Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1177/07388942231162335
Kyle Haynes, Brandon K. Yoder
This article demonstrates that foreign policies of reciprocity entail previously unrecognized tradeoffs. The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that reciprocating another state's cooperative and non-cooperative actions can simultaneously promote cooperation and allow states with compatible preferences to build trust. We present a model that synthesizes recent work on signaling and cooperation to identify a tension between the goals of building long-term trust and inducing short-term cooperation. Specifically, a receiver's highly reciprocal strategy generates strong incentives for hostile senders to behave cooperatively, which reduces the credibility of cooperation as a signal of benign intentions. Conversely, a less reciprocal strategy increases the credibility of senders’ cooperative signals, but forgoes the benefits of short-term cooperation with hostile states. Thus, uncertain receivers often face a tradeoff between inducing cooperation and eliciting credible signals. We illustrate these tradeoffs in pre-First World War British foreign policy, and highlight the article's policy implications for contemporary US–China relations.
{"title":"Trust, cooperation, and the tradeoffs of reciprocity","authors":"Kyle Haynes, Brandon K. Yoder","doi":"10.1177/07388942231162335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231162335","url":null,"abstract":"This article demonstrates that foreign policies of reciprocity entail previously unrecognized tradeoffs. The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that reciprocating another state's cooperative and non-cooperative actions can simultaneously promote cooperation and allow states with compatible preferences to build trust. We present a model that synthesizes recent work on signaling and cooperation to identify a tension between the goals of building long-term trust and inducing short-term cooperation. Specifically, a receiver's highly reciprocal strategy generates strong incentives for hostile senders to behave cooperatively, which reduces the credibility of cooperation as a signal of benign intentions. Conversely, a less reciprocal strategy increases the credibility of senders’ cooperative signals, but forgoes the benefits of short-term cooperation with hostile states. Thus, uncertain receivers often face a tradeoff between inducing cooperation and eliciting credible signals. We illustrate these tradeoffs in pre-First World War British foreign policy, and highlight the article's policy implications for contemporary US–China relations.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44332785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-23DOI: 10.1177/07388942231153598
B. D. de Mesquita
I propose an audience costs game with considerations added from selectorate theory. We see that winning coalition and selectorate size have competing effects on conflict choices in an audience costs setting. Large coalition regimes face lower audience costs than non-democracies, making it harder for them to commit to war. But larger selectorates increase the value of office, making conflict escalation more attractive. Coalition effects dominate when interacted with selectorate size. Evidence from 1816–2014 supports the game's implications. The results indicate that both threat initiation and dispute resolution are better predicted by focusing on domestic, leader-specific variables.
{"title":"A game of domestic imperatives: Audience costs and conflict avoidance","authors":"B. D. de Mesquita","doi":"10.1177/07388942231153598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231153598","url":null,"abstract":"I propose an audience costs game with considerations added from selectorate theory. We see that winning coalition and selectorate size have competing effects on conflict choices in an audience costs setting. Large coalition regimes face lower audience costs than non-democracies, making it harder for them to commit to war. But larger selectorates increase the value of office, making conflict escalation more attractive. Coalition effects dominate when interacted with selectorate size. Evidence from 1816–2014 supports the game's implications. The results indicate that both threat initiation and dispute resolution are better predicted by focusing on domestic, leader-specific variables.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"599 - 618"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41743651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-21DOI: 10.1177/07388942231155396
Elizabeth Radziszewski
This study examines how military background of chief executive officers (CEOs) of private military and security companies (PMSCs) that intervened in Iraq from 2003 to 2019 affected the frequency with which companies committed human rights abuses. My findings show that PMSCs with CEOs who served in the military, for any regime type, are more likely to commit a high number of human rights abuses than companies led by CEOs without service experience. The risk is higher for PMSCs with CEOs who served in the Navy and lowest for CEOs with experience in the Air Force. The risk increases when ex-military CEOs lead private rather than publicly traded companies. The study contributes novel data on military service of CEOs for international PMSCs that were present in Iraq. The data reports on the type of governing system where CEOs served, their service branch, and whether they graduated from military academies/colleges.
{"title":"Private military and security companies and human rights abuses: The impact of CEOs’ military background","authors":"Elizabeth Radziszewski","doi":"10.1177/07388942231155396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231155396","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how military background of chief executive officers (CEOs) of private military and security companies (PMSCs) that intervened in Iraq from 2003 to 2019 affected the frequency with which companies committed human rights abuses. My findings show that PMSCs with CEOs who served in the military, for any regime type, are more likely to commit a high number of human rights abuses than companies led by CEOs without service experience. The risk is higher for PMSCs with CEOs who served in the Navy and lowest for CEOs with experience in the Air Force. The risk increases when ex-military CEOs lead private rather than publicly traded companies. The study contributes novel data on military service of CEOs for international PMSCs that were present in Iraq. The data reports on the type of governing system where CEOs served, their service branch, and whether they graduated from military academies/colleges.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"554 - 574"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"65183736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1177/07388942231153333
Andrew P. Owsiak, John A. Vasquez
Why don't democracies fight each other? Since discovering this empirical regularity, scholars have assumed that the answer must lie with regime type (i.e. democracy). Our paper provides and tests an alternative explanation: the territorial explanation of war, which stresses grievances and argues that territorial issues incentivize states to resort to war more often than disagreements over other, non-territorial issues. We show that democracies do not generally have territorial militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) or the territorial claims that would produce territorial MIDs. Democracies are peaceful because they lack the most dangerous grievances in the international system.
{"title":"Why don’t democracies fight each other? The role of territorial issues","authors":"Andrew P. Owsiak, John A. Vasquez","doi":"10.1177/07388942231153333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231153333","url":null,"abstract":"Why don't democracies fight each other? Since discovering this empirical regularity, scholars have assumed that the answer must lie with regime type (i.e. democracy). Our paper provides and tests an alternative explanation: the territorial explanation of war, which stresses grievances and argues that territorial issues incentivize states to resort to war more often than disagreements over other, non-territorial issues. We show that democracies do not generally have territorial militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) or the territorial claims that would produce territorial MIDs. Democracies are peaceful because they lack the most dangerous grievances in the international system.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"619 - 633"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47638393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1177/07388942231155161
P. Sullivan
Since 2001, there has been a dramatic increase in the amount of US military aid flowing to foreign governments. What is the impact of this aid on human security? Drawing on recent research on the principal–agent relationship between state leaders and security sector actors, I develop a theory of the impact of security assistance on the use of deadly force against civilians. Using methods to account for the endogeneity of aid allocations, I find that the impact of security assistance on state violence varies based on the type of assistance provided and the institutional environment in the recipient state.
{"title":"Lethal aid and human security: The effects of US security assistance on civilian harm in low- and middle-income countries","authors":"P. Sullivan","doi":"10.1177/07388942231155161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231155161","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2001, there has been a dramatic increase in the amount of US military aid flowing to foreign governments. What is the impact of this aid on human security? Drawing on recent research on the principal–agent relationship between state leaders and security sector actors, I develop a theory of the impact of security assistance on the use of deadly force against civilians. Using methods to account for the endogeneity of aid allocations, I find that the impact of security assistance on state violence varies based on the type of assistance provided and the institutional environment in the recipient state.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"467 - 488"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"65183719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-10DOI: 10.1177/07388942221149670
Kyungkook Kang, J. Kugler
This paper identifies profound contradictions within and across nuclear deterrence strategies that evolved in response to the proliferation and modernization of nuclear weapons. To reconcile theory with practice, we summarize the theoretical assumptions and implications of nuclear strategy. Informed by these discussions, we develop a decision-theoretic model of deterrence based on power transition theory. We explore conditions for the stability of deterrence and link outcomes to policy decisions. The conditions for conflict emerge when a dissatisfied nuclear nation is threatened with conventional loss, when conventional and nuclear parity is achieved and if dissatisfied non-state actors acquire even minimal nuclear capabilities.
{"title":"Beyond deterrence: Uncertain stability in the nuclear era","authors":"Kyungkook Kang, J. Kugler","doi":"10.1177/07388942221149670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221149670","url":null,"abstract":"This paper identifies profound contradictions within and across nuclear deterrence strategies that evolved in response to the proliferation and modernization of nuclear weapons. To reconcile theory with practice, we summarize the theoretical assumptions and implications of nuclear strategy. Informed by these discussions, we develop a decision-theoretic model of deterrence based on power transition theory. We explore conditions for the stability of deterrence and link outcomes to policy decisions. The conditions for conflict emerge when a dissatisfied nuclear nation is threatened with conventional loss, when conventional and nuclear parity is achieved and if dissatisfied non-state actors acquire even minimal nuclear capabilities.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"655 - 674"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41603470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-10DOI: 10.1177/07388942231153804
Bimal Adhikari, J. King, L. Santoso
Within the human rights literature, a growing number of studies have focused on the factors that explain engagement in protests. Most prior studies of this type give little or no consideration to the effect of these factors on gender. Recently, though, some scholars have begun focusing on the gender dimension, exploring why women engage in protests specifically. In this study, we examine a previously unexplored factor, that of naming and shaming by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and its effect on the likelihood of women's protest activities. We argue that UNHRC shaming increases the likelihood of women engaging in protests. Moreover, given its preeminent position within the UN, UNHRC shaming should be much more effective in mobilizing women in comparison with shaming by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, in countries where governments actively repress NGOs, the effect of UNHRC shaming on women's protests should be smaller.
{"title":"The limits of shame: UN shaming, NGO repression, and women's protests","authors":"Bimal Adhikari, J. King, L. Santoso","doi":"10.1177/07388942231153804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231153804","url":null,"abstract":"Within the human rights literature, a growing number of studies have focused on the factors that explain engagement in protests. Most prior studies of this type give little or no consideration to the effect of these factors on gender. Recently, though, some scholars have begun focusing on the gender dimension, exploring why women engage in protests specifically. In this study, we examine a previously unexplored factor, that of naming and shaming by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and its effect on the likelihood of women's protest activities. We argue that UNHRC shaming increases the likelihood of women engaging in protests. Moreover, given its preeminent position within the UN, UNHRC shaming should be much more effective in mobilizing women in comparison with shaming by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, in countries where governments actively repress NGOs, the effect of UNHRC shaming on women's protests should be smaller.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49423162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-07DOI: 10.1177/07388942231153332
Vesna Danilovic, Joe Clare
We examine whether bargaining behavior alters the initially expected effects of exogenous factors, such as power balance, issues, and domestic regimes, influencing crisis outcomes. Our argument is that, instead of weakening threat credibility as assumed in the traditional advocacy for firmness, mixing coercion with accommodation optimally allows states to reach an outcome within the bargaining range shaped by exogenous factors. After establishing causal mechanisms, we test our hypotheses over the 1918−2015 period. The findings validate our expectations that intransigence exacerbates crisis stability even under favorable exogenous conditions whereas mixed bargaining mitigates the effects of unfavorable ones.
{"title":"Exogenous factors and the crisis bargaining process","authors":"Vesna Danilovic, Joe Clare","doi":"10.1177/07388942231153332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231153332","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether bargaining behavior alters the initially expected effects of exogenous factors, such as power balance, issues, and domestic regimes, influencing crisis outcomes. Our argument is that, instead of weakening threat credibility as assumed in the traditional advocacy for firmness, mixing coercion with accommodation optimally allows states to reach an outcome within the bargaining range shaped by exogenous factors. After establishing causal mechanisms, we test our hypotheses over the 1918−2015 period. The findings validate our expectations that intransigence exacerbates crisis stability even under favorable exogenous conditions whereas mixed bargaining mitigates the effects of unfavorable ones.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"634 - 654"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44858205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-02DOI: 10.1177/07388942231153335
Vesna Danilovic
The articles in this special issue were originally presented at a conference held at the University of Buffalo, SUNY. As the purpose of the conference was to honor its distinguished professor, Frank C. Zagare, it included a number of his past and present associates, ranging from his early mentor, research collaborators and former students to career-long colleagues. While the participants reflected Zagare’s career path, the thematic and methodological diversity in their papers showed the common arc that brought them together with their honoree throughout his career—an eversearching work toward solving the puzzles of war and peace. This goal is indeed shared with our larger community gathered around the Peace Science Society (International) and its journal Conflict Management and Peace Science. Not surprisingly then, the conference participants included no fewer than five of the Society’s former presidents. Perhaps the best starting point to this issue is Zagare’s (1990) distinction between “procedural” and “instrumental” rationality, which effectively removed the fault lines between domestic decision-theoretic frameworks and strategic rational choice models. The path was set toward dispelling the long-standing chasm between domestic and strategic approaches, as demonstrated in several contributions to this issue. The decision-making framework was integrated into Zagare’s own work, both in formal-theoretic (e.g., Kugler and Zagare 1990) and detailed historical analyses (Zagare 2011). In their logical reexamination of deterrence, for example, Kugler and Zagare (1990) showed the critical role of a leader’s risk orientation under an already precarious condition of power transition. Risk avoidance and risk acceptance are also featured as critical factors in the formal stylization by Lisa J. Carlson and Raymond Dacey in this issue. Depending on a leader’s risk attitude and the particulars of the decision problem in crisis situations, especially whether a threat can potentially incur greater, moderate or lower costs, their model specifies the conditions under which inexperienced decision-makers are more or less likely than experienced ones to defy the threat. Given the contradictory empirical findings about the risk behavior of leaders based on their foreign policy (in) experience, their study demonstrates great potential in the use of formal rigor to resolve empirical
{"title":"The conditions for war and peace in interstate crises: An Introduction to this special issue","authors":"Vesna Danilovic","doi":"10.1177/07388942231153335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231153335","url":null,"abstract":"The articles in this special issue were originally presented at a conference held at the University of Buffalo, SUNY. As the purpose of the conference was to honor its distinguished professor, Frank C. Zagare, it included a number of his past and present associates, ranging from his early mentor, research collaborators and former students to career-long colleagues. While the participants reflected Zagare’s career path, the thematic and methodological diversity in their papers showed the common arc that brought them together with their honoree throughout his career—an eversearching work toward solving the puzzles of war and peace. This goal is indeed shared with our larger community gathered around the Peace Science Society (International) and its journal Conflict Management and Peace Science. Not surprisingly then, the conference participants included no fewer than five of the Society’s former presidents. Perhaps the best starting point to this issue is Zagare’s (1990) distinction between “procedural” and “instrumental” rationality, which effectively removed the fault lines between domestic decision-theoretic frameworks and strategic rational choice models. The path was set toward dispelling the long-standing chasm between domestic and strategic approaches, as demonstrated in several contributions to this issue. The decision-making framework was integrated into Zagare’s own work, both in formal-theoretic (e.g., Kugler and Zagare 1990) and detailed historical analyses (Zagare 2011). In their logical reexamination of deterrence, for example, Kugler and Zagare (1990) showed the critical role of a leader’s risk orientation under an already precarious condition of power transition. Risk avoidance and risk acceptance are also featured as critical factors in the formal stylization by Lisa J. Carlson and Raymond Dacey in this issue. Depending on a leader’s risk attitude and the particulars of the decision problem in crisis situations, especially whether a threat can potentially incur greater, moderate or lower costs, their model specifies the conditions under which inexperienced decision-makers are more or less likely than experienced ones to defy the threat. Given the contradictory empirical findings about the risk behavior of leaders based on their foreign policy (in) experience, their study demonstrates great potential in the use of formal rigor to resolve empirical","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"580 - 583"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48961790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-02DOI: 10.1177/07388942221149672
S. Quackenbush
Many theories of international conflict are based on the premise that war can occur by accident. The basic idea of accidental war is that crisis situations can spiral out of control, leading to the outbreak of a war despite no one having decided to go to war. Although World War I is often claimed to be the prime example of such an accidental war, modern research suggests that it began as a result of deliberate choices, not by accident. Nonetheless, accidental war continues to be used as an important building block in many theories, including theories of deterrence, bargaining, and the spiral model. In this article, I examine the validity of the assumption that wars can begin by accident, as well as the implications that the lack of accidental wars has for international relations theory.
{"title":"The problem with accidental war","authors":"S. Quackenbush","doi":"10.1177/07388942221149672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221149672","url":null,"abstract":"Many theories of international conflict are based on the premise that war can occur by accident. The basic idea of accidental war is that crisis situations can spiral out of control, leading to the outbreak of a war despite no one having decided to go to war. Although World War I is often claimed to be the prime example of such an accidental war, modern research suggests that it began as a result of deliberate choices, not by accident. Nonetheless, accidental war continues to be used as an important building block in many theories, including theories of deterrence, bargaining, and the spiral model. In this article, I examine the validity of the assumption that wars can begin by accident, as well as the implications that the lack of accidental wars has for international relations theory.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"675 - 691"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45494319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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