Pub Date : 2020-01-21DOI: 10.1177/0951629819895594
T. Choate, J. Weymark, Alan E. Wiseman
We use an extension of the Baron–Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining in which there are three legislators, two of whom have partisan ties, to analyze the division of a fixed political resource in a majoritarian legislature. A legislator’s preferences depend on the shares that he and any copartisan receive. We ask whether there are circumstances under which a partisan legislator is willing to delegate proposal-making authority to a party leader so as to take advantage of the special proposal rights accorded by the legislature to this office rather than retaining equal-recognition proposal rights for himself. We show that this is the case only if (i) the leader’s proposal recognition probability is larger than the probability that one of the partisans is recognized when the legislators act independently, (ii) the value of partisan affiliation is sufficiently high, and (iii) the legislators are sufficiently impatient. We explore the relevance of these results to ongoing debates regarding the role and effect of parties and party leaders in Congress.
{"title":"Legislative bargaining and partisan delegation","authors":"T. Choate, J. Weymark, Alan E. Wiseman","doi":"10.1177/0951629819895594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819895594","url":null,"abstract":"We use an extension of the Baron–Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining in which there are three legislators, two of whom have partisan ties, to analyze the division of a fixed political resource in a majoritarian legislature. A legislator’s preferences depend on the shares that he and any copartisan receive. We ask whether there are circumstances under which a partisan legislator is willing to delegate proposal-making authority to a party leader so as to take advantage of the special proposal rights accorded by the legislature to this office rather than retaining equal-recognition proposal rights for himself. We show that this is the case only if (i) the leader’s proposal recognition probability is larger than the probability that one of the partisans is recognized when the legislators act independently, (ii) the value of partisan affiliation is sufficiently high, and (iii) the legislators are sufficiently impatient. We explore the relevance of these results to ongoing debates regarding the role and effect of parties and party leaders in Congress.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819895594","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49351419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-13DOI: 10.1177/0951629819893025
S. Wolford
I analyze a three-actor model of crisis bargaining with two key features. First, diplomatic opposition raises the costs of war, but an informed state can avoid it by conveying restraint to a supporter. Second, the means of conveying restraint may fail to convince an enemy tempted to risk war of the informed state’s willingness to fight. I derive three results. First, war is more likely when third parties believe the informed state to be generally restrained. Second, the threat of opposition that modestly affects the costs of war discourages risky bluffing. Third, the threat of opposition that substantially raises the costs of war can lead states to mask a true willingness to fight, securing diplomatic support at the price of an elevated risk of war despite the availability of a credible signal. Building diplomatic coalitions to prevent balancing can simultaneously make credible communication that averts war both easy and unattractive.
{"title":"War and diplomacy on the world stage: Crisis bargaining before third parties","authors":"S. Wolford","doi":"10.1177/0951629819893025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819893025","url":null,"abstract":"I analyze a three-actor model of crisis bargaining with two key features. First, diplomatic opposition raises the costs of war, but an informed state can avoid it by conveying restraint to a supporter. Second, the means of conveying restraint may fail to convince an enemy tempted to risk war of the informed state’s willingness to fight. I derive three results. First, war is more likely when third parties believe the informed state to be generally restrained. Second, the threat of opposition that modestly affects the costs of war discourages risky bluffing. Third, the threat of opposition that substantially raises the costs of war can lead states to mask a true willingness to fight, securing diplomatic support at the price of an elevated risk of war despite the availability of a credible signal. Building diplomatic coalitions to prevent balancing can simultaneously make credible communication that averts war both easy and unattractive.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819893025","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44664255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-13DOI: 10.1177/0951629819895596
Greg Sasso
We study a two-period delegation model with an uncertain future principal. In the first period, an incumbent principal decides whether to delegate policy-making authority to an agent or make policy herself. Before the second period, there is an election, and another principal with different preferences may take power. The main result is that the incumbent can exploit the uncertainty about the future principal to extract policy surplus from the agent. The agent’s uncertainty about the future principal pushes him to implement a policy that both principals accept. The surplus from this compromise policy makes the incumbent better off than she would be without the possibility of turnover. We also find that when costs are low, policy stability can increase as elections become more competitive, as the agent has more incentive to implement a compromise policy. We then allow the incumbent to appoint the agent. We show that as the incumbent becomes more likely to retain office, she prefers more policy conflict with the agent.
{"title":"Delegation and political turnover","authors":"Greg Sasso","doi":"10.1177/0951629819895596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819895596","url":null,"abstract":"We study a two-period delegation model with an uncertain future principal. In the first period, an incumbent principal decides whether to delegate policy-making authority to an agent or make policy herself. Before the second period, there is an election, and another principal with different preferences may take power. The main result is that the incumbent can exploit the uncertainty about the future principal to extract policy surplus from the agent. The agent’s uncertainty about the future principal pushes him to implement a policy that both principals accept. The surplus from this compromise policy makes the incumbent better off than she would be without the possibility of turnover. We also find that when costs are low, policy stability can increase as elections become more competitive, as the agent has more incentive to implement a compromise policy. We then allow the incumbent to appoint the agent. We show that as the incumbent becomes more likely to retain office, she prefers more policy conflict with the agent.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819895596","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47808281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629819893023
Thomas Mustillo, John Polga-Hecimovich
Under free list proportional representation voters can: (a) cast preference votes for candidates; (b) cast multiple preferences; and (c) distribute preferences across multiple lists. Alternatively, they can cast a list vote. Our theory shows that office-seeking candidates face incentives to pursue the personal vote, while non-candidate partisans seek the party vote. Voters are in the cross-currents of these forces. Also, since preference voting is so cognitively and informationally demanding, voters have incentives to use shortcuts, especially (a) list voting; (b) casting fewer than their allotment of preferences; and (c) preference voting for well-known or highly placed candidates. We find support for our expectations using linear mixed-effects regression of the proportion of preference votes in candidate-level electoral data from Ecuador. Personal voting is more prevalent as magnitude increases, where the local party is strong, and for candidates that are incumbents, male, high on the list, and in the position of first loser.
{"title":"Party, candidate, and voter incentives under free list proportional representation","authors":"Thomas Mustillo, John Polga-Hecimovich","doi":"10.1177/0951629819893023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819893023","url":null,"abstract":"Under free list proportional representation voters can: (a) cast preference votes for candidates; (b) cast multiple preferences; and (c) distribute preferences across multiple lists. Alternatively, they can cast a list vote. Our theory shows that office-seeking candidates face incentives to pursue the personal vote, while non-candidate partisans seek the party vote. Voters are in the cross-currents of these forces. Also, since preference voting is so cognitively and informationally demanding, voters have incentives to use shortcuts, especially (a) list voting; (b) casting fewer than their allotment of preferences; and (c) preference voting for well-known or highly placed candidates. We find support for our expectations using linear mixed-effects regression of the proportion of preference votes in candidate-level electoral data from Ecuador. Personal voting is more prevalent as magnitude increases, where the local party is strong, and for candidates that are incumbents, male, high on the list, and in the position of first loser.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819893023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43367422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629819895808
D. Kselman
Building on past research, this paper develops a game theoretic model to study the provision of local public goods under closed- and open-list proportional representation (CLPR and OLPR). The core results suggest that, all thing equal, legislators will provide voters with higher levels of public goods in OLPR than in CLPR systems. However, two intervening variables condition the institutional comparison: the district magnitude and electoral volatility. Firstly, public goods effort increases as district magnitude increases in OLPR systems, while it tends to decrease as magnitude increases in CLPR systems. Indeed, when district magnitude is 2 , the two systems are often indistinguishable. Furthermore, the distinction between OLPR and CLPR weakens when electoral volatility is low, such that neither system generates high levels of public goods effort. In addition to their relevance for political economy, the paper’s results provide game theoretic foundations for a series of theoretical conjectures found in Carey and Shugart’s (1995) seminal study of electoral institutions and legislative personalism (Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank-ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies 1995; 14(4): 417–439).
{"title":"Public goods equilibria under closed- and open-list proportional representation","authors":"D. Kselman","doi":"10.1177/0951629819895808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819895808","url":null,"abstract":"Building on past research, this paper develops a game theoretic model to study the provision of local public goods under closed- and open-list proportional representation (CLPR and OLPR). The core results suggest that, all thing equal, legislators will provide voters with higher levels of public goods in OLPR than in CLPR systems. However, two intervening variables condition the institutional comparison: the district magnitude and electoral volatility. Firstly, public goods effort increases as district magnitude increases in OLPR systems, while it tends to decrease as magnitude increases in CLPR systems. Indeed, when district magnitude is 2 , the two systems are often indistinguishable. Furthermore, the distinction between OLPR and CLPR weakens when electoral volatility is low, such that neither system generates high levels of public goods effort. In addition to their relevance for political economy, the paper’s results provide game theoretic foundations for a series of theoretical conjectures found in Carey and Shugart’s (1995) seminal study of electoral institutions and legislative personalism (Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank-ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies 1995; 14(4): 417–439).","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819895808","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49315989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629819893028
Olle Folke, Johanna Rickne
We study the distribution of preference votes across politicians with different behaviors and attitudes. There are two main findings. First, preference votes are concentrated to politicians who are more active in communicating their policy proposals and policy priorities. This suggests that preference voting may incentivize more transparency and communication among politicians, and, hence, be positive for accountability. Second, preference votes are concentrated to politicians who are more—not less—loyal to the party in their voting decisions, and to politicians who’s ideological and policy positions are mainstream—rather than extreme—compared to their party colleagues. Together with the first finding, this suggests that preference voting can strengthen the bond of accountability between voters and politicians without undercutting parties’ ideological cohesion.
{"title":"Who wins preference votes? An analysis of party loyalty, ideology, and accountability to voters","authors":"Olle Folke, Johanna Rickne","doi":"10.1177/0951629819893028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819893028","url":null,"abstract":"We study the distribution of preference votes across politicians with different behaviors and attitudes. There are two main findings. First, preference votes are concentrated to politicians who are more active in communicating their policy proposals and policy priorities. This suggests that preference voting may incentivize more transparency and communication among politicians, and, hence, be positive for accountability. Second, preference votes are concentrated to politicians who are more—not less—loyal to the party in their voting decisions, and to politicians who’s ideological and policy positions are mainstream—rather than extreme—compared to their party colleagues. Together with the first finding, this suggests that preference voting can strengthen the bond of accountability between voters and politicians without undercutting parties’ ideological cohesion.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819893028","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44449118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629819892336
Royce Carroll, M. Nalepa
Conventional wisdom suggests that parties in candidate-centered electoral systems should be associated with less cohesive policy preferences among legislators. We model the incentives of party leaders to achieve voting unity accounting for the costs of discipline, showing that candidate-centered systems have the counterintuitive effect of promoting party agreement on policies and preference cohesion. These implications for cohesion derive from the degree of control over list rank held by leaders under open lists (open-list proportional representation, OLPR) and closed lists (closed-list proportional representation, CLPR). Because discipline is costlier in OLPR, owing to leaders’ lack of control over list rank, leaders seeking voting unity propose policies that promote agreement between members and leadership. Under CLPR, however, leaders can more easily achieve voting unity by relying on discipline and therefore lack incentives to promote internal agreement. We then extend the model to allow the party leader to replace members, showing that preference cohesion itself is greater under OLPR. Further, our baseline results hold when allowing legislative behavior to affect vote share and when accounting for candidates’ valence qualities. We interpret our results to suggest that candidate-centered systems result in stronger incentives for developing programmatic parties, compared with party-centered systems.
{"title":"The personal vote and party cohesion: Modeling the effects of electoral rules on intraparty politics","authors":"Royce Carroll, M. Nalepa","doi":"10.1177/0951629819892336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819892336","url":null,"abstract":"Conventional wisdom suggests that parties in candidate-centered electoral systems should be associated with less cohesive policy preferences among legislators. We model the incentives of party leaders to achieve voting unity accounting for the costs of discipline, showing that candidate-centered systems have the counterintuitive effect of promoting party agreement on policies and preference cohesion. These implications for cohesion derive from the degree of control over list rank held by leaders under open lists (open-list proportional representation, OLPR) and closed lists (closed-list proportional representation, CLPR). Because discipline is costlier in OLPR, owing to leaders’ lack of control over list rank, leaders seeking voting unity propose policies that promote agreement between members and leadership. Under CLPR, however, leaders can more easily achieve voting unity by relying on discipline and therefore lack incentives to promote internal agreement. We then extend the model to allow the party leader to replace members, showing that preference cohesion itself is greater under OLPR. Further, our baseline results hold when allowing legislative behavior to affect vote share and when accounting for candidates’ valence qualities. We interpret our results to suggest that candidate-centered systems result in stronger incentives for developing programmatic parties, compared with party-centered systems.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819892336","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48644847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629819898365
J. Cheibub, M. Nalepa
{"title":"Revisiting electoral personalism","authors":"J. Cheibub, M. Nalepa","doi":"10.1177/0951629819898365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819898365","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819898365","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42982235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629819892334
Carol Mershon
The conclusion to the special issue takes stock of both the first and the second generations of research on preferential proportional representation (PR) and electoral personalism. The article uses this appraisal in order to locate this project’s achievements within extant scholarship. It argues that the project not only reevaluates but also challenges the wisdom on preferential PR. In challenging the canon, the project enriches the study of electoral institutions, political parties, legislative politics, comparative politics, and political science more broadly.
{"title":"Challenging the wisdom on preferential proportional representation","authors":"Carol Mershon","doi":"10.1177/0951629819892334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819892334","url":null,"abstract":"The conclusion to the special issue takes stock of both the first and the second generations of research on preferential proportional representation (PR) and electoral personalism. The article uses this appraisal in order to locate this project’s achievements within extant scholarship. It argues that the project not only reevaluates but also challenges the wisdom on preferential PR. In challenging the canon, the project enriches the study of electoral institutions, political parties, legislative politics, comparative politics, and political science more broadly.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819892334","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49613384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629819893024
J. Cheibub, Gisela Sin
Open list proportional representation (PR) systems require that candidates seek personal votes in order to be successful. This feature of the system is considered to lead to intense competition among co-partisans and, ultimately, to weak electoral and legislative parties, narrow public policies, localism, clientelism, and corruption. We examine the distribution of personal votes among candidates from the same party for seven elections to the Brazilian national chamber of deputies (1990–2014). These elections are widely seen as hyper-competitive, particularly among candidates from the same list. Yet, the patterns in the data are not compatible with such a view. We find that the level of overall competition is considerably lower than the absolute number of parties and candidates competing would suggest. More significantly, we find that the number of viable candidates within party lists is limited and that their votes are distributed in such a way that indicates a contained competition among co-partisans during the election. These findings add to recent work that builds a more nuanced view of ballot structure, competition, and personalism.
{"title":"Preference vote and intra-party competition in open list PR systems","authors":"J. Cheibub, Gisela Sin","doi":"10.1177/0951629819893024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819893024","url":null,"abstract":"Open list proportional representation (PR) systems require that candidates seek personal votes in order to be successful. This feature of the system is considered to lead to intense competition among co-partisans and, ultimately, to weak electoral and legislative parties, narrow public policies, localism, clientelism, and corruption. We examine the distribution of personal votes among candidates from the same party for seven elections to the Brazilian national chamber of deputies (1990–2014). These elections are widely seen as hyper-competitive, particularly among candidates from the same list. Yet, the patterns in the data are not compatible with such a view. We find that the level of overall competition is considerably lower than the absolute number of parties and candidates competing would suggest. More significantly, we find that the number of viable candidates within party lists is limited and that their votes are distributed in such a way that indicates a contained competition among co-partisans during the election. These findings add to recent work that builds a more nuanced view of ballot structure, competition, and personalism.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819893024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42148846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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