Pub Date : 2023-11-03DOI: 10.1177/07388942231210295
Giacomo Chiozza, Lena Khalifa
Where were coups more likely to occur in the US world order? The US has occasionally resorted to coups to realign the foreign policy preferences in allied nations with its own preferences. This article explains why coups were more likely in countries where the leaders enjoyed an incumbency advantage that thwarted the ability of potential successors to gain power through regular channels of leadership turnover. That was more likely to be the case in presidential than in parliamentary democracies, and more likely in personalistic, military, or single-party regimes than in autocracies with multiparty legislatures.
{"title":"The harsh face of the empire by invitation: Coups in the US world order","authors":"Giacomo Chiozza, Lena Khalifa","doi":"10.1177/07388942231210295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231210295","url":null,"abstract":"Where were coups more likely to occur in the US world order? The US has occasionally resorted to coups to realign the foreign policy preferences in allied nations with its own preferences. This article explains why coups were more likely in countries where the leaders enjoyed an incumbency advantage that thwarted the ability of potential successors to gain power through regular channels of leadership turnover. That was more likely to be the case in presidential than in parliamentary democracies, and more likely in personalistic, military, or single-party regimes than in autocracies with multiparty legislatures.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"13 72","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135821686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1177/07388942231209730
Jori Breslawski, David Cunningham, Madeline Fleishman
Research has shown that international actors can contribute to resolving violent conflicts. In this article, we focus on conflict prevention, and argue that tools that are relatively non-invasive and rapid to deploy are effective at preventing conflict from escalating. We identify two tools that meet these criteria—rhetorical and diplomatic action, and argue that regional organizations are particularly poised to deploy these tools successfully. Drawing upon new data, we find that rhetorical and diplomatic actions deployed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are generally associated with reductions in violent events as well as fatalities in the following month.
{"title":"Regional approaches to conflict prevention: The effectiveness of rhetorical and diplomatic tools","authors":"Jori Breslawski, David Cunningham, Madeline Fleishman","doi":"10.1177/07388942231209730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231209730","url":null,"abstract":"Research has shown that international actors can contribute to resolving violent conflicts. In this article, we focus on conflict prevention, and argue that tools that are relatively non-invasive and rapid to deploy are effective at preventing conflict from escalating. We identify two tools that meet these criteria—rhetorical and diplomatic action, and argue that regional organizations are particularly poised to deploy these tools successfully. Drawing upon new data, we find that rhetorical and diplomatic actions deployed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are generally associated with reductions in violent events as well as fatalities in the following month.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"193 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135371924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1177/07388942231205519
Corina Simonelli, Iain Osgood
How do multinational firms trapped in host markets suffering from political violence find security? Terrorism and conflict repel foreign investment and recent research has sought to understand heterogeneity across firms in their response to violence. When multinational firms are unable to move their investments in the face of violence, we argue that their home governments use diplomatic capacity and security and economic resources to secure protection from host governments. Multinational corporations from home markets with significant leverage over host markets are therefore less likely to curtail their operations or investments in the wake of violence. Examining dyadic data on foreign direct investment (FDI), we show that home market diplomatic missions, aid, and alliances substantially abate the negative effects of violence on FDI. Consistent with our argument, this effect is observed after violence begins and is not an artifact of host markets garnering security aid from great powers other than the home market. A strong diplomatic presence matched to both hard and soft power resources positively contributes to the defense of core foreign policy interests.
{"title":"Home market power and host market protection of foreign investment","authors":"Corina Simonelli, Iain Osgood","doi":"10.1177/07388942231205519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231205519","url":null,"abstract":"How do multinational firms trapped in host markets suffering from political violence find security? Terrorism and conflict repel foreign investment and recent research has sought to understand heterogeneity across firms in their response to violence. When multinational firms are unable to move their investments in the face of violence, we argue that their home governments use diplomatic capacity and security and economic resources to secure protection from host governments. Multinational corporations from home markets with significant leverage over host markets are therefore less likely to curtail their operations or investments in the wake of violence. Examining dyadic data on foreign direct investment (FDI), we show that home market diplomatic missions, aid, and alliances substantially abate the negative effects of violence on FDI. Consistent with our argument, this effect is observed after violence begins and is not an artifact of host markets garnering security aid from great powers other than the home market. A strong diplomatic presence matched to both hard and soft power resources positively contributes to the defense of core foreign policy interests.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"20 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135321655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-30DOI: 10.1177/07388942231210296
Lisa Langdon Koch
How do Americans’ core beliefs about punishment, and their intuitions about which actors deserve blame, shape attitudes toward the use of force against a hostile state? I apply insights from recent work in social psychology to investigate the causal mechanisms linking punitive beliefs to support for a nuclear strike. In a large- N study, I find that the strength and ethical logic underlying beliefs about punishment affect attitudes regarding the use of nuclear weapons, and who to blame for the crisis, which mediates the causal pathway. Those who ground their support for severe punishment not in the logic of moral justice, but in societal benefit, are more likely to hold foreign citizens socially responsible for their state's actions.
{"title":"Punishment and blame: How core beliefs affect support for the use of force in a nuclear crisis","authors":"Lisa Langdon Koch","doi":"10.1177/07388942231210296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231210296","url":null,"abstract":"How do Americans’ core beliefs about punishment, and their intuitions about which actors deserve blame, shape attitudes toward the use of force against a hostile state? I apply insights from recent work in social psychology to investigate the causal mechanisms linking punitive beliefs to support for a nuclear strike. In a large- N study, I find that the strength and ethical logic underlying beliefs about punishment affect attitudes regarding the use of nuclear weapons, and who to blame for the crisis, which mediates the causal pathway. Those who ground their support for severe punishment not in the logic of moral justice, but in societal benefit, are more likely to hold foreign citizens socially responsible for their state's actions.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136068816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-25DOI: 10.1177/07388942231207029
Casey Crisman-Cox, Yohan Park
How do remittances affect domestic terrorism? Past work argues that remittances increase groups’ resources and increase terrorism. However, we argue that the effect of remittances depends on political institutions. Within democracies, remittances can help groups overcome barriers to legitimate politics and reduce terrorism's allure. Within autocracies, however, fewer legitimate political opportunities exist, and remittances may lead to more terrorism as it remains an alternative and available political outlet. We find that remittances are associated with less (more) domestic terrorism within democracies (autocracies) and use additional mechanism tests to demonstrate that the competitive aspects of democracy help explain these trends.
{"title":"Remittances, terrorism, and democracy","authors":"Casey Crisman-Cox, Yohan Park","doi":"10.1177/07388942231207029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231207029","url":null,"abstract":"How do remittances affect domestic terrorism? Past work argues that remittances increase groups’ resources and increase terrorism. However, we argue that the effect of remittances depends on political institutions. Within democracies, remittances can help groups overcome barriers to legitimate politics and reduce terrorism's allure. Within autocracies, however, fewer legitimate political opportunities exist, and remittances may lead to more terrorism as it remains an alternative and available political outlet. We find that remittances are associated with less (more) domestic terrorism within democracies (autocracies) and use additional mechanism tests to demonstrate that the competitive aspects of democracy help explain these trends.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"C-25 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135170434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-20DOI: 10.1177/07388942231198490
Elena V McLean, Jeheung Ryu, Taehee Whang
Existing research on the relationship between economic coercion and foreign direct investment suggests that sanctions have no effect on investments in targeted countries or may even encourage investment inflows. A key limitation of this research, however, is its aggregate country-level focus, which fails to capture company-level decision-making processes and factors shaping them. In contrast, this paper evaluates multinational companies’ investment plans as reflected in new investment announcements and shows that sanctions in fact lead to significant adjustments in multinational companies’ plans to invest in a targeted country. Our company-level analyses of new investment projects in Russia show that companies are less likely to announce new investments after the imposition of economic sanctions against the country.
{"title":"The effect of economic coercion on companies’ foreign direct investment decisions: Evidence from sanctions against Russia","authors":"Elena V McLean, Jeheung Ryu, Taehee Whang","doi":"10.1177/07388942231198490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231198490","url":null,"abstract":"Existing research on the relationship between economic coercion and foreign direct investment suggests that sanctions have no effect on investments in targeted countries or may even encourage investment inflows. A key limitation of this research, however, is its aggregate country-level focus, which fails to capture company-level decision-making processes and factors shaping them. In contrast, this paper evaluates multinational companies’ investment plans as reflected in new investment announcements and shows that sanctions in fact lead to significant adjustments in multinational companies’ plans to invest in a targeted country. Our company-level analyses of new investment projects in Russia show that companies are less likely to announce new investments after the imposition of economic sanctions against the country.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136313843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-16DOI: 10.1177/07388942231198489
Shubha Kamala Prasad, Irfan Nooruddin
How do conflicts within a country's borders affect its behavior beyond them? We argue that fighting insurgencies at home shapes a country's human rights posture at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). States often suppress insurgencies using methods that violate their international human rights commitments. They are therefore hesitant to condemn other countries’ alleged violations for fear of reciprocal condemnation of their own actions. This is especially true in countries with greater media freedom where the media is more likely to hold the state accountable for human rights violations, and to highlight its apparent hypocrisy internationally. Such states, we argue, are more likely to vote against or abstain from resolutions that target individual states for human rights transgressions. We test this claim with a global statistical analysis of country voting patterns at the UNHRC from 1973 to 2017. Our results yield new insights into the determinants of countries’ voting behavior in multilateral human rights fora.
{"title":"States living in glasshouses …: Why fighting domestic insurgency changes how countries vote in the UN human rights council","authors":"Shubha Kamala Prasad, Irfan Nooruddin","doi":"10.1177/07388942231198489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231198489","url":null,"abstract":"How do conflicts within a country's borders affect its behavior beyond them? We argue that fighting insurgencies at home shapes a country's human rights posture at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). States often suppress insurgencies using methods that violate their international human rights commitments. They are therefore hesitant to condemn other countries’ alleged violations for fear of reciprocal condemnation of their own actions. This is especially true in countries with greater media freedom where the media is more likely to hold the state accountable for human rights violations, and to highlight its apparent hypocrisy internationally. Such states, we argue, are more likely to vote against or abstain from resolutions that target individual states for human rights transgressions. We test this claim with a global statistical analysis of country voting patterns at the UNHRC from 1973 to 2017. Our results yield new insights into the determinants of countries’ voting behavior in multilateral human rights fora.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135307114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-14DOI: 10.1177/07388942231199164
Jeff Carter
How are patterns of military spending shaped by political leaders who have substantive policy preferences and need the support of their constituents to remain in power? A formal model developed to address this question indicates leaders’ preferences, political vulnerability, and motivation and their domestic audiences’ preferences jointly influence equilibrium military spending. I find variation in patterns of military spending consistent with the model's implications between 1946 and 2010. My analyses demonstrate that leaders’ desire to remain in power and individual-level characteristics and domestic audiences’ preferences jointly shape policy outcomes and, accordingly, suggest studying the interactions among them can provide insights into a range of topics central to peace science.
{"title":"Political leaders and military spending","authors":"Jeff Carter","doi":"10.1177/07388942231199164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231199164","url":null,"abstract":"How are patterns of military spending shaped by political leaders who have substantive policy preferences and need the support of their constituents to remain in power? A formal model developed to address this question indicates leaders’ preferences, political vulnerability, and motivation and their domestic audiences’ preferences jointly influence equilibrium military spending. I find variation in patterns of military spending consistent with the model's implications between 1946 and 2010. My analyses demonstrate that leaders’ desire to remain in power and individual-level characteristics and domestic audiences’ preferences jointly shape policy outcomes and, accordingly, suggest studying the interactions among them can provide insights into a range of topics central to peace science.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135487697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-30DOI: 10.1177/07388942231196109
Michael A. Goldfien, Michael F. Joseph, Daniel Krcmaric
A wave of recent scholarship shows that the backgrounds of political leaders shape their behavior once in office. This paper shifts the literature in a new direction by investigating the conditions under which foreign observers think a leader's background is relevant. We argue that pre-tenure biographical attributes are most informative to outsiders during leadership transitions—unique periods where the new ruler does not yet have a track record—because a leader's background provides clues about how that leader might govern. But as time passes, foreign observers quickly discount the leader's biography and instead evaluate the leader's observable behavior. We test our theory by creating a systematic daily measure of attention to foreign leader backgrounds derived from the President's Daily Brief, a novel data source of 4991 recently declassified reports from the Central Intelligence Agency to the American president.
{"title":"When do leader backgrounds matter? Evidence from the President’s Daily Brief","authors":"Michael A. Goldfien, Michael F. Joseph, Daniel Krcmaric","doi":"10.1177/07388942231196109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231196109","url":null,"abstract":"A wave of recent scholarship shows that the backgrounds of political leaders shape their behavior once in office. This paper shifts the literature in a new direction by investigating the conditions under which foreign observers think a leader's background is relevant. We argue that pre-tenure biographical attributes are most informative to outsiders during leadership transitions—unique periods where the new ruler does not yet have a track record—because a leader's background provides clues about how that leader might govern. But as time passes, foreign observers quickly discount the leader's biography and instead evaluate the leader's observable behavior. We test our theory by creating a systematic daily measure of attention to foreign leader backgrounds derived from the President's Daily Brief, a novel data source of 4991 recently declassified reports from the Central Intelligence Agency to the American president.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43728528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-30DOI: 10.1177/07388942231195300
Zachary Greene, A. Licht
National executives in Western democracies are not unilateral deciders: they lead parties with long-term policy priorities and manage challenging multiparty coalitions. Leaders of donor states use foreign aid to pursue their goals, including enacting policy output consistent with party ideology. Because preferences for international engagement condition the effect of left–right ideology and coalition government incorporates actors with distinct preferences, we predict that left-pro-internationalist prime ministers and development ministers prefer aiding the neediest recipients while right-internationalists emphasize trade opportunities. Our statistical analysis of OECD donor–potential recipient dyads demonstrates the utility of unpacking democratic domestic politics’ effect on leader incentives and decisions.
{"title":"Donor political preferences and the allocation of aid: Patterns in recipient type","authors":"Zachary Greene, A. Licht","doi":"10.1177/07388942231195300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231195300","url":null,"abstract":"National executives in Western democracies are not unilateral deciders: they lead parties with long-term policy priorities and manage challenging multiparty coalitions. Leaders of donor states use foreign aid to pursue their goals, including enacting policy output consistent with party ideology. Because preferences for international engagement condition the effect of left–right ideology and coalition government incorporates actors with distinct preferences, we predict that left-pro-internationalist prime ministers and development ministers prefer aiding the neediest recipients while right-internationalists emphasize trade opportunities. Our statistical analysis of OECD donor–potential recipient dyads demonstrates the utility of unpacking democratic domestic politics’ effect on leader incentives and decisions.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49061891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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