We show that when citizens are uncertain about whether a successful revolution will turn out better than the status quo, communication between citizens reduces the likelihood of successful revolution when the status quo is sufficiently bad . A bad regime faces a tradeoff: communication helps citizens to coordinate, facilitating revolution; but it also facilitates the dissemination of any negative information about the alternative to the status quo, forestalling revolution. When the regime is sufficiently bad, this latter effect dominates. This result contrasts with the literature that assumes that each citizen knows that he wants to change the regime, but he is uncertain about whether enough citizens will revolt. In such settings, communication always raises the likelihood of successful revolution.
{"title":"When Can Citizen Communication Hinder Successful Revolution","authors":"Mehdi Shadmehr, D. Bernhardt","doi":"10.1561/100.00017008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00017008","url":null,"abstract":"We show that when citizens are uncertain about whether a successful revolution will turn out better than the status quo, communication between citizens reduces the likelihood of successful revolution when the status quo is sufficiently bad . A bad regime faces a tradeoff: communication helps citizens to coordinate, facilitating revolution; but it also facilitates the dissemination of any negative information about the alternative to the status quo, forestalling revolution. When the regime is sufficiently bad, this latter effect dominates. This result contrasts with the literature that assumes that each citizen knows that he wants to change the regime, but he is uncertain about whether enough citizens will revolt. In such settings, communication always raises the likelihood of successful revolution.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2017-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00017008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47171007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The political consequences of economic globalization has lately been fiercely debated across Europe and the United States, including the role of labor immigration. In this paper we study the party choices of voters facing labor market competition from immigration. To identify the effect of labor market competition we introduce the national skill cell approach, which is designed to isolate a direct partial effect of immigrant competition. By access to detailed, population-wide, administrative data, we get precise measures of Norwegian voters' exposure to competition, and we relate this measure to voting behavior in five national elections. We find a polarizing effect of immigration among voters experiencing negative wage effects of immigration. The polarization points to the existence of a protectionist and a compensatory response, and we propose that predetermined ideological convictions determine the response.
{"title":"Labor market competition with immigrants and political polarization","authors":"Henning Finseraas, M. Røed, Pål Schøne","doi":"10.1561/100.00016109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016109","url":null,"abstract":"The political consequences of economic globalization has lately been fiercely debated across Europe and the United States, including the role of labor immigration. In this paper we study the party choices of voters facing labor market competition from immigration. To identify the effect of labor market competition we introduce the national skill cell approach, which is designed to isolate a direct partial effect of immigrant competition. By access to detailed, population-wide, administrative data, we get precise measures of Norwegian voters' exposure to competition, and we relate this measure to voting behavior in five national elections. We find a polarizing effect of immigration among voters experiencing negative wage effects of immigration. The polarization points to the existence of a protectionist and a compensatory response, and we propose that predetermined ideological convictions determine the response.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2017-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00016109","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46304146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Escape Through Export? Women-Owned Enterprises, Domestic Discrimination, and Global Markets
通过出口逃脱?女性拥有的企业、国内歧视与全球市场
{"title":"Escape Through Export? Women-Owned Enterprises, Domestic Discrimination, and Global Markets","authors":"Iain Osgood, M. Peters","doi":"10.1561/100.00015177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00015177","url":null,"abstract":"Escape Through Export? Women-Owned Enterprises, Domestic Discrimination, and Global Markets","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2017-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00015177","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45246236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent studies indicate that the wealthy receive more representation from their members of Congress, though this relationship may be more pronounced in Republican compared to Democratic districts. However, drawbacks in existing survey data hamper efforts to delineate the relationship between income and representation with precision, especially at the highest income levels. In this paper we use new data to explore the relationship between wealth, the party identity of elected officials, and representation in greater depth. We develop several alternative models of the relationship between income and representation, and compare them with models employed in previous empirical research. We test each of these models, using two different data sets containing large numbers of wealthy individuals and very granular measures of income. Our results suggest that individuals with Democratic congressional representatives experience a fundamentally different type of representation than do individuals with Republican representatives. Individuals with Democratic representatives encounter a mode of representation best described as ``populist,'' in which the relationship between income and representation is flat (if not negative). However, individuals with Republican representatives experience an ``oligarchic'' mode of representation, in which wealthy individuals receive much more representation than those lower on the economic ladder.
{"title":"Testing Models of Unequal Representation: Democratic Populists and Republican Oligarchs?","authors":"Jesse H. Rhodes, Brian F. Schaffner","doi":"10.1561/100.00016077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016077","url":null,"abstract":"Recent studies indicate that the wealthy receive more representation from their members of Congress, though this relationship may be more pronounced in Republican compared to Democratic districts. However, drawbacks in existing survey data hamper efforts to delineate the relationship between income and representation with precision, especially at the highest income levels. In this paper we use new data to explore the relationship between wealth, the party identity of elected officials, and representation in greater depth. We develop several alternative models of the relationship between income and representation, and compare them with models employed in previous empirical research. We test each of these models, using two different data sets containing large numbers of wealthy individuals and very granular measures of income. Our results suggest that individuals with Democratic congressional representatives experience a fundamentally different type of representation than do individuals with Republican representatives. Individuals with Democratic representatives encounter a mode of representation best described as ``populist,'' in which the relationship between income and representation is flat (if not negative). However, individuals with Republican representatives experience an ``oligarchic'' mode of representation, in which wealthy individuals receive much more representation than those lower on the economic ladder.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2017-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00016077","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45429699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Presidents have substantial unilateral policymaking powers in the United States despite constitutional provisions for checks and balances. I study how electoral concerns encourage officeholders to exercise these powers, using a formal model in which unilateral policymaking skill varies across officeholders and is unknown to voters. Undesirable unilateral action is unavoidable in equilibrium under broad conditions. This perverse behavior occurs when the incumbent acts unilaterally to show off policymaking skill even though unilateral action is inferior policy. Showing off is driven by electoral motivations and occurs because unilateral action is important for re-election. I also characterize conditions under which the incumbent acts unilaterally in equilibrium if and only if it improves voter welfare.
{"title":"Showing Off: Promise and Peril in Unilateral Policymaking","authors":"Gleason Judd","doi":"10.1561/100.00016144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016144","url":null,"abstract":"Presidents have substantial unilateral policymaking powers in the United States despite constitutional provisions for checks and balances. I study how electoral concerns encourage officeholders to exercise these powers, using a formal model in which unilateral policymaking skill varies across officeholders and is unknown to voters. Undesirable unilateral action is unavoidable in equilibrium under broad conditions. This perverse behavior occurs when the incumbent acts unilaterally to show off policymaking skill even though unilateral action is inferior policy. Showing off is driven by electoral motivations and occurs because unilateral action is important for re-election. I also characterize conditions under which the incumbent acts unilaterally in equilibrium if and only if it improves voter welfare.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2017-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00016144","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41989602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. C. Fair, Patrick M. Kuhn, Neil Malhotra, N. Jacob, Shapiro
How natural disasters affect politics in developing countries is an important question, given the fragility of fledgling democratic institutions in some of these countries as well as likely increased exposure to natural disasters over time due to climate change. Research in sociology and psychology suggests traumatic events can inspire pro-social behavior and therefore might increase political engagement. Research in political science argues that economic resources are critical for political engagement and thus the economic dislocation from disasters may dampen participation. We argue that when the government and civil society response effectively blunts a disaster's economic impacts, then political engagement may increase as citizens learn about government capacity. Using diverse data from the massive 2010–11 Pakistan floods, we find that Pakistanis in highly flood-affected areas turned out to vote at substantially higher rates three years later than those less exposed. We also provide speculative evidence on the mechanism. The increase in turnout was higher in areas with lower ex ante flood risk, which is consistent with a learning process. These results suggest that natural disasters may not necessarily undermine civil society in emerging developing democracies.
{"title":"Natural disasters and political engagement: Evidence from the 2010-11 Pakistani floods","authors":"C. C. Fair, Patrick M. Kuhn, Neil Malhotra, N. Jacob, Shapiro","doi":"10.1561/100.00015075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00015075","url":null,"abstract":"How natural disasters affect politics in developing countries is an important question, given the fragility of fledgling democratic institutions in some of these countries as well as likely increased exposure to natural disasters over time due to climate change. Research in sociology and psychology suggests traumatic events can inspire pro-social behavior and therefore might increase political engagement. Research in political science argues that economic resources are critical for political engagement and thus the economic dislocation from disasters may dampen participation. We argue that when the government and civil society response effectively blunts a disaster's economic impacts, then political engagement may increase as citizens learn about government capacity. Using diverse data from the massive 2010–11 Pakistan floods, we find that Pakistanis in highly flood-affected areas turned out to vote at substantially higher rates three years later than those less exposed. We also provide speculative evidence on the mechanism. The increase in turnout was higher in areas with lower ex ante flood risk, which is consistent with a learning process. These results suggest that natural disasters may not necessarily undermine civil society in emerging developing democracies.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2017-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00015075","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48726403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to scholarly wisdom, party competition at the subnational level plays a negligible role in national elections. We provide theory and evidence that qualifies this view. Subnational elections determine entrance into subnational parliaments, which provides essential organizational resources: members and money. Since in most cases the same political actors compete at all levels of government, they can make use of these resources to improve their status in national party competition. We test our argument exploiting two institutional features of the German multi-level electoral context: the discontinuities generated by the 5% electoral threshold in German state elections, and the occurance of German state elections at different times in the federal election cycle. We find that parties that marginally cross the threshold for state parliamentary representation gain more members, and eventually perform better in national elections, but only if the party has sufficient time to organize between the state and the federal election. Consistent with our organizational explanation, bottom-up effects are more pronounced where state parliamentary parties receive more financial resources. Alternative mechanisms are tested, and receive no empirical support.
{"title":"The National Effects of Subnational Representation: Access to Regional Parliaments and National Electoral Performance","authors":"Elias Dinas, Florian Foos","doi":"10.1561/100.00015068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00015068","url":null,"abstract":"According to scholarly wisdom, party competition at the subnational level plays a negligible role in national elections. We provide theory and evidence that qualifies this view. Subnational elections determine entrance into subnational parliaments, which provides essential organizational resources: members and money. Since in most cases the same political actors compete at all levels of government, they can make use of these resources to improve their status in national party competition. We test our argument exploiting two institutional features of the German multi-level electoral context: the discontinuities generated by the 5% electoral threshold in German state elections, and the occurance of German state elections at different times in the federal election cycle. We find that parties that marginally cross the threshold for state parliamentary representation gain more members, and eventually perform better in national elections, but only if the party has sufficient time to organize between the state and the federal election. Consistent with our organizational explanation, bottom-up effects are more pronounced where state parliamentary parties receive more financial resources. Alternative mechanisms are tested, and receive no empirical support.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2017-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00015068","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43056646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The policy choices of governments are frequently durable. From the building of bridges to the creation of social programs, investments in public infrastructure typically last well beyond a single electoral cycle. In this paper we develop a dynamic model of repeated elections in which policy choices are durable. The behavior that emerges in equilibrium reveals a novel mechanism through which durability interacts with the shorter electoral cycle and distorts the incentives of politicians. We find that a government that is electorally accountable nevertheless underinvests in policy, that it deliberately wastes investment on projects that are never implemented, and that the type of policy it implements is itself Pareto inefficient. The first two distortions match evidence from infrastructure policy in western democracies, and the third identifies a distortion that has heretofore not been explored empirically. Notably, these effects emerge solely due to the interaction of policy durability and political accountability, and not from corruption, poor decision making, or voter myopia.
{"title":"Durable Policy, Political Accountability, and Active Waste","authors":"Steven Callander, Davin Raiha","doi":"10.1561/100.00016120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016120","url":null,"abstract":"The policy choices of governments are frequently durable. From the building of bridges to the creation of social programs, investments in public infrastructure typically last well beyond a single electoral cycle. In this paper we develop a dynamic model of repeated elections in which policy choices are durable. The behavior that emerges in equilibrium reveals a novel mechanism through which durability interacts with the shorter electoral cycle and distorts the incentives of politicians. We find that a government that is electorally accountable nevertheless underinvests in policy, that it deliberately wastes investment on projects that are never implemented, and that the type of policy it implements is itself Pareto inefficient. The first two distortions match evidence from infrastructure policy in western democracies, and the third identifies a distortion that has heretofore not been explored empirically. Notably, these effects emerge solely due to the interaction of policy durability and political accountability, and not from corruption, poor decision making, or voter myopia.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2017-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00016120","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48905257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Issue frames are a central concept in studying public opinion, and are thought to operate by foregrounding related considerations in citizens' minds. But scholarship has yet to consider the breadth of framing effects by testing whether frames influence attitudes beyond the specific issue they highlight. For example, does a discussion of terrorism affect opinions on proximate issues like crime or even more remote issues like poverty? By measuring the breadth of framing effects, we can assess the extent to which citizens' political considerations are cognitively organized by issues. We undertake a population-based survey experiment with roughly 3,300 respondents which includes frames related to terrorism, crime, health care, and government spending. The results demonstrate that framing effects are narrow, with limited but discernible spillover on proximate, structurally similar issues. Discrete issues not only organize elite politics but also exist in voters' minds, a finding with implications for studying ideology as well as framing.
{"title":"Assessing the Breadth of Framing Effects","authors":"D. Hopkins, Jonathan Mummolo","doi":"10.1561/100.00015139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00015139","url":null,"abstract":"Issue frames are a central concept in studying public opinion, and are thought to operate by foregrounding related considerations in citizens' minds. But scholarship has yet to consider the breadth of framing effects by testing whether frames influence attitudes beyond the specific issue they highlight. For example, does a discussion of terrorism affect opinions on proximate issues like crime or even more remote issues like poverty? By measuring the breadth of framing effects, we can assess the extent to which citizens' political considerations are cognitively organized by issues. We undertake a population-based survey experiment with roughly 3,300 respondents which includes frames related to terrorism, crime, health care, and government spending. The results demonstrate that framing effects are narrow, with limited but discernible spillover on proximate, structurally similar issues. Discrete issues not only organize elite politics but also exist in voters' minds, a finding with implications for studying ideology as well as framing.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2017-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00015139","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47375294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Partisans report different perceptions from the same set of facts. According to the perceptual screen hypothesis, this difference arises because partisans perceive different realities. An alternative hypothesis is that partisans take even fact-based questions as an opportunity to voice support for their team. In 2009, Gerber and Huber conducted the first behavioral test of the perceptual screen hypothesis outside of the lab. I re-analyze Gerber and HuberÂ’s original data and collect new data from two additional U.S. elections. Gerber and HuberÂ’s finding of a relationship between partisanship and economic behavior does not hold when observations from a single state-year (Texas in 1996) are excluded from their analysis. Out-of-sample replication based on the two U.S. presidential elections since the original study similarly shows no evidence of an effect. Given these results, the balance of evidence tips toward the conclusion that economic perceptions are not filtered through partisanship.
{"title":"Economic Behavior and the Partisan Perceptual Screen","authors":"Mary C. McGrath","doi":"10.1561/100.00015100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00015100","url":null,"abstract":"Partisans report different perceptions from the same set of facts. According to the perceptual screen hypothesis, this difference arises because partisans perceive different realities. An alternative hypothesis is that partisans take even fact-based questions as an opportunity to voice support for their team. In 2009, Gerber and Huber conducted the first behavioral test of the perceptual screen hypothesis outside of the lab. I re-analyze Gerber and HuberÂ’s original data and collect new data from two additional U.S. elections. Gerber and HuberÂ’s finding of a relationship between partisanship and economic behavior does not hold when observations from a single state-year (Texas in 1996) are excluded from their analysis. Out-of-sample replication based on the two U.S. presidential elections since the original study similarly shows no evidence of an effect. Given these results, the balance of evidence tips toward the conclusion that economic perceptions are not filtered through partisanship.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2017-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00015100","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46761037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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