Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory最新文献

Fear of Black Consciousness By Lewis R. Gordon. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2022 黑人意识的恐惧》作者：刘易斯-R-戈登。法拉尔、斯特劳斯和吉鲁出版社，2022 年

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Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2024-04-04 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12752

William Paris

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The Force of Truth: Critique, Genealogy, and Truth-Telling in Michel Foucault By Daniele Lorenzini, Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 2023 真理的力量：米歇尔-福柯笔下的批判、谱系和讲真话作者：丹尼尔-洛伦齐尼，芝加哥/伦敦：芝加哥大学出版社，2023 年

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Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2024-04-04 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12751

Frieder Vogelmann

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Neoliberal Citizenship: Sacred Markets, Sacrificial Lives By Luca Mavelli, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022 新自由主义公民身份：卢卡-马维利（LucaMavelli）著，牛津大学出版社，2022 年：牛津大学出版社，2022 年

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Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2024-04-04 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12746

Luke Glanville

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Deparochializing Political Theory By Melissa S. Williams, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2020 政治理论的去政治化梅丽莎-威廉姆斯（Melissa S.Williams）著，纽约州纽约市：剑桥大学出版社，2020 年

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Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2024-04-04 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12750

Nicholas Tampio

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Intersubjectivity and ecology: Habermas on natural history 主体间性与生态学：哈贝马斯论自然史

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12740

Felix Kämper

In philosophy, the field of natural history generally explores the transition from natural prehistory to genuine human history. It asks whether, and if so how, the human species rose above the realm of nature. Regarding the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, this type of inquiry is predominantly associated with the essay “The Idea of Natural History” by Theodor W. Adorno (1984; Pensky, 2004). There, Adorno assumes a constant interlocking of nature and history such that we cannot (yet) speak of a truly human history. But there is another version of natural history in Critical Theory, namely, that of Jürgen Habermas. Often overlooked, there exists no systematic discussion of it until now. One of the two central aims of this article is to close this gap and highlight key features of Habermas's version of natural history. What sets it apart is that it is thoroughly intersubjective: The natural history of Habermas brings out the role of linguistically based cooperation in the transition to human history. As we will see, this theme runs through his oeuvre since a 1958 article on philosophical anthropology at least, though it emerges most elaborately only in his Also a History of Philosophy (originally published in 2019).In this book, Habermas looks for signs of reason in history. This search is triggered by the diagnosis that autonomous collective action lacks traction to counter the aberrations of modernity. To solve this problem, he puts forward a history of learning processes. Although it is essential for this overarching purpose, the discussion around the book has thus far entirely ignored natural history. This deficit can be compensated for by exploring Habermas's take on the works of two anthropological thinkers, Johann G. Herder and Michael Tomasello. The engagement with their writings establishes a natural-historical point of departure for his quest to detect reason in history. The second aim of this article is to show that, in his occupation with them, Habermas marginalizes a crucial insight of Tomasello and especially of Herder—the dependence of the course of history on ecological circumstances—and accordingly underestimates the significance of environmental conditions for propelling collective self-determination. Whereas the first aim is more interpretive, this second aim has a critical intent, foregrounding the influence of the natural environment on developments in the intersubjective dimension.The overall argument of this article proceeds as follows. The first section provides an overview of the hitherto overlooked role of natural history in Habermas's thinking. It proves to be a constant throughout his work. The second section continues this overview by analyzing his engagement with Herder in Also a History of Philosophy. Drawing on Herder's natural history, Habermas conceptualizes his own history of learning processes. The third section subsequently concludes t

在哲学中，博物学领域一般探讨从自然史前史到真正人类历史的过渡。它询问人类是否，如果是，又是如何超越自然的。对于法兰克福学派的批判理论，这种类型的探究主要与西奥多·阿多诺(Theodor W. Adorno, 1984；Pensky, 2004)。在那里，阿多诺假设自然和历史之间存在着持续的连锁关系，以至于我们（还）不能谈论真正的人类历史。但在批判理论中还有另一种版本的自然史，即哈贝马斯的版本。它经常被忽视，直到现在还没有系统的讨论。本文的两个中心目标之一是弥合这一差距，并突出哈贝马斯版本的自然史的关键特征。使它与众不同的是，它完全是主体间性的：哈贝马斯的自然史揭示了在向人类历史过渡的过程中，基于语言的合作的作用。正如我们将看到的，这个主题至少从1958年的一篇关于哲学人类学的文章开始贯穿他的全部作品，尽管它只在他的《也是一部哲学史》（最初出版于2019年）中得到了最详尽的体现。在这本书中，哈贝马斯在历史中寻找理性的迹象。这种探索是由一种诊断引发的，即自主的集体行动缺乏对抗现代性畸变的动力。为了解决这个问题，他提出了学习过程的历史。尽管它对于这一总体目的至关重要，但围绕这本书的讨论迄今为止完全忽视了自然史。这一缺陷可以通过探索哈贝马斯对两位人类学思想家约翰·g·赫尔德（john G. Herder）和迈克尔·托马塞洛（Michael Tomasello）著作的理解来弥补。与他们的著作的接触为他探索历史中的理性建立了一个自然历史的出发点。本文的第二个目的是表明，哈贝马斯在他的职业生涯中，边缘化了托马塞洛，特别是赫尔的一个关键见解——历史进程对生态环境的依赖——相应地低估了环境条件对推动集体自决的重要性。虽然第一个目标更具解释性，但第二个目标具有批判性意图，强调自然环境对主体间性维度发展的影响。本文的总体论点如下。第一部分概述了自然史在哈贝马斯思想中迄今为止被忽视的作用。事实证明，在他的整个作品中，这是一个常数。第二部分通过分析他与赫尔德在《也是一部哲学史》中的合作，继续这一概述。哈贝马斯借鉴了赫尔德的自然史，将他自己的学习过程的历史概念化。第三部分随后以哈贝马斯对托马塞洛作品的理解作为文章的解释部分。他引用托马塞洛来揭示语言主体间性的出现是如何产生的。第四部分认为，与托马塞洛和赫尔德相比，哈贝马斯实际上把人类历史看作是与生态环境脱钩的，因此有必要重新挂钩。最后，第五部分主张人类自决的生态去中心化。以自主模式推进的历史不是独立于环境影响的，而是意识到其生态依赖性的历史。根据这一描述，哲学人类学把人理解为动物物种的亲戚和后代，人与动物的共同点有时多一些，有时少一些同时，它“在某种程度上”只属于动物学。虽然它使用了类似的方法，但该条款明确指出，它的调查对象与动物学学科的调查对象完全不同。这里暗指的是亚里士多德对没有理性的动物和拥有理性语言或“逻各斯”的人类物种的区分。尽管他的工作有很多曲折，但这种人类学上的差异仍然是一个不断完善的常数，以及我们从自然历史上从类人猿进化而来的潜在观点。哈贝马斯认为，自然史通过产生语言而战胜了自己，语言是将我们人类从自然领域中提升出来的媒介。在几年后写给Helmuth Plessner的一封信中，他相应地为“语言的习得[是]我们黑猩猩人性化的最重要因素”的假设辩护(Habermas, 1974, p. 139；我的翻译)。在1981年出版的代表作《交往行为理论》中，哈贝马斯将这种进化分化纳入了他的主体间性理论范式。在对乔治·h·米德的社会化思想进行讨论的过程中，哈贝马斯(1987,pp。 10−11)表明，他想要阐明自然历史“一种更高层次的生活形式的出现问题，这种生活形式的特征是一种由语言构成的主体间性形式，这种形式使交流行动成为可能。”在“涌现”一词中，他特意选择了一个术语来表达一种新形式的内在发展，这种形式是由先兆形式整合而来的。正如他所解释的那样，类人猿必须在史前的某一时刻跨过这个“人类形成的门槛”（哈贝马斯，1987，第22页），因为否则，就不会达到最初的社会文化状态，从那时起，人类物种就一直朝着明显不同的方向发展通过与米德的联系，哈贝马斯的巨著承担了以语言为基础的、主体间社会化的自然历史基础。在这种背景下，《也是一部哲学史》中对赫尔德和托马塞洛自然史的关注似乎是对早期思想的恢复。然而，在我们进入这本书，更仔细地研究主体间性的出现之前，让我总结一下，在哈贝马斯关于优生学的讨论中，自然史是他思想中的一个恒定因素。在1992年《事实与规范之间》出版前后，随着话语伦理和民主理论的转向，自然历史问题逐渐退居幕后，但在2001年《人性的未来》一书中又重新出现。尽管哈贝马斯（2003a，第106页）承认，在达尔文革命之后，“关于人类在自然史中的地位的生物学幻灭”产生了深远的影响，但他坚持自己的立场，即人类与所有其他生物之间存在着特殊的差异。他断言，只有人类才会提出有效性主张。与此相反，动物“不属于主体间相互传递公认规则和命令的群体”（Habermas, 2003a, p. 33）。对他来说，以语言为基础的处理主体间可接受规范的能力代表了物种伦理自我理解的一个重要组成部分，他认为，当我们在纯粹的预防措施之外操纵未出生人类的基因构成时，这种自我理解就会受到干扰。再一次，语言作为自然历史的产物，以及它所带来的技能使人类与众不同。因此，我们可以说，人类语言能力起源的自然历史母题形成了一个常数，将哈贝马斯作品的不同阶段联系在一起。更重要的是，这一主题不仅出现在他的早期作品中。它在《也是哲学史》中也扮演着重要的角色，将我们带入哈贝马斯最近的作品以及他对自然史的讨论，首先是赫尔德，其次是托马塞洛。《也是一部哲学史》的动力在于，集体行动目前缺乏自我决定的动力，在我们这个后形而上学时代，所有诉诸神圣正义的想法都受到了阻碍哈贝马斯说，理性在放弃对形而上学世界观的依赖方面做得很好，但现在它在与它微弱的动机力量作斗争。正因为如此，他在学习过程中寻找一种合理可行的替代品。过去已经取得的进步，即使只是部分和暂时的，应该激励我们应对未来的复杂挑战。哈贝马斯没有预设一般的历史规律，当然也没有预设整个历史运行的终极目标。他只是想解释断断续续的学习过程在历史上留下了印记——这是他对康德关于我们可能希望什么的第三个基本问题的回答（康德，1992，第538页）。他认为，过去对理性目标的坚持证明，通过集体努力取得进步在原则上是可能的。因此，可以在过去煽起希望的火花，借用本杰明（2003，第391页）的话，向我们同时代的人灌输勇气，即使在具有挑战性的情况下，也要努力寻求共同解决问题的办法。哈贝马斯相信，更重要的是，他希望其他人相信，他们可以有意地重塑当今全球相互交织的社会。我们可以把这称为《也是一部哲学史》的世界性目的。在提供了哈贝马斯计划的简要概述之后，自然史在此背景下的功能需要一些解释。为此，我参考了哈贝马斯关于自然史的两大支柱，首先是赫尔德。Herder代表了学习过程概念的关键先驱。由于史学上的相似性，哈贝马斯甚至借用了赫尔德的《也是一种人类形成的历史哲学》作为书名，概述了他的历史观这种情况使我们能够通过比较来阐明它们的方法的基本特征。在我看来，哈贝马斯偏离赫尔德的地方特别有趣。然而，我们首先需要弄清楚它们

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Marx's three different conceptions of political change under capitalism: Direct democracy, proletarian revolution, or self-government under proletarian leadership 马克思关于资本主义政治变革的三种不同概念：直接民主、无产阶级革命或无产阶级领导下的自治

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2024-03-03 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12741

Can Mert Kökerer

Scholars have interpreted Marx's conception of political change within the framework of his critique of capitalist society in myriad ways. Three main interpretations have prevailed in Marx scholarship in the last few decades with regard to his conception of political change under capitalism. The first interpretation, which is epitomized by Althusser's (1965) division of Marx's intellectual development into an early and late period, claims that his earlier philosophical and radical democratic analyses give place to a more scientific conception of capitalist society (see Cantin, 2003). The philosophical and ideological interests of the Young Marx, which provides “a radical-democratic interpretation” (Habermas, 1989, p. 126), according to this understanding, are superseded by the scientific and materialistic analyses of the Old Marx. Whereas the Young Marx entertains the possibility of achieving human emancipation through radical democratic politics, they highlight “the incompatibility of such writings with the historical insights and doctrines of the mature Marx” (Krancberg, 1982, p. 23). From the second half of the 19th century, they claim, Marx no longer pays attention to those political concepts and philosophical questions influenced by Aristotle, Rousseau, and Hegel, but is rather interested in providing a scientific analysis and critique of the capitalist mode of production for revolutionary communist politics.The second and third groups of scholars directly oppose this division of Marx into an early and late period through the Althusserian concept of epistemological break, although their emphases on the development of his conception of political change under capitalism diverge significantly. The main argument of the second group (Avineri, 1968; Draper, 1974; Femia, 1993; Fromm, 1961; Grollios, 2011; Springborg, 1984a, 1984b) is that Marx's earlier notion of democracy as the locus of human freedom is to a large extent encompassed by his later understanding of communism. They stress that “in his Critique of Hegel, what Marx terms ‘democracy’ is not fundamentally different from what he will later call ‘communism’” (Femia, 1993, p. 70). Rather than finding an epistemological break in Marx's earlier and later writings, they claim that “in spite of certain changes in concepts, in mood, in language” (Fromm, 1961, p. 79), the mid-1840s onward, Marx uses very similar terms with his earlier account of democracy to describe what communism would look like after the overthrow of capitalist society. They go as far as to maintain that “the Communist Manifesto is immanent in the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right” (Avineri, 1968, p. 34). Thus, there occurs only a change in the terminology he employs during this period “in the direction of defining consistent democr

学者们在马克思批判资本主义社会的框架内以各种方式解释马克思的政治变革概念。在过去的几十年里，关于马克思在资本主义制度下的政治变革的概念，马克思学界有三种主要的解释。第一种解释是阿尔都塞（1965）将马克思的智力发展分为早期和晚期的缩影，声称他早期的哲学和激进的民主分析让位于资本主义社会的更科学的概念（见Cantin， 2003）。根据这种理解，青年马克思的哲学和意识形态利益提供了“激进民主的解释”（哈贝马斯，1989年，第126页），被老马克思的科学和唯物主义分析所取代。尽管《青年马克思》认为通过激进的民主政治实现人类解放是可能的，但他们强调“这种著作与成熟的马克思的历史见解和学说不相容”（克兰伯格，1982年，第23页）。他们声称，从19世纪下半叶开始，马克思不再关注那些受亚里士多德、卢梭和黑格尔影响的政治概念和哲学问题，而是更有兴趣为革命的共产主义政治提供对资本主义生产方式的科学分析和批判。第二组和第三组学者通过阿尔都塞的认识论断裂概念直接反对将马克思划分为早期和晚期，尽管他们对马克思在资本主义下政治变革概念发展的侧重点存在显著分歧。第二组的主要论点(Avineri, 1968；德雷伯,1974;Femia, 1993;弗洛姆,1961;Grollios, 2011;Springborg, 1984a, 1984b)认为马克思早期关于民主作为人类自由中心的概念在很大程度上包含在他后来对共产主义的理解中。他们强调，“在《黑格尔批判》中，马克思所说的‘民主’与他后来所说的‘共产主义’并没有根本的不同”（Femia, 1993，第70页）。他们没有在马克思早期和后期的著作中找到认识论上的突破，而是声称，“尽管在概念、情绪和语言上发生了某些变化”（弗洛姆，1961年，第79页），在19世纪40年代中期以后，马克思使用了与他早期关于民主的描述非常相似的术语来描述推翻资本主义社会后的共产主义。他们甚至认为“《共产党宣言》是《黑格尔法哲学批判》的内在内容”（Avineri, 1968，第34页）。因此，在这一时期，他所使用的术语只发生了变化，“朝着用社会主义术语定义一致的民主，用民主术语定义一致的社会主义的方向”（Draper, 1974，第102页）。最后一批学者(Abensour, 2011；坐浴盆,2001;Chrysis, 2018;科恩,1985;Doveton, 1994;加罗语,2001;亨特,1974;Kouvelakis, 2001;莱文,1989;美世,1980;Mostov, 1989;尼米,2010;奥马利,1970;鲁贝尔,1983;熊彼特，1942)，反过来，同意第二组的批评Young-Old马克思的论点；但他们在从他对民主的理解向共产主义的转变的条件上存在分歧。与前者将转型解释为术语问题相反，他们认为，在他的一生中，他对民主和共产主义的理解存在连续性。他们“强调他早期思想的连续性如何为理解《哥达纲领批判》提供了一个框架，使其与他早期的民主信仰保持一致”（Niemi, 2010，第41页）。他在1843年对黑格尔的君主制和官僚制的概念进行了批判，由此他得出了民主是人类自由的中心的观点，这被解释为他对人类自由更深入的理解的先驱，这将在共产主义下实现，作为无产阶级革命机构的结果。他们坚持认为，“他们[马克思和恩格斯]对未来社会的设想，从一开始就是一种参与式民主”（Hunt, 1974, p. XIII）。根据他们的观点，这种转变并不发生在他的术语使用上，而是意味着他早期理解的扩展，以及他在欧洲和其他地区社会政治变革中的智力发展。因此，这种转变涉及到“马克思对主题选择的转变”（Doveton, 1994，第564页），这反过来又扩展了他早期对民主下人类自由的理解，向更详细地概念化无产阶级革命和共产主义。本文表明，这些对马克思对资本主义制度下政治变革的理解的主流解释未能追溯马克思政治思想在其整个思想生活中的发展。就在宣布成立公社的一年前，马克思，如上所述，认为只有英国无产阶级才能成为革命转型的杠杆，现在他把公社本身，通过它的群众参与和无产阶级领导的结合，看作是共产主义革命的杠杆。因此，对于马克思来说，公社“是民主延伸到其社会学基础的一个例子，并通过工人的民主导向的集体行动创造出来”（Niemi, 2010，第47页）。无产阶级作为公社领导人的角色发生在各种社会团体的广泛联盟中（马克思，1986a，第492,496页）。无产阶级“被公开承认是唯一具有社会首创精神的阶级，甚至巴黎的大多数中产阶级——店主、商人、商人——除了富有的资本家之外”（马克思，1940年b版，第62页）。巴黎人民作为一个整体对无产阶级解放机构的承认，体现在制度秩序中，这种制度秩序促进了大众参与，并与民选的和可撤销的无产阶级领导结合在一起。在这里，公社既是“法国社会一切健全成分的真正代表，因而是真正的国民政府……同时又是工人政府，是争取劳动解放的勇敢斗士”（马克思，1940年b页，第64-65页）。公社的有效存在导致了“一种适合无产阶级的解放政治形式的发明”（Abensour, 2011, p. 88）。无产阶级获得了“使实践更接近真理，实现社会实践的真理，消灭国家和政治”的新的历史使命（列斐伏尔，1965，第390-391页）。公社的制度秩序是建立在公社成员有条件地把他们的权力委托给他们负责任的、选举出来的、可罢免的代表的基础上的，这些代表是从无产阶级中选出的，通过他们的领导，资产阶级将被剥夺。因此，公社短暂的存在“只能预示着民治民有政府的趋势”（马克思，1940年b期，第65页）。公社“要求各种形式的地方自治，使最大程度的主动性和群众参与成为可能”（约翰斯通，1971年，第457页）。它的政府基于“人民为自己而行动”的理念（马克思，1986a，第463-464页）。因此，马克思指出，“工人的巴黎及其公社将永远作为新社会的光荣先驱而受到赞扬”（马克思，1940年b期，第81-82页）。马克思对公社的理解是推翻资本主义社会并代之以共产主义社会的杠杆，这使他进一步通过无产阶级的制度性领导参与民主政治。仔细阅读和分析马克思在1870年至1883年期间的著作，包括他的信件，已发表和未发表的手稿和小册子，信件，新闻报道和采访，可以证明马克思在多大程度上通过直接借鉴公社的经验构建了他的新政治立场，思想和建议。在这一时期，民众参与和无产阶级领导的结合产生了一种特殊的制度衔接。马克思早在1871年夏天就明确指出，有必要在欧洲和美国建立和支持无产阶级政党(约翰斯通，1971年，第452页；马克思，1986b，第601页)。公社的经验证明了“工人必须组织自己的政党的想法”（Gaido, 2021，第108页）。这一思想构成了1871年秋国际工人协会伦敦会议决议的核心，这些决议后来在1872年秋的海牙会议上被修改为国际工人协会的总规则和管理条例(马克思，1988a；马克思,恩格斯，1988，第243页)。马克思解释说，“协会要求工人参与政治，不仅是在今天，而是在任何时候”（马克思，1986c，第617页）。因此，由马克思和恩格斯撰写的代表大会决议宣布：“为了保证社会革命的胜利和它的最终目的——消灭阶级，工人阶级组成政党是必不可少

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引用次数: 0

Reimagining citizenship: Exploring the intersection of ecofeminism and republicanism through political care and compulsory care service 重新想象公民身份：通过政治关怀和义务关怀服务探索生态女性主义和共和主义的交汇点

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2024-02-28 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12742

Jaeim Park

As the world was hit by COVID-19, care workers were once again recognized as key workers in society, whose primary responsibility is to ensure the survival and well-being of people. Care work is defined as a set of “economic activities in the home, market, community, and state that fit loosely under the rubric of human services” (Folbre, 2006, pp. 11–12). Although care work is frequently performed within households as an unpaid form of labor and is not monetized, the pandemic has revealed a shortage of care supplies and an increasing demand for care. Despite its importance, care work remains one of the lowest-paying occupations in the global capitalist economy. Furthermore, recent studies have indicated that women, both in and outside the formal workforce, continue to bear a disproportionate burden of unpaid care work (Chopra & Zambelli, 2017; Güney-Frahm, 2020; Power, 2020).Given these complexities and contradictions, this article aims to contribute to the adequate recognition of such an essential and ineliminable form of work. Feminist scholars and care theorists have attempted to reframe care as an explicitly political idea (Held, 2018; Kittay, 1999; Noddings, 1984; Robinson, 2010; Ruddick, 1980; Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Tronto, 1993). Previous research about care work has commonly been raised from an enduring critique that the notions of public sphere and citizenship have been plagued by a misogynized democracy deficit.The first section characterizes care work as an essential maintenance activity that stems from human vulnerability. Then the second section shows how both vulnerability and care work are “feminized” and therefore “interiorised” by “imagined invulnerability,” a dominant patriarchal mentality, logic, norm, and discipline of liberal capitalism. The third section, however, argues that care should be a collective concern of all citizens, moving it out of the private sphere and into the realm of politics, by interpreting the Arendtian understanding of “the political” and “public life.” Not only is care already a political issue, but it should also be developed as a sense of citizenship, which this article shall call political care. This is achieved by combining ecofeminist philosophy with the republican understanding of politics and power, so that care work is no longer gendered but seen as a universal interest for all citizens in society. To this end, the article proposes an institution of compulsory care service, given its emphasis on both degendering care work and fostering active citizenship.First and foremost, as humans, we are inherently vulnerable beings. Vulnerability is a defining aspect of our existence and is an inseparable part of what it means to be human. It stems from our corporeality and mortality and encompasses our universal susceptibility to hun

随着全球遭受COVID-19的打击，医护人员再次被认为是社会的关键工作者，其主要责任是确保人们的生存和福祉。护理工作被定义为一套“家庭、市场、社区和国家的经济活动，这些活动大致符合人类服务的范畴”（Folbre, 2006，第11-12页）。虽然护理工作通常是作为一种无报酬的劳动形式在家庭内进行的，而且没有货币化，但大流行表明护理用品短缺，对护理的需求不断增加。尽管护理工作很重要，但它仍然是全球资本主义经济中收入最低的职业之一。此外，最近的研究表明，在正式劳动力市场内外，妇女继续承担着不成比例的无偿护理工作负担(Chopra &amp；Zambelli, 2017;Guney-Frahm, 2020;力量,2020)。鉴于这些复杂性和矛盾，本文旨在有助于充分认识到这种必不可少的和不可消除的工作形式。女权主义学者和护理理论家试图将护理重新定义为一个明确的政治概念(Held, 2018；Kittay, 1999;点头,1984;罗宾逊,2010;鲁迪,1980;Sevenhuijsen, 1998;Tronto, 1993)。先前关于护理工作的研究通常来自于一个持久的批评，即公共领域和公民身份的概念一直受到厌恶女性的民主赤字的困扰。第一部分将护理工作定性为源于人类脆弱性的基本维护活动。然后，第二部分展示了脆弱性和护理工作是如何被“想象的坚不可摧”“内化”的，这是一种占主导地位的父权心态、逻辑、规范和自由资本主义的纪律。然而，第三部分认为，通过解释阿伦特对“政治”和“公共生活”的理解，关怀应该是所有公民的集体关注，将其从私人领域转移到政治领域。关怀不仅已经是一个政治问题，而且还应该发展成为一种公民意识，本文将其称为政治关怀。这是通过将生态女性主义哲学与共和主义对政治和权力的理解相结合来实现的，因此护理工作不再是性别的，而是被视为社会中所有公民的普遍利益。为此，本文提出了一种强制性护理服务制度，它既强调护理工作的性别化，又强调培养积极的公民意识。首先，作为人类，我们天生就是脆弱的。脆弱是我们存在的一个决定性方面，是作为人类不可分割的一部分。它源于我们的肉体和死亡，包括我们对饥饿、口渴、疾病、残疾、不健康和死亡的普遍敏感性（Mackenzie等人，2014年，第7页）。我们的身体限制使我们容易受到各种危险、伤害和危险，使“不稳定”，用巴特勒的话说，成为人类经历中不可避免的一部分（2004年）。脆弱也标志着我们身体的存在与依赖，因为我们在生活中的某些时候都需要别人的关心和帮助，以减轻风险，过上美好的生活。当我们有需要的时候，我们可以依靠别人，也可以向其他脆弱的人提供帮助。护理的定义表明，给予和接受护理是一种集体和公共的体验，而不是单向的或暂时的情况。关心是多维的，在我们的一生中伴随着不同的时间和空间尺度。这样，脆弱和关怀都是必不可少的，也是不可消除的。脆弱性与护理工作之间的联系突出表明，脆弱性往往促使我们发展道德义务，例如护理伦理，以确保那些生活相互依存并受我们所生活的社会和生态环境影响的人的福祉和自主权。通过将脆弱性置于我们的道德义务和社会学习的中心，我们可以创造更多政治上可行和合理的条件，以实现社会正义、民主平等、道德公民、国家责任和生态可持续性，这些都提醒我们“作为公民，我们欠彼此什么”（Mackenzie, 2014, p. 36）。另一个关键方面是，这种维持和修复生命的活动承认我们相互依存的本质，并旨在提高他人的自主性和福祉。长期以来的生态女权主义观点认为，我们不仅依赖于其他人类，也依赖于非人类和自然世界，构成了生命之网。作为关系和脆弱的生物，我们通过组织社会规范和伦理政治义务生活在我们的社区中。集体体验感在民主主义中很重要，因为它创造了宝贵的社会资本，例如公民的积极政治参与，可以为更可持续的福利服务进行审议。虽然强制性护理计划可以在国家一级合法化和制定，但实际做法可以在地方管理，以有效地满足地方需要。这篇文章认为，应该承认脆弱是一种基本的人类状况，是发展以关怀为导向的公民概念的基础。想象中的无懈可击将性别上的脆弱视为一种软弱的、不受欢迎的女性气质，但这篇文章表明，在民主国家，源于我们普遍脆弱的关怀是一种可取的道德品质。虽然普遍性原则和特殊性原则之间存在一些紧张关系，但这篇文章表明，它们不必被视为相互排斥的。我们固有的和不可避免的脆弱性可能暴露于情境性或致病性脆弱性，其动态往往由权力不平等塑造。该条还强调有必要认识到脆弱性的特殊性。权力和责任的概念被用来表明在当前的政治舞台上缺乏关心。缺乏关怀不仅是少数人的道德失误，而且是一个根深蒂固的结构性问题，而自由民主国家的主导政治文化尚未认识到这一问题具有政治相关性。换句话说，必须将护理视为一项公共和共同利益，应在政治领域加以处理。因此，将护理工作去性别化和将以脆弱性为导向的护理概念政治化，应该是将男性对公共生活的看法转变为更具关爱性的观点的起点。具体来说，护理的去性别化和民主化将是将特权与男性的不负责任区分开来的一种方式。从更广泛的角度来看，培养关心的美德可以为规范和制裁权力提供公平的理由，无论是合法的还是不公正的，以解决社会、经济和生态问题。然而，如果没有适当的系统安排的支持，就不能指望个别公民自己实践政治关怀。鉴于此，本文提出了一种潜在的义务医疗服务制度，使公民个人能够有效地实践政治医疗。在这里，护理工作不仅是人类生存的必要劳动，也是一种道德公民的实际实践。强制医疗服务是一种象征女权主义的制度，也受到共和主义的支持，因为它强调积极的公民身份和国家的监管特征。如果我们是绝对独立的，就不需要履行道德义务去照顾有需要的人，也不需要得到别人的关心和关注。生态女性主义伦理学肯定人类与自然世界的关系应该是“开放和细心的”，从而培养“关心和同情的态度”（Matthews, 1994, p. 159）。也就是说，脆弱促使我们采取基于“对人类和非人类他人的关心和同情”的道德行动（Barry, 2012, p. 75）。为了更进一步，生态女权主义者采用了“亲属关系”的概念，认为家庭的范围可以扩展到我们人类和非人类的“亲属”（Mathews, 1994, p. 162）。因此，在人类和非人类亲属相互复杂联网的行星社区中，每个人都可以善良、关心和爱，而不需要用康德的理性概念来证明他们的动机是合理的，康德的理性概念被认为能够实现道德代理（Donovan, 1990, p. 355）。然而，正如我将在下一节中所论证的那样，关怀和同情不应该被视为理所当然，也不应该被认为是内在的积极体验，而是应该首先充分地重新评估，考虑到在自由资本主义世界中，无偿和有偿护理工作的剥削条件往往是其特征。脆弱性不一定是消极的，也不一定总是积极的，而是“矛盾的”和开放式的，“在不同的社会情境中呈现出不同的形式”（Gilson, 2011, p. 310）。认识到脆弱是以矛盾心理为标志的，这与生态女权主义者解构人/自然二元论的努力是平行的，它包含了随后划分理性和情感、男人和女人等的其他二元论(Haraway, 2003；商人,1990年;Plumwood, 1993;斯特拉斯恩,1980)。在这个二元框架中，由脆弱产生的依赖通常被认为是一种消极的、女性化的（反过来也被消极地降级）特征，

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引用次数: 0

Technology, conscience, and the political: Harold Laski's pluralism in Carl Schmitt's intellectual development 技术、良知与政治：哈罗德-拉斯基的多元论与卡尔-施米特的思想发展

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2024-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12735

Florian R. R. van der Zee

引用次数: 0

Democratic self-defense and public sphere institutions 民主自卫和公共领域机构

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2024-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12737

Ludvig Norman, Ludvig Beckman

Contemporary concerns with democratic backsliding and contestation of democratic institutions, even in consolidated democracies, have reignited longstanding debates on how democratic societies should respond to perceived anti-democratic threats and what a principled “democratic self-defense” should look like (Kirshner, 2014; Müller, 2016; Malkopoulou & Norman, 2018; cf. Loewenstein, 1937). The core dilemma in these debates concerns the extent to which restrictions on anti-democratic speech, actors, and their associations can be justified in the interest of protecting the integrity of democratic institutions and strengthening democracy's guardrails.Variations of this dilemma, traditionally concerned with the protection of democratic institutions, have increasingly come to the fore in other arenas of democratic societies. Public sphere institutions such as schools, universities, and public broadcasting organizations, as well as social media platforms have become deeply entangled in discussions on the limits of speech and political action. These institutions are expected, either by convention or legislation, to uphold and reproduce core liberal democratic values while also remaining open to a plurality of views, allowing for the free formation and expression of political ideas. Yet, the existing literature has had less to say about what values should guide decisions to restrict or call out speech deemed to challenge liberal democratic norms in the context of these public sphere institutions.Our concern in this article is to clearly flesh out what core dilemmas of democratic self-defense in the public sphere consist of and theorize the democratic values at stake in this context. Seeing human dignity as a fundamental value for liberal democracy, we argue, helps us to more precisely identify the character of democratic threats in the public sphere, the various ways in which democratic values may be undermined, and in light of that, how public sphere institutions may respond to these challenges.Crucially, the assumption that human dignity is a basic democratic value allows us to identify how legally protected speech can still be highly problematic from a democratic perspective. This is important, we argue, as many of the challenges to liberal democracy involve individual-level harms, instances where the human dignity of individual people is undermined. Key to this argument is theorizing the link between attacks on the equal dignity of citizens and attacks on democracy. We tie human dignity as a democratic value to the respect and status afforded to individuals as members of a political community. Paying attention to this link in the context of democracy helps highlight characteristics of speech that have not received sustained attention in current discussions on militant democracy and democratic self-defense.Our argument emphasizes that some members of democratic soci

当代对民主倒退和民主制度争论的关注，甚至在巩固的民主国家，重新引发了长期以来关于民主社会应如何应对感知到的反民主威胁以及原则性的“民主自卫”应该是什么样子的辩论(Kirshner, 2014；穆勒,2016;Malkopoulou,诺曼,2018;参见Loewenstein， 1937)。这些辩论的核心困境在于，为了保护民主制度的完整性和加强民主的护栏，对反民主言论、行动者及其协会的限制在多大程度上是合理的。这一传统上与保护民主体制有关的困境的各种形式，在民主社会的其他领域日益突出。公共领域机构，如学校、大学和公共广播组织，以及社交媒体平台，已经深深地卷入了关于言论和政治行动限制的讨论中。根据惯例或立法，人们期望这些机构维护和再现自由民主的核心价值，同时对多种观点保持开放，允许自由形成和表达政治思想。然而，在这些公共领域机构的背景下，哪些价值观应该指导限制或呼吁被视为挑战自由民主规范的言论的决定，现有的文献很少提及。我们在这篇文章中关注的是明确地充实公共领域民主自卫的核心困境，并将在此背景下岌岌可危的民主价值理论化。我们认为，将人的尊严视为自由民主的基本价值，有助于我们更准确地识别公共领域中民主威胁的特征，民主价值可能受到破坏的各种方式，以及据此，公共领域机构如何应对这些挑战。至关重要的是，人类尊严是一种基本民主价值的假设，使我们能够认识到，从民主的角度来看，受法律保护的言论如何仍然存在很大的问题。我们认为，这一点很重要，因为对自由民主的许多挑战涉及个人层面的伤害，即个人尊严受到损害的情况。这一论点的关键是将攻击公民平等尊严与攻击民主之间的联系理论化。我们把作为民主价值的人的尊严与作为政治共同体成员给予个人的尊重和地位联系起来。关注民主背景下的这种联系有助于突出在当前关于激进民主和民主自卫的讨论中没有得到持续关注的言论特征。我们的论点强调，民主社会的一些成员比其他人面临更大的风险，因为他们在承认平等地位方面已经处于不稳定的地位。纳入这一见解应对在民主国家“微观层面”打击反民主威胁的战略产生影响。最后，这使我们能够重新思考民主行动者可以通过哪些战略来解决这一困境。我们考虑排他性和表达性策略，并讨论它们如何涉及不同的权衡和困境。本文首先澄清了公共领域中反民主挑战的理论起点。我们将我们的观点与民主理论中关注民主保护的流行观点进行对比。接下来，我们概述了人类尊严作为一种民主价值的重要性，并定义了尊严在公共领域可能受到破坏的主要方式。我们通过讨论公共广播组织、社交媒体平台和教育机构所面临的困境来阐述我们的论点。最后一节概述了在公共领域击退反民主威胁的可用策略，包括排斥性和表达性行动。我们提出了一个支持表达策略的论点，同时强调了两种策略都可以使用的实例，以及公共领域机构应该保持被动的实例。我们的出发点是，当代对民主的威胁需要更多地关注公共领域中民主自卫的困境。公共领域可以被定义为“社会中允许信息、思想和辩论流通的交流空间的星座”（Dahlgren, 2005）。它由正式和非正式机构组成，包括学校和大学（Holmwood, 2017）、公共媒体机构（Iosifidis, 2011）、博物馆（Barrett, 2011）以及越来越多的社交媒体平台（cf. m<e:1>勒，2019）。法律上的禁令，例如在某些民主国家针对反民主政党的禁令，显然超出了公共领域机构的能力范围。然而，这些机构有权设计自己的正式或非正式规范，在符合法律的情况下排除行为者或内容。在实施针对内容、个人或组织的排他性措施时，与侵犯这些行动者的权利有关的风险是众所周知的。如果期望公共领域机构再现包容、公正和开放的规范，并保障言论自由等个人权利，那么排他性做法就会成为问题。除了对个人造成的民主危害外，实施排他性措施还会带来系统性风险。其中最主要的可能是，它们使一个至关重要的公共领域的一个重要组成部分短路，即向社会所有成员提供原则性的信任，以处理和回应该领域所表达的任何观点。建立在个人无能的观念上的公共领域不仅有扼杀公共辩论的风险。它还带来了一些问题，比如在公共领域注入了一种与自治的民主原则背道而驰的家长式逻辑。强制措施，如禁止演员参与和删除某些类型的内容，在实施之前应该非常仔细地考虑。为了从民主的角度评估排斥性措施是否合理，从比传统情况更有区别的角度来考虑排斥性是有用的。在这里，考虑排他性措施所针对的行为者类型，例如私人或组织，可能会得出不同的结论。将攻击或损害其他公民尊严的团体、组织或政党的代表排除在学校、公共场所和社交媒体平台上传播信息并非没有问题。但是，针对作为普通公民而不仅仅是作为政治组织代表的行动者，就有破坏对这些个人的人的尊严的尊重的危险而言，是更为严重的。正如Kirshner（2014）所指出的那样，反民主主义者、种族主义者和极端主义者的政治利益和身份并不仅仅取决于他们对民主制度和价值观的敌意。作为普通公民，他们可能也有独特的政治利益，值得在集体意志形成过程中得到保护和包容。因此，将普通公民全面排除在公共领域的机构之外比将组织代表排除在外更严重地违反了民主规范。将代表排除在特定环境之外所造成的损害也具有更广泛的影响，因为它将更广泛的行为者的观点排除在讨论之外。然而，使关于排他性措施的讨论具有细微差别的另一个方面是考虑制裁的时限，而不是不限期限或无限期的。这些考虑是Meta最近恢复唐纳德·特朗普的Facebook和Instagram账户的部分原因（Meta, 2023）。排他策略也可以针对特定的言论内容或形式。同样，激进的民主人士通常支持法律禁止攻击民主机构或民选代表的言论。纳粹意识形态和宣传一再被欧洲人权法院驳回，许多欧洲宪法允许或要求限制威胁民主制度的“滥用”言论自由（Tsoumidis, 2021）。在社交媒体平台的背景下，这相当于删除内容，而不是“去平台化”。删除内容（通常被称为内容审核）的一个问题是，主要社交媒体平台每天做出的无数此类决定往往是不透明的，几乎没有提供上诉的手段。因此，内容节制正面临着民主合法性的具体挑战。这些挑战可以通过表达性的行动来缓解。公共领域机构有责任为排斥提供理由，并为个人提供申诉的可能性，这一点很重要。因此，表达性行动是实施排他性措施的必要方面。此外，排他性措施本身具有表达性，可用于表明公众可接受的政治行动对直接针对对象之外的行为者的限制。同所有一般原则一样，关于适用这里概述的战略的决定需要考虑到具体情况。对于此类决策至关重要的是特定社会中不同群体之间权力不对称和统治的历史遗产。历史遗产塑造并赋予了什么是非合法化和非人性化，以及它们如何损害个人尊严的实质内容，因此必须为最有利于保护民主价值观的战略提供信息。了解这些遗产将有助于深入了解对人类尊严的威胁的不均衡分布。虽然我们所讨论的困境的具体解决办法取决于它产生的背景，但我们认为，这里发展的一般概念工具对于充分认识所涉及的利害关系和为适合民主社会的反应建模是必不可少的。在本文中，我们通过阐述人类尊严的民主意义，为在公共领域保护民主提供了理论基础。这种观点的转变部分是由于对当代民主社会所面临的各种反民主威胁进行了实证评估。公开的反民主和极端主义政治运动仍然存在，不应忽视。然而，我们在政治行为者中看到一个更严重的问题，他们往往仍然广泛

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引用次数: 0

Manifesting the revolutionary people: The Yellow Vest Movement and popular sovereignty 体现革命的人民：黄背心运动与人民主权

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2024-01-29 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12736

Samuel Hayat

The 2010s ended as they had begun: with mass popular uprisings (Brannen et al., 2020). And as had happened during the Arab Spring and the subsequent democratic movements of the early part of the decade, these protests took place outside of existing organizations such as parties, unions, or associations. In France, Chile, Lebanon, Iraq, Ecuador, Hong Kong, or Algeria, it was as if the people were spontaneously rebelling against rising prices or the encroachment of freedom by their government, which they condemned as belonging to an oligarchy. The French Yellow Vest Movement, which began in November 2018 in opposition to a rise in fuel taxes, seems to have been the inaugural uprising of this wave of protests, and it received massive media coverage in France (Moualek, 2022; Siroux, 2020), as well as early and pronounced scholarly interest (Bendali & Rubert, 2020; Bourmeau, 2019; Confavreux, 2019; Jeanpierre, 2019; Le Bart, 2020; Ravelli, 2020). Yet there was then, and still is, no consensus on the political nature of the movement. Was it a movement of selfish motorists fighting to retain their right to pollute at low cost, or was it about social and environmental justice (Dormagen et al., 2021; Mehleb et al., 2021)? Was it the return of the working class to the center of the political stage or a movement that transcended class distinctions (Bantigny & Hayat, 2019; Gerbaudo, 2023)? Was it an apolitical movement with a series of demands derived from “anger” or “relative deprivation” (Lüders et al., 2021; Morales et al., 2020), or was it secretly controlled by leaders who had a political agenda?1 Was it a populist or popular movement (Bergem, 2022; Guerra et al., 2019; Legris, 2022), right or left (Bendali et al., 2019; Cointet et al., 2021; Collectif d'enquête sur les Gilets jaunes, 2019)? Was it just another episode in the long history of protest in France, or was it an unprecedented movement aiming at nothing less than a brand new social contract (Devellennes, 2021)?How can we make sense of this apparent impossibility of grasping what the Yellow Vest Movement really wanted? It seems that the Yellow Vests were not really heard, not because they did not speak—they were avidly invited onto TV shows, interviewed in newspapers, and many of them had tirelessly documented their own activity on social networks, especially Facebook (Baisnée et al., 2022; Souillard et al., 2020)—but because they did not speak appropriately political language, i.e., language that would have been transparent and easy to categorize for professional political commentators such as journalists and academics. Indeed, when they spoke, some of

2010年代的结束与开始一样：大规模的民众起义（Brannen et al., 2020）。正如阿拉伯之春和本世纪初随后的民主运动所发生的那样，这些抗议活动发生在政党、工会或协会等现有组织之外。在法国、智利、黎巴嫩、伊拉克、厄瓜多尔、香港或阿尔及利亚，人们似乎自发地反抗物价上涨或政府侵犯自由，他们谴责政府属于寡头政治。法国黄背心运动始于2018年11月，旨在反对提高燃油税，似乎是这波抗议浪潮的首次起义，并在法国获得了大量媒体报道(Moualek, 2022；Siroux, 2020)，以及早期和明显的学术兴趣(Bendali &amp；Rubert, 2020;Bourmeau, 2019;Confavreux, 2019;Jeanpierre, 2019;勒巴特，2020；Ravelli, 2020)。然而，对于这场运动的政治性质，无论是当时还是现在，都没有达成共识。这是一场自私的驾驶者争取以低成本保留污染权利的运动，还是关于社会和环境正义的运动(Dormagen et al., 2021；Mehleb et al., 2021)？是工人阶级重新回到政治舞台的中心，还是一场超越阶级差别的运动(班蒂尼&安培；是,2019;Gerbaudo 2023) ?它是一场非政治性的运动，其一系列要求源于“愤怒”或“相对剥夺”(l<s:1> ders等人，2021；莫拉莱斯等人，2020)，还是由有政治议程的领导人秘密控制？它是民粹主义还是大众运动(Bergem, 2022；Guerra等人，2019；Legris, 2022)，右或左(Bendali et al., 2019；Cointet et al., 2021；收藏'enquête sur les Gilets jaunes, 2019)？这是法国漫长的抗议历史中的又一个插曲，还是一场史无前例的运动，旨在建立一种全新的社会契约（Devellennes, 2021）？我们如何理解这种明显不可能理解黄背心运动真正想要的是什么？似乎黄背心并没有真正被听到，并不是因为他们没有说话——他们被热切地邀请上电视节目，接受报纸采访，他们中的许多人不知倦地记录了他们在社交网络上的活动，尤其是Facebook (baisnsamae et al., 2022；Souillard et al., 2020)——但因为他们没有使用适当的政治语言，即对于记者和学者等专业政治评论员来说，透明且易于分类的语言。事实上，当他们说话时，在现代政治中被称为真正的政治语言的一些基本要素是缺失的。首先，在现代政治中，政治语言是政治代表专业人士的语言(Bourdieu, 1991b；Gaxie, 1978)，而在黄背心运动中，一切都是为了没有代表，没有代表(Hayat, 2022；Lefebvre, 2019)。第二，现代政治语言的两极化和意识形态化。但“黄背心”运动的语言缺乏政治标记：没有宣言，很少有口号和口号，没有集中的决策程序——尽管一些由长期活跃分子组成的团体提出了一些倡议（Ravelli et al., 2020）——运动拒绝左右分歧或任何形式的党派关系（Bedock et al., 2020）。这种代表性和党派关系的双重缺失并不是缺乏（例如，由于无能），而是一种积极主动的“制度性政治回避”（Reungoat et al., 2022）。在本文中，我将表明，他们拒绝在政治上定位自己与对人民主权的特殊理解有关。事实上，伴随着多场表演，黄背心将自己表现为主权人民，向他们的代表，特别是总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙（Emmanuel Macron）发表讲话，他们指责马克龙背叛了他们的使命。出于这个原因，政治理论的工具，特别是对人民主权概念的分析，它的不同含义，它们的历史和政治含义，可以帮助我们理解这场运动，而不是表面上对其形式的混淆。将“黄背心”抗议视为一种声称行使人民主权的某种方式，有助于理解这场看似多面性的运动，或许还可以延伸到2010年代的其他民众抗议活动。反过来，描述他们如何思考和执行人民主权丰富了我们对这一概念的理论理解，为对话带来了新的参与者。这种政治理论与社会现实之间的反复是基于问题的政治理论的一部分，其中政治理论的有效性是通过其解决经验问题的实用能力来检验的(Mansbridge, 2023；沃伦,2017)。这一因素导致一些“黄背心”采取了非法行动，例如占领公共空间，封锁高速公路和收费站，在未经授权的每周示威活动中进行各种形式的破坏，烧毁各县，威胁议会成员——大多数社会运动早已不再采取这些行动（Tartakowsky, 1989）。另一方面，当被问及他们的要求时，从他们的提议中浮现出的画面作为人民的意志并不是革命性的，至少在20世纪激进社会运动的要求方面，特别是他们对民主的理解(Hardt &amp；Negri, 2005;Laclau,Mouffe, 2001;帕特曼，1970;)。“黄背心”主张的是一种可以被称为功能代议制民主的制度，代表的特权比今天要少，并建立机制，允许公民对以他们的名义所做的事情做出判断，有时还可以通过公投直接表达他们的意愿。这场运动的手段和目的之间的明显不匹配，可能源于政治新手占主导地位，他们不熟悉适当的抗议形式。但这种有点家长式的论点只是转移了一个问题：为什么新来者会在这种情况下进入政界，并声称自己是主权人民？也许这与当前代议制民主的转型有关，尤其是公民让政客听到自己声音的能力正在下降。在代议制民主中，最重要的是在两次选举之间让公民表达对他们的代表的判断。这对于代表制的正常运作是必要的，因为任何代议制都需要制度化的回应形式（Pitkin, 1972），但也有具体的民主原因。正如Nadia Urbani所说，民主代表制要求“主权人民保留一种消极的权力，允许他们调查、判断、影响和谴责他们的立法者”（Urbinati, 2006，第28页）。然而，在大多数代议制政府中，包括法兰西共和国，政党是组织这种公民控制的唯一制度化手段（Manin, 1997）。但是，当人们不再相信这些政党能够做到这一点时，公民就必须诉诸于对他们的代表进行直接质询的形式，而不是作为党员，而是作为全体选民。因此，对法国大革命传统的呼吁有了另一种含义。作为选民的行动不仅是一种被视为合法的手段，而且还恢复了久违的人民控制的革命机制。事实上，无套裤汉可以被视为主权人民的象征，他们作为人民主权的承担者，并利用这一地位对他们的代表进行控制。从历史上看，无套裤汉通常不会要求在所有问题上直接行使主权（Guermazi, 2017）。他们认为他们的主要政治角色是“对权力中心施加压力”（Lucas, 1988，第448页），这意味着试图主要通过请愿来影响公约，并且对于他们更激进的成员来说，“发展一种政治制度，在这种制度下，人民可以对政治统治进行“检查”（von Eggers, 2016，第255页）。”他们的角色——这在很大程度上是雅各宾派（Jacobins）对他们的看法，甚至是对他们的构建（Burstin, 2005）——不是取代议会，而是监督它，确保代表们捍卫普遍利益，而不是他们自己或富人的利益，有时还会就通过的法律征求意见。这种对主权的理解在很大程度

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