<p>At the heart of the science of early life adversity—past and present—is the discursive power of “age.” As a measure of time, age operates not only to separate childhood from adulthood but also to conjure fictions that anchor the temporality of Western modernity, meaning developmental time as the normative gauge of progress and improvement (Ibrahim, <span>2021</span>, p. 30). The way that early life adversity is narrated today can help us to grasp the extent to which the present continues to move “in the wake” (Sharpe, <span>2016</span>) of this temporality. As to the question of why this matters, I would simply add the word “still.” The approach to critical inquiry that Horkheimer and Adorno exemplify in their <i>Dialectic of enlightenment</i> (<span>2002</span>), for example, which is comparable to Foucault's archaeology of knowledge (<span>2002, 1972</span>), still matters. What these thinkers share is an attitude of refusal—a refusal to settle for the world as it is, hence the need to take up a critical relationship to the present and to ourselves. If we can grasp how we have come to be who and what we are as subjects, then it might be possible to be otherwise, thereby cracking open a new world from within the shell of the old. This is what Foucault had in mind when he characterized critique as a “historical ontology of ourselves,” meaning an “attitude” that engages critically with the present (<span>1984</span>, p. 49). It has to be said, however, that Horkheimer and Adorno's present was not quite the same as Foucault's, and his present is not ours. So, context changes, yet the questions that critical theory poses endure: What stands in the way of a transformative politics, and how might critical theory respond?</p><p>As I aim to show in this article, the contemporary science of early life adversity runs the risk of sustaining the power relations that are entangled in the temporality of Western modernity (which is not to suggest that all associated researchers and practitioners are culpable; this is surely not the case)—power relations that traverse not just childhood and adulthood, but also class, gender, and racialized inequalities. Reading Nidesh Lawtoo's <i>Homo mimeticus</i> and Saidiya Hartman's <i>Wayward lives</i> together offers a critical response to this situation, but there is a “but,” and this concerns Lawtoo's way of figuring an “anti-mimetic” mode of resistant agency.</p><p>In what follows I present a three-way dialogue (of sorts), by thinking between and across Lawtoo, Hartman, and the contemporary science of early life adversity, which will be presented as NEAR science, encompassing Neuroscience, Epigenetics, Adverse Childhood Experiences, and Resilience. I caution against the move that Lawtoo makes in aligning the figure of <i>Homo mimeticus</i> to NEAR science, arguing that Hartman's method of “critical fabulism” affords greater critical traction in teasing out of the radical potential of mimesis as a way of thinking a p
早期生活逆境科学的核心——过去和现在——是“年龄”的话语力量。作为时间的衡量标准，年龄不仅将童年与成年分开，而且还虚构了一些小说，这些小说锚定了西方现代性的时间性，这意味着发展时间是进步和改进的规范尺度（Ibrahim, 2021，第30页）。今天对早期生活逆境的叙述方式可以帮助我们把握当下在多大程度上继续“跟随”这种时间性（Sharpe, 2016）。至于为什么这很重要，我会简单地加上“仍然”这个词。例如，霍克海默和阿多诺在他们的启蒙辩证法（2002）中例证的批判性探究方法，与福柯的知识考古学（2002,1972）相当，仍然很重要。这些思想家所共有的是一种拒绝的态度——拒绝满足于世界的现状，因此需要对现在和我们自己采取一种批判性的关系。如果我们能理解作为主体，我们是如何成为这样的人，成为什么样的人，那么就有可能改变现状，从而从旧世界的外壳中打开一个新世界。当福柯将批判描述为“我们自己的历史本体论”时，这就是他所想到的，意思是一种批判性地与现在接触的“态度”（1984，第49页）。然而，必须说的是，霍克海默和阿多诺的“现在”与福柯的“现在”并不完全相同，他的“现在”也不是我们的。因此，语境发生了变化，但批判理论提出的问题依然存在：是什么阻碍了政治变革，批判理论又会如何回应？正如我在这篇文章中想要表明的那样，关于早期生活逆境的当代科学存在着维持权力关系的风险，这种关系与西方现代性的暂时性纠缠在一起(这并不是说所有相关的研究人员和实践者都是有罪的；当然不是这样的)——权力关系不仅跨越童年和成年，而且跨越阶级、性别和种族化的不平等。读奈德什·劳图的《猿人》和赛迪亚·哈特曼的《生活在一起的人》，对这种情况提供了一种批判性的回应，但这里有一个“但是”，这涉及到劳图对抵抗机构的“反模仿”模式的思考方式。在接下来的内容中，我将通过在Lawtoo， Hartman和早期生活逆境的当代科学之间和之间进行思考，呈现一种三方对话（各种对话），这将作为近科学呈现，包括神经科学，表观遗传学，不良童年经历和弹性。我对劳图将拟人的形象与近距离科学联系起来的举动提出了警告，我认为哈特曼的“批判神话论”方法在梳理拟人作为一种思考拒绝政治的方式的激进潜力方面提供了更大的批判牵引力通过设定场景和确定什么是危险的，我以一个例子开始，即过去如何叙述早期生活的逆境，以及科学如何从事实主张中塑造规范的小说。这将为我所说的“虚构的政治”提供一个初步的近似。在1904年出版的《青春期》第一卷的序言中，美国发展心理学的先驱之一g·斯坦利·霍尔（G. Stanley Hall）介绍了手头问题的关键，即“对新环境的适应性可塑性”（第7页）。霍尔是新拉马克主义者，他将拉马克关于通过使用和不使用获得特征遗传的理论（也称为软遗传）与重述理论结合起来。该理论认为个体发育（个体生物的胚胎发育）复制了系统发育（物种的进化祖先）（古尔德，1977年，第82页）。所讨论的环境——这是过去开始照亮现在的地方——是一个加速社会和文化变革的环境。从霍尔项目的有利位置来看，这产生了有利于进化的“个体和种族的停滞和迟缓”的条件（霍尔，1904，第viii页）。因此，霍尔对童年感兴趣，它提供了在儿童的“适应性可塑性”表现为不道德、任性和犯罪之前掌握生活的可能性。关于应该做些什么来抵消发展“停滞”和进化“倒退”的危险，霍尔建议“保护，身体护理，道德和智力指导”（1904，第47页）。就社会支持而言，在实践中，这是一种儿童保护模式，以针对倾向于抵制或拒绝提供帮助的儿童和家庭的强制性控制为后盾(见Garlock, 1979；希克斯,2003)。关于这一点，我稍后会说得更多。 我需要强调这一点：哈特曼的作品是一个警世故事，讲述了社会逆境如何被话语编码、沟通和组织成社会实践的利害关系，特别是当另类模仿倾向和关系被自诩的秩序保管人——以权威的专业知识为武装——视为“滥交、鲁莽、狂野和任性”时，会发生什么（哈特曼，2019，第xvi页）。似乎这并没有美化事实，也注意到“有弹性”的孩子的形象锚定了一个妥协的“逆境”符号学，维持了它自己的物质存在。哈特曼的工作解决了猿人项目的一个空白。哈特曼虚构的生活追寻着一种对距离的模仿之情，这种距离为其他的生活、其他的世界打开了可能，否则就无法赎回。为了呼应福柯，在面对残酷和不公正时开辟一条错误的道路是实践一种“存在的美学”（2011，第190页）。通过一种关系的、具体的和情感的替代模仿来实践一种集体存在的美学，就是居住在政治和美学之间的门槛上。正如哈特曼所说，这是一场小调的革命。 在时间方面，霍尔优先考虑了青春期（因此他的书的标题），因为他相信青春期是一个发展阶段，在这个阶段，进化的适应能力被环境压力所超越为了对抗发展停滞和进化倒退的威胁，“适应性可塑性”必须由自封的设想规范未来的建筑师来指导和管理。这种童年的园艺概念绝不是新的（见Mintz， 2018），但这与独创性无关。它是关于编写一个引人入胜的故事，让人们采取行动。在问题的背景下，一系列跨越教育倡议，科学研究和社会工作的行动合并为儿童研究运动(围攻&；白色,1982;也叫Platt， 1969)。霍尔也不是第一个声称未来犯罪和堕落的原因在于早期生活经历和环境的人(例如，Carpenter, 1851；麦克洛克,1988)。事实证明，他也不会是最后一个。在过去一个世纪左右的时间里，霍尔提出的解释框架已经从强调系统发生转变为强调个体发生，开启了对童年时期体现的可塑性的新兴趣（Ryan， 2020年，2021年），以及对早期生活经验作为未来行为问题来源的兴趣日益增加（见Two Fuse， 2022年）。今天，早期生活的逆境是一个新兴科学范式的焦点，有时通过首字母缩略词NEAR science进行交流，并以逆境和弹性的生物学(Boyce等人，2021；Shonkoff et al., 2021a)。就像一个世纪前的儿童研究运动一样，关于早期生活逆境的当代科学通过故事来编造事实，这些故事为一个从数据汇总中产生的准虚构的童年提供了外衣。这种虚构的聚合充满了规范性，在档案中盘旋而回。如果我们倾听这段历史——我们应该这样做，在接下来的篇章中我们也会这样做——那么我们就会发现有理由保持警惕，因为近距离科学与其历史上的前辈一样，都是对偏离规范的矫形反应，这种反应深深烙印在童年的生命政治学中。作为对当代早期生活逆境科学的一种批判性优势的一种方式，我将仔细阅读哈特曼的《流浪生活》（2019）和劳图的《猿人》（2022c）。哈特曼的“批判神话”方法将镜头对准了犯罪和任性。例如，梅布尔·汉普顿（Mabel Hampton）是一位年轻女性，在儿童学习运动如日中天的时候，她经历了现在被认为是早期生活的逆境。下面我将详细讨论她的故事（由哈特曼介绍）。现在需要注意的是，在讲述梅布尔的故事时——《任性的生活》中充斥着许多“骚乱的黑人女孩、麻烦的女人和酷儿激进分子的亲密历史”——哈特曼也虚构了事实，但在某种程度上与虚构的科学形成了鲜明的对比。哈特曼的方法从一开始就假设，不可能通过使用诸如“任性”这样的规范类别来检索那些被写进历史边缘的人的生活。为了对抗以这种方式编码的生活被沉默的方式，需要一种完全不同的策略，这种策略
{"title":"Homo mimeticus, Wayward lives, and The biology of adversity and resilience: Early life adversity and the politics of fabulation","authors":"Kevin Ryan","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12762","url":null,"abstract":"<p>At the heart of the science of early life adversity—past and present—is the discursive power of “age.” As a measure of time, age operates not only to separate childhood from adulthood but also to conjure fictions that anchor the temporality of Western modernity, meaning developmental time as the normative gauge of progress and improvement (Ibrahim, <span>2021</span>, p. 30). The way that early life adversity is narrated today can help us to grasp the extent to which the present continues to move “in the wake” (Sharpe, <span>2016</span>) of this temporality. As to the question of why this matters, I would simply add the word “still.” The approach to critical inquiry that Horkheimer and Adorno exemplify in their <i>Dialectic of enlightenment</i> (<span>2002</span>), for example, which is comparable to Foucault's archaeology of knowledge (<span>2002, 1972</span>), still matters. What these thinkers share is an attitude of refusal—a refusal to settle for the world as it is, hence the need to take up a critical relationship to the present and to ourselves. If we can grasp how we have come to be who and what we are as subjects, then it might be possible to be otherwise, thereby cracking open a new world from within the shell of the old. This is what Foucault had in mind when he characterized critique as a “historical ontology of ourselves,” meaning an “attitude” that engages critically with the present (<span>1984</span>, p. 49). It has to be said, however, that Horkheimer and Adorno's present was not quite the same as Foucault's, and his present is not ours. So, context changes, yet the questions that critical theory poses endure: What stands in the way of a transformative politics, and how might critical theory respond?</p><p>As I aim to show in this article, the contemporary science of early life adversity runs the risk of sustaining the power relations that are entangled in the temporality of Western modernity (which is not to suggest that all associated researchers and practitioners are culpable; this is surely not the case)—power relations that traverse not just childhood and adulthood, but also class, gender, and racialized inequalities. Reading Nidesh Lawtoo's <i>Homo mimeticus</i> and Saidiya Hartman's <i>Wayward lives</i> together offers a critical response to this situation, but there is a “but,” and this concerns Lawtoo's way of figuring an “anti-mimetic” mode of resistant agency.</p><p>In what follows I present a three-way dialogue (of sorts), by thinking between and across Lawtoo, Hartman, and the contemporary science of early life adversity, which will be presented as NEAR science, encompassing Neuroscience, Epigenetics, Adverse Childhood Experiences, and Resilience. I caution against the move that Lawtoo makes in aligning the figure of <i>Homo mimeticus</i> to NEAR science, arguing that Hartman's method of “critical fabulism” affords greater critical traction in teasing out of the radical potential of mimesis as a way of thinking a p","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"32 1","pages":"169-183"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12762","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143581534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The external world and the future of political theory","authors":"J. Mohorčich","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12761","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"32 1","pages":"154-168"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143581402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>This paper responds to the call in social philosophy to retheorize or reconceptualize the economy. For at least 40 years, social philosophy has displaced “the economy” as the site of social theory and normative argument. Today, philosophers are trying to work their way back into a critique of political economy, given the increasing centrality of political-economic processes to what scholars are referring to as a “polycrisis” in contemporary political experience (Tooze, <span>2018</span>). I argue that a central obstacle to reviving this form of social criticism is that a range of philosophers and social theorists remain committed to a Weberian view of how the economy fits into social life that perpetuates this displacement effect. My position will be counterintuitive to many, as it is common to think that it is Marx's influence on critical theory, not Weber's, that does so by narrowing one's scope of concern. By contrast, I claim that reconstructing Marxian structuralism is what is needed, but on pragmatist rather than functionalist grounds.</p><p>The steps in my argument are as follows: First, I focus on what is known as critical theory, descending from the Frankfurt School, to show that this tradition has always had a problem regarding how it conceptualizes the economy, how it incorporates that conception into social theory, and, therefore, how it evaluates it. In brief, “the economy” as such is a conceptual and normative weak point. It is not, nor has it been, straightforwardly the central object of social analysis. This lineage inherits from Max Weber the idea of instrumental reason to its detriment, which is what—counterintuitively—displaces the economy from view. Second, I depict Weber's view of the economy as a fork in the road for social theory to illuminate an alternative, and I argue that what is known as the “pragmatist turn” in social philosophy is a promising, yet insufficient way of realizing this alternative. Finally, I propose a view that I call structuralist pragmatism to bring classical Marxian insights into a pragmatist framework.</p><p>I will begin with some explanation for my starting point since social philosophy has come under increasing pressure to justify its methodology with respect to what lineages of thought it does or does not bring to bear on a theoretical problem. As I am writing about the economy, one may want to know why I begin with the usual suspects in German critical theory rather than more subterranean strands of thinking within or outside Europe. Indeed, I imagine that, say, neither analytical Marxist nor decolonial thinkers would prefer to rehash the Frankfurt School's theoretical influence. Nonetheless, my reason is agenda-setting: There is a way of conceptualizing and evaluating the economy that emerged from this tradition that shapes a terrain of inquiry and how theorists try to intervene on it. In brief, I want to explain why and how the concept of instrumental reason displaces political-economic thi
本文响应了社会哲学界对经济重新理论化或重新概念化的呼吁。至少40年来，社会哲学已经取代“经济”成为社会理论和规范论证的场所。今天，哲学家们正试图回到对政治经济学的批判中，因为政治经济过程日益成为学者们所说的当代政治经验中的“多重危机”（Tooze, 2018）。我认为，恢复这种形式的社会批评的一个主要障碍是，一系列哲学家和社会理论家仍然致力于韦伯的观点，即经济如何适应社会生活，使这种位移效应永久化。我的立场可能与许多人的直觉相反，因为人们通常认为是马克思对批判理论的影响，而不是韦伯的影响，通过缩小人们的关注范围来实现这一点。相比之下，我主张重建马克思的结构主义是必要的，但基于实用主义而不是功能主义的基础。我的论证步骤如下：首先，我关注从法兰克福学派传承下来的所谓批判理论，以表明这一传统在如何概念化经济、如何将这一概念纳入社会理论以及如何对其进行评估等方面一直存在问题。简而言之，“经济”本身就是一个概念和规范上的弱点。它不是，也一直不是社会分析的直接中心对象。这一谱系继承了马克斯•韦伯（Max Weber）的工具理性（instrumental reason）观点，但对其不利，这是与直觉相反的，它将经济从视野中取代了。其次，我将韦伯的经济观点描述为社会理论阐明另一种选择的岔路口，我认为社会哲学中所谓的“实用主义转向”是一种有希望的，但不足以实现这种选择的方式。最后，我提出了一种我称之为结构主义实用主义的观点，将经典马克思主义的见解带入实用主义框架。我将首先对我的出发点进行一些解释，因为社会哲学正面临着越来越大的压力，需要证明它的方法论是正确的，即它在理论问题上采用或不采用何种思想谱系。当我写关于经济的文章时，人们可能想知道，为什么我从德国批判理论中常见的疑点开始，而不是从欧洲内外更隐秘的思考入手。事实上，我认为，无论是分析马克思主义者还是非殖民化思想家，都不愿意重提法兰克福学派的理论影响。尽管如此，我的理由是议程设置：有一种概念化和评估经济的方法，从这种传统中出现，形成了一个探索的领域，理论家们如何试图干预它。简而言之，我想解释工具理性的概念为什么以及如何通过将经济排除在人们的直接视野之外来取代政治经济思维。我的观点影响了法兰克福学派以外的社会哲学家，因为他们对资本主义制度的独特批判是哲学家如何与政治经济学或社会思想中的马克思主义传统联系起来的旗手。如果有人看到他们的方法使经济黯然失色，而不是与经济接轨，那么他可能会对政治经济学的重要假设提出质疑。在某种程度上，我对经济的看法反映了佩里·安德森（Perry Anderson, 1976）在《西方马克思主义思考》（Considerations on Western Marxism）中提出的一个论点，当时他描述了“经济或政治结构作为理论中心关注点的逐步放弃是如何伴随着欧洲马克思主义的整个重心向哲学的基本转移”（第49页）。安德森描述了马克思主义从政党和工人组织进入大学的运动，特别是进入哲学主席的领域，这些哲学主席被阶级、世代和主要对话者从早期的政治马克思主义传统中分离出来，后者成为资产阶级思想和文化，而不是社会主义思想和文化。根据安德森的说法，这一轨迹是马克思主义与社会主义思想和人民革命“长期分离”的结果，这形成了主要在意大利、法国和德国成为西方马克思主义的理论形式。此后，它开始沉迷于方法和前马克思哲学的影响。读这篇文章可能会让很多人感到惊讶，就像我一样，因为它说西方马克思主义在进入哲学的初期就避开了经济、国家和革命的传统主题。 事实上，一个成功的劳工运动需要做大量的规范重构和包容，以凝聚自己作为一股社会力量，并向公众施压。但是，对于规范是什么以及规范能做什么，这种宽泛的想法可能会让人轻信是什么让一些冲突的根源变得根深蒂固或看似难以解决。换句话说，它有可能对机构和结构的改革能力过于乐观，因此对这些结构的批评不够。社会对规范包容的渴望可能在某些方面超越了它所处的制度形式，使政治代理人不知所措，不知道如何分析这些形式约束他们的方式。女权主义给我的印象就是一个明显的例子。在过去的50年里，性别规范发生了巨大的变化，但在大多数地方，这些变化并没有带来普遍的产前护理、儿童保育或同等数量的育儿假——或者根本没有。但是，即使是唯物主义实用主义也尚未解决结构主义反对的实质问题。如果重新定义经济概念的部分动机是为了理解当前重叠的社会危机，那么拥有一个广泛的经济概念只是解决了分析问题的一个方面。“广度”对外部性逻辑提出了有价值的挑战，因为它坚持打破实践理性和所谓工具理性之间的任意区分。社会理论和分析开辟了一个新的领域，人们可能会问人们如何在战略上和规范上与微观和宏观经济约束联系起来。工人阶级的世界不再是一个具有政治重要性的物化的资本主义主体性的世界，因为它阻碍了知识分子或那些尚未融入其大众文化的人的解放目标。的确，新兴的后新自由主义时代的独特之处在于，没有一个人可以干预的大众政治来质疑资本为解决社会问题而设定的条件，也没有一个单一的文化空间。我认为，这种背景在某种程度上助长了我们的危机感。打开黑盒子作为实践的纽带，可能会在某种程度上了解一些关于自启蒙辩证法所代表的世纪中叶以来社会发展的新情况。另一方面，宽度可能会让人迷失方向。它有可能使重新定义事物的分析任务在没有获得对资本主义制度逻辑的理解的情况下结束。通过系统逻辑，我指的是政治主体如何相互定位以及这种定位如何创造政治机会结构。例如，扩大一个人对经济的理解，将传统上由女性完成的看护工作包括在内，这几乎没有什么作用，只会表明社会对它的低估；也就是说，只要这种重新定义的活动不被整合到对其商品化程度和限制的理解中。一旦一个人把护理工作看作是一种全部或部分的特殊商品，那么他就已经进入了《资本论》第一卷的第二部分，在那里马克思邀请人们以劳动出现在我们面前的方式来询问劳动的先决条件，然后下降到对资本主义运动规律的调查。结构主义者的反对意见很简单：那又怎样？关于社会世界的规律，实践告诉了我们什么，使我们能够更好地理解在哪里进行政治干预？批判理论中的实用主义转向就像是介于法兰克福学派的韦伯起源和历史唯物主义之间的中途之家。它看到了前者的局限性，但拒绝重新审视经典马克思主义的主题，如资本主义的运动规律、国家、阶级冲突和帝国主义。这种拒绝并不令人惊讶，因为正如安德森指出的那样，这些主题从未真正进入过它们的轨道。此外，社会理论中的后结构主义转向使得这些主题似乎难以触及。换句话说，问题不只是狭隘。外部性的逻辑也使宏观经济过程非政治化，如竞争、积累、货币政策、贸易失衡、移民、人口统计等。它使它们看起来像是被社会理论所包含的东西或者被哲学家重新定义为另一种问题，而不是通过集体行动作为政治问题来挑战。对于社会理论和哲学来说，这种宏观经济过程的永久偏离是一个问题，只要它们都不能评估这些过程如何以及为什么以它们所做的方式出现在我们面前。于是批判理论又回到了结构主义的轨道上。多重危机的出现，完全是因为人们认为构成经济的社会实践是正常的。 这种常态是一种关于经济应该如何运作的监管理念——一系列实践是否按照“应有”的方式运作。人们应该如何描述这种联系呢？作为结构或系统逻辑。没有人比南希·弗雷泽（Nancy Fraser）更了解这个结构主义者的观点。她的资
{"title":"Making sense of critical theory's economic gap","authors":"Lillian Cicerchia","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12758","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper responds to the call in social philosophy to retheorize or reconceptualize the economy. For at least 40 years, social philosophy has displaced “the economy” as the site of social theory and normative argument. Today, philosophers are trying to work their way back into a critique of political economy, given the increasing centrality of political-economic processes to what scholars are referring to as a “polycrisis” in contemporary political experience (Tooze, <span>2018</span>). I argue that a central obstacle to reviving this form of social criticism is that a range of philosophers and social theorists remain committed to a Weberian view of how the economy fits into social life that perpetuates this displacement effect. My position will be counterintuitive to many, as it is common to think that it is Marx's influence on critical theory, not Weber's, that does so by narrowing one's scope of concern. By contrast, I claim that reconstructing Marxian structuralism is what is needed, but on pragmatist rather than functionalist grounds.</p><p>The steps in my argument are as follows: First, I focus on what is known as critical theory, descending from the Frankfurt School, to show that this tradition has always had a problem regarding how it conceptualizes the economy, how it incorporates that conception into social theory, and, therefore, how it evaluates it. In brief, “the economy” as such is a conceptual and normative weak point. It is not, nor has it been, straightforwardly the central object of social analysis. This lineage inherits from Max Weber the idea of instrumental reason to its detriment, which is what—counterintuitively—displaces the economy from view. Second, I depict Weber's view of the economy as a fork in the road for social theory to illuminate an alternative, and I argue that what is known as the “pragmatist turn” in social philosophy is a promising, yet insufficient way of realizing this alternative. Finally, I propose a view that I call structuralist pragmatism to bring classical Marxian insights into a pragmatist framework.</p><p>I will begin with some explanation for my starting point since social philosophy has come under increasing pressure to justify its methodology with respect to what lineages of thought it does or does not bring to bear on a theoretical problem. As I am writing about the economy, one may want to know why I begin with the usual suspects in German critical theory rather than more subterranean strands of thinking within or outside Europe. Indeed, I imagine that, say, neither analytical Marxist nor decolonial thinkers would prefer to rehash the Frankfurt School's theoretical influence. Nonetheless, my reason is agenda-setting: There is a way of conceptualizing and evaluating the economy that emerged from this tradition that shapes a terrain of inquiry and how theorists try to intervene on it. In brief, I want to explain why and how the concept of instrumental reason displaces political-economic thi","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"32 1","pages":"83-96"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12758","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143581404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>In 2000, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation tackled an issue concerning the American education system: unsatisfactory high school graduation rates and college entry rates, especially in urban school districts (Ravitch, <span>2011</span>). Between 2000 and 2008, this foundation donated more than $2 billion to 2600 schools across 45 US states. Bill and Melinda Gates's aim was clearly spelled out: they saw the K−12<sup>1</sup> education system as “obsolete”<sup>2</sup> and in need of drastic reforms (Ravitch, <span>2011</span>). The Gates Foundation's leaders observed that some schools in the United States could host up to 4000 or 5000 pupils, leading to the neglect of a portion of students who needed extra attention. Based on contemporary research and already-existing movements in civil society,<sup>3</sup> they concluded that smaller schools were the key to students’ success.</p><p>In a context of public budget cuts, not many school boards could refuse a multimillion-dollar philanthropic donation. Hence, the Gates Foundation started to distribute money all over the United States, tying its gifts to conditions that would promote an effectiveness-based conception of education. At first, schools were asked to restructure and split themselves into independent units of no more than 400 students. Later, performance-based pay for teachers and national-standards tests, serving as effectiveness yardsticks, became mandatory for funding.</p><p>Although this system benefited some schools, it created more problems than it solved in the great majority of cases. For example, the fragmentation of large schools into small autonomous units increased conflict and competition for resources and deprived students of a significant range of activities that were only provided in larger institutions. Praised in the beginning, the Gates program was sharply criticized in 2005 when the first evaluations came out. In 2008, the foundation's directors recognized the bad start of their program and mostly put the blame on the lack of receptivity of the schools they helped or on teachers’ lack of competence. A few months later, the foundation decided to all but shut the program down.</p><p>In a democracy, there are good reasons to believe that the making of collectively binding decisions about such public goods as school infrastructures, education programs, and teachers’ salary should be carried out by citizens or people who speak in their name. However, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation's case shows a sense in which some people or organizations, by virtue of their private resources, have an additional and sometimes larger say on such questions. This raises the question whether the logics of democracy and philanthropy are compatible. The question is more pressing because philanthropic donations are generally tax subsidized, representing therefore a redirection of public money (Pevnick, <span>2013</span>) toward aims likely to advance donors’ personal interests.</p><p>Poli
{"title":"Philanthropy and democracy: Two kinds of authority","authors":"Matthieu Debief","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12759","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In 2000, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation tackled an issue concerning the American education system: unsatisfactory high school graduation rates and college entry rates, especially in urban school districts (Ravitch, <span>2011</span>). Between 2000 and 2008, this foundation donated more than $2 billion to 2600 schools across 45 US states. Bill and Melinda Gates's aim was clearly spelled out: they saw the K−12<sup>1</sup> education system as “obsolete”<sup>2</sup> and in need of drastic reforms (Ravitch, <span>2011</span>). The Gates Foundation's leaders observed that some schools in the United States could host up to 4000 or 5000 pupils, leading to the neglect of a portion of students who needed extra attention. Based on contemporary research and already-existing movements in civil society,<sup>3</sup> they concluded that smaller schools were the key to students’ success.</p><p>In a context of public budget cuts, not many school boards could refuse a multimillion-dollar philanthropic donation. Hence, the Gates Foundation started to distribute money all over the United States, tying its gifts to conditions that would promote an effectiveness-based conception of education. At first, schools were asked to restructure and split themselves into independent units of no more than 400 students. Later, performance-based pay for teachers and national-standards tests, serving as effectiveness yardsticks, became mandatory for funding.</p><p>Although this system benefited some schools, it created more problems than it solved in the great majority of cases. For example, the fragmentation of large schools into small autonomous units increased conflict and competition for resources and deprived students of a significant range of activities that were only provided in larger institutions. Praised in the beginning, the Gates program was sharply criticized in 2005 when the first evaluations came out. In 2008, the foundation's directors recognized the bad start of their program and mostly put the blame on the lack of receptivity of the schools they helped or on teachers’ lack of competence. A few months later, the foundation decided to all but shut the program down.</p><p>In a democracy, there are good reasons to believe that the making of collectively binding decisions about such public goods as school infrastructures, education programs, and teachers’ salary should be carried out by citizens or people who speak in their name. However, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation's case shows a sense in which some people or organizations, by virtue of their private resources, have an additional and sometimes larger say on such questions. This raises the question whether the logics of democracy and philanthropy are compatible. The question is more pressing because philanthropic donations are generally tax subsidized, representing therefore a redirection of public money (Pevnick, <span>2013</span>) toward aims likely to advance donors’ personal interests.</p><p>Poli","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"32 1","pages":"33-46"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12759","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143581403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Indeterminacy between phenomenology and social ontology: The tension in Claude Lefort's theory of democracy","authors":"Roger Ventura Cossin","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12765","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"32 1","pages":"18-32"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143581698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disillusioning ideology: From empty reference to flawed world-disclosure","authors":"Michael Schwarz","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12764","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"32 1","pages":"124-138"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143581687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Critical reflection and awareness-raising are nowadays part of many people's everyday lives: At workplaces and organizations, in relationships, in the media, and best-selling books, people are increasingly discussing what it means to treat each other as equals, how not to be racist, and the many ways that we still exclude or marginalize people based, for example, on gender, ethnicity, abilities, age, class, sexuality, or religious views. These conversations are not easy to have. They often proceed on a very general level, without naming names, without getting upset, and without confrontation. We are accustomed to discussing in this way: What matters is not the personal story but the general patterns; not our experiences and how we feel about them, but the objective facts and arguments; not our failures to live up to ideals and beliefs, but what some abstract “we” still need to work on. Not making it personal is supposed to ensure that everyone can feel comfortable to speak and be heard regardless of their personal history and how they live.</p><p>In democratic theory, this understanding of collective reflection as a “rational discussion” has been a central part of how scholars approach the realm of public deliberation. In Habermas’ famous phrase, participants in deliberation are supposed to respond only to the force of the better argument instead of giving importance to the status and power of the person speaking (Habermas, <span>1975, 1984</span>). While a critical component in early work on deliberation, this view has now been criticized by countless scholars (see Curato et al., <span>2019</span>; Holdo, <span>2020b</span>). Feminist and critical theorists, not the least, have argued that this idea obscures how, in the real situations in which deliberation takes place, people's views and ways of expressing themselves are always embodied—that is, always shaped by their particular locations and experiences (Hayward, <span>2004</span>; Holdo, <span>2015</span>; Olson, <span>2011</span>; Young, <span>1996, 2000</span>).</p><p>Today, many deliberative theorists acknowledge that our ways of communicating—including both speaking and listening, both expressing something and considering it—in part reflect culture and social hierarchies. This is typically seen as an argument for a more inclusive approach to the type of expressions that should be accepted in deliberation. Thus, deliberative scholars have come to embrace emotions, testimony, greetings, rhetoric, and storytelling as additions to the earlier ideal of rational discussion (see Bächtiger et al, <span>2018</span>; Elstub, <span>2010</span>).</p><p>The criticism against the early ideals of deliberative theory can, to a certain extent, be seen as a critique of a norm of disembodied objectivity: that we ought to listen and respond to what is being said while disregarding who is saying it. Emotions, testimony, and storytelling are all modes of expression that bear witness to who we are and what w
{"title":"To walk the walk: Why we need to make things personal in public deliberation","authors":"Markus Holdo, Zohreh Khoban","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12747","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12747","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Critical reflection and awareness-raising are nowadays part of many people's everyday lives: At workplaces and organizations, in relationships, in the media, and best-selling books, people are increasingly discussing what it means to treat each other as equals, how not to be racist, and the many ways that we still exclude or marginalize people based, for example, on gender, ethnicity, abilities, age, class, sexuality, or religious views. These conversations are not easy to have. They often proceed on a very general level, without naming names, without getting upset, and without confrontation. We are accustomed to discussing in this way: What matters is not the personal story but the general patterns; not our experiences and how we feel about them, but the objective facts and arguments; not our failures to live up to ideals and beliefs, but what some abstract “we” still need to work on. Not making it personal is supposed to ensure that everyone can feel comfortable to speak and be heard regardless of their personal history and how they live.</p><p>In democratic theory, this understanding of collective reflection as a “rational discussion” has been a central part of how scholars approach the realm of public deliberation. In Habermas’ famous phrase, participants in deliberation are supposed to respond only to the force of the better argument instead of giving importance to the status and power of the person speaking (Habermas, <span>1975, 1984</span>). While a critical component in early work on deliberation, this view has now been criticized by countless scholars (see Curato et al., <span>2019</span>; Holdo, <span>2020b</span>). Feminist and critical theorists, not the least, have argued that this idea obscures how, in the real situations in which deliberation takes place, people's views and ways of expressing themselves are always embodied—that is, always shaped by their particular locations and experiences (Hayward, <span>2004</span>; Holdo, <span>2015</span>; Olson, <span>2011</span>; Young, <span>1996, 2000</span>).</p><p>Today, many deliberative theorists acknowledge that our ways of communicating—including both speaking and listening, both expressing something and considering it—in part reflect culture and social hierarchies. This is typically seen as an argument for a more inclusive approach to the type of expressions that should be accepted in deliberation. Thus, deliberative scholars have come to embrace emotions, testimony, greetings, rhetoric, and storytelling as additions to the earlier ideal of rational discussion (see Bächtiger et al, <span>2018</span>; Elstub, <span>2010</span>).</p><p>The criticism against the early ideals of deliberative theory can, to a certain extent, be seen as a critique of a norm of disembodied objectivity: that we ought to listen and respond to what is being said while disregarding who is saying it. Emotions, testimony, and storytelling are all modes of expression that bear witness to who we are and what w","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"32 1","pages":"97-109"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12747","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140693359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>The equivocation of modern civil society—its democratic potential and the actuality of economic inequality—has been accentuated by the political situations in the East and West during the 20th century. In the former, the democratic potential of civil society was stifled under state socialism, while in the latter, the welfarism of state capitalism kept the exploitative features of capitalist civil society intact. With the collapse of “actually existing socialism” in the East and the perceived intellectual demise of Marxism everywhere, the neoliberal era in the West was marked by optimism in automation and the promotion of “democracy and human rights” in the East and the Global South. However, as a result of the neoliberal reconfiguration of the state and civil society, human rights became associated almost solely with formal liberties at the expense of substantive social rights, so much so that, as Samuel Moyn (<span>2018</span>) argued, “human rights have become prisoners of the contemporary age of inequality” (p. 6). This article departs from the presumption that it is not enough to only criticize neoliberalism. Instead, it is necessary to think of an affirmative way to reconfigure the relationship between the state and society and reconstruct the normative foundations of social rights out of the modern intellectual tradition.</p><p>The modern analysis of rights formalism can be seen as stemming from Hegel's critique that while Kant and Fichte's philosophies of right hinge on the primacy of subjective autonomy, the subject itself should be understood as historically and socially conditioned. Once formal rights are revealed as conditioned by historically identifiable social relations, the question of rights can be recast in terms of substantial inequality and its potential overcoming.<sup>1</sup> This critique of right formalism was extended by Marx to the analysis of property relations under 19th-century capitalism. It is not that Marx rejected traditional formal rights and the liberal conception of justice, but offered an immanent critique of these rights in the conditions of substantial inequities determined by capitalist property ownership (Shoikhedbrod, <span>2019</span>).</p><p>However, 20th-century Continental political philosophy significantly deviated from the critique of rights formalism and the question of substantial (in)equality. Contemporary Continental thinkers disavow notions of juridical rights altogether (Agamben, <span>1998, 1999</span>; Hardt & Negri, <span>2003</span>), recast the question of human rights in terms of radical democracy (Lefort, <span>1988</span>; Rancière, <span>2004</span>), or discuss the question of law and right in neo-Kantian ethical terms (Derrida, <span>2006</span>; Lévinas, <span>1998</span>).<sup>2</sup> Influenced by Arendt's thinking about the communicative aspect of political action, Habermas (<span>2001</span>) theorized economic welfare as a condition of deliberative democracy. However, hi
{"title":"The state and society reconfigured: Resolving Arendt's “social question” through Kojève's “right of equity”","authors":"Bogdan Ovcharuk","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12748","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12748","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The equivocation of modern civil society—its democratic potential and the actuality of economic inequality—has been accentuated by the political situations in the East and West during the 20th century. In the former, the democratic potential of civil society was stifled under state socialism, while in the latter, the welfarism of state capitalism kept the exploitative features of capitalist civil society intact. With the collapse of “actually existing socialism” in the East and the perceived intellectual demise of Marxism everywhere, the neoliberal era in the West was marked by optimism in automation and the promotion of “democracy and human rights” in the East and the Global South. However, as a result of the neoliberal reconfiguration of the state and civil society, human rights became associated almost solely with formal liberties at the expense of substantive social rights, so much so that, as Samuel Moyn (<span>2018</span>) argued, “human rights have become prisoners of the contemporary age of inequality” (p. 6). This article departs from the presumption that it is not enough to only criticize neoliberalism. Instead, it is necessary to think of an affirmative way to reconfigure the relationship between the state and society and reconstruct the normative foundations of social rights out of the modern intellectual tradition.</p><p>The modern analysis of rights formalism can be seen as stemming from Hegel's critique that while Kant and Fichte's philosophies of right hinge on the primacy of subjective autonomy, the subject itself should be understood as historically and socially conditioned. Once formal rights are revealed as conditioned by historically identifiable social relations, the question of rights can be recast in terms of substantial inequality and its potential overcoming.<sup>1</sup> This critique of right formalism was extended by Marx to the analysis of property relations under 19th-century capitalism. It is not that Marx rejected traditional formal rights and the liberal conception of justice, but offered an immanent critique of these rights in the conditions of substantial inequities determined by capitalist property ownership (Shoikhedbrod, <span>2019</span>).</p><p>However, 20th-century Continental political philosophy significantly deviated from the critique of rights formalism and the question of substantial (in)equality. Contemporary Continental thinkers disavow notions of juridical rights altogether (Agamben, <span>1998, 1999</span>; Hardt & Negri, <span>2003</span>), recast the question of human rights in terms of radical democracy (Lefort, <span>1988</span>; Rancière, <span>2004</span>), or discuss the question of law and right in neo-Kantian ethical terms (Derrida, <span>2006</span>; Lévinas, <span>1998</span>).<sup>2</sup> Influenced by Arendt's thinking about the communicative aspect of political action, Habermas (<span>2001</span>) theorized economic welfare as a condition of deliberative democracy. However, hi","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"32 1","pages":"69-82"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12748","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140705711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Therefore, I propose that core to the current panic over “illiberalism” and “populism” is a fantasy (Glynos, <span>2021</span>) whose discourse uncritically posits liberalism and liberal democracy as a natural bulwark against reaction. This narrative, born out of the Second World War and the defeat of fascism and Nazism, is based on a simplistic, mythologizing reading of history, which conveniently eschews the well-documented ambivalence of “the West” toward many key tenets of what would eventually become the benchmark for “evil” in politics (Meister, <span>2010</span>). In this narrative, the West and liberalism were redeemed through (eventually) taking sides against fascism (even though mainstream actors had not only partaken in some of the most abhorrent ideas pushed by the fascist regimes to their logical end but also influenced Hitler's own deathly ideology and practice (see Losurdo, <span>2014</span>, pp. 337–340 for a summary)). The Second World War conveniently wiped the slate clean for the liberal elite,<sup>3</sup> as if they had had no involvement in countless genocidal projects throughout the era of colonialism or are not continuing to benefit from the exploitation and/or exclusion of certain communities on the basis of (biological) race, gender, ability, or class.</p><p>What I argue in this article is that such fantasies have led Western democracies to a situation where full-fledged reaction is at the gates of power, and yet where there is still no appetite to face the possibility that <i>really existing liberalism</i><sup>4</sup> has been a more or less active enabler rather than a bulwark. Addressing such shortcomings would mean that if we were to be serious about democracy, solutions would have to be found elsewhere than in fantasized visions of the past or blamed on others for stealing our enjoyment of liberal democracy. This would mean facing the failings of liberalism itself and restarting history. Yet at present, we seem stuck in a cycle where all we can be given as an alternative to a deeply dysfunctional and disliked status quo are reactionary politics taking us back, rather than forward: There is no present or future, only the past, over and over again.</p><p>My aim is thus to tease out whether what we are seeing is the rise of “illiberalism” and/or “populism” against liberalism, or whether liberalism always held “illiberal” tendencies at its core and can therefore act as an enabler. To illustrate what has become an incredibly precarious position, where the rights of many are increasingly denied, threatened, or removed, I first briefly outline the construction of the liberal fantasy and counterpose it with really existing liberalism's failure to live by its own ideals. I then turn to the crumbling of the liberal fantasy and the necessity for the liberal elite of creating and hyping an illiberal other on the (far) right to strengthen the liberal hegemony leading to the mainstreaming of reaction. Finally, I conclude with a
{"title":"Really existing liberalism, the bulwark fantasy, and the enabling of reactionary, far right politics1","authors":"Aurelien Mondon","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12749","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12749","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Therefore, I propose that core to the current panic over “illiberalism” and “populism” is a fantasy (Glynos, <span>2021</span>) whose discourse uncritically posits liberalism and liberal democracy as a natural bulwark against reaction. This narrative, born out of the Second World War and the defeat of fascism and Nazism, is based on a simplistic, mythologizing reading of history, which conveniently eschews the well-documented ambivalence of “the West” toward many key tenets of what would eventually become the benchmark for “evil” in politics (Meister, <span>2010</span>). In this narrative, the West and liberalism were redeemed through (eventually) taking sides against fascism (even though mainstream actors had not only partaken in some of the most abhorrent ideas pushed by the fascist regimes to their logical end but also influenced Hitler's own deathly ideology and practice (see Losurdo, <span>2014</span>, pp. 337–340 for a summary)). The Second World War conveniently wiped the slate clean for the liberal elite,<sup>3</sup> as if they had had no involvement in countless genocidal projects throughout the era of colonialism or are not continuing to benefit from the exploitation and/or exclusion of certain communities on the basis of (biological) race, gender, ability, or class.</p><p>What I argue in this article is that such fantasies have led Western democracies to a situation where full-fledged reaction is at the gates of power, and yet where there is still no appetite to face the possibility that <i>really existing liberalism</i><sup>4</sup> has been a more or less active enabler rather than a bulwark. Addressing such shortcomings would mean that if we were to be serious about democracy, solutions would have to be found elsewhere than in fantasized visions of the past or blamed on others for stealing our enjoyment of liberal democracy. This would mean facing the failings of liberalism itself and restarting history. Yet at present, we seem stuck in a cycle where all we can be given as an alternative to a deeply dysfunctional and disliked status quo are reactionary politics taking us back, rather than forward: There is no present or future, only the past, over and over again.</p><p>My aim is thus to tease out whether what we are seeing is the rise of “illiberalism” and/or “populism” against liberalism, or whether liberalism always held “illiberal” tendencies at its core and can therefore act as an enabler. To illustrate what has become an incredibly precarious position, where the rights of many are increasingly denied, threatened, or removed, I first briefly outline the construction of the liberal fantasy and counterpose it with really existing liberalism's failure to live by its own ideals. I then turn to the crumbling of the liberal fantasy and the necessity for the liberal elite of creating and hyping an illiberal other on the (far) right to strengthen the liberal hegemony leading to the mainstreaming of reaction. Finally, I conclude with a","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"32 1","pages":"47-58"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12749","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140714507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fear of Black Consciousness By Lewis R. Gordon. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2022","authors":"William Paris","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12752","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1467-8675.12752","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"31 3","pages":"485-487"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140743100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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