{"title":"Degenerations of democracy By Craig Calhoun, Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, Charles Taylor, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2022, pp. 368. $29.95 (hbk). ISBN: 9780674237582","authors":"Julian Culp","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12718","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12718","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 1","pages":"124-126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136034542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The domination of nature: A forgotten theme in critical theory?","authors":"Omar Dahbour","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12702","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12702","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 3","pages":"368-381"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135483201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Criticism against identity politics, both in public discourse and political theory, has intensified over the past decade with the rise of right-wing populism and the polarization of politics (Walters, <span>2018</span>). Such criticism portrays identity politics as a threat to democracy, alleging that it erodes community, rational communication, and solidarity. Drawing on radical democratic and standpoint theories, I argue for the opposite thesis; namely, that identity politics is crucial for the democratization of democracy. I show that democratization works through disrupting hegemonic discourse and is, therefore, a matter of power; and that such power politics are reasonable when following minority standpoints generated through identity politics. In other words, the universal democratic claims of equality and freedom can only become effective through their repeated actualization in particular power struggles.</p><p>Identity politics is a contested term. Nevertheless, there are systematic overlaps between current criticisms of identity politics that mainly repeat arguments that have been similarly articulated since the 1990s. Communitarians criticize identity politics as dividing the political community, liberals criticize it as disruptive of the public sphere and free deliberation (Fukuyama, <span>2018</span>; Habermas, <span>2020</span>; Lilla, <span>2017</span>), and Marxist and anarchist theorists argue that identity politics undermines the struggle for justice and emancipation and stabilizes state power through neoliberal diversity politics (Fraser, <span>1990, 2007</span>; Kumar et al., <span>2018</span>; Newman, <span>2010</span>; Táíwò, <span>2022</span>; for a critique of these debates, see Bickford, <span>1997</span>; Walters, <span>2018</span>; Young, <span>2000</span>, pp. 82−87; Paul, <span>2019</span>). Based on universalist accounts of the political,<sup>1</sup> all three positions share the concern that particularist identity politics conflates social positions with epistemological possibilities and political positions, resulting in standpoint fundamentalism. In other words, the critics claim that, in identity politics, it matters more who speaks than what is said.<sup>2</sup></p><p>Discussions about difference (Benhabib, <span>1996</span>), counterpublics (Fraser, <span>1990</span>), and inclusion (Young, <span>2000</span>) at the intersection of deliberative and Critical theory early criticized such universalist accounts of the political for their exclusionist effects. While these works offer valuable resources to construct the argument that strengthening identity politics is important for the development of more inclusive deliberations and institutions, they frame this as a correction of reason, leaving the aspect of power underdeveloped. To understand both the severe resistance against more inclusive politics and the strategic need for non-deliberative means to achieve it—such as protest, civil disobedience, “cancel cultu
在过去十年中，随着右翼民粹主义的兴起和政治两极分化，对公共话语和政治理论中身份政治的批评愈演愈烈(Walters, 2018)。这种批评将身份政治描述为对民主的威胁，声称它侵蚀了社区、理性沟通和团结。根据激进民主和立场理论，我提出了相反的论点;也就是说，身份政治对民主的民主化至关重要。我表明，民主化通过破坏霸权话语而起作用，因此，民主化是一个权力问题;这种权力政治是合理的，当遵循少数人的立场产生的身份政治。换句话说，平等和自由的普遍民主主张只有通过在特定的权力斗争中反复实现才能发挥作用。身份政治是一个有争议的术语。然而，目前对身份政治的批评之间存在系统性的重叠，这些批评主要是重复自上世纪90年代以来类似的论点。社群主义者批评身份政治分裂了政治共同体，自由主义者批评它破坏了公共领域和自由审议(Fukuyama, 2018;哈贝马斯,2020;Lilla, 2017)，马克思主义和无政府主义理论家认为，身份政治破坏了争取正义和解放的斗争，并通过新自由主义的多样性政治稳定了国家权力(Fraser, 1990, 2007;Kumar et al.， 2018;纽曼,2010;泰沃,2022;关于这些辩论的评论，见Bickford, 1997;沃尔特斯,2018;Young, 2000，第82 - 87页;保罗,2019)。基于普遍主义对政治的描述，这三种立场都有一个共同的担忧，即特殊主义的身份政治将社会立场与认识论的可能性和政治立场混为一谈，导致立场原教旨主义。换句话说，批评者声称，在身份政治中，谁说话比说什么更重要关于差异(Benhabib, 1996年)、反公众(Fraser, 1990年)和包容(Young, 2000年)在审议理论和批判理论的交叉点上的讨论，早期批评了这种对政治的普遍主义解释，因为它们具有排他性的影响。虽然这些著作提供了宝贵的资源来构建强化身份政治对更具包容性的审议和制度的发展很重要的论点，但它们将其框定为对理性的纠正，使权力方面不发达。要理解对更具包容性的政治的严重抵制和实现这一目标的非协商手段的战略需要，如抗议、公民不服从、“取消文化”或起义，就必须有一个理论框架，将民主化描述为权力与理性之间的振荡。即使Mansbridge(1996)也没有提供这样一个理论框架，尽管他明确地认为——与协商民主相反——通过强制手段获得的权力是民主的核心，并正确地指出需要“受保护的飞地”(第57页)来发展少数民族的立场。由于权力与理性之间的紧张关系，以及特殊主义与普遍主义之间的紧张关系，是激烈激进民主理论的核心(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001;Lefort, 1988;Mouffe, 2008;ranci<e:1>， 1999)，它更适合开发这样一个框架比审议的方法这种紧张关系不应该被理解为身份政治站在特殊主义一边，而它的批评者站在普遍性一边;相反，它是身份政治的组成部分，延伸开来，是民主本身的组成部分。“身份政治”——从这个术语起源的历史以及当前的争论的意义上来说——指的是边缘群体的政治实践，他们与集体身份和立场的建构有关，捍卫自己免受多数社会的结构、文化和规范所造成的不利影响。继黑人女权主义组织Combahee River Collective (1979, p. 365)之后，身份政治可以被定义为“关注我们自己的压迫”，因此从特定的经历和立场出发。然而，这不应该像一些当代批评家所做的那样，与本质主义的利益集团政治混为一谈。相反，身份政治通常是针对压迫的，因为它是一种交叉的、“基于主要压迫系统相互关联这一事实的综合分析和实践”(Combahee River Collective, 1979, p. 362)。这种特殊主义和普遍主义对压迫的描述之间的摇摆并不是《集体》文本中的缺陷，而是源于身份政治内在的紧张。 在过去十年中，随着右翼民粹主义的兴起和政治两极分化，对公共话语和政治理论中身份政治的批评愈演愈烈（Walters, 2018）。这种批评将身份政治描述为对民主的威胁，声称它侵蚀了社区、理性沟通和团结。根据激进民主和立场理论，我提出了相反的论点；也就是说，身份政治对民主的民主化至关重要。我表明，民主化通过破坏霸权话语而起作用，因此，民主化是一个权力问题；这种权力政治是合理的，当遵循少数人的立场产生的身份政治。换句话说，平等和自由的普遍民主主张只有通过在特定的权力斗争中反复实现才能发挥作用。身份政治是一个有争议的术语。然而，目前对身份政治的批评之间存在系统性的重叠，这些批评主要是重复自上世纪90年代以来类似的论点。社群主义者批评身份政治分裂了政治共同体，自由主义者批评它破坏了公共领域和自由审议(Fukuyama, 2018；哈贝马斯,2020;Lilla, 2017)，马克思主义和无政府主义理论家认为，身份政治破坏了争取正义和解放的斗争，并通过新自由主义的多样性政治稳定了国家权力(Fraser, 1990, 2007；Kumar et al., 2018；纽曼,2010;泰沃,2022;关于这些辩论的评论，见Bickford, 1997；沃尔特斯,2018;Young, 2000，第82 - 87页；保罗,2019)。基于普遍主义对政治的描述，这三种立场都有一个共同的担忧，即特殊主义的身份政治将社会立场与认识论的可能性和政治立场混为一谈，导致立场原教旨主义。换句话说，批评者声称，在身份政治中，谁说话比说什么更重要。关于差异（Benhabib, 1996）、反公众（Fraser, 1990）和包容（Young, 2000）在协商理论和批判理论的交叉点上的讨论，早期批评了这种对政治的普遍主义解释，因为它们具有排他性的影响。虽然这些著作提供了宝贵的资源来构建强化身份政治对更具包容性的审议和制度的发展很重要的论点，但它们将其框定为对理性的纠正，使权力方面不发达。要理解对更具包容性的政治的严重抵制和实现这一目标的非协商手段的战略需要，如抗议、公民不服从、“取消文化”或起义，就必须有一个理论框架，将民主化描述为权力与理性之间的振荡。即使Mansbridge（1996）也没有提供这样一个理论框架，尽管他明确地认为——与协商民主相反——通过强制手段获得的权力是民主的核心，并正确地指出需要“受保护的飞地”（第57页）来发展少数民族的立场。由于权力与理性之间的紧张关系，以及特殊主义与普遍主义之间的紧张关系，是激烈的激进民主理论的核心(拉克劳；Mouffe, 2001;Lefort, 1988;Mouffe, 2008;ranci<e:1>, 1999)，它更适合开发这样一个框架比审议的方法。这种紧张关系不应被理解为身份政治站在特殊主义一边，而其批评者站在普遍性一边；相反，它是身份政治的组成部分，延伸开来，是民主本身的组成部分。“身份政治”——从这个术语起源的历史以及当前的争论的意义上来说——指的是边缘群体的政治实践，他们与集体身份和立场的建构有关，捍卫自己免受多数社会的结构、文化和规范所造成的不利影响。继黑人女权主义组织Combahee River Collective （1979, p. 365）之后，身份政治可以被定义为“关注我们自己的压迫”，因此从特定的
{"title":"Identity politics and the democratization of democracy: Oscillations between power and reason in radical democratic and standpoint theory","authors":"Karsten Schubert","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12715","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12715","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Criticism against identity politics, both in public discourse and political theory, has intensified over the past decade with the rise of right-wing populism and the polarization of politics (Walters, <span>2018</span>). Such criticism portrays identity politics as a threat to democracy, alleging that it erodes community, rational communication, and solidarity. Drawing on radical democratic and standpoint theories, I argue for the opposite thesis; namely, that identity politics is crucial for the democratization of democracy. I show that democratization works through disrupting hegemonic discourse and is, therefore, a matter of power; and that such power politics are reasonable when following minority standpoints generated through identity politics. In other words, the universal democratic claims of equality and freedom can only become effective through their repeated actualization in particular power struggles.</p><p>Identity politics is a contested term. Nevertheless, there are systematic overlaps between current criticisms of identity politics that mainly repeat arguments that have been similarly articulated since the 1990s. Communitarians criticize identity politics as dividing the political community, liberals criticize it as disruptive of the public sphere and free deliberation (Fukuyama, <span>2018</span>; Habermas, <span>2020</span>; Lilla, <span>2017</span>), and Marxist and anarchist theorists argue that identity politics undermines the struggle for justice and emancipation and stabilizes state power through neoliberal diversity politics (Fraser, <span>1990, 2007</span>; Kumar et al., <span>2018</span>; Newman, <span>2010</span>; Táíwò, <span>2022</span>; for a critique of these debates, see Bickford, <span>1997</span>; Walters, <span>2018</span>; Young, <span>2000</span>, pp. 82−87; Paul, <span>2019</span>). Based on universalist accounts of the political,<sup>1</sup> all three positions share the concern that particularist identity politics conflates social positions with epistemological possibilities and political positions, resulting in standpoint fundamentalism. In other words, the critics claim that, in identity politics, it matters more who speaks than what is said.<sup>2</sup></p><p>Discussions about difference (Benhabib, <span>1996</span>), counterpublics (Fraser, <span>1990</span>), and inclusion (Young, <span>2000</span>) at the intersection of deliberative and Critical theory early criticized such universalist accounts of the political for their exclusionist effects. While these works offer valuable resources to construct the argument that strengthening identity politics is important for the development of more inclusive deliberations and institutions, they frame this as a correction of reason, leaving the aspect of power underdeveloped. To understand both the severe resistance against more inclusive politics and the strategic need for non-deliberative means to achieve it—such as protest, civil disobedience, “cancel cultu","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 4","pages":"563-579"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12715","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135193513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The politics of flight refugee movements between radical democracy and autonomous exodus","authors":"Johannes Siegmund","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12714","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12714","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 4","pages":"532-544"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135193097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Neoliberalism is a notoriously contested term, and even among those who principally subscribe to it, which is mostly its critics, fierce debates persist over its nature, how to study it properly—and whether it is still the appropriate conceptual armament to understand the contemporary world and an arguably emerging “post-neoliberalism” (Davies & Gane, <span>2021</span>). Not only is it controversial how neoliberalism should be defined—a governing rationality in the spirit of Foucault's governmentality lectures (Foucault, <span>2008</span>), a portfolio of certain policies, or a strategy of transnational capital to restore and safeguard profit rates (Harvey, <span>2005</span>)—but also on what level to study it, either that of “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner & Theodore, <span>2002</span>; Cahill, <span>2014</span>), a set of theories and arguments, or both.</p><p>My starting point and focus for most of this paper is neoliberal thought as it is represented by the writings of Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, the German ordoliberals, and, importantly, James Buchanan. My aim is to develop a critical account of neoliberal thought that will abstain from explicitly normative criticisms and rather opt for a more indirect but effective and somewhat novel critique that holds neoliberalism to its own standards and shows how it fails to meet them or is pushed into adopting highly questionable positions in the attempt to do so. The argument proceeds as follows: As already suggested, the meaning of neoliberalism is heavily contested, so I will provide the basis of my argument by laying out a brief account of neoliberalism, which relies on a theoretical-historical reconstruction of its context of emergence around the middle of the 20th century. What I conclude from this reconstruction is that we are well-advised not to narrow down neoliberalism too much and not to downplay its internal heterogeneities. Therefore, rather than trying to isolate a number of doctrines or positions as quintessentially neoliberal or even considering them to be the “essence” of neoliberalism, I argue that what unites neoliberal discourse is not a set of positive convictions—although there is some significant overlap in certain areas—but rather a shared <i>problematic</i> that pertains to the preconditions of functioning markets.</p><p>Within that overall problematic, democracy is one of the most pressing problems according to neoliberal thinkers, because virtually all of them agree that it complicates the task of setting up and securing the workings of functioning markets significantly. Still, this basic agreement notwithstanding, neoliberal accounts of democracy display a considerable range of specific diagnoses as to the nature and source of its dysfunctionalities or even pathologies. Accordingly, the second step of the argument is a survey of some selected lines of critique of democracy as they are formulated by leading neoliberals. Among other things, this su
{"title":"The revolution will not be theorized: Neoliberal thought and the problem of transition","authors":"Thomas Biebricher","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12713","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12713","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Neoliberalism is a notoriously contested term, and even among those who principally subscribe to it, which is mostly its critics, fierce debates persist over its nature, how to study it properly—and whether it is still the appropriate conceptual armament to understand the contemporary world and an arguably emerging “post-neoliberalism” (Davies & Gane, <span>2021</span>). Not only is it controversial how neoliberalism should be defined—a governing rationality in the spirit of Foucault's governmentality lectures (Foucault, <span>2008</span>), a portfolio of certain policies, or a strategy of transnational capital to restore and safeguard profit rates (Harvey, <span>2005</span>)—but also on what level to study it, either that of “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner & Theodore, <span>2002</span>; Cahill, <span>2014</span>), a set of theories and arguments, or both.</p><p>My starting point and focus for most of this paper is neoliberal thought as it is represented by the writings of Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, the German ordoliberals, and, importantly, James Buchanan. My aim is to develop a critical account of neoliberal thought that will abstain from explicitly normative criticisms and rather opt for a more indirect but effective and somewhat novel critique that holds neoliberalism to its own standards and shows how it fails to meet them or is pushed into adopting highly questionable positions in the attempt to do so. The argument proceeds as follows: As already suggested, the meaning of neoliberalism is heavily contested, so I will provide the basis of my argument by laying out a brief account of neoliberalism, which relies on a theoretical-historical reconstruction of its context of emergence around the middle of the 20th century. What I conclude from this reconstruction is that we are well-advised not to narrow down neoliberalism too much and not to downplay its internal heterogeneities. Therefore, rather than trying to isolate a number of doctrines or positions as quintessentially neoliberal or even considering them to be the “essence” of neoliberalism, I argue that what unites neoliberal discourse is not a set of positive convictions—although there is some significant overlap in certain areas—but rather a shared <i>problematic</i> that pertains to the preconditions of functioning markets.</p><p>Within that overall problematic, democracy is one of the most pressing problems according to neoliberal thinkers, because virtually all of them agree that it complicates the task of setting up and securing the workings of functioning markets significantly. Still, this basic agreement notwithstanding, neoliberal accounts of democracy display a considerable range of specific diagnoses as to the nature and source of its dysfunctionalities or even pathologies. Accordingly, the second step of the argument is a survey of some selected lines of critique of democracy as they are formulated by leading neoliberals. Among other things, this su","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 4","pages":"506-519"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12713","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135816164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“What would I do?”: Political action under oppression in Arendt","authors":"Alzbeta Hajkova","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12704","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12704","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 3","pages":"311-323"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48496057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>I have noticed, in Anglophone philosophy, a certain way of invoking Marx. The pattern here is—understandably, given the relative scarcity of substantial engagement with Marx outside of (radical) political theory—a rather loose one. But I've spotted it in the work of John McDowell, Michael Thompson, and Mary Midgley. In each of these thinkers, Marx is invoked in the context of an inquiry into human nature: into the question of what (if anything) separates us from the animals.</p><p>In this paper, I propose to adjudicate a certain debate between these three thinkers—a debate which their shared invocation of Marx allows us to stage. I will argue that this debate between McDowell, Thompson, and Midgley, such as it is, is doomed to remain interminable, unless we clear up a confusion about Marx which all three share. Clearing up this confusion will allow us to get in focus an account of human nature I label “Dialectical Aristotelianism”. I am unable to offer a detailed defense of this position here—rather, I offer it as something which might be worked out more comprehensively in other work.<sup>1</sup></p><p>The point I wish to make here, and the way I wish to make it, unfortunately demands a structure which might at first glance seem a little obscure. To spell it out: in Section 1, I introduce the perennial philosophical problem of “what separates us from the animals”—working my way toward Midgley's critique of the “single distinguishing factor” conception of what separates human beings from other animals in <i>Beast and Man</i>. Sections 2 and 3 relate an existing debate between McDowell and Thompson, who both incorporate Marx into their attempts to find such a single distinguishing factor. In Section 4, I introduce Midgley's specific criticisms of what she sees as Marx's attempt to identify a “single distinguishing factor” answer to the question of what separates us from the animals—criticisms which would seem to do for McDowell and Thompson as well. In Section 5, I explain why (in my view) Midgley was wrong about Marx—and then proceed to demonstrate that, in <i>The German Ideology</i>, he and Engels (albeit in an incomplete, increasingly disputed text) can be read as providing us with a “single distinguishing factor” answer to the question of what separates us from the animals that does <i>not</i> suffer from the problems Midgley identifies with (usual) attempts to identify such a factor. The result is an account which is, handily, able to incorporate the best of Midgley's, McDowell's, and Thompson's views. This is the position that, in the conclusion, I label “Dialectical Aristotelianism”.</p><p>As human beings, we have some notion of ourselves as a species, and not only that, we have a sense of ourselves as a different kind of species, distinct somehow from all other animals. This sense of difference is perhaps best articulated as the Aristotelian notion that humans, as rational animals, are in some important sense “between beast and god”.<sup
{"title":"Dialectical Aristotelianism: On Marx's account of what separates us from the animals","authors":"Tom Whyman","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12712","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12712","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I have noticed, in Anglophone philosophy, a certain way of invoking Marx. The pattern here is—understandably, given the relative scarcity of substantial engagement with Marx outside of (radical) political theory—a rather loose one. But I've spotted it in the work of John McDowell, Michael Thompson, and Mary Midgley. In each of these thinkers, Marx is invoked in the context of an inquiry into human nature: into the question of what (if anything) separates us from the animals.</p><p>In this paper, I propose to adjudicate a certain debate between these three thinkers—a debate which their shared invocation of Marx allows us to stage. I will argue that this debate between McDowell, Thompson, and Midgley, such as it is, is doomed to remain interminable, unless we clear up a confusion about Marx which all three share. Clearing up this confusion will allow us to get in focus an account of human nature I label “Dialectical Aristotelianism”. I am unable to offer a detailed defense of this position here—rather, I offer it as something which might be worked out more comprehensively in other work.<sup>1</sup></p><p>The point I wish to make here, and the way I wish to make it, unfortunately demands a structure which might at first glance seem a little obscure. To spell it out: in Section 1, I introduce the perennial philosophical problem of “what separates us from the animals”—working my way toward Midgley's critique of the “single distinguishing factor” conception of what separates human beings from other animals in <i>Beast and Man</i>. Sections 2 and 3 relate an existing debate between McDowell and Thompson, who both incorporate Marx into their attempts to find such a single distinguishing factor. In Section 4, I introduce Midgley's specific criticisms of what she sees as Marx's attempt to identify a “single distinguishing factor” answer to the question of what separates us from the animals—criticisms which would seem to do for McDowell and Thompson as well. In Section 5, I explain why (in my view) Midgley was wrong about Marx—and then proceed to demonstrate that, in <i>The German Ideology</i>, he and Engels (albeit in an incomplete, increasingly disputed text) can be read as providing us with a “single distinguishing factor” answer to the question of what separates us from the animals that does <i>not</i> suffer from the problems Midgley identifies with (usual) attempts to identify such a factor. The result is an account which is, handily, able to incorporate the best of Midgley's, McDowell's, and Thompson's views. This is the position that, in the conclusion, I label “Dialectical Aristotelianism”.</p><p>As human beings, we have some notion of ourselves as a species, and not only that, we have a sense of ourselves as a different kind of species, distinct somehow from all other animals. This sense of difference is perhaps best articulated as the Aristotelian notion that humans, as rational animals, are in some important sense “between beast and god”.<sup","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 3","pages":"354-367"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12712","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49431759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>At first glance, there would appear to be no wider gulf than between persons who believe that life is meaningful and valuable only if oriented by some transcendent force or being and those who try to steer themselves by earthly signposts alone. Since at least the Enlightenment secular humanists have tried to construct what Charles Taylor has called purely “immanent” ethics. In Taylor's influential but controversial view, materialist humanist ethical theories, and accounts of the good for human beings can be internally consistent and satisfying to their adherents, but ultimately incomplete. Taylor's argument remains compelling more than a decade after the publication of <i>A Secular Age</i> because he does not argue that “exclusive” humanist doctrines are incomplete on the terms of believers in transcendent forces and beings, but incomplete on their own terms. All deep commitments to meaning, purpose, and value in life, he suggests provocatively, in fact contain a concealed longing for transcendence of the unrecoverable passage of time and the oblivion into which subjects will disappear if there is nothing more than the physical universe and the human social world.</p><p>This paper will treat Taylor's conclusions as a challenge to account for life-value within the confines of secular time and without making secret appeals to transcendent forces or beings.<sup>1</sup> I am not going to try to turn tables on Taylor and argue that all religious believers secretly interpret their sacred texts and principles with a view to earthly happiness, but I will argue that there are more overlapping concerns than dogmatists on either side believe. My argument will be critical of Taylor's conclusions, but it is also a response to his invitation for members of different faith, traditions, and secular humanists to engage in a “more frank exchange” that acknowledges the differences but is conducted “with the kind of respect that can only come from a sense that we have something to learn from each other” (Taylor, <span>2010a</span>, p. 402). I will argue that the most important lesson that humanism teaches is that the desire for fullness, in earthly life or on some transcendent plane is not necessary and may even be a mistake. In contrast to fullness as the overarching goal of life, I will suggest that receptive openness to the world best accords with the <i>known</i> conditions of human existence. Since the receptively open person who accepts the finality of death does not demand fullness, they cannot be justly suspected of secretly steering their goals by transcendent principles.</p><p>The paper begins with a focused analysis of Taylor's argument that the emergence of natural scientific accounts of the elements and dynamics of the universe created a crisis of meaning. Exclusive humanisms are attempts to reconstruct the foundations of meaning within the confines of secular time, but no matter how rich the texture of their values, Taylor argues, they must always f
{"title":"Taylor and Feuerbach on the problem of fullness: Must a meaningful life have a transcendent foundation?","authors":"Jeff Noonan","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12709","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12709","url":null,"abstract":"<p>At first glance, there would appear to be no wider gulf than between persons who believe that life is meaningful and valuable only if oriented by some transcendent force or being and those who try to steer themselves by earthly signposts alone. Since at least the Enlightenment secular humanists have tried to construct what Charles Taylor has called purely “immanent” ethics. In Taylor's influential but controversial view, materialist humanist ethical theories, and accounts of the good for human beings can be internally consistent and satisfying to their adherents, but ultimately incomplete. Taylor's argument remains compelling more than a decade after the publication of <i>A Secular Age</i> because he does not argue that “exclusive” humanist doctrines are incomplete on the terms of believers in transcendent forces and beings, but incomplete on their own terms. All deep commitments to meaning, purpose, and value in life, he suggests provocatively, in fact contain a concealed longing for transcendence of the unrecoverable passage of time and the oblivion into which subjects will disappear if there is nothing more than the physical universe and the human social world.</p><p>This paper will treat Taylor's conclusions as a challenge to account for life-value within the confines of secular time and without making secret appeals to transcendent forces or beings.<sup>1</sup> I am not going to try to turn tables on Taylor and argue that all religious believers secretly interpret their sacred texts and principles with a view to earthly happiness, but I will argue that there are more overlapping concerns than dogmatists on either side believe. My argument will be critical of Taylor's conclusions, but it is also a response to his invitation for members of different faith, traditions, and secular humanists to engage in a “more frank exchange” that acknowledges the differences but is conducted “with the kind of respect that can only come from a sense that we have something to learn from each other” (Taylor, <span>2010a</span>, p. 402). I will argue that the most important lesson that humanism teaches is that the desire for fullness, in earthly life or on some transcendent plane is not necessary and may even be a mistake. In contrast to fullness as the overarching goal of life, I will suggest that receptive openness to the world best accords with the <i>known</i> conditions of human existence. Since the receptively open person who accepts the finality of death does not demand fullness, they cannot be justly suspected of secretly steering their goals by transcendent principles.</p><p>The paper begins with a focused analysis of Taylor's argument that the emergence of natural scientific accounts of the elements and dynamics of the universe created a crisis of meaning. Exclusive humanisms are attempts to reconstruct the foundations of meaning within the confines of secular time, but no matter how rich the texture of their values, Taylor argues, they must always f","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 3","pages":"324-337"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12709","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47564978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Political realists argue that political norms can more effectively guide judgment than can ideal norms derived from ethical principles. Three axioms shape the realist conceptualization of political norms: (a) Politics arises with the displacement of violent coercion by order and, so, authority. (b) Such authority needs a decision rule or rules. Historically, in Western states (“now and around here,” as put by Bernard Williams (<span>2005</span>, 8)), two such rules obtain. One (b<sub>1</sub>) is based on bargaining, whereby actors seek a mutually beneficial agreement that entails minimal concession, the other on deliberation (b<sub>2</sub>), whereby actors recognize a common end to pursue, taking as given relevant value differences and interests. (c) Political norms are an emergent property of the subsumption of moral values to the prudential considerations of actors involved in sustaining the step from (a) to (b).</p><p>Realists have thus far focused on normative theorizing from the axioms through the lens of legitimacy (Cozzaglio & Greene, <span>2019</span>; Cross, <span>2021</span>; Rossi, <span>2012</span>; Sigwart, <span>2013</span>; Sleat, <span>2014</span>). They have had little to say about the relationship, if any, between norms associated with (liberal) legitimacy and with democracy. This has led to claims that the new realism has little to offer democratic theory (e.g., Frega, <span>2020</span>). Interestingly, Williams gestured toward theorizing such a relationship. However, he did not fully elaborate his ideas. He not only claims that “[a]ny theory of modern [legitimacy] requires an account of democracy and political participation” (15) and that “it is a manifest fact—that some kind of democracy, participatory politics at some level, is a feature of [legitimacy] for the modern world” (17). At least implicitly, he also saw his account of liberal legitimacy and linked theory of the establishment of politics as a framework for “exploring what more radical and ambitious forms of participatory or deliberative democracy are possible …” (<span>2005</span>, 17). Taking our cue from Williams, we here begin to clarify the relationship between norms formed through the establishment of politics, we sometimes shorten as "politicization,"<sup>1</sup> and those through democratic agency. Motivation arises from our suspicion that Williams’ theorization of the establishment of politics—creating a normative requirement that states satisfy a “basic legitimation demand (BLD),” wherein its authority is justified “<i>to each subject</i>” (4)—stands in tension with his commitment to conceptualizing political norms in historical context and, so, genealogically (<span>2002</span>, 20ff; also, <span>2006</span>, 156). We show that Williams’ account of the norms that coincide with the establishment of politics—to whit, the step from (a) to (b) above—should not be read as also necessarily encompassing the establishment of conditions for the deepening of
{"title":"From politics to democracy? Bernard Williams’ basic legitimation demand in a radical realist lens","authors":"Janosch Prinz, Andy Scerri","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12710","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12710","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Political realists argue that political norms can more effectively guide judgment than can ideal norms derived from ethical principles. Three axioms shape the realist conceptualization of political norms: (a) Politics arises with the displacement of violent coercion by order and, so, authority. (b) Such authority needs a decision rule or rules. Historically, in Western states (“now and around here,” as put by Bernard Williams (<span>2005</span>, 8)), two such rules obtain. One (b<sub>1</sub>) is based on bargaining, whereby actors seek a mutually beneficial agreement that entails minimal concession, the other on deliberation (b<sub>2</sub>), whereby actors recognize a common end to pursue, taking as given relevant value differences and interests. (c) Political norms are an emergent property of the subsumption of moral values to the prudential considerations of actors involved in sustaining the step from (a) to (b).</p><p>Realists have thus far focused on normative theorizing from the axioms through the lens of legitimacy (Cozzaglio & Greene, <span>2019</span>; Cross, <span>2021</span>; Rossi, <span>2012</span>; Sigwart, <span>2013</span>; Sleat, <span>2014</span>). They have had little to say about the relationship, if any, between norms associated with (liberal) legitimacy and with democracy. This has led to claims that the new realism has little to offer democratic theory (e.g., Frega, <span>2020</span>). Interestingly, Williams gestured toward theorizing such a relationship. However, he did not fully elaborate his ideas. He not only claims that “[a]ny theory of modern [legitimacy] requires an account of democracy and political participation” (15) and that “it is a manifest fact—that some kind of democracy, participatory politics at some level, is a feature of [legitimacy] for the modern world” (17). At least implicitly, he also saw his account of liberal legitimacy and linked theory of the establishment of politics as a framework for “exploring what more radical and ambitious forms of participatory or deliberative democracy are possible …” (<span>2005</span>, 17). Taking our cue from Williams, we here begin to clarify the relationship between norms formed through the establishment of politics, we sometimes shorten as \"politicization,\"<sup>1</sup> and those through democratic agency. Motivation arises from our suspicion that Williams’ theorization of the establishment of politics—creating a normative requirement that states satisfy a “basic legitimation demand (BLD),” wherein its authority is justified “<i>to each subject</i>” (4)—stands in tension with his commitment to conceptualizing political norms in historical context and, so, genealogically (<span>2002</span>, 20ff; also, <span>2006</span>, 156). We show that Williams’ account of the norms that coincide with the establishment of politics—to whit, the step from (a) to (b) above—should not be read as also necessarily encompassing the establishment of conditions for the deepening of ","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 3","pages":"338-353"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12710","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47926067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Perhaps no contemporary thinker has contributed as many fundamental insights into the political pathologies and dangers of the neoliberal era as Wendy Brown. In her recent book, <i>In the Ruins of Neoliberalism</i>, Brown deepens the Foucauldian understanding of neoliberalism as a political rationality that aims to make competition the universal governing principle of society. In her previous intervention, she explored how the metastasis of neoliberal rationality's figuration of subjectivity as <i>homo economicus</i> eviscerates democratic institutions (Brown, <span>2015</span>). Both building from and amending this work, Brown now draws a close connection between neoliberalism and popular anti-democratic mobilization. Brown observes that Hayek's understanding of society as a spontaneous order that results from human action but cannot be planned by ignorant human will is a theory not just of market coordination but also of moral traditionalism. In place of social justice and democratic self-rule—whose deliberate dimension makes them incompatible with spontaneous order and individual freedom—neoliberalism substitutes the institutional anchors of property rights and “family values.” Expanding the personal sphere by Christianizing the public sphere through the language of religious liberty and defending the nation conceived as a family against nontraditional identity groups and immigrants are developments internal to neoliberal reason.</p><p>Brown argues that “neoliberal rationality prepared the ground for the mobilization and legitimacy of ferocious antidemocratic forces in the second decade of the twenty-first century” (Brown, <span>2019</span>, p. 7). The intellectual architects of neoliberalism dreaded an ignorant populace agitated by authoritarian demagogues. Nevertheless, neoliberal rationality has brought about such an outburst, not as its “intended spawn” but its “Frankensteinian creation” (Brown, <span>2019</span>, p. 10). The neoliberal program has left people without civil norms and commitments but has not wholly vanquished extra-market society. The painful humiliations of economic abandonment and the dethronement of White patriarchy have elicited a return of the repressed. Left without alternative bases for mobilization, this politics draws from a moral traditionalism that, emptied of real content, arises as vengeful patriarchism and White supremacy.</p><p>Behind Brown's reliance on Foucault lies an ambivalent relation to Marxism. Despite an avowal of indebtedness to “neo-Marxist” approaches to neoliberalism as a “new chapter of capitalism,” a reader could be forgiven for thinking upon finishing the book that the cause of our ills is neoliberal reason rather than the social imperative to accumulate (Brown, <span>2019</span>, p. 21, contrast with Brown, <span>2015</span>, p. 76). Brown criticizes Marxists far more than she cites them. At one point, she chides Marxist approaches for “tend[ing] to focus on institutions, policies, economi
{"title":"The value form and the wounds of neoliberalism","authors":"David Lebow","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12706","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12706","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Perhaps no contemporary thinker has contributed as many fundamental insights into the political pathologies and dangers of the neoliberal era as Wendy Brown. In her recent book, <i>In the Ruins of Neoliberalism</i>, Brown deepens the Foucauldian understanding of neoliberalism as a political rationality that aims to make competition the universal governing principle of society. In her previous intervention, she explored how the metastasis of neoliberal rationality's figuration of subjectivity as <i>homo economicus</i> eviscerates democratic institutions (Brown, <span>2015</span>). Both building from and amending this work, Brown now draws a close connection between neoliberalism and popular anti-democratic mobilization. Brown observes that Hayek's understanding of society as a spontaneous order that results from human action but cannot be planned by ignorant human will is a theory not just of market coordination but also of moral traditionalism. In place of social justice and democratic self-rule—whose deliberate dimension makes them incompatible with spontaneous order and individual freedom—neoliberalism substitutes the institutional anchors of property rights and “family values.” Expanding the personal sphere by Christianizing the public sphere through the language of religious liberty and defending the nation conceived as a family against nontraditional identity groups and immigrants are developments internal to neoliberal reason.</p><p>Brown argues that “neoliberal rationality prepared the ground for the mobilization and legitimacy of ferocious antidemocratic forces in the second decade of the twenty-first century” (Brown, <span>2019</span>, p. 7). The intellectual architects of neoliberalism dreaded an ignorant populace agitated by authoritarian demagogues. Nevertheless, neoliberal rationality has brought about such an outburst, not as its “intended spawn” but its “Frankensteinian creation” (Brown, <span>2019</span>, p. 10). The neoliberal program has left people without civil norms and commitments but has not wholly vanquished extra-market society. The painful humiliations of economic abandonment and the dethronement of White patriarchy have elicited a return of the repressed. Left without alternative bases for mobilization, this politics draws from a moral traditionalism that, emptied of real content, arises as vengeful patriarchism and White supremacy.</p><p>Behind Brown's reliance on Foucault lies an ambivalent relation to Marxism. Despite an avowal of indebtedness to “neo-Marxist” approaches to neoliberalism as a “new chapter of capitalism,” a reader could be forgiven for thinking upon finishing the book that the cause of our ills is neoliberal reason rather than the social imperative to accumulate (Brown, <span>2019</span>, p. 21, contrast with Brown, <span>2015</span>, p. 76). Brown criticizes Marxists far more than she cites them. At one point, she chides Marxist approaches for “tend[ing] to focus on institutions, policies, economi","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 3","pages":"462-480"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12706","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42853049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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