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Manifesting the revolutionary people: The Yellow Vest Movement and popular sovereignty 体现革命的人民：黄背心运动与人民主权

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2024-01-29 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12736

Samuel Hayat

The 2010s ended as they had begun: with mass popular uprisings (Brannen et al., 2020). And as had happened during the Arab Spring and the subsequent democratic movements of the early part of the decade, these protests took place outside of existing organizations such as parties, unions, or associations. In France, Chile, Lebanon, Iraq, Ecuador, Hong Kong, or Algeria, it was as if the people were spontaneously rebelling against rising prices or the encroachment of freedom by their government, which they condemned as belonging to an oligarchy. The French Yellow Vest Movement, which began in November 2018 in opposition to a rise in fuel taxes, seems to have been the inaugural uprising of this wave of protests, and it received massive media coverage in France (Moualek, 2022; Siroux, 2020), as well as early and pronounced scholarly interest (Bendali & Rubert, 2020; Bourmeau, 2019; Confavreux, 2019; Jeanpierre, 2019; Le Bart, 2020; Ravelli, 2020). Yet there was then, and still is, no consensus on the political nature of the movement. Was it a movement of selfish motorists fighting to retain their right to pollute at low cost, or was it about social and environmental justice (Dormagen et al., 2021; Mehleb et al., 2021)? Was it the return of the working class to the center of the political stage or a movement that transcended class distinctions (Bantigny & Hayat, 2019; Gerbaudo, 2023)? Was it an apolitical movement with a series of demands derived from “anger” or “relative deprivation” (Lüders et al., 2021; Morales et al., 2020), or was it secretly controlled by leaders who had a political agenda?1 Was it a populist or popular movement (Bergem, 2022; Guerra et al., 2019; Legris, 2022), right or left (Bendali et al., 2019; Cointet et al., 2021; Collectif d'enquête sur les Gilets jaunes, 2019)? Was it just another episode in the long history of protest in France, or was it an unprecedented movement aiming at nothing less than a brand new social contract (Devellennes, 2021)?How can we make sense of this apparent impossibility of grasping what the Yellow Vest Movement really wanted? It seems that the Yellow Vests were not really heard, not because they did not speak—they were avidly invited onto TV shows, interviewed in newspapers, and many of them had tirelessly documented their own activity on social networks, especially Facebook (Baisnée et al., 2022; Souillard et al., 2020)—but because they did not speak appropriately political language, i.e., language that would have been transparent and easy to categorize for professional political commentators such as journalists and academics. Indeed, when they spoke, some of

2010年代的结束与开始一样：大规模的民众起义（Brannen et al., 2020）。正如阿拉伯之春和本世纪初随后的民主运动所发生的那样，这些抗议活动发生在政党、工会或协会等现有组织之外。在法国、智利、黎巴嫩、伊拉克、厄瓜多尔、香港或阿尔及利亚，人们似乎自发地反抗物价上涨或政府侵犯自由，他们谴责政府属于寡头政治。法国黄背心运动始于2018年11月，旨在反对提高燃油税，似乎是这波抗议浪潮的首次起义，并在法国获得了大量媒体报道(Moualek, 2022；Siroux, 2020)，以及早期和明显的学术兴趣(Bendali &amp；Rubert, 2020;Bourmeau, 2019;Confavreux, 2019;Jeanpierre, 2019;勒巴特，2020；Ravelli, 2020)。然而，对于这场运动的政治性质，无论是当时还是现在，都没有达成共识。这是一场自私的驾驶者争取以低成本保留污染权利的运动，还是关于社会和环境正义的运动(Dormagen et al., 2021；Mehleb et al., 2021)？是工人阶级重新回到政治舞台的中心，还是一场超越阶级差别的运动(班蒂尼&安培；是,2019;Gerbaudo 2023) ?它是一场非政治性的运动，其一系列要求源于“愤怒”或“相对剥夺”(l<s:1> ders等人，2021；莫拉莱斯等人，2020)，还是由有政治议程的领导人秘密控制？它是民粹主义还是大众运动(Bergem, 2022；Guerra等人，2019；Legris, 2022)，右或左(Bendali et al., 2019；Cointet et al., 2021；收藏'enquête sur les Gilets jaunes, 2019)？这是法国漫长的抗议历史中的又一个插曲，还是一场史无前例的运动，旨在建立一种全新的社会契约（Devellennes, 2021）？我们如何理解这种明显不可能理解黄背心运动真正想要的是什么？似乎黄背心并没有真正被听到，并不是因为他们没有说话——他们被热切地邀请上电视节目，接受报纸采访，他们中的许多人不知倦地记录了他们在社交网络上的活动，尤其是Facebook (baisnsamae et al., 2022；Souillard et al., 2020)——但因为他们没有使用适当的政治语言，即对于记者和学者等专业政治评论员来说，透明且易于分类的语言。事实上，当他们说话时，在现代政治中被称为真正的政治语言的一些基本要素是缺失的。首先，在现代政治中，政治语言是政治代表专业人士的语言(Bourdieu, 1991b；Gaxie, 1978)，而在黄背心运动中，一切都是为了没有代表，没有代表(Hayat, 2022；Lefebvre, 2019)。第二，现代政治语言的两极化和意识形态化。但“黄背心”运动的语言缺乏政治标记：没有宣言，很少有口号和口号，没有集中的决策程序——尽管一些由长期活跃分子组成的团体提出了一些倡议（Ravelli et al., 2020）——运动拒绝左右分歧或任何形式的党派关系（Bedock et al., 2020）。这种代表性和党派关系的双重缺失并不是缺乏（例如，由于无能），而是一种积极主动的“制度性政治回避”（Reungoat et al., 2022）。在本文中，我将表明，他们拒绝在政治上定位自己与对人民主权的特殊理解有关。事实上，伴随着多场表演，黄背心将自己表现为主权人民，向他们的代表，特别是总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙（Emmanuel Macron）发表讲话，他们指责马克龙背叛了他们的使命。出于这个原因，政治理论的工具，特别是对人民主权概念的分析，它的不同含义，它们的历史和政治含义，可以帮助我们理解这场运动，而不是表面上对其形式的混淆。将“黄背心”抗议视为一种声称行使人民主权的某种方式，有助于理解这场看似多面性的运动，或许还可以延伸到2010年代的其他民众抗议活动。反过来，描述他们如何思考和执行人民主权丰富了我们对这一概念的理论理解，为对话带来了新的参与者。这种政治理论与社会现实之间的反复是基于问题的政治理论的一部分，其中政治理论的有效性是通过其解决经验问题的实用能力来检验的(Mansbridge, 2023；沃伦,2017)。这一因素导致一些“黄背心”采取了非法行动，例如占领公共空间，封锁高速公路和收费站，在未经授权的每周示威活动中进行各种形式的破坏，烧毁各县，威胁议会成员——大多数社会运动早已不再采取这些行动（Tartakowsky, 1989）。另一方面，当被问及他们的要求时，从他们的提议中浮现出的画面作为人民的意志并不是革命性的，至少在20世纪激进社会运动的要求方面，特别是他们对民主的理解(Hardt &amp；Negri, 2005;Laclau,Mouffe, 2001;帕特曼，1970;)。“黄背心”主张的是一种可以被称为功能代议制民主的制度，代表的特权比今天要少，并建立机制，允许公民对以他们的名义所做的事情做出判断，有时还可以通过公投直接表达他们的意愿。这场运动的手段和目的之间的明显不匹配，可能源于政治新手占主导地位，他们不熟悉适当的抗议形式。但这种有点家长式的论点只是转移了一个问题：为什么新来者会在这种情况下进入政界，并声称自己是主权人民？也许这与当前代议制民主的转型有关，尤其是公民让政客听到自己声音的能力正在下降。在代议制民主中，最重要的是在两次选举之间让公民表达对他们的代表的判断。这对于代表制的正常运作是必要的，因为任何代议制都需要制度化的回应形式（Pitkin, 1972），但也有具体的民主原因。正如Nadia Urbani所说，民主代表制要求“主权人民保留一种消极的权力，允许他们调查、判断、影响和谴责他们的立法者”（Urbinati, 2006，第28页）。然而，在大多数代议制政府中，包括法兰西共和国，政党是组织这种公民控制的唯一制度化手段（Manin, 1997）。但是，当人们不再相信这些政党能够做到这一点时，公民就必须诉诸于对他们的代表进行直接质询的形式，而不是作为党员，而是作为全体选民。因此，对法国大革命传统的呼吁有了另一种含义。作为选民的行动不仅是一种被视为合法的手段，而且还恢复了久违的人民控制的革命机制。事实上，无套裤汉可以被视为主权人民的象征，他们作为人民主权的承担者，并利用这一地位对他们的代表进行控制。从历史上看，无套裤汉通常不会要求在所有问题上直接行使主权（Guermazi, 2017）。他们认为他们的主要政治角色是“对权力中心施加压力”（Lucas, 1988，第448页），这意味着试图主要通过请愿来影响公约，并且对于他们更激进的成员来说，“发展一种政治制度，在这种制度下，人民可以对政治统治进行“检查”（von Eggers, 2016，第255页）。”他们的角色——这在很大程度上是雅各宾派（Jacobins）对他们的看法，甚至是对他们的构建（Burstin, 2005）——不是取代议会，而是监督它，确保代表们捍卫普遍利益，而不是他们自己或富人的利益，有时还会就通过的法律征求意见。这种对主权的理解在很大程度

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Maeve Cooke

More than 90 years later, it is fascinating and encouraging to read Horkheimer's inaugural address as the second director of the Institute for Social Research. Social philosophy, as depicted in his lecture, had not yet found its specific articulation as critical theory. However, in setting out the Institute's tasks as a center for social philosophy, the key components of his emerging idea of critical theory are already visible. These will be elaborated in his programmatic essay on traditional and critical theory, which appeared in 1937 (Horkheimer, 1973). The fundamental elements of the early Horkheimer's view of social philosophy/critical theory seem to me as pertinent as ever. This is how I understand them:First, social philosophy's aim is to interpret philosophically “the fate of humans” (Horkheimer, 1988, p. 20).1 It must do so within a framework in which the individual and social whole exist in a dynamic relationship of mutual self-constitution (p. 20), which is in turn part of a dynamic interplay between fact and value or, as he writes, “mind” and “reality” (p. 32). We can infer from this that “the fate of humans” has a material basis and is socially produced. This calls for attentiveness to the actual facts of existing social reality. However, social philosophy must not lose sight of “the great principal questions”—questions about the relationship of the individual to society, the meaning of culture, the formation of communities, and the development of history as a whole (p. 28). In the same vein, though it must start from the concrete pressing philosophical questions of the times, it must endeavor always to keep the universal in view (p. 29).Second, social philosophy's interpretative efforts must be based on collective inquiry in multiple areas that has an empirical component. Accordingly, it must organize investigations in which philosophers, sociologists, economists, historians, and psychologists work together with the aid of the most precise scientific methods, revising the concrete philosophical questions driving its interpretative efforts and rendering them more exact; it must also develop new methods in the course of such work. Social philosophical questions thereby become part of a dialectical movement, in which they are drawn into the empirical scientific process, which affects their character (p. 30); presumably they in turn impact the empirical process of inquiry. While Horkheimer does not say so explicitly in his lecture, his 1937 essay criticizes theories that hypostatize the facts, treating them as extrinsic to the human mind. He contrasts such hypostatization with critical theory's view that facts are “products which in principle should be under human control” (Horkheimer, 1973, p. 209). In this way, “objective realities” lose the character of “pure factuality” (p. 209). In other words, critical theory recognizes the importance of a fact-driven, empirically b

90多年后的今天，读到霍克海默作为社会研究所第二任所长的就职演说，既令人着迷又令人鼓舞。正如他在演讲中所描述的那样，社会哲学还没有找到作为批判理论的具体表述。然而，在确定研究所作为社会哲学中心的任务时，他新兴的批判理论思想的关键组成部分已经可见。这些将在他1937年发表的关于传统和批判理论的纲领性论文中加以阐述（霍克海默，1973）。在我看来，霍克海默早期社会哲学/批判理论观点的基本要素一如既往地相关。我是这样理解它们的：首先，社会哲学的目的是哲学地解释“人类的命运”（霍克海默，1988，第20页）它必须在一个框架内这样做，在这个框架中，个人和社会整体存在于相互自我构成的动态关系中（第20页），这反过来又是事实与价值之间动态相互作用的一部分，或者正如他所写的那样，“思想”与“现实”（第32页）。由此我们可以推断，“人类的命运”是有物质基础的，是社会生产出来的。这就要求注意现有社会现实的实际情况。然而，社会哲学不能忽视“重大的主要问题”——关于个人与社会的关系、文化的意义、社区的形成以及作为一个整体的历史发展的问题。同样地，虽然它必须从具体而紧迫的时代哲学问题出发，但它必须始终努力保持对普遍的看法。其次，社会哲学的解释性努力必须建立在具有经验成分的多个领域的集体探究的基础上。因此，它必须组织调查，让哲学家、社会学家、经济学家、历史学家和心理学家在最精确的科学方法的帮助下共同努力，修正推动其解释努力的具体哲学问题，使其更加准确；它还必须在这项工作中发展新的方法。社会哲学问题因此成为辩证运动的一部分，在辩证运动中，社会哲学问题被卷入了影响其性质的经验科学过程；据推测，它们反过来又影响了调查的实证过程。虽然霍克海默在他的演讲中没有明确地说，但他在1937年的文章中批评了那些将事实物化的理论，将它们视为人类思维的外在因素。他将这种实体化与批判理论的观点进行了对比，批判理论认为事实是“原则上应该在人类控制之下的产品”（霍克海默，1973年，第209页）。这样，“客观现实”就失去了“纯粹事实”的性质（第209页）。换句话说，批判理论认识到事实驱动的、基于经验的探究的重要性，前提是它是在与意义和价值问题进行批判性接触的背景下进行的，并受到具体实践关注的推动，以实现更好的社会变革。因此，很明显，对于霍克海默来说，社会哲学形式的思维影响着现实正如经验科学所研究的那样，正如现实影响着思维一样。换句话说，在批判理论和科学发现之间存在一个反馈循环。第三，社会哲学关注的是认识人类存在意义的真正价值和内容。霍克海默将这种社会哲学观点归因于黑格尔，并将其描述为有问题的（第21页）。但是，从各方面看来，他只是把自己同黑格尔的唯心主义观点划清界限，黑格尔的唯心主义观点认为，这种认识仅仅是一种哲学洞察力的问题，它可以一劳永逸地确立起来，从而结束辩证过程。没有迹象表明他反对黑格尔的承诺，即决定人类存在的价值和内容，因为它是在历史现实中形成的，有些迹象表明他赞同这一点。事实上，如果我们撇开他对黑格尔唯心主义和辩证法的终结的反对，他对黑格尔的引用与他对社会哲学在价值灌输的社会背景下解释人类命运的关注的开场白非常吻合。他对黑格尔的引用也可以说是对他1937年论文的预测，他在论文中告诉我们，批判理论“构建了一个整体社会的发展图景，一个具有历史维度的存在主义判断”(霍克海默，1973年，第239页；参见Cooke， 2023)。在霍克海默的就职演说中，这三个要素中的第二个是突出的。他批评抽象的理论化，无论是斯宾诺莎的，黑格尔的，还是马克思的，因为他们把思想和现实分开了（第32页），并强调社会理论需要与它的材料保持不断的联系：它必须通过“对对象的研究”来发展它的哲学问题（第32页）。 28)，根据手头的事情而不是自己的意愿。这就要求它发展最多样化的调查方法（第33页）。如果不这样做，它就有可能忽视第一个核心元素；此外，它也可能陷入教条主义的僵化，提出从根本上不受外部控制的论点（第32-33页）。在他1937年的文章中，霍克海默扩展了这一点，观察到社会哲学（现在被称为批判理论）只有建立在对社会转型的关注基础上，才能避免教条的僵化，这种转型是从普遍存在的社会不公正中不断产生的。重要的是，对社会转型的具体关注必须体现在理论上知情的政治行动（实践）中虽然在这篇文章中，霍克海默似乎首先想到了批判理论的启蒙力量，但在他1931年的演讲中，他强调的是传统理论提供的科学证据，特别是在多学科中基于经验的科学探究。然而，没有迹象表明他认为这两者之间有任何冲突。在1937年的文章中，霍克海默比1931年的演讲更清楚地将注意力集中在思想（在批判理论的意义上）和现实（在以经验为基础的科学研究和实践的双重意义上）之间相互作用的相互学习上。一方面，批判理论由于其对社会转型的具体关注，必须随时准备修改其价值，并相应地修改其实质内容，以回应普遍存在的不公正；在这里，理论必须借鉴有关社会现实的科学发现。另一方面，批判理论的价值和实质内容必须塑造和指导其经验丰富的实践努力，通过具体的变革建议来克服普遍存在的不公正；实践不能仅仅依赖科学证据，还必须从批判理论的价值驱动的见解中学习。总而言之，在20世纪30年代，霍克海默的批判理论思想，以及促进这种理论化的研究机构的任务，表现出对社会转型的具体关注，以回应当时紧迫的哲学问题。在关注社会现实的过程中，它既没有忽视意义和价值等更普遍的问题，也没有忽视解释（以物质为基础的、社会产生的）人类命运的任务，同时又保持了精神与现实之间的动态关系。我将留下一个开放的问题，即批判理论是否在法兰克福学派传统中发展，成功地实现了早期霍克海默的计划。我接下来的问题是，这对当代批判理论意味着什么。为了使我的讨论集中起来，我考虑了全球范围内人为生态破坏所带来的一些挑战在当今批判理论面临的许多具体而紧迫的哲学问题中，人类生命在全球人为生态破坏背景下的意义和价值无疑是其中之一。在解决这个问题时，霍克海默对事实与价值、思想与现实之间动态关系的呼吁是非常相关的。现实一面的重要性是显而易见的。显而易见的是，生态破坏的规模，以及它已经发生和继续发生的速度，意味着任何从哲学上解释其含义的尝试都必须与多种经验调查相结合。它必须包含“对目标的工作”，最好是在霍克海默提到的领域进行的合作工作：社会学、经济学、历史学和心理学。我们还可以在这个列表中加上人文科学的所有其他学科，例如，人种学、科学技术研究、考古学和地理学，以及自然科学的整个研究领域。此外，迫切需要制止生态破坏，并在可能的情况下补救其最坏的影响，这就要求以实践为指导的社会变革，旨在带来更好的变化。但这种关系的精神层面同样重要。其中一个原因是当代的“后真理”文化，它破坏了经验科学提出的真理主张，对任何哲学或社会理论的有效性主张产生了连锁反应。这导致了广泛的迷失感。当涉及到社会变革行动的可能性时，迷失方向很容易导致冷漠。批判理论的定位和指导任务在这种情况下显得尤为重要。虽然霍克海默没有在他的社会哲学论述中明确地包括这些任务，但它们隐含在他赋予社会哲学的解释目标中：从“人类存在的真正价值和内容”的角度来解释（以物质为基础的、社会生产的）“人类的命运”。然而，这里的一个危险是，社会哲学对定向和引导的关注可能是专制的。显然，这

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引用次数: 0

The rational critique of social unreason. On critical theory in the Frankfurt tradition 对社会不合理现象的理性批判。论法兰克福传统中的批判理论

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2023-12-19 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12724

Rainer Forst

By “critical theory” in a general sense, we mean a unity of philosophical reflection and social scientific analysis informed by an interest in emancipation; all critical theories methodologically and normatively aim at uncovering forms of social domination and inquire into the possibilities of overcoming them. Critical theory in the tradition of what has been called the “Frankfurt School,” however, means something more specific: It develops a historically situated and normatively reflexive, systematic rational critique of existing forms of social unreason that are ideologically presented as forms of (individual and social) rationality — “the unreason of the dominant reason” (Adorno, 2005/1962, p. 151). It explains why that is the case (that is, it unveils the rationale for such unreason) and it also conceives of a (more) rational form of a social and political order.1 Specifically, it asks why the existing power relations within (and beyond) a society prevent the emergence of such an order. This is consistent with Horkheimer's (2002/1937, p. 199; tr. amended) original understanding of critical theory as “a theory guided at every turn by a concern for reasonable conditions of life.”As the history of this demanding theoretical program demonstrates, it poses a multitude of difficult questions: How should the “interest in emancipation” be defined so that it is truly emancipation that is being sought and not just another desire to dominate? What kind of social theory (one that includes concepts of power and ideology) is available for the negative work of critique as well as for positively identifying potentials for progress? Most importantly: Which conception of reason should be used when what is at issue is both an existing “irrational” (though functionally rational) social and political order as well as the prospect for one that has a more “rational” form?It is a characteristic of Frankfurt-type critical theory that, despite its numerous transformations, including the radical critique of reductive, one-sided instrumental rationality in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, it retains Horkheimer's original idea that the notion of reason developed in Kantian and Hegelian idealism had to be systematically connected to a structural-empirical (including psychological) analysis of social forces in order to identify the “rationality” of existing unreason. Social philosophy, Horkheimer (1993b/1931, p. 6) says in his programmatic speech from 1931, when he started the interdisciplinary program at the Institute for Social Research, searches to understand individual and social reality in a non-positivistic way, by seeking to include in its analysis “a higher, autonomous realm of being, or at least a realm of value or normativity in which transitory human beings have a share, but which is itself not reducible to mundane events.” For critical theory this is esse

在我看来，规范性反思和社会科学分析的系统统一是批判理论的特征，它需要在“事实”和“规范”之间，即在社会现实和规范性原则之间进行中介——这些术语既传达了“理性的非理性”的现实，又揭示了社会理性的潜力，同时展示了其基本原则。根据这种理论统一性的观念，用于批判的破坏性和建设性方面的概念都有一个共同的来源；对统治和非统治的分析，对非理性和理性的分析，必须在一个总体框架内进行。在我自己重新思考批判理论的尝试中，证明的概念起到了这个作用我在规范上将理性秩序的问题解释为正当秩序的问题，在下一步中，我反身性地将正当化的概念转化为理论和实践的概念，并寻求分析和找到改造现有秩序和正当化关系的方法，使服从它们的人成为它们（平等的）规范权威。这种方法允许对规范秩序进行双重分析：首先，它将使这些秩序合法化并构成这些秩序的理由视为社会事实，以对它们的出现、稳定性和功能进行批判性检查。，他们的“合理性”；其次，它对这些理由采取批判的立场，通过审查它们的理性正当性（给定某些正当性标准）。因此，“证明”和相应的“秩序”，一方面是描述性和批判性分析的对象，另一方面是规范性批判的对象。当我们以这种双重方式谈论“辩护”时，我们不仅考虑到“好的辩护”，而且考虑到那些作为权力形式在社会上有效的辩护，即使（也许是因为）它们具有意识形态特征。在这里，意识形态的定义是消极的，而且相当简单：它为不能被证明的东西辩护，从而使怀疑和批判沉默。用阿多诺的话来说：“意识形态就是辩护”(阿多诺1979/1954，第465页；tr水)。这种方法需要对关键概念的传统哲学定义进行去物化，这些定义压制了它们的实践性、政治性和解放性。这就是批判理论和“传统”理论的不同之处。首先，它需要重新解释追溯到康德的理性理论，因为，正确地理解，他的理性概念仍然是最激进的理性概念，将批判理性的声音与所有人的话语、自主的声音等同起来，这些声音被合理的辩护和相互尊重的原则所约束诚然，这种声音在现实中从来没有纯粹地听到过，但它在争取解放的斗争和成就中表现出来。解放意味着尽可能“成为你自己”：成为与他人平等的规范权威。理性，从这个意义上说，是一种发现并受适当的理由或理由指导的能力。因此，理性批判理论通过在公共领域、一般的政治话语、社会结构以及科学和日常交流中识别“非理性”的各种方法，分析了缺乏社会推理的社会原因（Forst, 2023）这允许区分强大的社会“理性”和揭示这些（可能非理性的）理性的理性形式；理性的两个概念都是话语性质的，但第一个是社会学的，第二个是规范性的。两者对于意识形态批判的实践都是必不可少的，意识形态批判识别那些将“民主”等概念转变为剥夺社会群体基本权利的专制手段的理性曲解，将自私的专断和对他人的经济剥削称为“自由”，或将对某些最恶劣形式的结构性不公正的补偿称为“正义”，同时保持这些结构完好无损。正如哈贝马斯教导我们的那样，一个理论不能声称是“批判的”，除非它寻求对其理性概念的明确保证因为无论批判理论如何反对现代性中的“理性病理学”，正如阿克塞尔·霍尼特（Axel Honneth, 2009，第28页）所强调的那样，它总是将“普遍性——同时，它应该由社会合作体现并通过社会合作实现——置于理性辩护的标准之下。”批判的能力只有一种，那就是理性（参见阿多诺，2005/1962，第158页）。根据规范秩序的两面性，正当性的问题总是出现在具体的情境中，同样也出现在情境之外。人们可以尝试在既定规范和制度的传统背景下为规范性问题提供最好的答案。社会权力的主要“席位”并不在某些物质手段或制度中，而是在为意义和霸权而斗争的正当性的本体空间中（Forst, 2017a，第7章）。2和3)。权力的概念既不带正电荷，也不带负电荷；只有它的行使模式，从“授权”到统治和压迫，无论是人际关系还是结构，必须加以区分和评估。结构性社会权力只能通过重构塑造并部分构成规范秩序（及其主体）的正当性叙事来解释。在这里，福柯式意义上的家谱创造了一个重要的规范距离从这个角度来看，如上所述，人们也可以发展一种对意识形态的理解，这种意识形态不以有问题的“真正利益”构建为基础，而是以一种被意识形态错误地描绘为不存在或已经满足的正当权利为基础。这种批判观点的要点是，对权力的解放和意识形态的使用都应该作为在辩护空间中的行动来分析。这就是社会理论和规范理论系统统一的原则所要求的。另一个必须去具体化的基本概念是民主。民主并不指定一种固定的制度模式。相反，它必须被理解为一个公共批评和辩护的过程，既存在于制度内部，也存在于制度外部，在这个过程中，那些受统治的人逐渐成为政治秩序的共同作者。在这个概念上，民主是正义的政治形式。从这里开始，需要重新政治化的进一步概念也变得容易理解。例如，人权不是满足有需要的人请求帮助的一种手段，而是参与设计一个人所服从的社会和政治秩序的所有方面的权利。其核心是基本人权的正当性和非支配性（Forst, 2010）。批判理论的目标是克服这种虚假的、异化的理性形式——即与社会现实（正确理解）和作为集体行动形式的政治干预的可能性的异化。社会异化包括不把自己和他人视为一个人真正的“是”（但不允许如此）：作为社会、道德和政治上的辩护自主主体，或作为规范秩序中的平等规范权威（Forst, 2017b）。它也可能阻止他们过上“美好的生活”，但这是另一回事。从这个角度来看，其他规范性术语可以被重新解释。例如，如上所述，宽容的批判理论揭示了那些宽容的形式，在这些形式中，主导群体产生了仅仅是“被容忍”的二等群体——而在规范的平等群体之间，他们对美好生活的概念不同，而宽容是一种民主的选择(Brown &amp；弗斯特,2014;弗斯特,2013)。因此，在我看来，批判理论必须被重新配置为对正当性关系的批判。一方面，这要求对统治的社会和政治关系进行批判性的社会科学分析，其中包括文化，尤其是经济结构和关系。在这方面，必须区分统治的两个方面：屈从于不合理的规范和制度，以及屈从于阻止正当行为的条件。这种批判性分析必须与话语理论相结合，对正当性和正当性叙事进行谱系批判，这些正当性和叙事赋予了不正当性关系的合法性。另一方面，我们必须提出一个建设性的问题，即“正当性的基本结构”如何被视为基本正义的要求，并在社会实践中实现——不是作为一种强加于社会的理想或模式，而是作为一种自主发展的规范秩序。从本质上讲，我们称之为批判的理论应该建立在批判原则本身的基础上。它的媒介是理性在平等者之间寻求自主辩护的实践。

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引用次数: 0

The Institute for Social Research at 100 100 岁的社会研究所

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2023-12-19 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12727

Hubertus Buchstein, Peter E. Gordon, Axel Honneth, Ertug Tombus

引用次数: 0

If Foucault, why not Rawls? On enlarging the critical tent 如果是福柯，为什么不是罗尔斯？关于扩大批判的帐篷

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2023-12-19 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12723

Alessandro Ferrara