Pub Date : 2023-07-12DOI: 10.1177/07388942231182674
Douglas M. Gibler, Steven V. Miller
We use this article to introduce the Militarized Interstate Events (MIE) dataset, a new dataset for international conflict with a host of innovative features. The MIE data offers dyadic, event-level information for all militarized interstate confrontations from 1816 to 2014, including major wars as well as all threats, displays, and uses of force between two or more states. The data come with major innovations, including dyadic fatality estimates at the event level and recorded events for general conflicts alongside the battles of the wars of the last two centuries. We discuss how to use these conflict data and provide a replication that demonstrates the dataset's usefulness.
{"title":"The Militarized Interstate Events (MIE) dataset, 1816–2014","authors":"Douglas M. Gibler, Steven V. Miller","doi":"10.1177/07388942231182674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231182674","url":null,"abstract":"We use this article to introduce the Militarized Interstate Events (MIE) dataset, a new dataset for international conflict with a host of innovative features. The MIE data offers dyadic, event-level information for all militarized interstate confrontations from 1816 to 2014, including major wars as well as all threats, displays, and uses of force between two or more states. The data come with major innovations, including dyadic fatality estimates at the event level and recorded events for general conflicts alongside the battles of the wars of the last two centuries. We discuss how to use these conflict data and provide a replication that demonstrates the dataset's usefulness.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44218510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-05DOI: 10.1177/07388942231180499
William Spaniel, Işıl İdrisoğlu
When states fight wars, they choose between multiple military strategies, e.g. whether to place boots on the ground or restrict efforts to an air campaign. We modify the standard crisis bargaining model to account for this by endogenizing a state's war strategy. Intuitively, states choose the more powerful strategy when the additional strength gained covers the additional costs of doing so. However, there is a counterintuitive second-order consequence of this. When stronger campaigns are expensive but still credible, states are more likely to reach a negotiated settlement to avoid the corresponding high costs. As the cost of the more powerful option increases, states substitute their actions with cheaper but weaker alternatives. Because of these lower costs, states become less likely to reach a settlement. In some cases, both parties may be worse off as a result.
{"title":"Endogenous military strategy and crisis bargaining","authors":"William Spaniel, Işıl İdrisoğlu","doi":"10.1177/07388942231180499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231180499","url":null,"abstract":"When states fight wars, they choose between multiple military strategies, e.g. whether to place boots on the ground or restrict efforts to an air campaign. We modify the standard crisis bargaining model to account for this by endogenizing a state's war strategy. Intuitively, states choose the more powerful strategy when the additional strength gained covers the additional costs of doing so. However, there is a counterintuitive second-order consequence of this. When stronger campaigns are expensive but still credible, states are more likely to reach a negotiated settlement to avoid the corresponding high costs. As the cost of the more powerful option increases, states substitute their actions with cheaper but weaker alternatives. Because of these lower costs, states become less likely to reach a settlement. In some cases, both parties may be worse off as a result.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47550276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-13DOI: 10.1177/07388942231174174
S. Mitchell, C. Schmidt
We examine greed and grievance mechanisms that connect illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and piracy. We use several cases (e.g. Somalia, Nigeria) to illustrate these mechanisms and empirically examine the relationship between IUU fishing and state-year piracy events from 1990 to 2015. We find that countries experiencing significant levels of IUU fishing face much greater risks for piracy. We also evaluate several mediating conditions of our theory with interaction terms (state capacity, state fragility, and legal fishing incentives) and find that the relationship between IUU fishing and piracy is strongest for moderately developed states with greater state fragility and higher fish catch values.
{"title":"Insecure fisheries: How illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing affects piracy","authors":"S. Mitchell, C. Schmidt","doi":"10.1177/07388942231174174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231174174","url":null,"abstract":"We examine greed and grievance mechanisms that connect illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and piracy. We use several cases (e.g. Somalia, Nigeria) to illustrate these mechanisms and empirically examine the relationship between IUU fishing and state-year piracy events from 1990 to 2015. We find that countries experiencing significant levels of IUU fishing face much greater risks for piracy. We also evaluate several mediating conditions of our theory with interaction terms (state capacity, state fragility, and legal fishing incentives) and find that the relationship between IUU fishing and piracy is strongest for moderately developed states with greater state fragility and higher fish catch values.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42442914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-04DOI: 10.1177/07388942231172754
Kristin E. Fabbe, C. Hazlett, Tolga Sınmazdemir
For refugees who have fled civil conflict, do experiences of victimization by one armed group push them to support the opposing armed groups? Or, does victimization cause refugees to revoke their support for all armed groups, whatever side they are on, and call instead for peace? This paper studies the effect of civilian victimization on threat perceptions, loyalties, and attitudes toward peace in the context of Syrian refugees in Turkey, many of whom faced regime-caused violence prior to their departure. Our research strategy leverages variation in home destruction caused by barrel bombs to examine the effect of violence on refugees’ views. We find that refugees who lose their home to barrel bombs withdraw support from armed actors and are more supportive of ending the war and finding peace. Suggestive evidence shows that while victims do not disengage from issues in Syria, they do show less optimism about an opposition victory.
{"title":"Threat perceptions, loyalties and attitudes towards peace: The effects of civilian victimization among Syrian refugees in Turkey","authors":"Kristin E. Fabbe, C. Hazlett, Tolga Sınmazdemir","doi":"10.1177/07388942231172754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231172754","url":null,"abstract":"For refugees who have fled civil conflict, do experiences of victimization by one armed group push them to support the opposing armed groups? Or, does victimization cause refugees to revoke their support for all armed groups, whatever side they are on, and call instead for peace? This paper studies the effect of civilian victimization on threat perceptions, loyalties, and attitudes toward peace in the context of Syrian refugees in Turkey, many of whom faced regime-caused violence prior to their departure. Our research strategy leverages variation in home destruction caused by barrel bombs to examine the effect of violence on refugees’ views. We find that refugees who lose their home to barrel bombs withdraw support from armed actors and are more supportive of ending the war and finding peace. Suggestive evidence shows that while victims do not disengage from issues in Syria, they do show less optimism about an opposition victory.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47189202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-29DOI: 10.1177/07388942231174173
Dimitar Gueorguiev, Dongshu Liu
Research on social movements suggests that when protesters use violence, public opinion often turns against them, unless the observers already view the protesters as extremists. This creates what we refer to as an “asymmetric liability,” where by moderate protest movements are held to a higher standard of civility than more extreme ones. Based on a survey experiment surrounding the 2019 protests in Hong Kong, we show that violence undercuts Chinese public sympathy when movements are framed around rights-based agendas but has little impact when protesters are portrayed as separatists. Pairing our survey results alongside media trends offers suggestive evidence that mainland respondents became less sympathetic to anti-government protesters and slightly less sensitive to protest violence as state media began depicting protesters as radical separatists.
{"title":"Double standard: Chinese public opinion on the Hong Kong protests","authors":"Dimitar Gueorguiev, Dongshu Liu","doi":"10.1177/07388942231174173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231174173","url":null,"abstract":"Research on social movements suggests that when protesters use violence, public opinion often turns against them, unless the observers already view the protesters as extremists. This creates what we refer to as an “asymmetric liability,” where by moderate protest movements are held to a higher standard of civility than more extreme ones. Based on a survey experiment surrounding the 2019 protests in Hong Kong, we show that violence undercuts Chinese public sympathy when movements are framed around rights-based agendas but has little impact when protesters are portrayed as separatists. Pairing our survey results alongside media trends offers suggestive evidence that mainland respondents became less sympathetic to anti-government protesters and slightly less sensitive to protest violence as state media began depicting protesters as radical separatists.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135791837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-21DOI: 10.1177/07388942231172204
Omer Zarpli
Public opinion is central to understanding when states enforce human rights abroad. Yet we do not have firm evidence regarding why individuals demand government action in some cases of human rights violations, but not others. I argue that economic interests and shared identity play important roles. I employ a pre-registered survey experiment in Turkey measuring the extent to which individuals support sanctioning China for its repressive policies against the minority Uyghur population. Results provide partial support for my hypotheses. The findings have implications for the question of international human rights enforcement.
{"title":"To sanction or not to sanction: Public attitudes on sanctioning human rights violations","authors":"Omer Zarpli","doi":"10.1177/07388942231172204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231172204","url":null,"abstract":"Public opinion is central to understanding when states enforce human rights abroad. Yet we do not have firm evidence regarding why individuals demand government action in some cases of human rights violations, but not others. I argue that economic interests and shared identity play important roles. I employ a pre-registered survey experiment in Turkey measuring the extent to which individuals support sanctioning China for its repressive policies against the minority Uyghur population. Results provide partial support for my hypotheses. The findings have implications for the question of international human rights enforcement.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47916812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-16DOI: 10.1177/07388942231173613
Emil Petersson
How does how intervener airpower affect civil war parties’ ability to take and hold territory? I argue that airpower can have both short- and long-term effects on an actor's ability to take and hold territory, by reducing its ability to effectively fight its adversary. Using novel, disaggregated data, I conduct a quantitative within-case study of 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya. I find that the NATO air campaign made the Libyan government less likely to capture territory in the short term, and that airstrikes reduced its ability to capture territory in the long term.
{"title":"Airpower and territorial control: Unpacking the NATO intervention in Libya","authors":"Emil Petersson","doi":"10.1177/07388942231173613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231173613","url":null,"abstract":"How does how intervener airpower affect civil war parties’ ability to take and hold territory? I argue that airpower can have both short- and long-term effects on an actor's ability to take and hold territory, by reducing its ability to effectively fight its adversary. Using novel, disaggregated data, I conduct a quantitative within-case study of 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya. I find that the NATO air campaign made the Libyan government less likely to capture territory in the short term, and that airstrikes reduced its ability to capture territory in the long term.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43675923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-09DOI: 10.1177/07388942231171334
W. Chow, Enze Han
This paper examines whether non-monotonic patterns exist between forest coverage and conflict processes in Myanmar. Specifically, the paper finds that forest coverage and civil conflict follow an inverted U-shaped relationship: conflict decreases at extremely low and high densities of forest coverage but increases at medium and somewhat high forest densities. Following the logic of the variability of rugged terrain, we argue that this pattern reflects the dual mechanisms of refuge and tactical advantages for rebel groups, who intentionally use such terrain to maximize logistical advantage while minimizing the military advantages enjoyed by better equipped government forces.
{"title":"Rugged terrain, forest coverage, and insurgency in Myanmar","authors":"W. Chow, Enze Han","doi":"10.1177/07388942231171334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231171334","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether non-monotonic patterns exist between forest coverage and conflict processes in Myanmar. Specifically, the paper finds that forest coverage and civil conflict follow an inverted U-shaped relationship: conflict decreases at extremely low and high densities of forest coverage but increases at medium and somewhat high forest densities. Following the logic of the variability of rugged terrain, we argue that this pattern reflects the dual mechanisms of refuge and tactical advantages for rebel groups, who intentionally use such terrain to maximize logistical advantage while minimizing the military advantages enjoyed by better equipped government forces.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47712033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.1177/07388942231159582
C. Machain
Can military training decrease human rights violations by security forces? The case of foreign military training is a complicated one because often the aim of the training itself is to address human rights violations. In this paper I explore whether US military training is effective in promoting respect for human rights in the recipient country. States that receive human rights-focused military training and education only see an improvement in respect for human rights by members of security forces in very limited cases. I use global data as well as newly-coded data from a Latin America sample to evaluate this proposal empirically.
{"title":"School of influence: Human rights challenges in US foreign military training","authors":"C. Machain","doi":"10.1177/07388942231159582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231159582","url":null,"abstract":"Can military training decrease human rights violations by security forces? The case of foreign military training is a complicated one because often the aim of the training itself is to address human rights violations. In this paper I explore whether US military training is effective in promoting respect for human rights in the recipient country. States that receive human rights-focused military training and education only see an improvement in respect for human rights by members of security forces in very limited cases. I use global data as well as newly-coded data from a Latin America sample to evaluate this proposal empirically.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42960221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1177/07388942231162335
Kyle Haynes, Brandon K. Yoder
This article demonstrates that foreign policies of reciprocity entail previously unrecognized tradeoffs. The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that reciprocating another state's cooperative and non-cooperative actions can simultaneously promote cooperation and allow states with compatible preferences to build trust. We present a model that synthesizes recent work on signaling and cooperation to identify a tension between the goals of building long-term trust and inducing short-term cooperation. Specifically, a receiver's highly reciprocal strategy generates strong incentives for hostile senders to behave cooperatively, which reduces the credibility of cooperation as a signal of benign intentions. Conversely, a less reciprocal strategy increases the credibility of senders’ cooperative signals, but forgoes the benefits of short-term cooperation with hostile states. Thus, uncertain receivers often face a tradeoff between inducing cooperation and eliciting credible signals. We illustrate these tradeoffs in pre-First World War British foreign policy, and highlight the article's policy implications for contemporary US–China relations.
{"title":"Trust, cooperation, and the tradeoffs of reciprocity","authors":"Kyle Haynes, Brandon K. Yoder","doi":"10.1177/07388942231162335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231162335","url":null,"abstract":"This article demonstrates that foreign policies of reciprocity entail previously unrecognized tradeoffs. The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that reciprocating another state's cooperative and non-cooperative actions can simultaneously promote cooperation and allow states with compatible preferences to build trust. We present a model that synthesizes recent work on signaling and cooperation to identify a tension between the goals of building long-term trust and inducing short-term cooperation. Specifically, a receiver's highly reciprocal strategy generates strong incentives for hostile senders to behave cooperatively, which reduces the credibility of cooperation as a signal of benign intentions. Conversely, a less reciprocal strategy increases the credibility of senders’ cooperative signals, but forgoes the benefits of short-term cooperation with hostile states. Thus, uncertain receivers often face a tradeoff between inducing cooperation and eliciting credible signals. We illustrate these tradeoffs in pre-First World War British foreign policy, and highlight the article's policy implications for contemporary US–China relations.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44332785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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