By examining an array of sources from seventeenth century England, This article studies the medicines and medical community in a disease-ridden context. I chose the seventeenth century as the field of this research, particularly because plague eruptions occurred frequently in England throughout this period of time. The article serves as a material-culture history, for it is built around the materiality of medicines: Their distinct characters, their manufacturing, and their retailing. This article contends that seventeenth-century English medicines reflect the general stagnation in the development of medical ideas and serious divisions within the medical community. People’s preoccupation with scents indicate their reliance on ancient doctrines, and the lack of consensus regarding manufacturing methods manifested the rifts within the medical community. The disputes also existed in regards to medicine-selling, as two prominent professions of the medical industry, the physicians and apothecaries, antagonized each other due to profit conflicts in the medical market. The fogyish ideas, endless disputes, lack of consensus, and the poor effects of medicines reflect a stagnated and chaotic era during which medicines were an essential source of controversy.
{"title":"Unguaranteed Remedies","authors":"Fangxing Zhou","doi":"10.29173/cons29495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/cons29495","url":null,"abstract":"By examining an array of sources from seventeenth century England, This article studies the medicines and medical community in a disease-ridden context. I chose the seventeenth century as the field of this research, particularly because plague eruptions occurred frequently in England throughout this period of time. The article serves as a material-culture history, for it is built around the materiality of medicines: Their distinct characters, their manufacturing, and their retailing. This article contends that seventeenth-century English medicines reflect the general stagnation in the development of medical ideas and serious divisions within the medical community. People’s preoccupation with scents indicate their reliance on ancient doctrines, and the lack of consensus regarding manufacturing methods manifested the rifts within the medical community. The disputes also existed in regards to medicine-selling, as two prominent professions of the medical industry, the physicians and apothecaries, antagonized each other due to profit conflicts in the medical market. The fogyish ideas, endless disputes, lack of consensus, and the poor effects of medicines reflect a stagnated and chaotic era during which medicines were an essential source of controversy.","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48635558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Though often considered little more than an interesting moment in the history of the Church of England, the vestments controversy of the sixteenth century was a decisive historical moment in early modern western history. Vestments, the clothing of clergymen, were not merely garments in the eyes of the three diverging Christian denominations, the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of England, and the early Puritan movement, in the early post-Reformation era. Imbued with the power to literally “transnature” one’s body and soul, the vestments one chose to wear were both a proclamation of one’s beliefs and a condition of their spirituality. Vestments could, and did, serve many purposes, embodying many meanings – including what it meant to be holy, who had a claim to truth, how one conceptualized the relationship between church and state, and how one understood the relationship between man and God. Bound up in the theological, political, and social debates of sixteenth-century England, the vestments controversy functions as intellectual history, revealing how people, institutions, and societies think of themselves and others. The long-term religious, political, and cultural reverberations of the vestments controversy reveal the important and complex role that clothing inhabits in the Christian West.
{"title":"“Popish Pageauntes”","authors":"Rebecca Hicks","doi":"10.29173/cons29492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/cons29492","url":null,"abstract":"Though often considered little more than an interesting moment in the history of the Church of England, the vestments controversy of the sixteenth century was a decisive historical moment in early modern western history. Vestments, the clothing of clergymen, were not merely garments in the eyes of the three diverging Christian denominations, the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of England, and the early Puritan movement, in the early post-Reformation era. Imbued with the power to literally “transnature” one’s body and soul, the vestments one chose to wear were both a proclamation of one’s beliefs and a condition of their spirituality. Vestments could, and did, serve many purposes, embodying many meanings – including what it meant to be holy, who had a claim to truth, how one conceptualized the relationship between church and state, and how one understood the relationship between man and God. Bound up in the theological, political, and social debates of sixteenth-century England, the vestments controversy functions as intellectual history, revealing how people, institutions, and societies think of themselves and others. The long-term religious, political, and cultural reverberations of the vestments controversy reveal the important and complex role that clothing inhabits in the Christian West.","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46170592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>1. I first met Richard Bernstein in Frankfurt in the spring of 1988, where he was a visiting professor of philosophy while I was a student. I remember as truly eye-opening the seminar he taught together with Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel and the one he gave by himself on the authors he discussed in <i>The New Constellation</i> (<span>1991</span>). From that time on, this marvelous <i>Geist</i> became an important mentor for me and a dear friend, and I will always be grateful for this gift.</p><p>Dick used to refer to people he was fond of with the Yiddish <i>mensch</i>, meaning someone with a fine character and a certain knowledge of life based on experience. A great Aristotelian as he was, he inspires me to say that what a true <i>mensch</i> is one can hardly capture by a definition; rather, one has to point to an example. And I can think of no better example than Dick Bernstein himself, the warmest, most generous, wise, and dialogical person one could imagine.</p><p>2. This <i>menschsein</i> brings me to my topic, Bernstein's thinking about democracy. He was a true pragmatist, one of the greatest of his generation. This means that he approached issues in, say, political philosophy or epistemology not from separate methodological standpoints. Rather, for him all philosophical concepts and ideas had to be explained by reference to human practice and experience, and they found their place in a comprehensive philosophy of what he called the “dialogical character of our human existence” (Bernstein, <span>1983</span>, p. xv). Democracy, from this perspective, was not simply a certain form of organizing political life, rather, it was an ethical way of life. Yet for Bernstein democracy was grounded more fundamentally still as a mode of thought—or better: as <i>the</i> form of thought that makes us truly human, and again the Aristotelianism in the formulation is no mistake. Bernstein was not a metaphysical foundationalist, and he tried to liberate us from “Cartesian anxieties,” but he firmly believed in the human <i>potential</i> and <i>telos</i> of us humans, and of us <i>all</i>, as dialogical seekers of understanding. In his eyes, all human practices, those of pursuing knowledge, of social cooperation and production (including art), or of finding a common opinion or will, had to be understood as practices of <i>phronesis</i>, as communal endeavors to organize our individual and collective lives through mutual understanding. This of course means <i>rational</i> understanding, taking rationality to be the capacity of constructing our reality through dialogue. I am interested in that core idea of his, as I believe there are important treasures to be found in what I call Bernstein's <i>signature rationalism</i>. One can say a lot about its anti-Cartesian or non-Kantian character, but a form of rationalism it is, as any proper Aristotelian view must.</p><p>3. The topics of <i>praxis</i> and <i>phronesis</i> occupied Bernstein throughout his career
1. 1988年春，我在法兰克福第一次见到理查德•伯恩斯坦(Richard Bernstein)，当时他是那里的哲学客座教授，而我还是一名学生。我记得他与j<s:1>根·哈贝马斯和卡尔·奥托·阿佩尔一起教授的研讨会，以及他自己在《新星座》(1991)中讨论的作者的研讨会，确实让我大开眼界。从那时起，这位了不起的神灵就成了我重要的导师和挚友，我将永远感激这份礼物。迪克过去常常用意第绪语mensch来指代他喜欢的人，意思是性格好，根据经验对生活有一定了解的人。虽然他是一个伟大的亚里士多德主义者，但他激励我说，一个人很难用一个定义来描述一个真正的人;相反，人们必须举出一个例子。我想不出比迪克·伯恩斯坦本人更好的例子了，他是你能想象到的最热情、最慷慨、最聪明、最健谈的人。这种关系让我想到了我的主题，伯恩斯坦对民主的思考。他是一个真正的实用主义者，是他那一代最伟大的人之一。这意味着他在政治哲学或认识论中处理问题，而不是从不同的方法论立场出发。相反，对他来说，所有的哲学概念和思想都必须通过参考人类的实践和经验来解释，它们在他所谓的“我们人类存在的对话特征”的综合哲学中找到了自己的位置(伯恩斯坦，1983，第xv页)。从这个角度来看，民主不仅仅是组织政治生活的某种形式，而是一种道德的生活方式。但对伯恩斯坦来说，民主更根本的基础是作为一种思维方式，或者更确切地说，作为一种思维形式，使我们成为真正的人类，亚里士多德主义在他的表述中没有错。伯恩斯坦不是一个形而上学的基础主义者，他试图把我们从“笛卡尔式的焦虑”中解放出来，但他坚定地相信人类的潜力和我们人类的终极目标，我们所有人都是寻求理解的对话者。在他看来，所有人类的实践，包括追求知识、社会合作和生产(包括艺术)，或寻找共同意见或意志的实践，都必须被理解为实践，被理解为通过相互理解来组织我们个人和集体生活的共同努力。这当然意味着理性的理解，把理性看作是通过对话构建现实的能力。我对他的核心思想很感兴趣，因为我相信在伯恩斯坦的标志性理性主义中可以找到重要的宝藏。关于它的反笛卡儿主义或非康德主义的性质，人们可以说很多，但它是理性主义的一种形式，正如任何正统的亚里士多德观点所必须的那样。伯恩斯坦的整个职业生涯都围绕着实践和实践的主题，他的早期著作《实践与行动》(1971)和《社会与政治理论的重构》(1976)都证明了这一点。他最杰出和最持久的成就之一是他的伟大著作《超越客观主义和相对主义》(1983)我们当时在法兰克福讨论过。他在对立的观点之间引导方向的方式是无与伦比的，将他们团结在他们共同的观点上。他(与伽达默尔)认为，phronesis是“在所有理解中表现出来的判断和推理的类型”(伯恩斯坦，1983年，第40页)，并且(与哈贝马斯)他增加了一个“激进的张力”，强调“拥抱全人类的自由原则”(伯恩斯坦，1983年，第188页)。他继续认为，对于哈贝马斯和伽达默尔来说，“不受约束的对话和交流的原则不是我们‘选择’的任意理想或规范;它基于我们语言主体间性的特征”(Bernstein, 1983, p. 190f)。伯恩斯坦本人以一种非先验的，尽管仍然相当强烈的形式分享了哈贝马斯的理想，因为他坚持认为它是“指导我们克服系统扭曲的沟通的终极目标”(伯恩斯坦，1983，第195页)。他认为这种包揽一切的、平等主义的对沟通和对话的承诺是“对人类计划至关重要的”(Bernstein, 1983，第206页)，强调“当个人以平等和参与者的身份面对彼此时，可能发生的理性求爱类型”(Bernstein, 1983，第223页)是这种观点的核心。我认为这种类型的理性主义是伯恩斯坦思想的一个特征，因为在实用主义模式下，他更愿意把对未扭曲的交流的终极目标的信仰称为“信仰”，而不是理性的先验真理。有很多原因与他的非基础主义有关，但一个重要的原因是他想强调这种信仰的实践性。 正如他在《超越客观主义和相对主义》(Beyond Objectivism and Relativism)一书中所论述的那样，我们不应该被引诱“认为在当代社会中起作用的力量是如此强大和狡猾，以至于在不扭曲的沟通、对话、共同判断和理性说服的基础上实现共同生活是不可能的”(Bernstein, 1983, p. 227f)。正如他在《哲学简介》中所解释的那样，和杜威一样，伯恩斯坦强调理性的信念(和希望)，即人类原则上可以实现这样的交际实践，简而言之:“在适当的条件下，所有人类都有能力进行明智的判断、审议和行动”(伯恩斯坦，1986，第261页)。提到适当的条件是非常重要的，特别是在涉及教育和其他公共生活机构时。但这里所说的“反思信仰”是伯恩斯坦所坚持的一种坚定的实践信念，暗示着世界上没有任何社会秩序能够从根本上破坏平等主义的判断和审议能力，这种信仰可以与康德对善的倾向的理性信仰相比较。我在这里看到了一种强烈的，亚里士多德式的信仰在起作用，我不一定会称之为基础主义，但它仍然坚持一种关于人性的观点，强调一些特征和持久的东西，一些超越人类现实和历史的东西。有人可能会认为这对实用主义者来说太过分了，但我相信只有这样的信念才能解释迪克一直“拒绝屈服于绝望”(伯恩斯坦，1986，第272页)，正如他对杜威的评价(也描述了他自己)。这就是为什么他相信，引用杜威的话，“民主‘是共同体生活本身的理念’”(Bernstein, 1986, p. 264)，这意味着人类只有参与民主形式的生活，才能真正以人道的伦理方式生活。他赞许地引用了杜威1951年关于“创造性民主”的文章:“因为每一种民主失败的生活方式都限制了接触、交流、沟通和互动，而经验正是通过这些接触、交流、交流和互动才得以稳定，同时得以扩大和丰富”(伯恩斯坦，1986年，第262页)。只有民主才能释放人类丰富经验的潜力。我们在其他作品中也发现了这种对真实伦理政治生活的强烈描述。在《新星座》(1991)中，伯恩斯坦(与哈贝马斯)强调“对理性的主张具有一种‘顽固的超越力量’”(伯恩斯坦，1991，第52页)，他接着说:“对交流理性的复仇能量的实际承诺是希望的基础——也许是唯一诚实的基础”(伯恩斯坦，1991，第53页)。在《实用主义转向》(2010)中，他同样强调了民主作为人类生活的终极目标的伦理维度:“当人类独特的社会性的规范意义得到充分发展时，它会导致民主作为一种伦理生活形式的观念”(伯恩斯坦，2010，第72页)。请注意这种民主信仰意味着什么——即坚定的平等主义信念，认为每个人的道德和认知能力都是平等的。民主信仰是一种无条件的(我想这么说)“相互尊重”的道德信念(Bernstein, 2005，第30页)，作为一个(我称之为)辩护权利的辩护代理人，每个人都应享有这种权利:“当我们准备通过诉诸公开、公开、批判性讨论的理由和证据来为正义事业辩护时，我们对正义事业的热情承诺就会得到加强和深化。”这是真正珍惜自由的民主所必需的”(Bernstein, 2005，第67页)。在我看来，这意味着对所有给予理性和值得理性的人的平等尊重，并不是过去形而上学命令的残余;相反，它属于实用主义信仰的核心。鉴于这种希望和信念，邪恶的问题显然必须得到解决，主要是在与汉娜·阿伦特的对话中。正是在这种背景下，
{"title":"Democratic faith. A philosophical profile of Richard J. Bernstein","authors":"Rainer Forst","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12654","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12654","url":null,"abstract":"<p>1. I first met Richard Bernstein in Frankfurt in the spring of 1988, where he was a visiting professor of philosophy while I was a student. I remember as truly eye-opening the seminar he taught together with Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel and the one he gave by himself on the authors he discussed in <i>The New Constellation</i> (<span>1991</span>). From that time on, this marvelous <i>Geist</i> became an important mentor for me and a dear friend, and I will always be grateful for this gift.</p><p>Dick used to refer to people he was fond of with the Yiddish <i>mensch</i>, meaning someone with a fine character and a certain knowledge of life based on experience. A great Aristotelian as he was, he inspires me to say that what a true <i>mensch</i> is one can hardly capture by a definition; rather, one has to point to an example. And I can think of no better example than Dick Bernstein himself, the warmest, most generous, wise, and dialogical person one could imagine.</p><p>2. This <i>menschsein</i> brings me to my topic, Bernstein's thinking about democracy. He was a true pragmatist, one of the greatest of his generation. This means that he approached issues in, say, political philosophy or epistemology not from separate methodological standpoints. Rather, for him all philosophical concepts and ideas had to be explained by reference to human practice and experience, and they found their place in a comprehensive philosophy of what he called the “dialogical character of our human existence” (Bernstein, <span>1983</span>, p. xv). Democracy, from this perspective, was not simply a certain form of organizing political life, rather, it was an ethical way of life. Yet for Bernstein democracy was grounded more fundamentally still as a mode of thought—or better: as <i>the</i> form of thought that makes us truly human, and again the Aristotelianism in the formulation is no mistake. Bernstein was not a metaphysical foundationalist, and he tried to liberate us from “Cartesian anxieties,” but he firmly believed in the human <i>potential</i> and <i>telos</i> of us humans, and of us <i>all</i>, as dialogical seekers of understanding. In his eyes, all human practices, those of pursuing knowledge, of social cooperation and production (including art), or of finding a common opinion or will, had to be understood as practices of <i>phronesis</i>, as communal endeavors to organize our individual and collective lives through mutual understanding. This of course means <i>rational</i> understanding, taking rationality to be the capacity of constructing our reality through dialogue. I am interested in that core idea of his, as I believe there are important treasures to be found in what I call Bernstein's <i>signature rationalism</i>. One can say a lot about its anti-Cartesian or non-Kantian character, but a form of rationalism it is, as any proper Aristotelian view must.</p><p>3. The topics of <i>praxis</i> and <i>phronesis</i> occupied Bernstein throughout his career","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 1","pages":"20-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12654","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48723963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Democracy and/or critical theory? An unfinished conversation with Dick Bernstein","authors":"Nancy Fraser","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12669","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12669","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 1","pages":"23-25"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41376009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The ineluctable modality of the natural","authors":"Joel Whitebook","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12660","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12660","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 1","pages":"30-33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42682704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>It was nearly 50 years ago when Dick called me for the first time and invited me to come over to Haverford for a discussion. It is not only because of the beginning of our longstanding friendship that I start with that phone call I got in 1972 at the Humanities Center of Cornell University. It moreover led, at this first encounter, to a memorable and rather improbable discovery. The two of us had been brought up on different continents and in different societies, with different backgrounds at different schools and different universities, not to speak of a childhood and youth we spent on opposite sides of a monstrous World War, in which Dick had lost a brother; but in spite of all of these obvious distances in origin and socialization we soon discovered a broad overlap in our philosophical background and also in our present research interests. Hegel, Marx and Kierkegaard, Sartre and existentialism, even Peirce and Dewey and our present research programs in action theory and communication are the catch words to indicate this unexpected convergence of our philosophical orientations. And my surprise was soon confirmed when I read Dick's book <i>Praxis and Action</i> which I immediately recommended to Suhrkamp for translation.</p><p>However, the discovery of these <i>intellectual</i> family bonds is only half of the story; I would not have accepted the invitation to come to Haverford with Ute and our two daughters for a whole term, had Dick not been the impressive personality he indeed was—a host of overwhelming charm and an open-minded, spontaneous and inspiring partner in the ongoing ping-pong of arguments. Throughout the following years and decades, I got to know him as a sharp-minded, engaged and dedicated philosopher and teacher, as an attentive, sensitive and loyal friend and as a mind of great fairness and courage who got angry and immediately spoke up when he felt that somebody was not treated in the right way. And yet, even this friendship would not have flourished for such a long time if it had not been embedded in the broader context of relations between our families.</p><p>We enjoyed Carol's hospitality in her wide-open house, whether the families met at home—I remember our shy Judith dancing with little Daniel along the floor—or whether we were introduced to quite a few distinguished and interesting guests at dinner, first in Haverford, but in the same style later on at the upper Eastside in Manhattan or in the Adirondacks—where Dick finally spent his last days. During those memorable evenings, we met for example Jacques Derrida or Geoffrey Hartmann, or colleagues from Israel and elsewhere, who were teaching at the New School. By the way, this generous hospitality of the Bernsteins also included my son Tilmann and, my daughter, Rebekka, when they spent a year at the New School as Theodor Heuss professors. The visits were, of course, mutual: Dick has taught in Frankfurt several times; and I remember a last visit with him and Carol in Mu
将近50年前，迪克第一次给我打电话，邀请我到哈弗福德去讨论。1972年，我在康奈尔大学人文中心接到了一个电话，这不仅是我们长期友谊的开端。而且，在这第一次相遇中，它导致了一个令人难忘的、相当不可能的发现。我们两个在不同的大陆和不同的社会中长大，有着不同的背景，上过不同的学校和大学，更不用说我们在残酷的世界大战中各自度过的童年和青年时代了，迪克在那场大战中失去了一个兄弟;但是，尽管在起源和社会化方面有这些明显的距离，我们很快就发现，在我们的哲学背景和我们目前的研究兴趣中，有广泛的重叠。黑格尔、马克思和克尔凯郭尔、萨特和存在主义，甚至皮尔斯和杜威，以及我们目前在行动理论和交流方面的研究项目，都是表明我们哲学取向意外趋同的热门词汇。当我读到迪克的《实践与行动》(practice And Action)这本书时，我的惊讶很快得到了证实，我立即把这本书推荐给了苏尔坎普翻译。然而，这些智力家庭纽带的发现只是故事的一半;我不会接受邀请，带着尤特和我们的两个女儿去哈弗福德待整整一个学期，但迪克确实是一个令人印象深刻的人——他拥有压倒性的魅力，在不断的乒乓辩论中是一个开放、率性和鼓舞人心的伙伴。在接下来的几年和几十年里，我逐渐认识到他是一个头脑敏锐、敬业敬业的哲学家和老师，是一个细心、敏感和忠诚的朋友，是一个非常公正和勇敢的人，当他觉得有人受到不公正的对待时，他会生气并立即说出来。然而，即使是这种友谊，如果不是植根于我们两国家庭关系的更广泛背景中，也不会繁荣这么长时间。不管家人是在家里见面，我们都很享受卡罗尔在她那敞开大门的房子里的款待——我记得害羞的朱迪思和小丹尼尔在地板上跳舞——不管我们是在晚宴上被介绍给几位杰出而有趣的客人，先是在哈弗福德，后来在曼哈顿上东区或阿迪朗达克以同样的方式——迪克最后在那里度过了他最后的日子。在那些难忘的夜晚，我们遇到了雅克·德里达或杰弗里·哈特曼，或者来自以色列和其他地方的同事，他们在新学院任教。顺便说一下，伯恩斯坦一家的慷慨好客还包括我的儿子蒂尔曼和我的女儿丽贝卡，他们在新学院当了一年西奥多·豪斯的教授。当然，这种拜访是相互的:迪克曾在法兰克福教过几次书;我记得最后一次去慕尼黑拜访他和卡罗尔，他在那里开了一堂关于实用主义的大课;最后一场晚上的会议向全市公众开放，我们两人坐在讲台上，迪克以他最令人钦佩的角色出场。许多人会记得:当他充满激情地教授美国最激进的民主传统的主要路线时，这位老师自己变成了他实际教导的最好的化身——有时甚至是说教的化身。虽然我不能在此背景下详细介绍迪克的哲学著作，但至少让我提一下他最显著的三个成就。他值得认可的原因有:(a)实用主义的复兴，(b)使用解释学作为分析-大陆分裂的桥梁，(c)延续了新学派的伟大传统。(a)今天，美国的实用主义出现在世界各地的哲学系。在20世纪上半叶，查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔斯和威廉·詹姆斯，还有约翰·杜威，至少在美国被认为是主要的哲学家。但是，当我在60年代中期走访美国著名大学的哲学系时，情况已不再是这样了。当时，我的大多数同事认为杜威是一个“模糊思想家”。大多数系受到鲁道夫·卡尔纳普和维也纳学派移民的新实证主义或维特根斯坦和英国语言分析哲学的影响。只有在这些流行趋势的背景下，人们才能想象和理解这两位朋友——迪克·伯恩斯坦和迪克·罗蒂——发起这种转变意味着什么。他们坚持不懈的论证促成了实用主义的复兴，实用主义最终获得了第二次机会，反对这些其他分析方法的排他性统治地位(老实说，这些分析方法确实提高了论证的标准)。 (b)除了成功地推广实用主义及其在超验主义中的美国根源之外，迪克的哲学还揭示了另一个显著特征:我指的是他对解释学传统的强烈兴趣。他努力吸引人们对这一颇具大陆特色的传统的关注，尤其是他对汉斯-乔治·伽达默尔及其批评者的作品的钦佩，这可能是因为迪克本人是“翻译”艺术方面的天才。这种认真对待文本的表面真理主张的敏感性是他一般公平感的一部分;在任何反驳的尝试之前，他坚持有义务追寻真理的核心，即使面对奇怪的作者和文本，奇怪的传统和论点。然而，这种对文本意义的尊重和奉献并没有阻止他转向问题的真相，并坚持“产生差异”的差异，正如他多次重复的那样。(c)最后，汉娜·阿伦特和新学派是迪克哲学生涯中最重要的一章。他在她去世前不久见过她，她坚强的个性给他留下了深刻的印象。当他被邀请成为她在新学院的接班人时，他匆匆回到了他出生的城市纽约。要公正地评价迪克职业生涯中这一决定性转折的各个方面的巧合并不容易。他钦佩汉娜·阿伦特的为人和作品，熟悉她的德国哲学背景和德国哲学，最后但并非最不重要的是，他对政治移民对这些哲学家经历的影响的敏感——这些特点现在遇到了新学院哲学系的挑战，这所独特的大学，在纳粹时期，曾是许多流亡在外的欧洲重要学者的避难所。1967年，当我在新学院教书时，我仍然有幸见到了最后一代移民——除了汉娜·阿伦特、汉斯·乔纳斯、亚伦·古维奇、阿道夫Löwe等人——并沉浸在这个无与伦比的地方的独特氛围中。我深信，除了迪克·伯恩斯坦(Dick Bernstein)，没有人能够通过谨慎的转型步骤，将这一传统的形象和精神再延续40年，甚至近50年。特别是德国的大学和德国政府应该感谢他的这种特殊的专业和政治参与，当然，这只是反映了他非凡的哲学思想和实践的更深层次的动机。回顾迪克的传记，我们可以用阿多诺谨慎的话说，这样的生活并不是失败的。
{"title":"For my friend Richard J. Bernstein","authors":"Jürgen Habermas","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12656","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12656","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It was nearly 50 years ago when Dick called me for the first time and invited me to come over to Haverford for a discussion. It is not only because of the beginning of our longstanding friendship that I start with that phone call I got in 1972 at the Humanities Center of Cornell University. It moreover led, at this first encounter, to a memorable and rather improbable discovery. The two of us had been brought up on different continents and in different societies, with different backgrounds at different schools and different universities, not to speak of a childhood and youth we spent on opposite sides of a monstrous World War, in which Dick had lost a brother; but in spite of all of these obvious distances in origin and socialization we soon discovered a broad overlap in our philosophical background and also in our present research interests. Hegel, Marx and Kierkegaard, Sartre and existentialism, even Peirce and Dewey and our present research programs in action theory and communication are the catch words to indicate this unexpected convergence of our philosophical orientations. And my surprise was soon confirmed when I read Dick's book <i>Praxis and Action</i> which I immediately recommended to Suhrkamp for translation.</p><p>However, the discovery of these <i>intellectual</i> family bonds is only half of the story; I would not have accepted the invitation to come to Haverford with Ute and our two daughters for a whole term, had Dick not been the impressive personality he indeed was—a host of overwhelming charm and an open-minded, spontaneous and inspiring partner in the ongoing ping-pong of arguments. Throughout the following years and decades, I got to know him as a sharp-minded, engaged and dedicated philosopher and teacher, as an attentive, sensitive and loyal friend and as a mind of great fairness and courage who got angry and immediately spoke up when he felt that somebody was not treated in the right way. And yet, even this friendship would not have flourished for such a long time if it had not been embedded in the broader context of relations between our families.</p><p>We enjoyed Carol's hospitality in her wide-open house, whether the families met at home—I remember our shy Judith dancing with little Daniel along the floor—or whether we were introduced to quite a few distinguished and interesting guests at dinner, first in Haverford, but in the same style later on at the upper Eastside in Manhattan or in the Adirondacks—where Dick finally spent his last days. During those memorable evenings, we met for example Jacques Derrida or Geoffrey Hartmann, or colleagues from Israel and elsewhere, who were teaching at the New School. By the way, this generous hospitality of the Bernsteins also included my son Tilmann and, my daughter, Rebekka, when they spent a year at the New School as Theodor Heuss professors. The visits were, of course, mutual: Dick has taught in Frankfurt several times; and I remember a last visit with him and Carol in Mu","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 1","pages":"5-7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12656","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45874754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Despite accumulating challenges, digital information and communication technologies retain considerable democratic potential. They have enabled movements, mass protests, and open-data initiatives in cities. But as we have all learned from the failures of an earlier wave of techno-utopianism, the democratic exploitation of technological affordances is deeply contingent—dependent on ethical conviction, political engagement, public regulation, and good design choices. In particular, and in the spirit of Habermas’ remark quoted at the outset, we think that the democratic potential will only be realized if participants in what we will be calling “the digital public sphere” deepen their sense of responsibility for how communication proceeds there.</p><p>A brief clarification: by “the digital public sphere,” we mean a public sphere in which discussion about matters of potentially shared concern is shaped in part by communication on online platforms (intermediaries that store users’ information and enable its public dissemination). Thus, the digital public sphere is neither everything that happens online or on online platforms (much of which is not discussion of matters of shared concern), nor is it only online. It is a public sphere in which communication on platforms plays an important role in shaping public discussion.</p><p>We will begin by sketching an idealized democratic public sphere, which marries inclusion and deliberation. Our current digitalized public sphere is dramatically more inclusive than the post-war mass media public sphere. But this expansion of inclusion has come at a substantial deliberative price. To improve the quality of public discussion, we focus on the responsibilities that participants must take on for the digital public sphere to be more democratically successful.</p><p>To be sure, participant action is insufficient. We and others have offered suggestions for the contributions of regulation, corporate responsibility, and the contributions of researchers, as well as civic and advocacy organizations. The European Union's new regulations on Intermediary Services, for example, the Digital Services Act, include requirements on illegal content and impose due diligence responsibilities on very large online platforms that will need to do audited systematic risk assessments and offer plans for remediation (Husovec & Roche Laguna, <span>2022</span>). This approach has much to be said for it (though with the proliferation of generative models, it may be addressed to last year's problems). But because the digital public sphere has vastly expanded the aperture for contributions to discussion, and because we are uneasy about regulating the substance of public discussion, we are skeptical about proposals to turn public regulators or platforms (or any other agents) into editorial guardians.</p><p>Emphasizing participant responsibilities may give the appearance that we are at once blaming and burdening the victims of degraded public
{"title":"Democratic responsibility in the digital public sphere","authors":"Joshua Cohen, Archon Fung","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12670","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12670","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite accumulating challenges, digital information and communication technologies retain considerable democratic potential. They have enabled movements, mass protests, and open-data initiatives in cities. But as we have all learned from the failures of an earlier wave of techno-utopianism, the democratic exploitation of technological affordances is deeply contingent—dependent on ethical conviction, political engagement, public regulation, and good design choices. In particular, and in the spirit of Habermas’ remark quoted at the outset, we think that the democratic potential will only be realized if participants in what we will be calling “the digital public sphere” deepen their sense of responsibility for how communication proceeds there.</p><p>A brief clarification: by “the digital public sphere,” we mean a public sphere in which discussion about matters of potentially shared concern is shaped in part by communication on online platforms (intermediaries that store users’ information and enable its public dissemination). Thus, the digital public sphere is neither everything that happens online or on online platforms (much of which is not discussion of matters of shared concern), nor is it only online. It is a public sphere in which communication on platforms plays an important role in shaping public discussion.</p><p>We will begin by sketching an idealized democratic public sphere, which marries inclusion and deliberation. Our current digitalized public sphere is dramatically more inclusive than the post-war mass media public sphere. But this expansion of inclusion has come at a substantial deliberative price. To improve the quality of public discussion, we focus on the responsibilities that participants must take on for the digital public sphere to be more democratically successful.</p><p>To be sure, participant action is insufficient. We and others have offered suggestions for the contributions of regulation, corporate responsibility, and the contributions of researchers, as well as civic and advocacy organizations. The European Union's new regulations on Intermediary Services, for example, the Digital Services Act, include requirements on illegal content and impose due diligence responsibilities on very large online platforms that will need to do audited systematic risk assessments and offer plans for remediation (Husovec & Roche Laguna, <span>2022</span>). This approach has much to be said for it (though with the proliferation of generative models, it may be addressed to last year's problems). But because the digital public sphere has vastly expanded the aperture for contributions to discussion, and because we are uneasy about regulating the substance of public discussion, we are skeptical about proposals to turn public regulators or platforms (or any other agents) into editorial guardians.</p><p>Emphasizing participant responsibilities may give the appearance that we are at once blaming and burdening the victims of degraded public ","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 1","pages":"92-97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12670","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48734637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>In recent years, scholarly discourse has been dominated by concerns about the political public sphere: fake news and conspiracy theories are seen to have gained credence in “the age of social media,” strong polarization characterizes public debates even in established democracies, and, information abundance notwithstanding, more and more people appear to be disengaged from political news. In addition, print is unlikely to have a future; the prospects look equally bleak for linear TV programs. While more voices can permeate the public debate, only a handful of media enterprises are in control of the information market. Again, the field has turned to Jürgen Habermas’ groundbreaking perspective on the structural changes of the public sphere, first published more than 60 years ago. As before, it is displaying theoretical strength: better than any other approach, it seems capable of showing us the bigger picture. On top of that, Habermas again took up his seminal analysis in his latest contribution to political theory, a small book on the <i>New Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere</i> (Habermas, <span>2022</span>). In the book, Habermas emphasizes again the relevance of public discourse and deliberation for contemporary democracy and criticizes, rightly so, the distortions that capitalist structures and economic logic cause for democratic processes.</p><p>While many of the patterns Habermas described in the original version of <i>The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere</i> (<span>1992</span> [1962]) are still relevant,<sup>1</sup> it is also necessary to consider what has changed. On the one hand, this means examining aspects that have varied in Habermas’ analyses. On the other hand, it means including aspects that are missing entirely from his reflections. To these ends, my remarks first look at the role of journalists and other actors in the public sphere. Despite the persistence of economic interests in mass media organizations, Habermas’ latest work sometimes appears nostalgic for mass media journalism's democratic performance while neglecting the achievements or potentials of non-professional actors on digital media platforms. Drawing on the concept of “opinion leadership,” I argue instead that we should concentrate our evaluations of the digital public sphere not only on professional expertise and norms, but also on the merits of independence, the ethos of community dedication, and on what determines trustworthiness.</p><p>Second, my contribution focuses on the “sub-structures” of the public sphere that do not play an important role in Habermas’ reflections, but which influence democratic processes in manifold ways. Digital media not only reinforce economic concentration, lead to a fragmentation of the political sphere, and provoke a less rational style of discourse. They also draw public attention away from the local or regional level and towards high-level politic, which—at the same time—provokes widespread depoliticiz
我们必须比哈贝马斯的分析更深入地审视公共领域的内部结构，哈贝马斯的分析侧重于基础，而不是追踪和解释数字公共领域的不同碎片。这些新观点可能最容易与“复杂民主”的理论观点联系起来(Benson, 2009, p. 17)，该观点整合了审议和精英(看门人)模型以及建构主义观点的各个方面。无论如何，他们必须关注媒体系统和媒体监管，以及文化影响和社会变化。“今天，‘公共领域’几乎已经成为一个陈词滥调，也许是媒体和传播社会学中最常用的词汇之一，”罗德尼·本森(2009年，第179页)在10多年前谈到哈贝马斯作品的影响时说。像公共领域这样一个本质上广泛的概念总是有不精确的风险。然而，考虑到审议研究在数字时代的相关性，“公共领域”将继续成为当代学术话语中的关键术语。哈贝马斯的最新著作证明，坚持使用这个术语是值得的:公共领域的结构转型对民主的质量和稳定至关重要。仔细分析相关的变化——那些明显的变化和那些隐藏的变化——将有助于以民主的方式塑造公共话语、媒体系统和规范取向。通过拥抱这一雄心壮志，“公共领域”将永远是一个基本的视角——因此远远超过陈词滥调。
{"title":"The hidden structures of the digital public sphere","authors":"Claudia Ritzi","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12664","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12664","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In recent years, scholarly discourse has been dominated by concerns about the political public sphere: fake news and conspiracy theories are seen to have gained credence in “the age of social media,” strong polarization characterizes public debates even in established democracies, and, information abundance notwithstanding, more and more people appear to be disengaged from political news. In addition, print is unlikely to have a future; the prospects look equally bleak for linear TV programs. While more voices can permeate the public debate, only a handful of media enterprises are in control of the information market. Again, the field has turned to Jürgen Habermas’ groundbreaking perspective on the structural changes of the public sphere, first published more than 60 years ago. As before, it is displaying theoretical strength: better than any other approach, it seems capable of showing us the bigger picture. On top of that, Habermas again took up his seminal analysis in his latest contribution to political theory, a small book on the <i>New Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere</i> (Habermas, <span>2022</span>). In the book, Habermas emphasizes again the relevance of public discourse and deliberation for contemporary democracy and criticizes, rightly so, the distortions that capitalist structures and economic logic cause for democratic processes.</p><p>While many of the patterns Habermas described in the original version of <i>The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere</i> (<span>1992</span> [1962]) are still relevant,<sup>1</sup> it is also necessary to consider what has changed. On the one hand, this means examining aspects that have varied in Habermas’ analyses. On the other hand, it means including aspects that are missing entirely from his reflections. To these ends, my remarks first look at the role of journalists and other actors in the public sphere. Despite the persistence of economic interests in mass media organizations, Habermas’ latest work sometimes appears nostalgic for mass media journalism's democratic performance while neglecting the achievements or potentials of non-professional actors on digital media platforms. Drawing on the concept of “opinion leadership,” I argue instead that we should concentrate our evaluations of the digital public sphere not only on professional expertise and norms, but also on the merits of independence, the ethos of community dedication, and on what determines trustworthiness.</p><p>Second, my contribution focuses on the “sub-structures” of the public sphere that do not play an important role in Habermas’ reflections, but which influence democratic processes in manifold ways. Digital media not only reinforce economic concentration, lead to a fragmentation of the political sphere, and provoke a less rational style of discourse. They also draw public attention away from the local or regional level and towards high-level politic, which—at the same time—provokes widespread depoliticiz","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 1","pages":"55-60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12664","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43429028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>As someone who works interdisciplinarily between media and communication studies and sociology with an overall interest in critical social theory, Habermas’ “most successful” (Habermas, <span>2022a</span>, p. 145) book is important in at least three respects: He develops a normative, critical concept of the public sphere and the formation of public opinion, which aims at democratizing domination, that is ties it to a process of unrestricted discussion of questions of general interest involving all those affected. The development of this possibility, but also the transformation and disintegration of the public sphere, is sociologically embedded, that is, considered in the light of changing socio-spatial frames of reference, mediatization, and political-economic developments (cf. Seeliger & Sevignani, <span>2022</span>). Habermas, like few in critical social theory, is concerned with the organization and political economy of the media.<sup>1</sup> It was therefore a great honor that he not only contributed a commentary to texts edited by Martin Seeliger and me (first in German: Habermas, <span>2021</span>, then also in English: Habermas, <span>2022a</span>), but even wrote an independent text, which is now also available as a book together with smaller texts (Habermas, <span>2022b</span>).</p><p>Against this background, I was very pleased to be invited to participate in this symposium on his new book. In this contribution, I will first, according to Habermas, briefly sketch the role of the public sphere in liberal-representative political systems and its transformation during the rise of digital communication. Then, I will point to a notable tension, immanent to Habermas new reflections, between, on the one hand, the normative goal of communicative learning and development and, on the other hand, his affirmation of “editorial tutelage.” This tension, I think, presses to repose the question of ideology again that Habermas has removed from and at best locates outside the public sphere. By making the gate-keeper paradigm of mass-media communication as a yardstick to evaluate the ongoing transformations, Habermas tends to misjudge the quality of digital semi-public spheres. Not the lack of generalization, I argue finally, but a different, emancipatory, form of generalization is the core problem of public opinion formation.</p><p>In his new reflections, Habermas recapitulates—in a concise but accessible form—his approach to critical theory as reconstructive critique (1), his “sociological translation” (Habermas, <span>1996</span>, p. 315) of the political public sphere (2), and the effects brought about on this same public sphere by social media (3). This final point probably accounts for the great attention that the text has already received.</p><p>First, Habermas reconstructs, starting from the late 18th century, the rational but incompletely realized content of a modern subjectivity that sees itself as free, equal, and wanting to shape its fut
{"title":"“Ideology and simultaneously more than mere ideology”: On Habermas’ reflections and hypotheses on a further structural transformation of the political public sphere","authors":"Sebastian Sevignani","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12666","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12666","url":null,"abstract":"<p>As someone who works interdisciplinarily between media and communication studies and sociology with an overall interest in critical social theory, Habermas’ “most successful” (Habermas, <span>2022a</span>, p. 145) book is important in at least three respects: He develops a normative, critical concept of the public sphere and the formation of public opinion, which aims at democratizing domination, that is ties it to a process of unrestricted discussion of questions of general interest involving all those affected. The development of this possibility, but also the transformation and disintegration of the public sphere, is sociologically embedded, that is, considered in the light of changing socio-spatial frames of reference, mediatization, and political-economic developments (cf. Seeliger & Sevignani, <span>2022</span>). Habermas, like few in critical social theory, is concerned with the organization and political economy of the media.<sup>1</sup> It was therefore a great honor that he not only contributed a commentary to texts edited by Martin Seeliger and me (first in German: Habermas, <span>2021</span>, then also in English: Habermas, <span>2022a</span>), but even wrote an independent text, which is now also available as a book together with smaller texts (Habermas, <span>2022b</span>).</p><p>Against this background, I was very pleased to be invited to participate in this symposium on his new book. In this contribution, I will first, according to Habermas, briefly sketch the role of the public sphere in liberal-representative political systems and its transformation during the rise of digital communication. Then, I will point to a notable tension, immanent to Habermas new reflections, between, on the one hand, the normative goal of communicative learning and development and, on the other hand, his affirmation of “editorial tutelage.” This tension, I think, presses to repose the question of ideology again that Habermas has removed from and at best locates outside the public sphere. By making the gate-keeper paradigm of mass-media communication as a yardstick to evaluate the ongoing transformations, Habermas tends to misjudge the quality of digital semi-public spheres. Not the lack of generalization, I argue finally, but a different, emancipatory, form of generalization is the core problem of public opinion formation.</p><p>In his new reflections, Habermas recapitulates—in a concise but accessible form—his approach to critical theory as reconstructive critique (1), his “sociological translation” (Habermas, <span>1996</span>, p. 315) of the political public sphere (2), and the effects brought about on this same public sphere by social media (3). This final point probably accounts for the great attention that the text has already received.</p><p>First, Habermas reconstructs, starting from the late 18th century, the rational but incompletely realized content of a modern subjectivity that sees itself as free, equal, and wanting to shape its fut","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"30 1","pages":"84-91"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12666","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44441424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>In September 2022, 60 years after he first released the German edition of <i>The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society</i> (STPS) in 1962, Habermas published <i>A New Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Deliberative Politics</i> (<i>Ein neuer Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit und die deliberative Politik</i>). This “new engagement with an old theme” (Habermas, <span>2022c</span>, p. 7) has been a long time coming. Not only is STPS—as Habermas wrote in the dedication when he signed my English edition in 2008—“my first and still best-selling book (a kind of self-criticism),” in this new volume he also notes that it has “remained my most successful to date” (Habermas, <span>2022a</span>, p. 145). This contribution is significant both given the broad reach of the concept of the public sphere (<i>Öffentlichkeit</i>) and due to the growing interest in how the rise of the internet and digital media has affected public deliberation and the public realm more generally.</p><p>Scholars of Habermas are used to reading long books. This expectation was confirmed in 2019 with the publication of <i>Also a History of Philosophy</i> (<i>Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie</i>), which ran a total of 1752 pages across two volumes. By contrast, this bright orange book—which comes in at a slim 109 pages—refutes that same tendency. Additionally, aside from the short Foreword, all three chapters have been published in English elsewhere with only slight modifications.<sup>1</sup> In part, as Habermas points out, this brevity is due to the fact that he has “long been dealing with other issues” (Habermas, <span>2022c</span>, p. 7) and thus is not up to date on the literature. Additionally, given that he already apologized to his readers for not writing a third (!) volume of his aforementioned study of the relationship between faith and knowledge as “my strength is simply no longer sufficient for that (<i>dafür reichen meine Kräfte nicht mehr aus</i>)” (Habermas, <span>2019</span>, p. I.10), his advanced age is also a likely a factor, despite his continued and active participation in both scholarly debate and in the German public sphere.</p><p>Habermas’ original study of the public sphere worked at three distinct, but interrelated levels. First, it told a story of the historical rise of the public sphere in 17th- and 18th-century Europe, focusing specifically on French <i>salons</i>, English coffeehouses and German <i>Tischgesellschaften</i> (table societies). Second, it presented a sociological model of the public sphere as a space for critical-rational discussion about matters of public interest to all citizens that opened between the “private realm” of self-interested <i>bourgeois</i> individuals and the “sphere of public authority” defined by the state and the court (the society of nobles). Finally, Habermas developed a normative political theory that sought to achieve “a systematic comprehensi
2022年9月，哈贝马斯在1962年首次出版德版《公共领域的结构转型:对资产阶级社会一个范畴的探究》(STPS) 60年后，又出版了《公共领域和协商政治的新结构转型》(Ein neuer Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit und die Deliberative Politik)。这种“与旧主题的新接触”(Habermas, 2022c，第7页)已经出现了很长时间。正如哈贝马斯在2008年为我的英文版签名时所写的那样，《stps》不仅是“我的第一本也是迄今为止最畅销的书(一种自我批评)”，而且在这本新书中，他还指出，它“仍然是我迄今为止最成功的”(哈贝马斯，2022a，第145页)。鉴于公共领域概念的广泛影响(Öffentlichkeit)，以及互联网和数字媒体的兴起如何更广泛地影响公共审议和公共领域，这一贡献意义重大。研究哈贝马斯的学者习惯于阅读长篇书籍。这一预期在2019年出版的《也是一部哲学史》(Also a History of Philosophy)中得到了证实，这本书共有两卷，共1752页。相比之下，这本亮橙色的书——只有薄薄的109页——驳斥了同样的倾向。此外，除了简短的前言外，所有三章都已在其他地方以英文出版，只作了轻微的修改在某种程度上，正如哈贝马斯指出的那样，这种简洁是由于他“长期以来一直在处理其他问题”(哈贝马斯，2022c，第7页)，因此不是最新的文献。此外，鉴于他已经向读者道歉，因为他没有写他前面提到的关于信仰与知识之间关系的研究的第三卷(!)，因为“我的力量根本不再足以(daf<e:1> r reichen meine Kräfte nicht mehr aus)”(哈贝马斯，2019年，第I.10页)，他的高龄也可能是一个因素，尽管他继续积极参与学术辩论和德国公共领域。哈贝马斯对公共领域的原始研究在三个不同但又相互关联的层面上进行。首先，它讲述了17世纪和18世纪欧洲公共领域的历史崛起，特别关注法国的沙龙、英国的咖啡馆和德国的餐桌协会。其次，它提出了一个公共领域的社会学模型，作为一个批判理性的空间，讨论所有公民的公共利益问题，它在自利的资产阶级个人的“私人领域”和由国家和法院(贵族社会)定义的“公共权威领域”之间开放。最后，哈贝马斯发展了一种规范的政治理论，试图实现“从其中心范畴之一的角度对我们自己的社会的系统理解”(哈贝马斯，1989，第5页)。在这本简短的书中，哈贝马斯关注的是最后一点，即“公共领域在确保民主政治共同体可持续性方面的功能”(哈贝马斯，2022a，第146页)。尽管他拒绝区分实证研究和规范研究——以及理想理论和非理想理论之间的相关分歧——认为这是“过度简化”，但哈贝马斯的关注点主要在于政治理论领域，而不是历史或社会学领域。然而，这并不意味着这两个方面完全消失了，只是它们消失在他试图解释一种民主理论的背景中，这种理论的基础是“重建规范和实践的理性内容，这些规范和实践自18世纪末的宪政革命以来获得了积极的有效性，并因此成为历史现实的一部分”(哈贝马斯，2022a，第147页)。我的评论主要集中在这本小书的两个方面。我首先概述了哈贝马斯在这本新书中试图纠正的对STPS的误解。然后，我考察了他的观点，即互联网的兴起导致了“公共领域的新结构转型”。为了做到这一点，我特别关注他对数字化引起的革命与印刷机的比较。他认为，第一个历史转折点使每个人都成为潜在的读者，而第二个转折点使每个人都成为潜在的作者。我的基本论点是，虽然哈贝马斯关于数字化导致了一种新的结构转型的观点是正确的，但正如他所主张的那样，今天协商政治的问题并不在于从读者到作者的转变，而是在于公共领域日益个性化，这阻碍了公民创造政治所必需的共同世界。尽管STPS影响广泛，但在这三个层面上都存在争议。 从历史上讲，哈贝马斯关于18世纪欧洲资产阶级公共领域的兴起及其对政治的影响的论点引发了一场热烈的学术辩论。无论他所研究的沙龙、咖啡馆和餐桌社会是否真正体现了哈贝马斯所认为的人类和公共辩论的新理想。同样，他的社会学模型也受到了学者们的攻击，他们指出，公共领域作为经济私利和国家之间的私人领域，在性别和阶级方面的影响相对有限。最值得注意的是，南希·弗雷泽(1992，第116页)拒绝了这种模式，认为它是“一种男性主义的意识形态概念，其功能是使一种新兴的阶级统治形式合法化。”最后，他声称公共领域是一个理性辩论的空间，既可以提供对国家的公众监督，又可以通过正式机构形成政策，这经常受到嘲笑。例如，Klein (1996, p. 37,38)指出，哈贝马斯认定的空间是资产阶级公共领域的熔炉，而不是“通过对话寻求真理”，而是“助长了错误信息和误解的无政府状态”。这本新书中的所有三篇文章都试图纠正哈贝马斯认为的对STPS的根本误解。首先，他提出了一种普遍的批评，即这种理想是虚构的。哈贝马斯欣然承认，一个所有受影响的人都能公开、自由地讨论共同关心的问题，并就该做什么做出理性决定的公共领域，实际上从未存在过，因此，用韦伯的语言来说，这是一种理想类型。然而，这不是重点。对他的目的来说，重要的不是这些理想是否在实践中得到充分实现，而是“规范的公共领域”的理想是否使公民相信，他们政府的合法性取决于他们监督领导人和通过参与公共辩论来制定政策的能力。哈贝马斯认为，这种理想的深刻渗透可见于“像‘资产阶级公共领域’这样的历史事实与自由民主同时出现，首先在英国，然后在美国、法国和其他欧洲国家”(哈贝马斯，2022a，第150页)。其次，哈贝马斯反驳了他的话语概念导致“民主过程的理想主义概念，就像一个欢乐的大学研讨会(einer friedlichen Seminarveranstaltung)”的说法(哈贝马斯，2022a，第151页)。这种误读是基于哈贝马斯的说法，即政治话语是基于“达成协议的目标(Einverständnis)”(哈贝马斯，2018，第837页)。然而，在哈贝马斯的术语中，这一观点并不是指公共领域辩论的结果，甚至也不是指个人的政策决定。相反，它指的是在政治机构内遵守多数人统治的集体协议，其中的决定总是“在决定的压力下暂时结束的讨论中，试图确定什么是正确的，结果是错误的”(哈贝马斯，1996，第475页)。从这个意义上说，公民被一种预先存在的承诺联系在一起，“接受彼此的观点，并使自己适应可概括的利益或共同的价值观”(哈贝马斯，2018，第875页)，即使他们是少数。最后——也是相关的——哈贝马斯指出，“参与者对共识的必要取向自然并不意味着参与者可能会不切实际地期望他们实际上会在政治问题上达成共识”(哈贝马斯，2018，第875页)。相反，哈贝马斯认为，“理性的参与者对他们所争论的信念的真理或正确性的取向，甚至给政治争端的火上浇油”，允许“相互冲突的观点在话语中展开的认知潜力。”这一举动意在削弱他的敌对对手的修辞力量。在媒体和公民社会等非正式政治公共领域内进行讨论的全部意义在于，“它使我们能够通过政治争端改善我们的信念，并更接近问题的正确解决方案。”因此，审议“在公共领域是通过贡献的话语质量来衡量的，而不是通过达成共识的目标来衡量的”(哈贝马斯，2022a，第152页)。哈贝马斯
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