<p>A distance of exactly 100 years separates our present from the intellectual and institutional context in which talking of “critical” theory, as distinct from “traditional” theory, began to play the identity-forming role to which today's discussion owes its topic. Reflecting not only on the possible continuity but also on this factual distance can be helpful for gaining a clearer perspective of what it can mean to connect to this program today. For, first, it is only in a long history of the impact of certain texts, themes, and a certain style of theory that the impression of unity or coherence of this tradition has emerged, of which there was hardly a trace in the first decades. Neither the objectives of the Institute for Social Research in its founding phase nor the personal composition of the circle of (exclusively male) scholars around Max Horkheimer had made such a unity likely beyond a shared commitment to a heterodox, non-party Marxism.</p><p>The internal discussions in the Institute, in the pages of the <i>Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung</i> and its successor organs, and in scholarly communication with international colleagues were rather diverse and pluralistic. The disputes about the right relation to Marx and Marxism, to “bourgeois” philosophy, to psychoanalysis, to culture, to the Soviet Union, or to the question of revolution from the 1930s to the 1960s were so fierce because the one consensual line was not given and the protagonists of the debates did not agree on much. It would be rather anachronistic to assume coherence retrospectively, where a dynamic, ever-changing context of discussions had formed.</p><p>Second, in these 100 years, during which almost no stone has been left unturned in the social, cultural, and technological world, the contexts and conditions of both theory formation in general and of political–critical intervention in particular have changed profoundly. Already between the prewar and the postwar Institute, while the postal address remained the same, there were such profound differences in material endowment, symbolic significance, public efficacy, and embeddedness in academic context that the theoretical and political practice possible in each case was of a fundamentally different form. That this also affects the internal development of academic research should be evident, for it meant something different around 1930, around 1950, and around 1965 to refer to the general state of the social sciences, to react to international developments, or to work in an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary way. That this applies <i>a fortiori</i> to the contrast with the position around 2024 is to be expected. It might therefore be unproductive to create the suggestion of a seamless continuity and availability of an earlier academic-political practice, which was, after all, subject to its own situational contextual restrictions and potentials.</p><p>These skeptical remarks are intended to ward off all too great expectati
{"title":"Rethinking Critique and Theory","authors":"Martin Saar","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12731","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12731","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A distance of exactly 100 years separates our present from the intellectual and institutional context in which talking of “critical” theory, as distinct from “traditional” theory, began to play the identity-forming role to which today's discussion owes its topic. Reflecting not only on the possible continuity but also on this factual distance can be helpful for gaining a clearer perspective of what it can mean to connect to this program today. For, first, it is only in a long history of the impact of certain texts, themes, and a certain style of theory that the impression of unity or coherence of this tradition has emerged, of which there was hardly a trace in the first decades. Neither the objectives of the Institute for Social Research in its founding phase nor the personal composition of the circle of (exclusively male) scholars around Max Horkheimer had made such a unity likely beyond a shared commitment to a heterodox, non-party Marxism.</p><p>The internal discussions in the Institute, in the pages of the <i>Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung</i> and its successor organs, and in scholarly communication with international colleagues were rather diverse and pluralistic. The disputes about the right relation to Marx and Marxism, to “bourgeois” philosophy, to psychoanalysis, to culture, to the Soviet Union, or to the question of revolution from the 1930s to the 1960s were so fierce because the one consensual line was not given and the protagonists of the debates did not agree on much. It would be rather anachronistic to assume coherence retrospectively, where a dynamic, ever-changing context of discussions had formed.</p><p>Second, in these 100 years, during which almost no stone has been left unturned in the social, cultural, and technological world, the contexts and conditions of both theory formation in general and of political–critical intervention in particular have changed profoundly. Already between the prewar and the postwar Institute, while the postal address remained the same, there were such profound differences in material endowment, symbolic significance, public efficacy, and embeddedness in academic context that the theoretical and political practice possible in each case was of a fundamentally different form. That this also affects the internal development of academic research should be evident, for it meant something different around 1930, around 1950, and around 1965 to refer to the general state of the social sciences, to react to international developments, or to work in an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary way. That this applies <i>a fortiori</i> to the contrast with the position around 2024 is to be expected. It might therefore be unproductive to create the suggestion of a seamless continuity and availability of an earlier academic-political practice, which was, after all, subject to its own situational contextual restrictions and potentials.</p><p>These skeptical remarks are intended to ward off all too great expectati","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 4","pages":"426-430"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12731","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139180014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The animating impulses of critical theory","authors":"Peter E. Gordon","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12725","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12725","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 4","pages":"378-383"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139179540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>My first encounter with Horkheimer's seminal <span>1931</span> speech “The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research” dates back to 1981 when I was struggling as a young student to read the final chapters of Jürgen Habermas's just published <i>Theory of Communicative Action</i>. Habermas made a strong case for Horkheimer's program of interdisciplinary materialism in his book. He reconstructed Horkheimer's original program and presented an ambitious update (see Habermas, <span>1987</span>, pp. 374–403). This encouraged me to read Horkheimer's famous speech of January 1931 and became the inspirational starting point for my ongoing interest in the history of the Frankfurt School.</p><p>The primary reason for the appeal of the classical Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School until today is that while it remains within a Marxist framework, it contrasted the economism of Marxist orthodoxy. It restored an autonomous logic to the domains that orthodox Marxism qualified as “superstructure.” This perspective yields inspiring findings in cultural theory and social psychology to this day. Yet in the early period of the Frankfurt School, the inner circle around Horkheimer did not achieve comparable results; at no point did this circle elaborate a theory of the political or of political institutions. This shortcoming dates back to the very beginnings of the Frankfurt School, to Horkheimer's programmatic inaugural speech as the new director of <i>Institut für Sozialforschung</i> (IfS) of <span>1931</span> in particular.</p><p>When Horkheimer enumerated the subdisciplines of interdisciplinary materialism in his speech, the absence of political science was striking. He defined social philosophy as the philosophical interpretation of human beings as members of a community; social philosophy must therefore primarily concern itself with the social existence of human beings. Horkheimer named “the state” and the “law” (Horkheimer, <span>1931</span>, p. 25) first in the list of social phenomena, even above economy and religion. He dug deeper in his discussion of social philosophy with an examination of Hegel's theory of objective spirit by criticizing Hegel's idea that the state could serve as a solution to integrate the conflicts of capitalist society (see Horkheimer, <span>1931</span>, pp. 26–28). He included “the state” and “political association” (Horkheimer, <span>1931</span>, p. 31) as part of the investigation of the ways in which people live together.</p><p>In his following deliberations about the “ongoing dialectical permeation and evolution of philosophical theory and empirical-scientific praxis” (Horkheimer, <span>1931</span>, p. 29), however, Horkheimer quickly lost sight of political associations and the state. In his list of the scientific disciplines that are supposed to participate in socio-philosophical research, <i>Staatswissenschaft</i> and <i>Wissenschaft von der Politik</i>—as the discipline newly
我第一次接触霍克海默1931年的开创性演讲“社会哲学的现状和社会研究所的任务”要追溯到1981年，当时我还是一个年轻的学生，正在努力阅读j<s:1>根·哈贝马斯刚刚出版的《交往行为理论》的最后几章。哈贝马斯在他的书中有力地论证了霍克海默的跨学科唯物主义。他重建了霍克海默的原始计划，并提出了一个雄心勃勃的更新（见哈贝马斯，1987，第374-403页）。这鼓励我阅读霍克海默1931年1月的著名演讲，并成为我对法兰克福学派历史感兴趣的鼓舞人心的起点。法兰克福学派的经典批判理论直到今天仍然具有吸引力的主要原因是，尽管它仍然在马克思主义框架内，但它与马克思主义正统的经济主义形成了对比。它为正统马克思主义称之为“上层建筑”的领域恢复了一种自主逻辑。这一观点至今仍在文化理论和社会心理学中产生了鼓舞人心的发现。然而，在法兰克福学派的早期，霍克海默周围的小圈子并没有取得类似的成果；这个圈子从来没有详细阐述过政治或政治制度的理论。这一缺陷可以追溯到法兰克福学派之初，尤其是在1931年，霍克海默作为<s:1>社会科学研究所（IfS）新任所长发表的纲领性就职演说。当霍克海默在他的演讲中列举跨学科唯物主义的分支学科时，政治科学的缺失令人震惊。他将社会哲学定义为对作为共同体成员的人类的哲学解释；因此，社会哲学必须首先关注人类的社会存在。霍克海默将“国家”和“法律”（霍克海默，1931，第25页）列为社会现象之首，甚至高于经济和宗教。他对黑格尔的客观精神理论进行了更深入的探讨，批评了黑格尔认为国家可以作为整合资本主义社会冲突的解决方案的观点（见霍克海默，1931，第26-28页）。他把“国家”和“政治协会”（霍克海默，1931年，第31页）作为研究人们共同生活方式的一部分。然而，在他接下来关于“哲学理论和经验科学实践的持续辩证渗透和演变”的思考中（霍克海默，1931，第29页），霍克海默很快就忽视了政治协会和国家。在他列出的应该参与社会哲学研究的科学学科清单中，当时在德意志帝国的一些大学中新兴的学科Staatswissenschaft和Wissenschaft von der politit根本没有出现。在哲学家、社会学家、历史学家和心理学家之后，只有“政治经济学家”（霍克海默，1931年，第32页）被简单地提到。国家机器、政党或利益集团等政治团体、议会、选举或政治辩论都没有被提及。在他演讲的最后几段，“法律”作为一个研究课题在“特定的文化领域”中被最小化（霍克海默，1931，第33页），呼应了传统的马克思主义观点，即法律和政治是“上层建筑”的要素。这种对国家和政治协会研究的缺失，在霍克海默在《社会研究》（Zeitschrift fr Sozialforschung）第一期的序言（见霍克海默，1932年）和《studen ber Autorität und Familie》（《权威与家庭研究》，见霍克海默，1936年，第329-330页）的序言中列出的他认为最紧迫的研究课题中也很突出。沃尔特·本雅明（Walter Benjamin）为讲德语的流亡者撰写的对IfS的正面描述也反映了这种缺失（见本杰明，1938，第519页）。在我看来，除了研究所内部圈子对当前政治的个人厌恶的动机外，这种主题差距还有系统的原因。由于社会哲学的主要焦点是资本主义“社会”，这是基本的分析范畴，对他来说，将潜在的政治学主题转化为社会学和社会心理学问题似乎是很自然的。根据这种方法背后的假设，社会不是由政治制度维系的，而是由文化和心理倾向的粘合剂维系的。霍克海默1937年发表的两篇著名的纲领性论文延续了这一观点。 在《传统与批判理论》（Traditionelle und kritische Theorie）和《哲学与批判理论》（Philosophie und kritische Theorie）中，他概述了该研究所在“整个社会的历史进程”综合理论方面的跨学科工作（霍克海默，1937年b期，第247页）。他对“政治学学生”（霍克海默，1937年a版，第222页）的著作不屑一顾，认为这是一门知识视野有限的学术学科，他甚至假设“政治依赖于经济”（霍克海默，1937年b版，第271页）。在霍克海默发表演讲时，次年成为法兰克福大学同事的赫尔曼·海勒（Hermann Heller）承认了政治机构的“相对自主性”。他将政治学宣传为一门专注于“对政治现象的描述、解释和批评”的学术学科（Heller, 1934，第227页）。自20世纪30年代末以来，流亡的法兰克福学派“外围”（Honneth, 1987, p. 350）的三位成员——franz L. Neumann、Otto Kirchheimer和Arkadij gurland——追随了海勒的冲动，可惜在IfS没有取得成功。但在霍克海默的就职演说中，除了政治赤字之外，还有更多内容。他对“个人主义社会”的看法（霍克海默，1931，第28页）的诊断已经取代了旧的客观精神的黑格尔形而上学，为更新批判理论的另一种方式提供了起点。霍克海默关于对个人利益预先稳定的和谐的信念的失望将采取“报复”的声明（霍克海默，1931，第28页）与我们这个时代的政治特别相关。今天，《理性选择》提出了霍克海默言论最激进的版本。一切都是理性的选择！从古典批判理论的角度看，《理性选择》是拜物化理性和工具理性的化身。在我看来，这种批判理论与理性选择的鲜明对立已经过时，值得修改Mancur Olson对个人理性行为的集体非理性的洞见（Olson, 1965）， Amartya Sen对“理性傻瓜”的描述（Sen, 1977），以及Jon Elster对理性决策的理性边界的反思（Elster, 2002）——这些都是内在批判传统中具有里程碑意义的贡献——使理性选择成为批判理论的宝贵工具成为可能。像批判理论一样，理性选择也有唯物主义的方法，因为它假设了自私的，主要是唯物主义的行为者偏好。此外，理性选择的方法论个人主义允许重建集体非理性和社会灾难，这些非理性和社会灾难是由不受限制的个人理性计算的聚集导致的。在批判理论中选择性地使用《理性选择》提供了一种方法，可以将霍克海默对资本主义社会中黑格尔从“随意性的混合”中创造国家的naïve乐观主义（霍克海默，1931，第27页）的批评见解，转移到他的《启蒙辩证法》和《工具理性批判》关于工具理性病态的框架中。在理性选择理论中，最著名的关于集体非理性产生的组合是囚徒困境（PD）博弈。PD星座已经在政治学领域的许多领域被诊断出来（从工会的组织问题到国际裁军和全球气候政策）。PD博弈代表了一个星座，在这个星座中，所有参与者都被迫偏离他们的理想偏好。因此，PD星座指的是将主观兴趣的概念划分为偏好的二元论PD收益矩阵迫使理性个体行为者将自己定位于我所说的“真实偏好”，它的排名低于他们的“理想偏好”——无论是她或他自己的偏好还是游戏中所有其他参与者的偏好。问题来了：在什么条件下，理想偏好会胜过真实偏好？在PD博弈中，如果个体行为者有理由期望所有（或至少大多数）其他行为者也会合作行事，他们就会倾向于自己的理想偏好。早在1984年，Robert Axelrod就在他的开创性计算机锦标赛中解释了一系列重复
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{"title":"Horkheimer's unrealized vision","authors":"William E. Scheuerman","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12732","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12732","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 4","pages":"410-413"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139179928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Trying to offer some brief reflections on the legacy of critical theory over the past 100 years is a daunting task. In lieu of doing this, I shall focus on just one issue: the recent revival in critiques of ideology. In my view, this type of critique is an important task of critical theory and remains one of its most significant legacies. Yet, if one focuses on the work of critical theorists over the past decades, this statement is far from obvious. In fact, the second generation of the Frankfurt school, most notably Habermas in his Theory of Communicative Action, explicitly rejects ideology critique as obsolete in the context of contemporary societies.1 Even though in the 1960s and 1970s, he had embraced the classical Marxist approach to ideology critique, he ultimately rejected it. It was the explicit attempt to rebut objections that had plagued this approach that brought about the so-called “democratic turn” of critical theory characteristic of Habermas's work from the 1980s onward and in which the critique of ideologies no longer plays a role.
In contrast to Habermas, I am sympathetic to the return of a critique of ideology. Even if it is not the only form of critique, let alone the central task of a critical theory of contemporary societies, I think that it is an important tool for critical theorists. I shall briefly indicate why I think that newer approaches to the critique of ideology that are being currently developed (articulated by not only Frankfurt school critical theorists but also critical race theorists, feminists, and mainstream Anglo-American philosophers) are in a better position to overcome objections that understandably plagued classical Marxist conceptions of ideology critique.2 Moreover, in my view, they are perfectly compatible with the “democratic turn” of critical theory—so long as this turn is not given an exclusively proceduralist interpretation as Habermas does. I cannot give a full defense of this view here. Instead, I want (1) to briefly indicate important ways in which the new approaches to ideology critique differ from the classical Marxist approach and how they can avoid some key objections. Then, (2) I turn to Habermas's distinctive objections to ideology critique and show that, while they may call the feasibility of the classical Marxist approach into question, they leave room for a properly transformed approach to the critique of ideology in contemporary societies.
According to the classical Marxist approach, the critique of ideology is a central task in the “scientific” enterprise of articulating a critical theory of society. The aim of ideology critique is to respond to a specific theoretical question, namely, why members of a society would work to perpetuate their own subjection, exploitation, or oppression. Ideologies offer an answer to this question. They provide a distorted view of social practices and institutions to those who are “in the grip” of
试图对过去100年来批判理论的遗产提供一些简短的反思是一项艰巨的任务。在此之前，我将只关注一个问题：最近意识形态批评的复兴。在我看来，这种类型的批判是批判理论的重要任务，并且仍然是其最重要的遗产之一。然而，如果你关注过去几十年批判理论家的工作，这种说法远非显而易见。事实上，第二代法兰克福学派，最著名的是哈贝马斯在他的交往行为理论中，明确地拒绝意识形态批判，认为它在当代社会的背景下已经过时尽管在20世纪60年代和70年代，他接受了经典马克思主义的意识形态批判方法，但他最终拒绝了它。正是明确地试图反驳困扰这种方法的反对意见，才导致了哈贝马斯从20世纪80年代开始的批判理论的所谓“民主转向”，在这种转向中，对意识形态的批判不再发挥作用。与哈贝马斯相反，我赞同意识形态批判的回归。即使它不是批判的唯一形式，更不是当代社会批判理论的中心任务，我认为它是批判理论家的一个重要工具。我将简要说明为什么我认为目前正在发展的意识形态批判的新方法（不仅由法兰克福学派批判理论家，而且由批判种族理论家，女权主义者和主流英美哲学家所阐述）能够更好地克服可以理解地困扰经典马克思主义意识形态批判概念的反对意见此外，在我看来，它们与批判理论的“民主转向”是完全相容的——只要这种转向不像哈贝马斯那样被赋予一种完全的程序主义解释。我无法在这里为这一观点提供充分的辩护。相反，我想(1)简要指出意识形态批判的新方法不同于经典马克思主义方法的重要方面，以及它们如何避免一些关键的反对意见。然后，(2)我转向哈贝马斯对意识形态批判的独特反对，并表明，尽管他们可能会质疑经典马克思主义方法的可行性，但他们为当代社会中意识形态批判的适当转变方法留下了空间。根据经典马克思主义的方法，对意识形态的批判是阐述社会批判理论的“科学”事业的中心任务。意识形态批判的目的是回应一个具体的理论问题，即，为什么一个社会的成员会努力使他们自己的臣民、剥削或压迫永续下去。意识形态为这个问题提供了答案。他们向那些被他们“控制”的人提供了一种扭曲的社会实践和制度的观点。因此，意识形态不仅在道德上有缺陷（因为它们使不公正和压迫永久化），而且在认识上也有缺陷。相比之下，对意识形态的批判由于建立在科学知识的基础上，因此在认识论上被认为是优越的。社会科学家使用经验证据以及社会现象和实践的结构和功能理论解释来表明主流意识形态的错误之处。这两种经验证据和解释都无法从参与此类实践的人的内部角度获得。因此，只有从社会科学家的外部角度来看，才有可能看到社会成员对他们自己所从事的社会实践的实际运作和意义有一种扭曲的看法。这些假设中的许多都受到了挑战。挑战不仅来自那些拒绝意识形态批判的学者，也来自那些通常同情意识形态批判的学者，但他们对意识形态的批判有着更广泛、更实际的理解。让我简要地强调其中的一些挑战。对于许多从事黑人解放、女权主义、批判种族理论、去殖民理论等传统研究的学者来说，意识形态批判的主要目的不是理论，而是实践。重点不是阐明因果关系的解释，而是为解放做出贡献。根据这一假设，意识形态批判被认为是一种对所有参与者都平等开放的实践。它不需要一种只有社会科学家才能从超然观察者的角度获得的科学知识。此外，这种另类的理解也表明，为什么认为受压迫者通常不知道他们受到的压迫，因此必须由社会科学家“开导”，这是毫无根据的（也是令人愤慨的家长式作风）。 相反，被压迫者的不和谐经历和情感本身就是知识的重要来源，可以用来阐明替代框架，以削弱流行意识形态的力量。事实上，这些不同的理解方式并不一定要以解释性社会理论的形式出现。作为不和谐经历、非法情绪、抵抗行为等的表达，它们可能采取类似于第一人称叙述或证词的形式。由于这些原因，这些传统的成员经常正确地怀疑这样一种假设：在所有人中，社会理论家是有特权获得必要知识的人，这些知识可以帮助我们识别和克服意识形态的压迫力量。这种有问题的假设过度忽视了受压迫受害者已经参与的批评和抵抗的现有实践和传统。它低估了他们的认知能力和能动性，天真地忽视了社会科学倾向于延续而不是与流行的意识形态竞争的事实。当然，与经典方法和哈贝马斯批判理论的“民主转向”精神相反，可以回答说，当社会理论家从事意识形态批判时，他们使用的是原则上所有参与者都可以获得的“批判”能力。他们没有打破沟通的对称性，也不需要假设任何优越的认知权威。毕竟，他们的批评可能经不起公众的监督、挑战和争论。因此，社会批评家不必（通过自我免疫的解释）取消社会参与者的认知能力和转化能力。尽管如此，他们可以对已经存在的批判实践做出独特的贡献，除其他外，通过从另一种知识来源中汲取对挑战主流意识形态至关重要的知识：经验（统计）知识，以及对社会实践和系统的功能或结构解释。然而，统计和理论知识是通过采用外部观察者对社会实践和制度的第三人称视角获得的。这意味着这些知识不能简化为从参与者的内部角度获得的知识，也不是他们可以立即获得的知识。意识到自己受到的压迫是一回事，但了解相关事实（例如，有多少人受到影响，哪些结构性条件导致了这种情况，等等）又是另一回事然而，一旦这些知识公开，它可以为那些从事解放斗争的人提供决定性的支持。此外，如果人们认识到科学话语可以通过提供对强大机构和公众施加巨大影响的复杂表达来使意识形态永久化，那么揭露它们的意识形态特征对于抵消它们对社会的邪恶影响就变得更加重要。这种意识形态批判的替代版本与经典方法有重要的区别，但它可以保持其一些最独特的特征。它可以证明使用“意识形态”一词是正当的，在道德和认知上有缺陷的东西的贬义上。更重要的是，它可以证明意识形态批判超越或挑战参与者的自我解释的假设，而不会取消他们的认知能力和代理，也不会默认地将更高的认知权威归因于社会批评家。与意识形态的纯粹解释学方法相反，这种方法可以拒绝承认对社会参与者及其传统关于他们所从事的实践的意义和有效性的排他性（或最终）发言权。最后，这种类型的意识形态批判可以作为当代社会批判理论的一项重要任务来捍卫，它可以真正地为正在进行的反对不公正和压迫的解放斗争做出贡献。然而，这种对意识形态批判的辩护只有在意识形态对当代社会秩序及其病态的解释具有解释性的假设下才有效。正如哈贝马斯所主张的那样，如果意识形态在当代社会中已经过时，也就是说，如果它们在解释上是无关紧要的，那么批判理论中的“民主转向”可能会证明一般社会批评的可能性和合法性，而不是意识形态批评的合法性。因此，让我们来研究一下哈贝马斯的论点。长话短说，哈贝马斯关于意识形态在当代社会中已经过时的主张是基于两个相互关联的主张：一方面，意识形态不再是统一的、总体的或包罗万象的。作为生活世界合理化的结果，意识形态是碎片化的、多元化的，不再为所有社会成员所共享。 因此，它们不能像传统的形而上学和宗教世界观那样发挥社会整合的作用。正是因为它们是碎片化和多元化的，没有一种意识形态可以可靠地免于批评，因此所有的意识形态都可以受到持续的挑战和争论（Habermas 1987, p. 390）。意识形态因此失去了允许它们承担范式“意识形态”功能的属性（哈贝马斯1987，第352页）。现代学科已经获得了“批判”能力，使他们免受传统意义上的整体意识形态的“控制”。另一方面，系统整合现在是通过诸如金钱和权力等替代媒介实现的，这些媒介独立
{"title":"The return of the critique of ideologies","authors":"Cristina Lafont","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12728","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12728","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Trying to offer some brief reflections on the legacy of critical theory over the past 100 years is a daunting task. In lieu of doing this, I shall focus on just one issue: the recent revival in critiques of ideology. In my view, this type of critique is an important task of critical theory and remains one of its most significant legacies. Yet, if one focuses on the work of critical theorists over the past decades, this statement is far from obvious. In fact, the second generation of the Frankfurt school, most notably Habermas in his <i>Theory of Communicative Action</i>, explicitly rejects ideology critique as obsolete in the context of contemporary societies.<sup>1</sup> Even though in the 1960s and 1970s, he had embraced the classical Marxist approach to ideology critique, he ultimately rejected it. It was the explicit attempt to rebut objections that had plagued this approach that brought about the so-called “democratic turn” of critical theory characteristic of Habermas's work from the 1980s onward and in which the critique of ideologies no longer plays a role.</p><p>In contrast to Habermas, I am sympathetic to the return of a critique of ideology. Even if it is not the only form of critique, let alone the central task of a critical theory of contemporary societies, I think that it <i>is</i> an important tool for critical theorists. I shall briefly indicate why I think that newer approaches to the critique of ideology that are being currently developed (articulated by not only Frankfurt school critical theorists but also critical race theorists, feminists, and mainstream Anglo-American philosophers) are in a better position to overcome objections that understandably plagued classical Marxist conceptions of ideology critique.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, in my view, they are perfectly compatible with the “democratic turn” of critical theory—so long as this turn is not given an exclusively <i>proceduralist</i> interpretation as Habermas does. I cannot give a full defense of this view here. Instead, I want (1) to briefly indicate important ways in which the new approaches to ideology critique differ from the classical Marxist approach and how they can avoid some key objections. Then, (2) I turn to Habermas's distinctive objections to ideology critique and show that, while they may call the feasibility of the classical Marxist approach into question, they leave room for a properly transformed approach to the critique of ideology in contemporary societies.</p><p>According to the classical Marxist approach, the critique of ideology is a central task in the “scientific” enterprise of articulating a critical theory of society. The aim of ideology critique is to respond to a specific theoretical question, namely, why members of a society would work to perpetuate their own subjection, exploitation, or oppression. Ideologies offer an answer to this question. They provide a distorted view of social practices and institutions to those who are “in the grip” of","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 4","pages":"390-394"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12728","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139179970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Totality, morality, and social philosophy","authors":"Frank I. Michelman","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12729","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12729","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 4","pages":"406-409"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139179060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Institute for Social Research on its 100th birthday. A former director's perspective","authors":"Axel Honneth","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12726","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12726","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 4","pages":"372-377"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139180154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>I call cases like this—cross-border political engagements including both kinetic and non-kinetic elements—<i>hybrid cases</i>.<sup>1</sup> It is not obvious how to understand the non-kinetic elements of hybrid cases. Should we understand them as warfare—conflicts between “enemies” locked in a “radically adversarial relationship” whose main task is to harm each other and whose main normative quandary is how much and what kind of harm they are permitted to inflict (see Walzer, <span>2017</span>, p. xiii)? Or should we understand them as some (other) kind of political struggle?</p><p>The question of which analytic frame to adopt is important, as, I will argue, there are serious democratic costs associated with understanding the non-kinetic elements of hybrid cases as warfare. In Counterinsurgency, understanding civilian casualty reports made by journalists, activists, and insurgents as acts of war would mean seeing them as acts meant to cause harm (by debilitating “enemy” forces) and as strategic communications whose purpose and value were, at best, unconnected to their truth. It would mean seeing their authors as potentially liable to attack—as Gross does when he describes journalists as “the foot soldiers of media warfare” (<span>2015</span>, p. 300) and argues they are therefore liable to harms including “capture, incarceration, expulsion, or the destruction or confiscation of their equipment” (<span>2015</span>, p. 269). And it would mean seeing their audiences as pawns to be manipulated by propagandists.</p><p>Understanding civilian casualty reports instead as part of a political struggle would mean seeing them as statements that could inform, inspire critical reflection, and form the basis of democratic deliberation and contestation—which might not be contained within the borders of a single state. It would mean seeing their authors as sources of potentially weighty claims deserving real consideration and seeing their audiences as interlocutors capable of judging and responding in good faith to those claims.</p><p>Existing scholarship does not often explicitly recognize the question of whether to understand the non-kinetic elements of hybrid cases as warfare or political struggle—let alone explicitly evaluate the costs and benefits of making one choice or another.<sup>2</sup> Nonetheless, some (e.g., Blank, <span>2017</span>; Gross, <span>2015</span>; Gross & Meisels, <span>2017a</span>; Kittrie, <span>2016</span>; Walzer, <span>2017</span>) tend to treat them more like warfare, and others (e.g., Jurkevics, <span>2019</span>; Miller, <span>2010</span>, pp. 247–57; Miller, <span>2018</span>; Valdez, <span>2019a, 2019b</span>) tend to treat them more like political struggle. Here, I make explicit the implicit assumptions behind these two approaches, argue that adopting the <i>war paradigm</i> (understanding the non-kinetic elements of hybrid cases as “warfare”) has significant democratic costs, and argue that adopting an alternate <i>poli
我把这样的案例——包括动力因素和非动力因素的跨境政治接触——称为混合案例如何理解混合情况下的非动力因素还不是很明显。我们是否应该将它们理解为战争——“敌人”之间的冲突，这些冲突被锁定在一种“激进的敌对关系”中，其主要任务是相互伤害，其主要的规范性困境是他们被允许造成多大程度的伤害和什么样的伤害（见Walzer， 2017, p. xiii）？或者我们应该把它们理解为某种（其他）政治斗争？采用哪一种分析框架的问题很重要，因为，我认为，理解战争等混合情况的非动力因素会带来严重的民主成本。在《反叛乱》中，将记者、活动家和叛乱分子的平民伤亡报告理解为战争行为，意味着将其视为旨在造成伤害（通过削弱“敌人”力量）的行为，以及其目的和价值充其量与事实无关的战略沟通。这将意味着把他们的作者视为潜在的攻击对象——正如格罗斯所做的那样，他将记者描述为“媒体战争的步兵”（2015年，第300页），并认为他们因此容易受到伤害，包括“被捕、监禁、驱逐或销毁或没收他们的设备”（2015年，第269页）。这将意味着把他们的观众视为宣传者操纵的棋子。将平民伤亡报告理解为政治斗争的一部分，意味着将其视为一种声明，可以提供信息，激发批判性反思，并形成民主审议和竞争的基础——这可能不局限于一个国家的边界内。这将意味着把它们的作者视为值得真正考虑的潜在重大主张的来源，把它们的读者视为能够判断和真诚地回应这些主张的对话者。现有的学术研究通常没有明确认识到是否应该理解战争或政治斗争等混合案例的非动力因素的问题，更不用说明确评估做出一种选择或另一种选择的成本和收益了尽管如此，一些人(例如Blank, 2017；生产总值(gdp), 2015;总,刘振前,2017;Kittrie, 2016;Walzer, 2017)更倾向于将它们视为战争，而其他人(例如，Jurkevics, 2019；Miller, 2010，第247-57页；米勒,2018;Valdez, 2019a, 2019b)倾向于把它们更像是政治斗争。在这里，我明确了这两种方法背后的隐含假设，认为采用战争范式（将混合情况的非动力因素理解为“战争”）具有重大的民主成本，并认为采用替代的政治斗争范式可以减轻这些成本。更具体地说，对战争模式的过度依赖削弱了跨境政治成为——并被公认为——真正民主政治场所的潜力。它通过三种方式做到了这一点。首先，它将全球政治参与者呈现为陷入“一种激进的敌对关系”的敌人（Walzer, 2017, p. xiii），致力于相互伤害和征服。这掩盖了他们发展相互尊重关系的可能性，这种关系有利于相互学习和跨国界的团结合作——正是这种关系最能促进民主政治。其次，采用战争范式鼓励了一种假设，即跨境政治的参与者只是为他们的战争战略服务，而不是推进潜在的民主审议或政治斗争。这种假设的盛行反过来又会改变人们参与跨境政治的机构（如媒体）——将它们从民主政治的潜在催化剂转变为交战各方实施战争努力的工具。第三，如果人们认为跨境政治的参与者只是为了推进战争战略，他们可能会过早地低估参与者的合法道德论点，假设这些论点纯粹是工具性的。虽然采用战争范式有可能招致这些民主成本，但我认为我们可以通过采用政治斗争范式来减轻这些成本。这种替代性范式将跨境政治的参与者视为共同政治斗争的参与者，他们不一定会寻求伤害或摧毁对手，他们可能会以战斗人员不会的方式修改他们的目标，他们的行为应该主要受政治责任原则（而不是正义战争原则或军事战略原则）的支配。此外，根据政治斗争范式，边界不必将对手与盟友明确区分开来。下面，我将更彻底地定义战争范式。 这种替代性范式将跨境政治的参与者视为共同政治斗争的参与者，他们不一定会寻求伤害或摧毁对手，他们可能会以战斗人员不会的方式修改他们的目标，他们的行为应该主要受政治责任原则(而不是正义战争原则或军事战略原则)的支配。此外，根据政治斗争范式，边界不需要将对手与盟友明确区分开来下面，我将更彻底地定义战争范式。然后，我认为，过度依赖它会破坏跨境政治以上述三种方式成为(并被认可为)真正民主政治场所的潜力。最后，我概述了另一种政治斗争范式，并认为采用它可以减轻与战争范式相关的民主成本。我并不是说我们永远不应该使用战争模式。也许有时我们应该承担它的民主代价。一些认为跨境政治民主化没有价值的人可能会认为战争模式的民主成本在道德上是微不足道的。我不会试图在这里为民主辩护，反对它的批评者。但是，理解采用战争模式的民主代价，是对这些代价是否值得承担做出任何可信判断的先决条件——甚至是一个值得承担的可信判断。我在这里通过说明战争范式的民主成本以及如何采用替代范式来减轻这些成本来实现这种理解。在揭示跨境政治民主化的新障碍(过度依赖战争范式)时，我的论点可能对跨国民主的支持者具有重要意义(例如，Benhabib, 2005年，2009年;Bohman, 2007)，但对于任何有兴趣诚实地评估民主成本和使用一个或另一个分析框架来理解跨境政治的利益的人来说，它们仍然很重要。战争范式是对政治活动进行概念化和分析的一种特殊方式。只有当这样的活动涉及具有对立目的的行动者时，才有可能使用战争范式，所以我将假设在我讨论的所有情况下都是如此。采用战争范式来分析政治活动意味着将参与者视为陷入“一种彻底的对抗关系”(Walzer, 2017, p. xiii)。Walzer在撰写不采用传统动能战(“软战争”)形式的冲突时，说明了如何将这些冲突识别为“战争”，包括将这种对抗关系作为核心特征:“‘我们’试图伤害那些试图伤害‘我们’的敌人。“在这种战争中，就像在任何其他战争中一样，战斗人员需要知道什么伤害是允许的，什么伤害是不允许的，谁可以成为目标，谁不能成为目标”(Walzer, 2017, p. xiii)。Walzer在格罗斯和梅塞尔斯(2017a, p. 1)编辑的《软战争》一书中写道，该书提出了许多政治参与模式，包括“所有非动态措施，无论是有说服力的还是强制性的，包括网络战和经济制裁;媒体战和宣传，非暴力抵抗和公民不服从，抵制和“法律战”作为“战争”的形式——尽管是“软”的形式。公平地说，沃尔泽并没有主张我们应该总是把这些交战模式理解为“战争”，而是阐明了这样做的(一些)含义。他强调了当我们将一项活动归类为“战争”时所做的一些假设。也就是说，他阐明了一些隐含在战争范式下的假设，我想在这里明确说明。具体来说，沃尔泽指出，在“战争”中，每一个行动者的主要任务是伤害对方，直到他们被击败。每个行为者面临的主要规范性问题是:我给敌人造成多大程度的伤害和什么样的伤害是合理的(见Walzer, 2017, p. xiii)?这并不意味着这种完全对立的关系必须是政治遭遇中唯一合适的战争模式。即使是战争中的敌人也可能分享友谊、家庭关系、浪漫关系和仁慈的行为。但是选择用战争的范式来分析他们的政治活动就是选择把他们作为敌人的身份作为他们的中心身份，他们的任务是伤害他们的敌人来实现他们自己的目的，这是他们的中心任务，他们应该给敌人造成多大程度的伤害和什么样的伤害这是他们的中心规范困境。选择使用战争范式来分析政治活动，就是选择将政治参与者的身份、任务和规范困境(由其他(不太激进的敌对)关系定义)视为边缘。 然后，我认为，过度依赖
{"title":"Not just war by other means: Cross-border engagement as political struggle","authors":"Lucia M. Rafanelli","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12719","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12719","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I call cases like this—cross-border political engagements including both kinetic and non-kinetic elements—<i>hybrid cases</i>.<sup>1</sup> It is not obvious how to understand the non-kinetic elements of hybrid cases. Should we understand them as warfare—conflicts between “enemies” locked in a “radically adversarial relationship” whose main task is to harm each other and whose main normative quandary is how much and what kind of harm they are permitted to inflict (see Walzer, <span>2017</span>, p. xiii)? Or should we understand them as some (other) kind of political struggle?</p><p>The question of which analytic frame to adopt is important, as, I will argue, there are serious democratic costs associated with understanding the non-kinetic elements of hybrid cases as warfare. In Counterinsurgency, understanding civilian casualty reports made by journalists, activists, and insurgents as acts of war would mean seeing them as acts meant to cause harm (by debilitating “enemy” forces) and as strategic communications whose purpose and value were, at best, unconnected to their truth. It would mean seeing their authors as potentially liable to attack—as Gross does when he describes journalists as “the foot soldiers of media warfare” (<span>2015</span>, p. 300) and argues they are therefore liable to harms including “capture, incarceration, expulsion, or the destruction or confiscation of their equipment” (<span>2015</span>, p. 269). And it would mean seeing their audiences as pawns to be manipulated by propagandists.</p><p>Understanding civilian casualty reports instead as part of a political struggle would mean seeing them as statements that could inform, inspire critical reflection, and form the basis of democratic deliberation and contestation—which might not be contained within the borders of a single state. It would mean seeing their authors as sources of potentially weighty claims deserving real consideration and seeing their audiences as interlocutors capable of judging and responding in good faith to those claims.</p><p>Existing scholarship does not often explicitly recognize the question of whether to understand the non-kinetic elements of hybrid cases as warfare or political struggle—let alone explicitly evaluate the costs and benefits of making one choice or another.<sup>2</sup> Nonetheless, some (e.g., Blank, <span>2017</span>; Gross, <span>2015</span>; Gross & Meisels, <span>2017a</span>; Kittrie, <span>2016</span>; Walzer, <span>2017</span>) tend to treat them more like warfare, and others (e.g., Jurkevics, <span>2019</span>; Miller, <span>2010</span>, pp. 247–57; Miller, <span>2018</span>; Valdez, <span>2019a, 2019b</span>) tend to treat them more like political struggle. Here, I make explicit the implicit assumptions behind these two approaches, argue that adopting the <i>war paradigm</i> (understanding the non-kinetic elements of hybrid cases as “warfare”) has significant democratic costs, and argue that adopting an alternate <i>poli","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 4","pages":"661-677"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12719","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135167044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The public university as a real utopia","authors":"Martin Aidnik, Harshwardhani Sharma","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12716","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12716","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 4","pages":"688-704"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135462359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Critique and praxis: A critical philosophy of illusions, values, and action By Bernard E. Harcourt, New York: Columbia University Press, 2022. p. 696, $30","authors":"Maeve Cooke","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12717","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12717","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 2","pages":"286-288"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135512051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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