As conflicts flare around the world, images of refugees have become a familiar presence in Western media. Drawing on existing accounts of visual influence, this analysis explores how (un)sympathetic refugee portrayals in news accounts affect distant viewers’ compassion responses and refugee policy attitudes. The study reports the results of three survey experiments, in Sweden, the United States, and the UK, involving 25 unique images and over 4,500 combined respondents. Building on previous work on Moral Foundations Theory, we find the manifest vulnerability of depicted refugees to be an important influence on how visual portrayals evoke sympathy and impact conservatives’ (but not liberals’) compassion responses. Once activated, compassion is found to mediate the effect of refugee portrayals on right-wing support for refugee aid.
{"title":"Visual Portrayals of People in Need: The Impact of Refugee Depictions, Compassion, and Support for Humanitarian Aid","authors":"D. Dumitrescu, E. Bucy","doi":"10.1093/ijpor/edab016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edab016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 As conflicts flare around the world, images of refugees have become a familiar presence in Western media. Drawing on existing accounts of visual influence, this analysis explores how (un)sympathetic refugee portrayals in news accounts affect distant viewers’ compassion responses and refugee policy attitudes. The study reports the results of three survey experiments, in Sweden, the United States, and the UK, involving 25 unique images and over 4,500 combined respondents. Building on previous work on Moral Foundations Theory, we find the manifest vulnerability of depicted refugees to be an important influence on how visual portrayals evoke sympathy and impact conservatives’ (but not liberals’) compassion responses. Once activated, compassion is found to mediate the effect of refugee portrayals on right-wing support for refugee aid.","PeriodicalId":51480,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Opinion Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42934014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary respondent incentives are a means to counteract the trend toward declining response rates. This article summarizes the results of a series of experiments conducted in the past decade in the German General Social Survey. We found that prepaid monetary incentives led to a higher increase in response than promised incentives. There was no evidence that either promised or prepaid incentives had a systematic effect on sample composition. The incentives helped to reduce fieldwork efforts. Thus, the costs of incentives can—at least partially—be offset by a reduction in the number of contact attempts required to achieve a certain number of completed interviews. Our findings are highly credible due to the replicative design of the experiments.
{"title":"Monetary Incentives in Large-Scale Face-to-Face Surveys: Evidence from a Series of Experiments","authors":"Michael Blohm, Achim Koch","doi":"10.1093/ijpor/edab007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edab007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Monetary respondent incentives are a means to counteract the trend toward declining response rates. This article summarizes the results of a series of experiments conducted in the past decade in the German General Social Survey. We found that prepaid monetary incentives led to a higher increase in response than promised incentives. There was no evidence that either promised or prepaid incentives had a systematic effect on sample composition. The incentives helped to reduce fieldwork efforts. Thus, the costs of incentives can—at least partially—be offset by a reduction in the number of contact attempts required to achieve a certain number of completed interviews. Our findings are highly credible due to the replicative design of the experiments.","PeriodicalId":51480,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Opinion Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48594257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A large body of research exists concerning determinants of public opinion on immigration and immigrants, primarily based on Western countries. Given that South–South migratory flows have increased dramatically in recent decades, we contribute to the literature by analyzing cross-national probability data in the Asian context. Using multilevel modeling, we derive and test economic and cultural hypotheses concerning natives’ support for restrictive immigration policy. Results show that at the individual level, along with xenophobic tendency, personal financial insecurity, unequal material distribution in society, and sociotropic economic concern all significantly predict the outcome. As a theoretical contribution, contextual effects are also reported: living in a subnational region with more national pride and with higher parochialism is positively associated with it.
{"title":"Understanding economic and cultural underpinnings of anti-immigrant attitudes: multilevel evidence from the Asian Barometer Survey Wave IV (2014–2016)","authors":"H. Kim, Hyun Jin Kim","doi":"10.1093/IJPOR/EDAA034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IJPOR/EDAA034","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A large body of research exists concerning determinants of public opinion on immigration and immigrants, primarily based on Western countries. Given that South–South migratory flows have increased dramatically in recent decades, we contribute to the literature by analyzing cross-national probability data in the Asian context. Using multilevel modeling, we derive and test economic and cultural hypotheses concerning natives’ support for restrictive immigration policy. Results show that at the individual level, along with xenophobic tendency, personal financial insecurity, unequal material distribution in society, and sociotropic economic concern all significantly predict the outcome. As a theoretical contribution, contextual effects are also reported: living in a subnational region with more national pride and with higher parochialism is positively associated with it.","PeriodicalId":51480,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Opinion Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/IJPOR/EDAA034","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49371587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Matthew P. Motta, D. Chapman, Kathryn Haglin, D. Kahan
Science curious people—those who enjoy consuming science-related information—are less likely to hold politically polarized views about contentious science. Consequently, science curiosity is of great interest to scholars across the social sciences. However, measuring science curiosity via the science curiosity scale (SCS) is time intensive; potentially impeding its widespread usage. We present two new methods for reducing SCS administration time. One method presents respondents with a randomly selected subset of items (“Random Subset [RS] Method”). The other asks all respondents a core set of just four items (“Reduced-Form Method;” RF). In three nationally representative surveys, we assess the construct, convergent, and predictive validity of these alternatives. We find both versions to be well validated.
{"title":"Reducing the Administrative Demands of the Science Curiosity Scale: A Validation Study","authors":"Matthew P. Motta, D. Chapman, Kathryn Haglin, D. Kahan","doi":"10.1093/ijpor/edz049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edz049","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Science curious people—those who enjoy consuming science-related information—are less likely to hold politically polarized views about contentious science. Consequently, science curiosity is of great interest to scholars across the social sciences. However, measuring science curiosity via the science curiosity scale (SCS) is time intensive; potentially impeding its widespread usage. We present two new methods for reducing SCS administration time. One method presents respondents with a randomly selected subset of items (“Random Subset [RS] Method”). The other asks all respondents a core set of just four items (“Reduced-Form Method;” RF). In three nationally representative surveys, we assess the construct, convergent, and predictive validity of these alternatives. We find both versions to be well validated.","PeriodicalId":51480,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Opinion Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ijpor/edz049","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47510957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To examine whether mass media and social media relate to political knowledge, the study draws upon an original survey of adults from 11 countries, the 2014 CESifo DICE Report on public service broadcasting, and the 2015 Press Freedom Index by Freedom House. Findings reveal that news use via television, newspapers, online news sites, and social media is positively associated with political knowledge. Furthermore, press freedom and strong public broadcasting strengthen the association between news use (via both mass and social media) and political knowledge. The findings suggest that the media system plays a crucial role in creating a political learning environment even in this social media age.
{"title":"Learning about Politics from Mass Media and Social Media: Moderating Roles of Press Freedom and Public Service Broadcasting in 11 Countries","authors":"C. S. Park, Homero Gil de Zúñiga","doi":"10.1093/ijpor/edaa021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edaa021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 To examine whether mass media and social media relate to political knowledge, the study draws upon an original survey of adults from 11 countries, the 2014 CESifo DICE Report on public service broadcasting, and the 2015 Press Freedom Index by Freedom House. Findings reveal that news use via television, newspapers, online news sites, and social media is positively associated with political knowledge. Furthermore, press freedom and strong public broadcasting strengthen the association between news use (via both mass and social media) and political knowledge. The findings suggest that the media system plays a crucial role in creating a political learning environment even in this social media age.","PeriodicalId":51480,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Opinion Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ijpor/edaa021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42042972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The private background of populist politicians oftentimes seemingly contradicts the populist ideology—which can be taken up in political communication. Using two experiments (nStudy 1 = 734; nStudy 2 = 568), we investigate the effects of such ideology-inconsistent personalization on the evaluation of and voting for a populist candidate. We manipulate the politician’s localness and social class (Study 1) and traditionalism in family life (Study 2). Results reveal a number of effects on candidate evaluation which translated into voting intentions. An upper-class background of the populist politician yielded negative effects, but less so among populist voters. However, references to a cosmopolitan biography decreased perceived trustworthiness among all participants. Surprisingly, a nontraditional (i.e., homosexual) relationship was beneficial for a (female) populist.
{"title":"Populist Words Speak Louder? Ideology-Inconsistent Personalization and Voting for Populist Candidates","authors":"Philipp Müller, Nora Denner","doi":"10.1093/ijpor/edaa042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edaa042","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The private background of populist politicians oftentimes seemingly contradicts the populist ideology—which can be taken up in political communication. Using two experiments (nStudy 1 = 734; nStudy 2 = 568), we investigate the effects of such ideology-inconsistent personalization on the evaluation of and voting for a populist candidate. We manipulate the politician’s localness and social class (Study 1) and traditionalism in family life (Study 2). Results reveal a number of effects on candidate evaluation which translated into voting intentions. An upper-class background of the populist politician yielded negative effects, but less so among populist voters. However, references to a cosmopolitan biography decreased perceived trustworthiness among all participants. Surprisingly, a nontraditional (i.e., homosexual) relationship was beneficial for a (female) populist.","PeriodicalId":51480,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Opinion Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41441037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We seek to understand the extent to which affective polarization is driven by in-group love or out-group hate and whether it varies across context. The answer may, in turn, allow us to evaluate how well the fundamental premises of social identity theory mesh with different manifestations of affective polarization. Using an experiment to analyze partisans’ trust judgments, we find that the amount of affective polarization and the dominant mechanism underlying it varies by context—whether political or nonpolitical. We find that affective polarization is nearly twice as strong in political settings as in nonpolitical settings. In addition, although affective polarization reflects a blend of both in-party love and out-party hate in both contexts, we find that in-party love is the more dominant source of polarization in nonpolitical settings while out-party hate is the more dominant source in political settings. The latter finding causes us to question how well-suited social identity theory is for understanding polarization in the political sphere.
{"title":"Affective Polarization in Political and Nonpolitical Settings","authors":"T. Rudolph, Marc J Hetherington","doi":"10.1093/ijpor/edaa040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edaa040","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We seek to understand the extent to which affective polarization is driven by in-group love or out-group hate and whether it varies across context. The answer may, in turn, allow us to evaluate how well the fundamental premises of social identity theory mesh with different manifestations of affective polarization. Using an experiment to analyze partisans’ trust judgments, we find that the amount of affective polarization and the dominant mechanism underlying it varies by context—whether political or nonpolitical. We find that affective polarization is nearly twice as strong in political settings as in nonpolitical settings. In addition, although affective polarization reflects a blend of both in-party love and out-party hate in both contexts, we find that in-party love is the more dominant source of polarization in nonpolitical settings while out-party hate is the more dominant source in political settings. The latter finding causes us to question how well-suited social identity theory is for understanding polarization in the political sphere.","PeriodicalId":51480,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Opinion Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46722858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The COVID-19 pandemic has been paired with a global misinformation “infodemic.” Citizens in authoritarian countries, where most media is state controlled, often do not have access to credible information sources to help combat misinformation. In fact, the news media in these countries may be the primary drivers of misinformation while digital media may be sources of more accurate information. We test how news and digital media in an authoritarian context are associated with endorsing misinformation while introducing the concept of informational learned helplessness as an additional factor driving inaccurate beliefs. We test our hypotheses employing data from a nationally representative telephone survey of the Russian public (N = 1600) and discuss the implications of our findings for Russian attitudes about COVID-19 vaccination.
{"title":"Russian News Media, Digital Media, Informational Learned Helplessness, and Belief in COVID-19 Misinformation","authors":"E. Nisbet, O. Kamenchuk","doi":"10.1093/IJPOR/EDAB011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IJPOR/EDAB011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The COVID-19 pandemic has been paired with a global misinformation “infodemic.” Citizens in authoritarian countries, where most media is state controlled, often do not have access to credible information sources to help combat misinformation. In fact, the news media in these countries may be the primary drivers of misinformation while digital media may be sources of more accurate information. We test how news and digital media in an authoritarian context are associated with endorsing misinformation while introducing the concept of informational learned helplessness as an additional factor driving inaccurate beliefs. We test our hypotheses employing data from a nationally representative telephone survey of the Russian public (N = 1600) and discuss the implications of our findings for Russian attitudes about COVID-19 vaccination.","PeriodicalId":51480,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Opinion Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42743604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In many developing democracies, polling often comes with elevated levels of bias and variance. We argue that electoral malpractice can be one reason why. We build a theory and test it with data from elections between 2002 and 2014 in Brazil. We find that polling errors are larger in: (a) elections with many undecided voters and large imbalances in financial resources among campaigns; (b) the poorer Northeast region of Brazil, which is more closely associated with patronage and vote buying; and (c) low-profile, low-information elections. Our analysis serves as a cautionary tale for interpreting polling in democracies like Brazil, even if/when other sources of error in the polling industry are mitigated.
{"title":"Polling in New Democracies and Electoral Malpractice: The Case of Brazil","authors":"Ryan Lloyd, Mathieu Turgeon","doi":"10.1093/IJPOR/EDAB005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IJPOR/EDAB005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In many developing democracies, polling often comes with elevated levels of bias and variance. We argue that electoral malpractice can be one reason why. We build a theory and test it with data from elections between 2002 and 2014 in Brazil. We find that polling errors are larger in: (a) elections with many undecided voters and large imbalances in financial resources among campaigns; (b) the poorer Northeast region of Brazil, which is more closely associated with patronage and vote buying; and (c) low-profile, low-information elections. Our analysis serves as a cautionary tale for interpreting polling in democracies like Brazil, even if/when other sources of error in the polling industry are mitigated.","PeriodicalId":51480,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Opinion Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/IJPOR/EDAB005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45363466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Counterintuitively, wealthier countries tend to be more vaccine skeptical than poorer countries. One possible explanation—the Online Accessibility hypothesis—posits that internet access facilitates the spread of antivaccine misinformation, particularly for those lower in scientific and medical expert trust. Another explanation—the Out of Sight hypothesis—is that some citizens in richer countries fail to consider the risks of vaccine-preventable diseases because they are rarely experienced directly. Merging country-level data with nationally representative survey data (N = 149,014) from 144 countries, we find evidence for the Online Accessibility hypothesis. These findings are robust to alternate measures of wealth and modeling strategies.
{"title":"How Internet Access Drives Global Vaccine Skepticism","authors":"Kristin Lunz Trujillo, Matthew P. Motta","doi":"10.1093/IJPOR/EDAB012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IJPOR/EDAB012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Counterintuitively, wealthier countries tend to be more vaccine skeptical than poorer countries. One possible explanation—the Online Accessibility hypothesis—posits that internet access facilitates the spread of antivaccine misinformation, particularly for those lower in scientific and medical expert trust. Another explanation—the Out of Sight hypothesis—is that some citizens in richer countries fail to consider the risks of vaccine-preventable diseases because they are rarely experienced directly. Merging country-level data with nationally representative survey data (N = 149,014) from 144 countries, we find evidence for the Online Accessibility hypothesis. These findings are robust to alternate measures of wealth and modeling strategies.","PeriodicalId":51480,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Opinion Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45679113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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