Pub Date : 2025-03-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102047
Eilidh Geddes , Nicole Holz
When designing rent control regulations, policy makers aim to create regulations that ensure affordable and stable housing for current tenants while minimizing exits from the rental market by landlords. Vacancy decontrol provisions that allow rent re-sets between tenants intend to strike a balance between a lower rent burden for current tenants and future potential profitability for landlords. However, such provisions also increase the incentive for landlords to evict tenants. Such evictions reduce both the anti-displacement and rent reduction effects of rent control. To study the effects of rent control on eviction behavior, we exploit variation across ZIP codes in policy exposure to the passage of the 1994 rent control referendum in San Francisco. We find that a ZIP code with the average level of treatment experiences an additional 34 eviction notices—an 83% increase—and an additional 13 wrongful eviction claims—a 125% increase. These effects were concentrated in low-income ZIP codes and were larger in years when average rent prices rose faster than the allowed rent increases for controlled units.
{"title":"Rational eviction: How landlords use evictions in response to rent control","authors":"Eilidh Geddes , Nicole Holz","doi":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102047","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102047","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>When designing rent control regulations, policy makers aim to create regulations that ensure affordable and stable housing for current tenants while minimizing exits from the rental market by landlords. Vacancy decontrol provisions that allow rent re-sets between tenants intend to strike a balance between a lower rent burden for current tenants and future potential profitability for landlords. However, such provisions also increase the incentive for landlords to evict tenants. Such evictions reduce both the anti-displacement and rent reduction effects of rent control. To study the effects of rent control on eviction behavior, we exploit variation across ZIP codes in policy exposure to the passage of the 1994 rent control referendum in San Francisco. We find that a ZIP code with the average level of treatment experiences an additional 34 eviction notices—an 83% increase—and an additional 13 wrongful eviction claims—a 125% increase. These effects were concentrated in low-income ZIP codes and were larger in years when average rent prices rose faster than the allowed rent increases for controlled units.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51490,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Housing Economics","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 102047"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143621078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102046
Claire Océane Chevallier , Sarah El Joueidi
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in infinite horizon, in which deterministic rational housing bubbles may emerge. Borrowers are constrained by two macroprudential regulations: DTI and LTV limits. The study investigates whether housing bubbles can arise under these regulatory constraints and identifies the specific conditions for their emergence. Our findings show that: (1) with LTV regulations, the equilibrium may feature a housing bubble; (2) when agents face an LTV regulation, two equilibria may emerge: a bubbleless and a housing bubble equilibria; (3) tighter LTV regulations exacerbate the growth of housing bubbles.
{"title":"Housing regulation and bubbles","authors":"Claire Océane Chevallier , Sarah El Joueidi","doi":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102046","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102046","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in infinite horizon, in which deterministic rational housing bubbles may emerge. Borrowers are constrained by two macroprudential regulations: DTI and LTV limits. The study investigates whether housing bubbles can arise under these regulatory constraints and identifies the specific conditions for their emergence. Our findings show that: (1) with LTV regulations, the equilibrium may feature a housing bubble; (2) when agents face an LTV regulation, two equilibria may emerge: a bubbleless and a housing bubble equilibria; (3) tighter LTV regulations exacerbate the growth of housing bubbles.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51490,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Housing Economics","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 102046"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143526812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-26DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102048
Changha Jin, Sungho Yun
This study explores how loss aversion influences seller behavior in the housing market, employing both the reservation rule and the number-of-offers rule approaches. We show that loss aversion can increase the reservation value in an infinite-time model under the reservation rule, and a disposition effect can arise solely from reference dependence with risk-neutral sellers, consistent with prior research. In contrast, in a finite-time model with specific deadlines, the prospect of forced sales at a loss in the final period incentivizes sellers to opt for earlier sales, leading to dynamic fluctuations in the reservation value, both upwards and downwards. This finding adds a novel dimension to the existing literature. Furthermore, employing the number-of-offers rule, we find that loss aversion can lead sellers to await more offers, supporting the negative correlation between prices and time on the market.
{"title":"The impact of loss aversion on seller behavior in the housing market","authors":"Changha Jin, Sungho Yun","doi":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102048","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102048","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study explores how loss aversion influences seller behavior in the housing market, employing both the reservation rule and the number-of-offers rule approaches. We show that loss aversion can increase the reservation value in an infinite-time model under the reservation rule, and a disposition effect can arise solely from reference dependence with risk-neutral sellers, consistent with prior research. In contrast, in a finite-time model with specific deadlines, the prospect of forced sales at a loss in the final period incentivizes sellers to opt for earlier sales, leading to dynamic fluctuations in the reservation value, both upwards and downwards. This finding adds a novel dimension to the existing literature. Furthermore, employing the number-of-offers rule, we find that loss aversion can lead sellers to await more offers, supporting the negative correlation between prices and time on the market.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51490,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Housing Economics","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 102048"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143551608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-17DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102044
Daniel Brunstein , Georges Casamatta , Sauveur Giannoni
This study investigates the influence of Airbnb on property prices in Corsica. Leveraging machine learning techniques, we obtain more robust results than those achieved with conventional methods and uncover heterogeneous effects of Airbnb on property values. Our analysis reveals that a 1% increase in Airbnb listings leads to an average 0.21% rise in house prices. Interestingly, this effect is more pronounced in economically less developed regions, such as inland municipalities and remote seaside resorts, compared to traditionally popular tourist destinations and urban areas.
{"title":"Using machine learning to estimate the heterogeneous impact of Airbnb on house prices: Evidence from Corsica","authors":"Daniel Brunstein , Georges Casamatta , Sauveur Giannoni","doi":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102044","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102044","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates the influence of Airbnb on property prices in Corsica. Leveraging machine learning techniques, we obtain more robust results than those achieved with conventional methods and uncover heterogeneous effects of Airbnb on property values. Our analysis reveals that a 1% increase in Airbnb listings leads to an average 0.21% rise in house prices. Interestingly, this effect is more pronounced in economically less developed regions, such as inland municipalities and remote seaside resorts, compared to traditionally popular tourist destinations and urban areas.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51490,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Housing Economics","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 102044"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143464250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102045
Kang Mo Koo , Jinyoo Kim
We examine the impact of tenant protection policies on the rental housing market in Korea. Three regulations were enacted in 2020 to reduce the burden of rent and to protect the right to renew a rental agreement. These 1) put a cap on rent increases at 5 % at lease renewal; 2) require registering all leases; and 3) empower tenants to renew leases for an additional 2-year period. Using detailed rental contract information, this paper aims to investigate the impact of the rent control policies and the changes in tenants’ lease types. We find that the policies increased average rent in Greater Seoul by 17.7 % in the 2-year period post the effective date of the policies, and the impact is persistent. The negative impact on rental housing affordability is not limited to specific districts. However, districts with lower income levels experienced slightly higher increases in rental deposits. Moreover, we find a significant shift in contract mode, with a lower number of pure jeonse contracts and a marked increase in other lease types including a mixture of lump sum deposit (the jeonse system) and partial monthly payments.
{"title":"Putting a ceiling on housing costs: The aftermath of nationwide rent control in the case of jeonse system in Korea","authors":"Kang Mo Koo , Jinyoo Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102045","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102045","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the impact of tenant protection policies on the rental housing market in Korea. Three regulations were enacted in 2020 to reduce the burden of rent and to protect the right to renew a rental agreement. These 1) put a cap on rent increases at 5 % at lease renewal; 2) require registering all leases; and 3) empower tenants to renew leases for an additional 2-year period. Using detailed rental contract information, this paper aims to investigate the impact of the rent control policies and the changes in tenants’ lease types. We find that the policies increased average rent in Greater Seoul by 17.7 % in the 2-year period post the effective date of the policies, and the impact is persistent. The negative impact on rental housing affordability is not limited to specific districts. However, districts with lower income levels experienced slightly higher increases in rental deposits. Moreover, we find a significant shift in contract mode, with a lower number of pure <em>jeonse</em> contracts and a marked increase in other lease types including a mixture of lump sum deposit (the <em>jeonse</em> system) and partial monthly payments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51490,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Housing Economics","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 102045"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143422170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-17DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102043
Sven Damen, Tijmen van Kempen
Mandatory disclosure policies are increasingly being used by governments around the world to reduce information-driven market failures related to climate risk and energy efficiency. We exploit two policy changes in Flanders (Belgium) to study the causal effect of mandatory energy efficiency disclosure policies on house prices. We find that the introduction of mandatory energy performance certificates with an energy efficiency score in 2008 did not affect the association between energy efficiency and sales prices, indicating that the policy change did not reduce information frictions. However, the introduction of EPC labels in 2019 affected the capitalization of energy efficiency.
{"title":"Mandatory energy efficiency disclosure policies and house prices","authors":"Sven Damen, Tijmen van Kempen","doi":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102043","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102043","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Mandatory disclosure policies are increasingly being used by governments around the world to reduce information-driven market failures related to climate risk and energy efficiency. We exploit two policy changes in Flanders (Belgium) to study the causal effect of mandatory energy efficiency disclosure policies on house prices. We find that the introduction of mandatory energy performance certificates with an energy efficiency score in 2008 did not affect the association between energy efficiency and sales prices, indicating that the policy change did not reduce information frictions. However, the introduction of EPC labels in 2019 affected the capitalization of energy efficiency.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51490,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Housing Economics","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 102043"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143177626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-04DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102042
Sungjin Yun , Hoon Choi
This paper investigates the use of side payments to circumvent rent control policies, focusing on the 2020 amendment to Korea's Housing Lease Protection Act. Using a difference-in-differences-in-differences approach with data from the 2019–2022 waves of the Household Income and Expenditure Survey, we find a significant increase in maintenance fees following the expansion of rent control. This increase is particularly evident in units not subject to strict maintenance fee regulations, suggesting that landlords exploit regulatory gaps by raising fees in response to the rent cap. Our findings further indicate that individuals disproportionately affected by higher maintenance fees tend to be female, aged 30 to 39, aged 70 or older, and lacking a college degree. This pattern suggests that landlords may target individuals perceived as having weaker negotiating power, thus capitalizing on potential vulnerabilities.
{"title":"Circumventing rent controls with tenants’ maintenance fees: Evidence from Korea","authors":"Sungjin Yun , Hoon Choi","doi":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102042","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhe.2025.102042","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the use of side payments to circumvent rent control policies, focusing on the 2020 amendment to Korea's Housing Lease Protection Act. Using a difference-in-differences-in-differences approach with data from the 2019–2022 waves of the Household Income and Expenditure Survey, we find a significant increase in maintenance fees following the expansion of rent control. This increase is particularly evident in units not subject to strict maintenance fee regulations, suggesting that landlords exploit regulatory gaps by raising fees in response to the rent cap. Our findings further indicate that individuals disproportionately affected by higher maintenance fees tend to be female, aged 30 to 39, aged 70 or older, and lacking a college degree. This pattern suggests that landlords may target individuals perceived as having weaker negotiating power, thus capitalizing on potential vulnerabilities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51490,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Housing Economics","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 102042"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143176600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-31DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2024.102040
Stephanie Casey Pierce , Julia K. Brown , Stephanie Moulton , Yung Chun
Policy interventions often target negative shocks to employment or housing as independent events. For instance, unemployment benefits aim to make up for lost earnings while mortgage assistance programs aim to prevent foreclosures. Yet, research suggests that housing markets and labor markets are systematically correlated. In this paper, we test the extent to which temporary mortgage payment relief improves long-term labor outcomes. We use data on unemployed homeowners who sought assistance through the U.S. Department of Treasury's Hardest Hit Fund program in Ohio, which subsidized the mortgage payment for unemployed homeowners for up to 18 months while they searched for a job. Through event study difference-in-differences models with individual fixed effects, we find that the receipt of mortgage payment subsidies extends the duration of unemployment in the short term but results in significantly higher earnings and a higher probability of being employed over the long term. These positive long-term findings, however, are only observed when mortgage payment relief is provided shortly after the onset of the unemployment shock. This highlights the importance of timely intervention to not only prevent foreclosures but also to improve labor market outcomes for homeowners experiencing an income shock.
We thank the Ohio Housing Finance Agency for research support. Additional research assistance for this project was provided by Olga Kondratjeva. Funding for this research was provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Grant No: 13-103361-000-USP, “How Housing Matters to Families and Communities”, Title: A Multistate Study of Housing and Employment Impacts of Foreclosure Prevention Programs. The views in this paper are those of the researchers and do not represent the views of The MacArthur Foundation, The Ohio Housing Finance Agency, The Ohio State University, or any other government agency.
政策干预往往将就业或住房的负面冲击作为独立事件。例如，失业救济金旨在弥补失去的收入，而抵押贷款援助计划旨在防止丧失抵押品赎回权。然而，研究表明，住房市场和劳动力市场是系统性相关的。在本文中，我们测试了临时抵押贷款支付救济改善长期劳动结果的程度。我们使用了通过美国财政部在俄亥俄州的重灾区基金项目寻求帮助的失业房主的数据，该项目为失业房主在寻找工作期间提供长达18个月的抵押贷款补贴。通过具有个体固定效应的事件研究差异中的差异模型，我们发现领取抵押贷款补贴在短期内延长了失业持续时间，但在长期内显著提高了收入和就业概率。然而，这些积极的长期结果只有在失业冲击开始后不久提供抵押贷款支付减免时才能观察到。这凸显了及时干预的重要性，不仅可以防止止赎，还可以改善经历收入冲击的房主的劳动力市场结果。我们感谢俄亥俄州住房金融局的研究支持。Olga Kondratjeva为该项目提供了额外的研究援助。本研究由John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur基金会资助，资助号：13-103361- 1000 - usp，“住房对家庭和社区的影响”，题目：预防止赎项目对住房和就业影响的多州研究。本文仅代表研究人员的观点，不代表麦克阿瑟基金会、俄亥俄住房金融局、俄亥俄州立大学或任何其他政府机构的观点。
{"title":"Labor outcomes of mortgage payment subsidies for unemployed homeowners","authors":"Stephanie Casey Pierce , Julia K. Brown , Stephanie Moulton , Yung Chun","doi":"10.1016/j.jhe.2024.102040","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhe.2024.102040","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Policy interventions often target negative shocks to employment or housing as independent events. For instance, unemployment benefits aim to make up for lost earnings while mortgage assistance programs aim to prevent foreclosures. Yet, research suggests that housing markets and labor markets are systematically correlated. In this paper, we test the extent to which temporary mortgage payment relief improves long-term labor outcomes. We use data on unemployed homeowners who sought assistance through the U.S. Department of Treasury's Hardest Hit Fund program in Ohio, which subsidized the mortgage payment for unemployed homeowners for up to 18 months while they searched for a job. Through event study difference-in-differences models with individual fixed effects, we find that the receipt of mortgage payment subsidies extends the duration of unemployment in the short term but results in significantly higher earnings and a higher probability of being employed over the long term. These positive long-term findings, however, are only observed when mortgage payment relief is provided shortly after the onset of the unemployment shock. This highlights the importance of timely intervention to not only prevent foreclosures but also to improve labor market outcomes for homeowners experiencing an income shock.</div><div>We thank the Ohio Housing Finance Agency for research support. Additional research assistance for this project was provided by Olga Kondratjeva. Funding for this research was provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Grant No: 13-103361-000-USP, “How Housing Matters to Families and Communities”, Title: A Multistate Study of Housing and Employment Impacts of Foreclosure Prevention Programs. The views in this paper are those of the researchers and do not represent the views of The MacArthur Foundation, The Ohio Housing Finance Agency, The Ohio State University, or any other government agency.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51490,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Housing Economics","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 102040"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143175529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-24DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2024.102041
Yaqun Zhu, Jun Kong
This paper utilizes a quasi-experiment in China that removed home purchase restrictions (HPR) in 2014 to examine the causal effect of homeownership on public sector employment through a difference-in-differences (DID) approach. Combining the 2012, 2014 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) and the 2011, 2013, 2015 China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), we find that removing the HPR significantly decreases the probability of working in the public sector by 47 %, this negative effect holds for both homeowners and renters. The mechanism analyses show that firstly, removing the HPR increases house prices, which makes homeowners more resistant to possible unemployment shock, and thus reduces the attractiveness of the public sector, which is called as the wealth buffer channel; secondly, the rising house prices discourages renters to work in the public sector, where workers are paid lower wages and struggle to afford a more expensive house in the future, this is the home purchase channel; thirdly, as the HPR in China, is a prevailing Hukou1-based discriminatory policy, the removal of HPR makes local Hukou no longer necessary to qualify for buying a house, and then reduce the propensity of public sector employment, that is the homeownership eligibility channel. In addition, it is found that the impact of removing the HPR is larger for unmarried males who have a higher likelihood of buying a house to improve their competitiveness in the marriage market. Lastly, there are greater negative effects for young workers and employees with children.
{"title":"Homeownership and public sector employment: Evidence from the removal of home purchase restrictions in China","authors":"Yaqun Zhu, Jun Kong","doi":"10.1016/j.jhe.2024.102041","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhe.2024.102041","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper utilizes a quasi-experiment in China that removed home purchase restrictions (HPR) in 2014 to examine the causal effect of homeownership on public sector employment through a difference-in-differences (DID) approach. Combining the 2012, 2014 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) and the 2011, 2013, 2015 China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), we find that removing the HPR significantly decreases the probability of working in the public sector by 47 %, this negative effect holds for both homeowners and renters. The mechanism analyses show that firstly, removing the HPR increases house prices, which makes homeowners more resistant to possible unemployment shock, and thus reduces the attractiveness of the public sector, which is called as the wealth buffer channel; secondly, the rising house prices discourages renters to work in the public sector, where workers are paid lower wages and struggle to afford a more expensive house in the future, this is the home purchase channel; thirdly, as the HPR in China, is a prevailing <em>Hukou</em><span><span><sup>1</sup></span></span>-based discriminatory policy, the removal of HPR makes local <em>Hukou</em> no longer necessary to qualify for buying a house, and then reduce the propensity of public sector employment, that is the homeownership eligibility channel. In addition, it is found that the impact of removing the HPR is larger for unmarried males who have a higher likelihood of buying a house to improve their competitiveness in the marriage market. Lastly, there are greater negative effects for young workers and employees with children.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51490,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Housing Economics","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 102041"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143176599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-18DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2024.102032
Matthew Maltman , Ryan Greenaway-McGrevy
This paper studies a sequence of zoning reforms enacted in Lower Hutt, a constituent municipality of the wider Wellington metropolitan region of New Zealand. Beginning in the late 2010s, Lower Hutt independently implemented a sequence of widespread zoning changes to enable medium- and high- density housing in residential areas. Using a synthetic control to specify the policy counterfactual, we find that these zoning changes generated a three-fold increase in consents per capita and nearly tripled the number of housing starts over the six years subsequent to the onset of the reforms. Depending on how potential displacement effects are accounted for, the Lower Hutt reforms increased housing starts across the wider metropolitan region by approximately 10 to 18%. We also present evidence that the upzonings reduced rents by around 21% relative to the counterfactual.
{"title":"Going it alone: The impact of upzoning on housing construction in Lower Hutt","authors":"Matthew Maltman , Ryan Greenaway-McGrevy","doi":"10.1016/j.jhe.2024.102032","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhe.2024.102032","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies a sequence of zoning reforms enacted in Lower Hutt, a constituent municipality of the wider Wellington metropolitan region of New Zealand. Beginning in the late 2010s, Lower Hutt independently implemented a sequence of widespread zoning changes to enable medium- and high- density housing in residential areas. Using a synthetic control to specify the policy counterfactual, we find that these zoning changes generated a three-fold increase in consents per capita and nearly tripled the number of housing starts over the six years subsequent to the onset of the reforms. Depending on how potential displacement effects are accounted for, the Lower Hutt reforms increased housing starts across the wider metropolitan region by approximately 10 to 18%. We also present evidence that the upzonings reduced rents by around 21% relative to the counterfactual.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51490,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Housing Economics","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 102032"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143176598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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