{"title":"The Manchin Paradox","authors":"Keith Krehbiel, Sara Krehbiel","doi":"10.1561/100.00021165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021165","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135470422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conventional wisdom and existing research suggest that a predatory state benefits from divide-and-rule politics, as competition among political factions distracts them from collective action against expropriation. Historically, however, predatory states vary in whether they seek to heighten or reduce internal tensions. Using a formal model, I develop a political economy theory of how social conflict affects the policy choices and overall revenue of a rent-seeking ruler. I show that the profitability of divide-and-rule politics depends critically on the nature of the state’s revenue base. Internal conflict does not just reduce subjects’ incentive to resist, but also to engage in economically productive activity. On the whole, a regime that taxes the products of the society’s labor will profit from promoting social order. Conversely, a state whose objective is to control a fixed stock of wealth, such as natural resources, benefits from internal divisions. ∗I thank Scott Abramson, Phil Arena, Jeff Arnold, Nicole Audette, Brett Benson, Cristina Bodea, Rob Carroll, Clifford Carrubba, Dave Conner, Tom Dolan, Mark Fey, Michael Gibilisco, Hein Goemans, Jeremy Kedziora, Bethany Lacina, Jeff Marshall, Jack Paine, Mattias Polborn, Kristopher Ramsay, Miguel Rueda, Peter Schram, Curt Signorino, Brad Smith, Matt Testerman, and Alan Wiseman for helpful discussions and comments. †Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University. Email: brenton.kenkel@ vanderbilt.edu. The object of a predatory state, such as a colonial empire or a kleptocratic dictatorship, is to profit from power. Collective resistance by the subject population against a predatory regime or its extractive policies threatens the profitability of rule. Therefore, conventional wisdom at least since the Roman empire has held that a predatory state benefits from a policy of divide et impera, or divide and rule. When ethnic groups, religious factions, or other social subgroups are in conflict with each other, they have less time and manpower left over for collective resistance against government predation. Even in the absence of open conflict, the incentives for collective action may be weak in fractionalized societies (see Habyarimana et al. 2007), meaning ruling regimes face a relatively low internal threat to their position. Indeed, divide and rule has been a guiding policy for predatory regimes across time and space: military conquerors like Hernán Cortés in Mexico (Burkholder and Johnson 2015), global empires like the British in India (Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan 2005), and contemporary kleptocrats as in the post-Soviet republics (Driscoll 2015). Yet not all predatory regimes exploit internal divisions. In fact, some do the opposite, promoting internal order over conflict. For example, when the Dutch East India Company arrived in the northern Sulawesi region of present-day Indonesia in the 17th century, the region was beset with raiding and other violence, largely bet
传统智慧和现有研究表明，掠夺性国家从分而治之的政治中受益，因为政治派别之间的竞争分散了他们反对征用的集体行动。然而，从历史上看，掠夺性国家在寻求加剧还是减少国内紧张局势方面各不相同。使用一个正式的模型，我发展了一个政治经济学理论，关于社会冲突如何影响寻租统治者的政策选择和总体收入。我指出，分而治之政治的盈利能力主要取决于国家收入基础的性质。内部冲突不仅降低了主体反抗的动机，也降低了主体参与经济生产活动的动机。总的来说，对社会劳动产品征税的制度有利于促进社会秩序。相反，一个以控制固定财富(如自然资源)为目标的国家，则会从内部划分中获益。*我感谢斯科特·艾布拉姆森、菲尔·阿雷纳、杰夫·阿诺德、妮可·奥德特、布雷特·本森、克里斯蒂娜·博迪亚、罗布·卡罗尔、克利福德·卡鲁巴、戴夫·康纳、汤姆·多兰、马克·菲、迈克尔·吉比利斯科、海因·戈曼斯、杰里米·凯德齐奥拉、贝瑟尼·拉西纳、杰夫·马歇尔、杰克·潘恩、马蒂亚斯·波尔本、克里斯托弗·拉姆齐、米格尔·鲁埃达、彼得·施拉姆、科特·西格里诺、布拉德·史密斯、马特·特斯特曼和艾伦·怀斯曼的有益讨论和评论。†范德比尔特大学政治科学系助理教授。电子邮件:brenton。kenkel@ vanderbilt.edu。掠夺性国家的目标，如殖民帝国或盗贼专政，就是从权力中获利。臣民对掠夺性政权或其掠夺性政策的集体抵抗威胁到统治的盈利性。因此，至少从罗马帝国开始，传统智慧就认为掠夺性国家会从分而治之的政策中获益。当民族、宗教派别或其他社会子群体之间发生冲突时，他们就没有多少时间和人力来集体抵抗政府的掠夺。即使在没有公开冲突的情况下，在分化的社会中，集体行动的动机也可能很弱(见Habyarimana et al. 2007)，这意味着统治政权面临的内部威胁相对较低。事实上，分而治之一直是跨越时间和空间的掠夺性政权的指导政策:军事征服者，如墨西哥的Hernán cort(伯克霍德和约翰逊，2015年)，全球帝国，如印度的英国人(班纳吉，耶尔和索马纳坦，2005年)，以及后苏联共和国的当代盗贼统治者(德里斯科尔，2015年)。然而，并非所有掠夺性政权都利用内部分歧。事实上，一些国家的做法恰恰相反，他们提倡内部秩序，而不是冲突。例如，当荷兰东印度公司在17世纪到达苏拉威西北部地区(今天的印度尼西亚)时，该地区被袭击和其他暴力事件所困扰，主要发生在邻近的敌对村庄之间(Schouten 1998)。而不是鼓励和利用这些冲突，就像掠夺性政权的分而治之理论所预测的那样，荷兰人寻求减少抢劫和保护财产权。交战各方经常要求荷兰人仲裁他们的争端，使该公司在苏拉威西社会中成为一种“陌生的国王”。荷兰人发现这样做符合他们的利益，因为“任何冲突都会很快干扰米纳哈桑大米的生产和供应……形成了公司在该地区的主要经济利益”(Henley 2004,105)。换句话说，至少在苏拉威西岛，分而治之并不划算。在本文中，我发展了一个理论来解释为什么掠夺性政府有时从社会秩序中受益，而有时更喜欢内部冲突。我通过一个分裂社会掠夺性统治的正式模型来发展这一理论。所谓掠夺性统治，我的意思是政府唯一关心的是
{"title":"Social Conflict and the Predatory State","authors":"Brenton Kenkel","doi":"10.1561/100.00020116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020116","url":null,"abstract":"Conventional wisdom and existing research suggest that a predatory state benefits from divide-and-rule politics, as competition among political factions distracts them from collective action against expropriation. Historically, however, predatory states vary in whether they seek to heighten or reduce internal tensions. Using a formal model, I develop a political economy theory of how social conflict affects the policy choices and overall revenue of a rent-seeking ruler. I show that the profitability of divide-and-rule politics depends critically on the nature of the state’s revenue base. Internal conflict does not just reduce subjects’ incentive to resist, but also to engage in economically productive activity. On the whole, a regime that taxes the products of the society’s labor will profit from promoting social order. Conversely, a state whose objective is to control a fixed stock of wealth, such as natural resources, benefits from internal divisions. ∗I thank Scott Abramson, Phil Arena, Jeff Arnold, Nicole Audette, Brett Benson, Cristina Bodea, Rob Carroll, Clifford Carrubba, Dave Conner, Tom Dolan, Mark Fey, Michael Gibilisco, Hein Goemans, Jeremy Kedziora, Bethany Lacina, Jeff Marshall, Jack Paine, Mattias Polborn, Kristopher Ramsay, Miguel Rueda, Peter Schram, Curt Signorino, Brad Smith, Matt Testerman, and Alan Wiseman for helpful discussions and comments. †Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University. Email: brenton.kenkel@ vanderbilt.edu. The object of a predatory state, such as a colonial empire or a kleptocratic dictatorship, is to profit from power. Collective resistance by the subject population against a predatory regime or its extractive policies threatens the profitability of rule. Therefore, conventional wisdom at least since the Roman empire has held that a predatory state benefits from a policy of divide et impera, or divide and rule. When ethnic groups, religious factions, or other social subgroups are in conflict with each other, they have less time and manpower left over for collective resistance against government predation. Even in the absence of open conflict, the incentives for collective action may be weak in fractionalized societies (see Habyarimana et al. 2007), meaning ruling regimes face a relatively low internal threat to their position. Indeed, divide and rule has been a guiding policy for predatory regimes across time and space: military conquerors like Hernán Cortés in Mexico (Burkholder and Johnson 2015), global empires like the British in India (Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan 2005), and contemporary kleptocrats as in the post-Soviet republics (Driscoll 2015). Yet not all predatory regimes exploit internal divisions. In fact, some do the opposite, promoting internal order over conflict. For example, when the Dutch East India Company arrived in the northern Sulawesi region of present-day Indonesia in the 17th century, the region was beset with raiding and other violence, largely bet","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Interventions in the Administration of Justice","authors":"Carlo M. Horz, H. Simpson","doi":"10.1561/100.00020181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020181","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why are transparency regimes so rare? When some politicians have something to conceal, why would their opponents not press for transparency? To analyze transitional justice, we build a model that explains why uncompromised politicians might avoid a transparency regime, which could signal to the voters that they are clean. We model the interaction between an incumbent, an opposition leader, a strategic blackmailer, and voters who know that the opposition politician may be compromised. The incumbent can implement a transparency regime, which would force out a compromised opponent and thus make blackmail impossible. We show that, instead, she might strategically opt for no transparency that keeps all skeletons of the ancient regime in the closet, as it is easier to defeat a potentially compromised opponent. We corroborate our results using original data from the Global Transitional Justice Dataset combined with data on elections, incumbency, and successor autocrat status in post-communist Europe.
{"title":"How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes","authors":"Monika Nalepa, Konstantin Sonin","doi":"10.1561/100.00021017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021017","url":null,"abstract":"Why are transparency regimes so rare? When some politicians have something to conceal, why would their opponents not press for transparency? To analyze transitional justice, we build a model that explains why uncompromised politicians might avoid a transparency regime, which could signal to the voters that they are clean. We model the interaction between an incumbent, an opposition leader, a strategic blackmailer, and voters who know that the opposition politician may be compromised. The incumbent can implement a transparency regime, which would force out a compromised opponent and thus make blackmail impossible. We show that, instead, she might strategically opt for no transparency that keeps all skeletons of the ancient regime in the closet, as it is easier to defeat a potentially compromised opponent. We corroborate our results using original data from the Global Transitional Justice Dataset combined with data on elections, incumbency, and successor autocrat status in post-communist Europe.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135784815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study how social norms affect social change in a setting where people have both internal motivations and a desire to conform. We distinguish two kinds of internal motivations: common values in which people wish to behave consistent with some evolving, uncertain ground truth and private values in which individuals genuinely disagree about proper behavior for non-informational reasons. In both settings aggregate behavior changes more slowly than beliefs about proper behavior, and increased information reduces such inertia. Inertia is a more severe problem, but information is more effective, when values are common rather than private. In this common-values setting, we identify conditions under which increased information leads to a normative improvement. Finally, we elucidate empirical implications for the relationships between measures of attitudes, behavior, and descriptive norms. The average perceived descriptive norm is lower than the average action which is lower than the average belief about the right action (injunctive norm). Thus, behavioral forecasts based on survey answers about perceived descriptive or injunctive norms are under-and over-estimates, respectively.
{"title":"Social Norms and Social Change","authors":"Ethan BUENO DE MESQUITA, Mehdi Shadmehr","doi":"10.1561/100.00021153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021153","url":null,"abstract":"We study how social norms affect social change in a setting where people have both internal motivations and a desire to conform. We distinguish two kinds of internal motivations: common values in which people wish to behave consistent with some evolving, uncertain ground truth and private values in which individuals genuinely disagree about proper behavior for non-informational reasons. In both settings aggregate behavior changes more slowly than beliefs about proper behavior, and increased information reduces such inertia. Inertia is a more severe problem, but information is more effective, when values are common rather than private. In this common-values setting, we identify conditions under which increased information leads to a normative improvement. Finally, we elucidate empirical implications for the relationships between measures of attitudes, behavior, and descriptive norms. The average perceived descriptive norm is lower than the average action which is lower than the average belief about the right action (injunctive norm). Thus, behavioral forecasts based on survey answers about perceived descriptive or injunctive norms are under-and over-estimates, respectively.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67073004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lobbyists into Government","authors":"Benjamin C. K. Egerod, Joshua McCrain","doi":"10.1561/100.00021196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021196","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67073064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Editorial Board is thrilled to present the 2014 -2015 edition of the Evans School Review, a student led and peer reviewed academic journal. Evans School Review is a student run academic journal that provides an excellent opportunity for students in the Evans community to share their creative research with a wide audience to further research innovation within the area of public policy and administration. In the five years of this journal, we have been lucky enough to have Editorial Boards with the passion and clear vision to make the review what it is today. We are grateful to be at an institution that has supported their students and our desire to present public policy work that is of great interest to us.
{"title":"A Letter from the Editors-in-Chief","authors":"Anthony Fowler, Stephane Wolton","doi":"10.1561/100.00022138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00022138","url":null,"abstract":"The Editorial Board is thrilled to present the 2014 -2015 edition of the Evans School Review, a student led and peer reviewed academic journal. Evans School Review is a student run academic journal that provides an excellent opportunity for students in the Evans community to share their creative research with a wide audience to further research innovation within the area of public policy and administration. In the five years of this journal, we have been lucky enough to have Editorial Boards with the passion and clear vision to make the review what it is today. We are grateful to be at an institution that has supported their students and our desire to present public policy work that is of great interest to us.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster","authors":"Daniel Gibbs","doi":"10.1561/100.00020109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020109","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Democracy and its Vulnerabilities: Dynamics of Democratic Backsliding","authors":"Zhaotian Luo, Adam Przeworski","doi":"10.1561/100.00021112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021112","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136008976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ruling the Ruling Coalition: Information Control and Authoritarian Power-Sharing","authors":"Zhaotian Luo, Arturas Rozenas","doi":"10.1561/100.00021094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021094","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135470421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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