Pub Date : 2019-09-18DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875515
Anne Meng
When do executive constraints provide credible commitment power in dictatorships, and under what conditions do leaders establish such constraints? This article argues that institutions successfully constrain autocrats only when elites are given real access to state power, such as appointments to key governmental positions. I present a game theoretic model in which an autocratic leader decides whether to establish binding constraints at the start of her rule. Doing so shifts the future distribution of power in favor of elites, alleviating commitment problems in bargaining. I show that leaders are likely to place constraints on their own authority when they enter power especially weak, and these initial decisions shape the rest of their rule. Even if a leader enters power in a uniquely weak position vis-á-vis other elites, and is on average, quite strong, the need to alleviate commitment problems in the first period swamps expectations about the future distribution of power. I illustrate the model’s findings through case studies of Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire.
{"title":"Accessing the state: Executive constraints and credible commitment in dictatorship","authors":"Anne Meng","doi":"10.1177/0951629819875515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875515","url":null,"abstract":"When do executive constraints provide credible commitment power in dictatorships, and under what conditions do leaders establish such constraints? This article argues that institutions successfully constrain autocrats only when elites are given real access to state power, such as appointments to key governmental positions. I present a game theoretic model in which an autocratic leader decides whether to establish binding constraints at the start of her rule. Doing so shifts the future distribution of power in favor of elites, alleviating commitment problems in bargaining. I show that leaders are likely to place constraints on their own authority when they enter power especially weak, and these initial decisions shape the rest of their rule. Even if a leader enters power in a uniquely weak position vis-á-vis other elites, and is on average, quite strong, the need to alleviate commitment problems in the first period swamps expectations about the future distribution of power. I illustrate the model’s findings through case studies of Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"568 - 599"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819875515","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45297567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-18DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875511
Oleg Smirnov
International climate negotiations represent an interesting theoretical problem, which can be analyzed as a collective risk social dilemma as well as an n-person bargaining model. The problem is made more complicated by politics due to the differences between: (1) total and per capita emissions; and (2) present-day and cumulative emissions. Here, we use a game theoretic approach in conjunction with the literature on effort-sharing approaches to study a model of climate negotiations based on empirical emissions data. We introduce a ‘fair equilibrium’ bargaining solution and examine the consequences of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Our results suggest that the collective goal can still be reached but that this requires additional greenhouse gas emissions cuts from other countries, notably, China and India. Given the history of climate negotiations, it is unclear if these countries will have sufficient political will to accept the additional costs created by the US defection.
{"title":"Collective risk social dilemma and the consequences of the US withdrawal from international climate negotiations","authors":"Oleg Smirnov","doi":"10.1177/0951629819875511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875511","url":null,"abstract":"International climate negotiations represent an interesting theoretical problem, which can be analyzed as a collective risk social dilemma as well as an n-person bargaining model. The problem is made more complicated by politics due to the differences between: (1) total and per capita emissions; and (2) present-day and cumulative emissions. Here, we use a game theoretic approach in conjunction with the literature on effort-sharing approaches to study a model of climate negotiations based on empirical emissions data. We introduce a ‘fair equilibrium’ bargaining solution and examine the consequences of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Our results suggest that the collective goal can still be reached but that this requires additional greenhouse gas emissions cuts from other countries, notably, China and India. Given the history of climate negotiations, it is unclear if these countries will have sufficient political will to accept the additional costs created by the US defection.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"660 - 676"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819875511","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42391751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-18DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875519
Sharece Thrower
Recent attention to presidential action recognizes the legal and constitutional questions surrounding the controversial use of many of these powers. Yet, scholarly research on executive policymaking tends to ignore the role of the courts, instead focusing on presidential–congressional relations. I develop a formal theory of the president’s decision to issue a signing statement in the face of constraints from the Supreme Court. The model produces several novel predictions. First, I predict that the president is more likely to issue a signing statement when he is ideologically aligned with the Court. Second, contrary to previous literature, the president is more likely to issue a statement when his preferences are also aligned with Congress. Finally, when reviewing legislation that is constitutionally challenged, I predict that the Court is more likely to rule in favor of the president’s position when he has issued a signing statement.
{"title":"Presidential action and the Supreme Court: The case of signing statements","authors":"Sharece Thrower","doi":"10.1177/0951629819875519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875519","url":null,"abstract":"Recent attention to presidential action recognizes the legal and constitutional questions surrounding the controversial use of many of these powers. Yet, scholarly research on executive policymaking tends to ignore the role of the courts, instead focusing on presidential–congressional relations. I develop a formal theory of the president’s decision to issue a signing statement in the face of constraints from the Supreme Court. The model produces several novel predictions. First, I predict that the president is more likely to issue a signing statement when he is ideologically aligned with the Court. Second, contrary to previous literature, the president is more likely to issue a statement when his preferences are also aligned with Congress. Finally, when reviewing legislation that is constitutionally challenged, I predict that the Court is more likely to rule in favor of the president’s position when he has issued a signing statement.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"677 - 698"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819875519","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43597018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-18DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875517
Matt Malis, Alastair Smith
Diplomacy always occurs in the shadow of domestic political competition. We develop a model of top-level diplomatic exchange between an incumbent and a foreign leader, embedded within a global game of regime change, and examine four mechanisms that induce a relationship between diplomatic visits and regime survival. First, the foreign leader chooses to visit incumbents who are ex ante more secure in office (a selection effect). Second, because the foreign leader’s decision is based partly on private information, the citizens update on the revelation of that information (a learning effect) and are discouraged from mounting a challenge. Third, the foreign leader can bolster the incumbent’s strength in office with a transfer of material support (a strengthening effect). The latter two effects are then amplified by the complementarities in the citizens’ strategies (a multiplier effect). Contrary to standard global games results, we show that increased precision in the public information transmitted strategically by the foreign power induces a unique equilibrium, as citizens coordinate on the foreign leader’s action. Our findings explain why leaders are so eager to receive state visits from major world powers.
{"title":"A global game of diplomacy","authors":"Matt Malis, Alastair Smith","doi":"10.1177/0951629819875517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875517","url":null,"abstract":"Diplomacy always occurs in the shadow of domestic political competition. We develop a model of top-level diplomatic exchange between an incumbent and a foreign leader, embedded within a global game of regime change, and examine four mechanisms that induce a relationship between diplomatic visits and regime survival. First, the foreign leader chooses to visit incumbents who are ex ante more secure in office (a selection effect). Second, because the foreign leader’s decision is based partly on private information, the citizens update on the revelation of that information (a learning effect) and are discouraged from mounting a challenge. Third, the foreign leader can bolster the incumbent’s strength in office with a transfer of material support (a strengthening effect). The latter two effects are then amplified by the complementarities in the citizens’ strategies (a multiplier effect). Contrary to standard global games results, we show that increased precision in the public information transmitted strategically by the foreign power induces a unique equilibrium, as citizens coordinate on the foreign leader’s action. Our findings explain why leaders are so eager to receive state visits from major world powers.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"480 - 506"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819875517","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46555254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-18DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875516
Yasushi Asako
Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72
{"title":"Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting","authors":"Yasushi Asako","doi":"10.1177/0951629819875516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875516","url":null,"abstract":"Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"626 - 641"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819875516","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45652472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-01DOI: 10.1177/09516298211017236
A. Forteza, J. Pereyra
Separation of powers with checks and balances (SP) is usually regarded as a key institution complementing elections in the control of elected officials. However, some analysts and many politicians also warn that excessive checks on the executive in the presence of polarization may lead to political inaction. We analyze the interaction between elections and SP, and study under what circumstances they complement each other. We first introduce a political agency model with ideological parties where citizens and politicians care about rents (a valence issue) and policy (a positional issue). Then, we analyze the impact of SP on the effectiveness of elections to discipline and select politicians. We demonstrate that SP unambiguously raises a majority of voters’ welfare in highly polarized non-competitive political environments, because it strengthens both discipline and selection without causing political gridlock. SP also raises voters’ welfare if elections are very effective at disciplining first period incumbents. Nevertheless, SP may reduce voters’ welfare if most rents go undetected and reform is not a first-order issue.
{"title":"Separation of powers with ideological parties","authors":"A. Forteza, J. Pereyra","doi":"10.1177/09516298211017236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211017236","url":null,"abstract":"Separation of powers with checks and balances (SP) is usually regarded as a key institution complementing elections in the control of elected officials. However, some analysts and many politicians also warn that excessive checks on the executive in the presence of polarization may lead to political inaction. We analyze the interaction between elections and SP, and study under what circumstances they complement each other. We first introduce a political agency model with ideological parties where citizens and politicians care about rents (a valence issue) and policy (a positional issue). Then, we analyze the impact of SP on the effectiveness of elections to discipline and select politicians. We demonstrate that SP unambiguously raises a majority of voters’ welfare in highly polarized non-competitive political environments, because it strengthens both discipline and selection without causing political gridlock. SP also raises voters’ welfare if elections are very effective at disciplining first period incumbents. Nevertheless, SP may reduce voters’ welfare if most rents go undetected and reform is not a first-order issue.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"333 - 382"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/09516298211017236","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48018247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629819850630
D. Baron
Many if not most government policies, regulations, and laws continue in effect unless changed by the legislature, providing a natural dynamic to the political process. Lobbying is a ubiquitous component of that process and can affect both proposal making and voting. This paper characterizes Markov perfect equilibria of a dynamic legislative bargaining model with stable policies and durable coalitions despite lobbying. Interest groups aligned with challenges to the incumbent coalition have a greater willingness to pay than have the defending interest groups, but the defenders have a legislative incumbency advantage in needing to counter-lobby fewer legislators than the challengers lobby. If legislators are sufficiently patient, equilibria exist such that the defenders of the incumbent coalition are successful. More than a minimal majority may be lobbied by the challengers, and coalitions can be surplus. Lobbying can increase proposal power, resulting in a more unequal distribution within a coalition.
{"title":"Lobbying dynamics","authors":"D. Baron","doi":"10.1177/0951629819850630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819850630","url":null,"abstract":"Many if not most government policies, regulations, and laws continue in effect unless changed by the legislature, providing a natural dynamic to the political process. Lobbying is a ubiquitous component of that process and can affect both proposal making and voting. This paper characterizes Markov perfect equilibria of a dynamic legislative bargaining model with stable policies and durable coalitions despite lobbying. Interest groups aligned with challenges to the incumbent coalition have a greater willingness to pay than have the defending interest groups, but the defenders have a legislative incumbency advantage in needing to counter-lobby fewer legislators than the challengers lobby. If legislators are sufficiently patient, equilibria exist such that the defenders of the incumbent coalition are successful. More than a minimal majority may be lobbied by the challengers, and coalitions can be surplus. Lobbying can increase proposal power, resulting in a more unequal distribution within a coalition.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"403 - 452"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819850630","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46875017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629819858666
Haritz Garro
In recent decades, fear of terrorism has increased among voters in liberal democracies. In response, governments have adopted counterterrorist measures that curtail civil liberties, at times prompting allegations that political expediency underlies such measures. I study politicians’ strategic design of counterterrorist policies in a model of valence competition under threat of terrorism. The incumbent chooses a counterterrorist strategy that combines observable (state of emergency) and unobservable (effort) actions. In equilibrium, emergencies and terrorist attacks become endogenously informative about valence. The low-valence incumbent underprovides effort relative to the high-valence incumbent, and at times declares a state of emergency in the absence of a terrorist threat. Increasing voters’ information about the incumbent’s valence improves politician selection, but at the expense of a higher incidence of unwarranted emergencies and, under some conditions, terrorist attacks.
{"title":"Terrorism prevention with reelection concerns and valence competition","authors":"Haritz Garro","doi":"10.1177/0951629819858666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819858666","url":null,"abstract":"In recent decades, fear of terrorism has increased among voters in liberal democracies. In response, governments have adopted counterterrorist measures that curtail civil liberties, at times prompting allegations that political expediency underlies such measures. I study politicians’ strategic design of counterterrorist policies in a model of valence competition under threat of terrorism. The incumbent chooses a counterterrorist strategy that combines observable (state of emergency) and unobservable (effort) actions. In equilibrium, emergencies and terrorist attacks become endogenously informative about valence. The low-valence incumbent underprovides effort relative to the high-valence incumbent, and at times declares a state of emergency in the absence of a terrorist threat. Increasing voters’ information about the incumbent’s valence improves politician selection, but at the expense of a higher incidence of unwarranted emergencies and, under some conditions, terrorist attacks.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"330 - 369"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819858666","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41688937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629819863171
Torun Dewan, John W. Patty
{"title":"Editors’ Introduction to JTP issue 31.3","authors":"Torun Dewan, John W. Patty","doi":"10.1177/0951629819863171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819863171","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"283 - 285"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819863171","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43061804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-27DOI: 10.1177/0951629819854138
S. Merrill, B. Grofman
We examine the consequences to policy-seeking, center-left and center-right parties under proportional representation following entry by extremist parties either at one or both ends of a unidimensional political spectrum. Assuming a symmetric, unimodal voter distribution, we show that the entry of a single extremist party on either the left or right drives both mainstream parties in the direction opposite to the extremist party. We argue that this three-party scenario is the most empirically relevant case in contemporary European politics. We also extend results of Casamatta and De Donder that project moderation of mainstream parties at equilibrium for PR elections with two extremist parties – one on each end – to a symmetric, unimodal voter distribution. In a setting not considered by these authors, we show that this moderating effect on the mainstream parties for a symmetric voter distribution is reversed if the voter distribution is sufficiently bimodal.
{"title":"What are the effects of entry of new extremist parties on the policy platforms of mainstream parties?","authors":"S. Merrill, B. Grofman","doi":"10.1177/0951629819854138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819854138","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the consequences to policy-seeking, center-left and center-right parties under proportional representation following entry by extremist parties either at one or both ends of a unidimensional political spectrum. Assuming a symmetric, unimodal voter distribution, we show that the entry of a single extremist party on either the left or right drives both mainstream parties in the direction opposite to the extremist party. We argue that this three-party scenario is the most empirically relevant case in contemporary European politics. We also extend results of Casamatta and De Donder that project moderation of mainstream parties at equilibrium for PR elections with two extremist parties – one on each end – to a symmetric, unimodal voter distribution. In a setting not considered by these authors, we show that this moderating effect on the mainstream parties for a symmetric voter distribution is reversed if the voter distribution is sufficiently bimodal.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"453 - 473"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819854138","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46774576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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