Pub Date : 2021-08-02DOI: 10.1177/07388942211033229
Jori Breslawski, Colin Tucker
Which armed groups are the most likely to tax civilians? A common assumption is that armed groups only tax civilians when they lack access to other sources of revenue. However, recent insights have pointed to the fact that economic considerations are not the only influence on groups’ decisions to tax civilian populations. In this article, we argue that armed groups with a communist ideology are more likely to tax civilians than other groups because it serves as a testament to their ideological goals. We conduct a statistical analysis of armed groups operating from 1990 to 2015 and find support for our argument.
{"title":"Ideological motives and taxation by armed groups","authors":"Jori Breslawski, Colin Tucker","doi":"10.1177/07388942211033229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211033229","url":null,"abstract":"Which armed groups are the most likely to tax civilians? A common assumption is that armed groups only tax civilians when they lack access to other sources of revenue. However, recent insights have pointed to the fact that economic considerations are not the only influence on groups’ decisions to tax civilian populations. In this article, we argue that armed groups with a communist ideology are more likely to tax civilians than other groups because it serves as a testament to their ideological goals. We conduct a statistical analysis of armed groups operating from 1990 to 2015 and find support for our argument.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"39 1","pages":"333 - 350"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/07388942211033229","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48881821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-28DOI: 10.1177/07388942211030885
M. Allen, Michael E Flynn, Carla Martínez Machain
Recent research has shown the importance of studying military deployments and their effects on a wide range of social, political, and economic outcomes. In particular, it has demonstrated how the US has shaped the international system through the largest, and most enduring, military footprint in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. However, data on US military deployments have been limited in scope and are often difficult to access, making it harder for researchers to use them more widely. In this article, we focus on three goals. First, we discuss the evolution of the quantitative US military deployment literature in recent years, highlighting some of the insights this work has generated for scholarship on international relations and US foreign policy. Second, we update the existing troop data assembled by Kane (2004) through 2020. We also include new data on deployment levels specific to US service branches. Third, to facilitate the use of these data we introduce troopdata, an R package containing the updated data and convenience functions to allow scholars to more easily access these data.
{"title":"US global military deployments, 1950–2020*","authors":"M. Allen, Michael E Flynn, Carla Martínez Machain","doi":"10.1177/07388942211030885","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211030885","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research has shown the importance of studying military deployments and their effects on a wide range of social, political, and economic outcomes. In particular, it has demonstrated how the US has shaped the international system through the largest, and most enduring, military footprint in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. However, data on US military deployments have been limited in scope and are often difficult to access, making it harder for researchers to use them more widely. In this article, we focus on three goals. First, we discuss the evolution of the quantitative US military deployment literature in recent years, highlighting some of the insights this work has generated for scholarship on international relations and US foreign policy. Second, we update the existing troop data assembled by Kane (2004) through 2020. We also include new data on deployment levels specific to US service branches. Third, to facilitate the use of these data we introduce troopdata, an R package containing the updated data and convenience functions to allow scholars to more easily access these data.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"39 1","pages":"351 - 370"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/07388942211030885","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41607118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-06DOI: 10.1177/07388942211024947
Colin Krainin, Kristopher W. Ramsay, Bella Wang, Joseph J Ruggiero
The preventive motive for war arises because states cannot commit to limit the use of their growing power. This commitment problem can lead to war when there are not enough resources available to compensate the declining state for their expected losses. In this article, we show how capital markets affect preventive war incentives by introducing a profit-maximizing bond market to the canonical bargaining model of war. We find that the nature of the power shift and fundamentals of the market for debt interact to determine when a preventive motive is more likely to lead to war. Two main results show that (1) less probable but more extreme power shifts are most dangerous and (2) unlike the direct effect of interest rates on the cost of war, higher interest on sovereign debt makes war more likely. We present evidence for the latter effect by extending Lemke’s (2003) study of preventive war for major-power dyads between 1816 and 1992.
{"title":"Preventive war and sovereign debt","authors":"Colin Krainin, Kristopher W. Ramsay, Bella Wang, Joseph J Ruggiero","doi":"10.1177/07388942211024947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211024947","url":null,"abstract":"The preventive motive for war arises because states cannot commit to limit the use of their growing power. This commitment problem can lead to war when there are not enough resources available to compensate the declining state for their expected losses. In this article, we show how capital markets affect preventive war incentives by introducing a profit-maximizing bond market to the canonical bargaining model of war. We find that the nature of the power shift and fundamentals of the market for debt interact to determine when a preventive motive is more likely to lead to war. Two main results show that (1) less probable but more extreme power shifts are most dangerous and (2) unlike the direct effect of interest rates on the cost of war, higher interest on sovereign debt makes war more likely. We present evidence for the latter effect by extending Lemke’s (2003) study of preventive war for major-power dyads between 1816 and 1992.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"39 1","pages":"487 - 519"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/07388942211024947","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45510103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-05DOI: 10.1177/07388942211026319
Inken von Borzyskowski, Ursula E Daxecker, P. Kuhn
Election violence is common in many developing countries and has potentially detrimental implications for democratic consolidation. Drawing on political psychology, we argue that citizens’ fear of campaign violence undermines support for democracy while increasing support for autocracy. Using individual-level survey data from 21 electoral democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, we find robust support for our argument. Citizens fearing campaign violence are less likely to support democracy and multi-party competition, more likely to favor a return to autocracy, and less likely to turn out to vote. Our findings have important implications for democratic survival and provide further impetus for reducing electoral violence.
{"title":"Fear of campaign violence and support for democracy and autocracy","authors":"Inken von Borzyskowski, Ursula E Daxecker, P. Kuhn","doi":"10.1177/07388942211026319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211026319","url":null,"abstract":"Election violence is common in many developing countries and has potentially detrimental implications for democratic consolidation. Drawing on political psychology, we argue that citizens’ fear of campaign violence undermines support for democracy while increasing support for autocracy. Using individual-level survey data from 21 electoral democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, we find robust support for our argument. Citizens fearing campaign violence are less likely to support democracy and multi-party competition, more likely to favor a return to autocracy, and less likely to turn out to vote. Our findings have important implications for democratic survival and provide further impetus for reducing electoral violence.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"39 1","pages":"542 - 564"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/07388942211026319","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49250943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1177/07388942211012623
D. Donno, Charis Psaltis, Omer Zarpli
How can ethnic reconciliation be achieved in conflict settings where populations are physically separated? We address this question by examining the role of “extended contact”—a form of indirect contact which entails learning about the contact experiences of others—in the context of Cyprus’s frozen conflict. We field a survey experiment in order to test two pathways through which extended contact works: (1) by helping build a common identity; and (2) by activating empathy. We find that our treatments are associated with greater trust in the outgroup and greater support for cross-ethnic interaction, but only among segments of the population that are initially less favorable toward reconciliation.
{"title":"Extended intergroup contact in frozen conflicts: Experimental evidence from Cyprus","authors":"D. Donno, Charis Psaltis, Omer Zarpli","doi":"10.1177/07388942211012623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211012623","url":null,"abstract":"How can ethnic reconciliation be achieved in conflict settings where populations are physically separated? We address this question by examining the role of “extended contact”—a form of indirect contact which entails learning about the contact experiences of others—in the context of Cyprus’s frozen conflict. We field a survey experiment in order to test two pathways through which extended contact works: (1) by helping build a common identity; and (2) by activating empathy. We find that our treatments are associated with greater trust in the outgroup and greater support for cross-ethnic interaction, but only among segments of the population that are initially less favorable toward reconciliation.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"38 1","pages":"411 - 433"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/07388942211012623","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41618906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-28DOI: 10.1177/07388942211015242
R. Williams
There are many regions that meet the necessary conditions for sovereign governance in the world, but few secessionist conflicts. I argue that this relative paucity of secessionist violence is the result of government preemption of potential secessionist movements. Using cross-national geospatial data from 1992 to 2013, I find that governments invest more, measured via nighttime light emissions, in more secession-prone regions. The same factors that make territory attractive for secession, such as large populations and international borders, also make governments willing to work to retain control of that territory, contributing to the scarcity of separatist civil conflicts.
{"title":"Turning the lights on to keep them in the fold: How governments preempt secession attempts","authors":"R. Williams","doi":"10.1177/07388942211015242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211015242","url":null,"abstract":"There are many regions that meet the necessary conditions for sovereign governance in the world, but few secessionist conflicts. I argue that this relative paucity of secessionist violence is the result of government preemption of potential secessionist movements. Using cross-national geospatial data from 1992 to 2013, I find that governments invest more, measured via nighttime light emissions, in more secession-prone regions. The same factors that make territory attractive for secession, such as large populations and international borders, also make governments willing to work to retain control of that territory, contributing to the scarcity of separatist civil conflicts.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"39 1","pages":"422 - 446"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/07388942211015242","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47769896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1177/07388942211024956
Ore Koren, Bumba Mukherjee
Research on the causes of repression has had limited success in connecting economic crises to state-led violence. We develop an explanation for violent government repression in urban areas, which links the importance of urban infrastructure in enabling civilians to wage an effective opposition campaign with the stress caused by economic crisis, empirically validating the underlying mechanisms using disaggregated geospatial data. We then confirm the empirical expectation that governments will violently repress during times of economic crisis where the civilians’ capacity to wage a collective action campaign is high using a disaggregated global sample of urban areas within developing states.
{"title":"Economic crises, civilian mobilization, and repression in developing states","authors":"Ore Koren, Bumba Mukherjee","doi":"10.1177/07388942211024956","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211024956","url":null,"abstract":"Research on the causes of repression has had limited success in connecting economic crises to state-led violence. We develop an explanation for violent government repression in urban areas, which links the importance of urban infrastructure in enabling civilians to wage an effective opposition campaign with the stress caused by economic crisis, empirically validating the underlying mechanisms using disaggregated geospatial data. We then confirm the empirical expectation that governments will violently repress during times of economic crisis where the civilians’ capacity to wage a collective action campaign is high using a disaggregated global sample of urban areas within developing states.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"39 1","pages":"520 - 541"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/07388942211024956","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42293152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-08DOI: 10.1177/07388942211017881
Solveig Hillesund
Do people from disadvantaged ethnic groups favor political violence over non-violent tactics? Studies of horizontal (between-group) inequality often concentrate on civil war. This article drills below the macro level and looks beyond civil war, to investigate individual participation in various types of conflict. Different types and combinations of ethnic disadvantage favor participation in different kinds of conflict, because of different opportunity structures. Political exclusion motivates leadership, which facilitates organized movements. Economic disadvantages restrict economic leverage, making non-violent tactics less likely to succeed. The article maps these components of groups’ opportunity structure onto different constellations of inequality. It uses Afrobarometer survey data (N = 29,727) to show that economic disadvantages increase participation in political violence short of civil war. When they coincide with political exclusion, they also make people steer actively away from demonstrations. The evidence is less conclusive for political disadvantages alone, but points toward increased participation in demonstrations.
{"title":"To fight or demonstrate? Micro foundations of inequality and conflict","authors":"Solveig Hillesund","doi":"10.1177/07388942211017881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211017881","url":null,"abstract":"Do people from disadvantaged ethnic groups favor political violence over non-violent tactics? Studies of horizontal (between-group) inequality often concentrate on civil war. This article drills below the macro level and looks beyond civil war, to investigate individual participation in various types of conflict. Different types and combinations of ethnic disadvantage favor participation in different kinds of conflict, because of different opportunity structures. Political exclusion motivates leadership, which facilitates organized movements. Economic disadvantages restrict economic leverage, making non-violent tactics less likely to succeed. The article maps these components of groups’ opportunity structure onto different constellations of inequality. It uses Afrobarometer survey data (N = 29,727) to show that economic disadvantages increase participation in political violence short of civil war. When they coincide with political exclusion, they also make people steer actively away from demonstrations. The evidence is less conclusive for political disadvantages alone, but points toward increased participation in demonstrations.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"39 1","pages":"166 - 190"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/07388942211017881","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45000882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-27DOI: 10.1177/07388942211015240
S. Kim
Do natural disasters promote conflict or peace? A series of analyses of longitudinal data between 1971 and 2011 shows the modest but significant impact of natural disasters on the likelihood of conflict, conditional on the level of foreign aid in developing countries. This paper argues that frequent natural disasters, through the legitimacy effect and monitoring effect, allow foreign aid to be channeled to marginalized groups and used for its intended development purpose, eventually lowering the likelihood of conflict. This study is the first to incorporate an examination of foreign aid into an analysis of natural disasters and civil conflicts.
{"title":"Environmental shocks, civil conflict and aid effectiveness","authors":"S. Kim","doi":"10.1177/07388942211015240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211015240","url":null,"abstract":"Do natural disasters promote conflict or peace? A series of analyses of longitudinal data between 1971 and 2011 shows the modest but significant impact of natural disasters on the likelihood of conflict, conditional on the level of foreign aid in developing countries. This paper argues that frequent natural disasters, through the legitimacy effect and monitoring effect, allow foreign aid to be channeled to marginalized groups and used for its intended development purpose, eventually lowering the likelihood of conflict. This study is the first to incorporate an examination of foreign aid into an analysis of natural disasters and civil conflicts.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"38 1","pages":"674 - 695"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/07388942211015240","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46714819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-15DOI: 10.1177/07388942211005420
William Spaniel
Members of the non-proliferation regime give technical assistance to countries contemplating nuclear weapons. This is puzzling: it facilitates the behavior donors wish to stop, and other forms of concessions do not have this drawback. Why do it? I develop a model of uncertainty, bargaining, and nuclear proliferation. In it, assistance hastens acquisition time but also generates a signal about the recipient’s domestic nuclear proficiency. This allows donors to better calibrate other concessions to the recipient. In equilibrium, donors sometimes find the information worth sacrificing bargaining leverage for. However, despite providing information, assistance can cause proliferation if donors believe that the recipient is competent but observe a misleading signal indicating incompetence. This paper works toward understanding how scientific intelligence affects international negotiations, an underexplored subject matter for political scientists.
{"title":"Scientific intelligence, nuclear assistance, and bargaining","authors":"William Spaniel","doi":"10.1177/07388942211005420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211005420","url":null,"abstract":"Members of the non-proliferation regime give technical assistance to countries contemplating nuclear weapons. This is puzzling: it facilitates the behavior donors wish to stop, and other forms of concessions do not have this drawback. Why do it? I develop a model of uncertainty, bargaining, and nuclear proliferation. In it, assistance hastens acquisition time but also generates a signal about the recipient’s domestic nuclear proficiency. This allows donors to better calibrate other concessions to the recipient. In equilibrium, donors sometimes find the information worth sacrificing bargaining leverage for. However, despite providing information, assistance can cause proliferation if donors believe that the recipient is competent but observe a misleading signal indicating incompetence. This paper works toward understanding how scientific intelligence affects international negotiations, an underexplored subject matter for political scientists.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"39 1","pages":"447 - 469"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/07388942211005420","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46689677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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