice and the changing nature of the market for personal legal services in the United States.
长期以来,人们一直认为律师广告能降低法律服务的成本。在具有里程碑意义的第一修正案案件贝茨诉亚利桑那州州律师协会案中,最高法院首次允许律师做广告时就假设了这一点。而且,在贝茨案之后的几十年里,法院、评论员、美国律师协会和联邦贸易委员会也纷纷效仿,频繁地吹捧广告削减消费者成本的能力。因此,律师广告的价格效应既看似确定,又深深植根于其司法正当性之中。但这里有一个问题。虽然在贝茨案之后的几年里,广告似乎确实降低了常规法律服务的价格,但在这中间的几十年里,已经出现了一个确定的、迄今为止尚未被探索的转变。当代律师广告现在大多是人身伤害律师的领域。然而,很少有证据表明,律师广告降低了律师收取的人身伤害应急费用。相反,对法律费用和律师广告进行的最好、最复杂、最全面的研究发现,与大多数基本的法律服务(如遗嘱、个人破产、无争议离婚)不同,那些为人身伤害法律服务做广告的人收取的费用高于没有做广告的同行。其他证据同样表明,即使人身伤害律师的广告支出飙升,意外费用也没有下降。这一事实几乎被忽视了,尽管它对律师广告的合法性和更普遍的法律服务的提供都有着巨大的影响。本文旨在根据人身伤害业务的特殊性和美国个人法律服务市场的变化性质,重新开启和重新定位“已解决”的律师广告辩论。
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引用次数: 26
When pregnancy is an injury: rape, law, and culture. 当怀孕是一种伤害:强奸、法律和文化。
IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2013-03-01
Khiara M Bridges
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引用次数: 0
Front-End Fiduciaries: Pre-Certification Duties and Class Conflict 前端受托人:预认证责任和阶级冲突
IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2012-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2155365
Nick Landsman-Roos
On August 31, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Standard Fire Insurance v. Knowles to decide whether named plaintiffs may defeat removal under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 by filing 'binding stipulations' with complaints in state court, capping a class’s recovery at under $5 million (the jurisdictional threshold for removal). The case presents an opportunity to address an issue under-theorized in the existing literature on class actions: what fiduciary duties, if any, are owed by a plaintiff's attorney to potential absent class members in a class action prior to certification? What are the contours or scope of such a pre-certification fiduciary duty? This paper fills two gaps in the literature about fiduciary duties (or more broadly conflicts of interest) in class actions. First, there has been little scholarly treatment of the scope and contours of an attorney’s fiduciary duty to class members prior to class certification - that is, outside the strictures of Rule 23. Pre-certification conflicts are far more difficult to address because no federal rules-based framework exists for addressing pre-certification conduct. Second, this is the first academic treatment of means-based decision making in class actions. Unlike post-certification inquiries into conflicts of interest concerning settlements, this inquiry is particularly complicated because there is often inadequate information about likely outcomes when certain means are employed. Conceivably, there is considerably more grey area surrounding means-related decision making. In the pre-certification stage, without information about how the litigation will run its course, attorneys make decisions that could credibly be defended as in the best interest of the class, or as in breach of the attorney’s fiduciary obligations to those class members. In discussing pre-certification fiduciary duties, this paper investigates the legitimacy of 'binding stipulations' as a case study. In addition to this specific analysis, this paper offers a specific formulation of the scope of attorneys’ pre-certification fiduciary duties: an attorney breaches his fiduciary duty to class members when he makes a decision that prejudices the substantive legal rights of absent class members without notice and opportunity for objection. When an action potentially prejudices or does prejudice a substantive legal right of absent class members, an attorney should have an opportunity to offer a good faith defense - that the course of conduct was undertaken in a good faith belief that it would maximize the class’s recovery. That defense, in turn, can be evaluated in terms of whether it is legitimate, genuine, or pretextual.
2012年8月31日,最高法院在“标准火灾保险诉诺尔斯案”(Standard Fire Insurance v. Knowles)一案中批准了调卷令,以决定指定原告是否可以根据《2005年集体诉讼公平法》(collective Action Fairness Act of 2005)向州法院提交“有约束力的规定”,将集体赔偿上限限制在500万美元以下(诉讼撤诉的司法门槛),从而否决撤诉。该案例提供了一个机会来解决现有集体诉讼文献中理论化不足的问题:在证明之前,原告律师对集体诉讼中可能缺席的集体成员负有什么信托义务(如果有的话)?这种核证前的信义责任的轮廓或范围是什么?本文填补了文献中关于集体诉讼中的信义义务(或更广泛的利益冲突)的两个空白。首先,在集体认证之前,律师对集体成员的信义义务的范围和范围,也就是说,在规则23的限制之外,很少有学术研究。预认证冲突更难解决,因为没有联邦规则框架来解决预认证行为。其次,这是学术界首次对集体诉讼中基于经济能力的决策进行研究。与对涉及和解的利益冲突进行核证后调查不同,这种调查特别复杂,因为关于采用某些手段可能产生的结果的信息往往不足。可以想象,在与手段相关的决策过程中,存在着相当多的灰色地带。在预认证阶段,在没有关于诉讼将如何进行的信息的情况下,律师做出的决定可能会被可信地辩护为符合集体的最佳利益,或者违反律师对这些集体成员的信托义务。在讨论认证前信义义务时,本文以“约束性规定”的合法性为例进行了研究。在此具体分析的基础上,本文对律师认证前信义义务的范围进行了具体表述:律师在未事先通知和没有异议机会的情况下,作出损害缺席的集体成员实体合法权利的决定,即违反了其对集体成员的信义义务。当一项诉讼可能损害或确实损害了缺席的集体成员的实质性法律权利时,律师应该有机会提供善意辩护-行为过程是出于善意的信念,它将最大限度地提高集体的赔偿。反过来,这种辩护可以根据它是合法的、真实的还是借口来评估。
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引用次数: 0
The ghost that slayed the mandate. 杀死委任令的幽灵。
IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2012-01-01
Kevin C Walsh

Virginia v. Sebelius is a federal lawsuit in which Virginia has challenged President Obama's signature legislative initiative of health care reform. Virginia has sought declaratory and injunctive relief to vindicate a state statute declaring that no Virginia resident shall be required to buy health insurance. To defend this state law from the preemptive effect of federal law, Virginia has contended that the federal legislation's individual mandate to buy health insurance is unconstitutional. Virginia's lawsuit has been one of the most closely followed and politically salient federal cases in recent times. Yet the very features of the case that have contributed to its political salience also require its dismissal for lack of statutory subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has placed limits on statutory subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which a state seeks a declaration that a state statute is not preempted by federal law--precisely the relief sought in Virginia v. Sebelius. These statutory limits are a sea wall; they keep out, on statutory grounds, some suits that should otherwise be kept out on Article III grounds. The statutory and constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction over suits like Virginia v. Sebelius insulate federal courts from the strong political forces surrounding lawsuits that follow from state statutes designed to create federal jurisdiction over constitutional challenges by states to federal law. This Article identifies previously neglected jurisdictional limits, shows why they demand dismissal of Virginia v. Sebelius, and explains why it is appropriate for federal courts to be closed to suits of this type.

维吉尼亚州诉西贝利厄斯是一项联邦诉讼,维吉尼亚州对奥巴马总统签署的医疗改革立法倡议提出质疑。维吉尼亚州寻求声明性和禁令性救济,以证明一项州法规的有效性,该法规宣布维吉尼亚州居民不应被要求购买健康保险。为了保护州法律不受联邦法律先发制人的影响,弗吉尼亚州辩称,联邦立法要求个人购买医疗保险是违宪的。弗吉尼亚州的诉讼是近年来最受关注、政治上最突出的联邦案件之一。然而,该案的特点使其在政治上引人注目,这也要求以缺乏法定主题管辖权为由将其驳回。最高法院对宣告性判决诉讼的法定主体管辖权进行了限制,在宣告性判决诉讼中,一个州寻求声明州法规不受联邦法律的优先地位——这正是弗吉尼亚诉西贝利厄斯案所寻求的救济。这些法定限制是一道防波堤;他们以法定理由排除了一些诉讼,否则根据第三条的理由应该排除这些诉讼。联邦法院对弗吉尼亚诉西贝利厄斯(Virginia v. Sebelius)等诉讼的管辖权受到法律和宪法的限制,这使联邦法院不受围绕诉讼的强大政治力量的影响。这些诉讼源于州法规,旨在对各州对联邦法律提出的宪法挑战建立联邦管辖权。本文指出了以前被忽视的管辖权限制,说明了为什么他们要求驳回弗吉尼亚诉西贝利厄斯案,并解释了为什么联邦法院对这类诉讼不予受理是合适的。
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引用次数: 0
State sovereign standing: often overlooked, but not forgotten. 国家主权地位:经常被忽视,但不会被遗忘。
IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2012-01-01
Kenneth T Cuccinelli, E Duncan Getchell, Wesley G Russell

Critics of Virginia's challenge to the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act have asserted that Virginia lacked standing to even raise the issue. Such criticism is inconsistent with foundational understandings of the role of states in providing a check on federal power and with the modern standing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, especially as reflected in the Court's decisions regarding a state's sovereign interest in defending its code of laws. This Article demonstrates that, as a matter of constitutional design and history, as well as under relevant precedents, Virginia clearly had and has standing to bring its challenge.

弗吉尼亚州对《患者保护和平价医疗法案》的合宪性提出挑战的批评者断言,弗吉尼亚州甚至没有提出这个问题的立场。这种批评与对各州在制衡联邦权力方面的作用的基本理解不一致,也与最高法院的现代判例不一致,尤其是在最高法院关于各州捍卫其法典的主权利益的裁决中所反映的情况。这篇文章表明,作为宪法设计和历史的问题,以及根据相关的先例,弗吉尼亚州显然有并且有资格提出挑战。
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引用次数: 0
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