{"title":"Insights from the Blinder–Oaxaca Decomposition on Polarization in the US Senate","authors":"Daniel M. Butler","doi":"10.1561/100.00019219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019219","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42392778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the electoral effects of party bans, studying the case of the ban on Batasuna, the political wing of ETA. In an initial electoral term, in 2003, Batasuna was banned from contesting local elections in all Basque municipalities; in a second term, in 2007, it was banned only in a subset of them, and in 2011 it became legal again. Exploiting the finite and heterogeneous length of the ban across municipalities, I find that a longer ban has a negative effect on electoral support for the targeted party. This effect is explained by the extent of the immediate loss in support in treated municipalities under the 2007 ban, observable in this instance because Batasuna called for a null vote. This pattern and further heterogeneous effects are consistent with voters learning from the new electoral scenario rather than with a direct cost attributable to the party no longer having institutional representation. This suggests that party bans may be used by incumbents to reduce their challengers’ strength by triggering an electoral reshuffling, with voters learning about new parties and potentially switching allegiances.
{"title":"Party Bans: Deterrence or Backlash? Evidence from the Basque Country","authors":"Andreu Arenas","doi":"10.1561/100.00018119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00018119","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the electoral effects of party bans, studying the case of the ban on Batasuna, the political wing of ETA. In an initial electoral term, in 2003, Batasuna was banned from contesting local elections in all Basque municipalities; in a second term, in 2007, it was banned only in a subset of them, and in 2011 it became legal again. Exploiting the finite and heterogeneous length of the ban across municipalities, I find that a longer ban has a negative effect on electoral support for the targeted party. This effect is explained by the extent of the immediate loss in support in treated municipalities under the 2007 ban, observable in this instance because Batasuna called for a null vote. This pattern and further heterogeneous effects are consistent with voters learning from the new electoral scenario rather than with a direct cost attributable to the party no longer having institutional representation. This suggests that party bans may be used by incumbents to reduce their challengers’ strength by triggering an electoral reshuffling, with voters learning about new parties and potentially switching allegiances.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45362773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Polarized Extremes and the Confused Centre: Campaign Targeting of Voters with Correlation Neglect
两极分化的极端和混乱的中间:忽视相关性的选民竞选目标
{"title":"Polarized Extremes and the Confused Centre: Campaign Targeting of Voters with Correlation Neglect","authors":"Gilat Levy, Inés Moreno de Barreda, R. Razin","doi":"10.1561/100.00019125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019125","url":null,"abstract":"Polarized Extremes and the Confused Centre: Campaign Targeting of Voters with Correlation Neglect","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43797306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The dominant paradigm for policymaking by chief executives is they are first-movers who change the status quo. I re-evaluate this notion by extending recent advances in measuring the conservatism of policy, and by constructing a new comprehensive measure of presidential action. Though executive unilateralism theories predict whether a given status quo will change, empirical studies rely on aggregate analyses of executive productivity and second-order predictions based on assumptions about the spatial distribution of policies. I find evidence of the ecological fallacy in presidency research: despite aggregate findings in support of the theory, it poorly predicts policies addressed by presidential initiatives. Moreover, I show most of the prediction error is due to a high falsenegative rate—with the president acting despite supposed separation of powers constraints. This suggests either that Congress is a weaker countervailing policymaker than previously thought, or that unilateral action is a poor conceptual paradigm for understanding presidential policymaking.
{"title":"Presidents and the Status Quo","authors":"Kenneth Lowande","doi":"10.1561/100.00019170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019170","url":null,"abstract":"The dominant paradigm for policymaking by chief executives is they are first-movers who change the status quo. I re-evaluate this notion by extending recent advances in measuring the conservatism of policy, and by constructing a new comprehensive measure of presidential action. Though executive unilateralism theories predict whether a given status quo will change, empirical studies rely on aggregate analyses of executive productivity and second-order predictions based on assumptions about the spatial distribution of policies. I find evidence of the ecological fallacy in presidency research: despite aggregate findings in support of the theory, it poorly predicts policies addressed by presidential initiatives. Moreover, I show most of the prediction error is due to a high falsenegative rate—with the president acting despite supposed separation of powers constraints. This suggests either that Congress is a weaker countervailing policymaker than previously thought, or that unilateral action is a poor conceptual paradigm for understanding presidential policymaking.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43765528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can voters learn what they need to learn to hold governments accountable for the economy through news coverage? Employing the first large-scale cross-national dataset of media coverage of the economy — over 2 million articles related to three economic indicators in 32 mainstream newspapers, one left-wing and one right-wing, in 16 developed countries and 6 languages — we investigate media coverage of the economy that bears implications for electoral accountability and partisan advantage. We find that the tone of most mainstream newspapers tracks the economy faithfully, although the frequency of coverage increases with negative outcomes. While we find some evidence for partisan bias in tone for growth headlines and in frequency of coverage for unemployment articles, its substantive magnitude is diminutive. Mainstream newspaper coverage of the economy provides voters with largely accurate information.
{"title":"Does the Media Cover the Economy Accurately? An Analysis of Sixteen Developed Democracies","authors":"Mark A. Kayser, Michael Peress","doi":"10.1561/100.00019098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019098","url":null,"abstract":"Can voters learn what they need to learn to hold governments accountable for the economy through news coverage? Employing the first large-scale cross-national dataset of media coverage of the economy — over 2 million articles related to three economic indicators in 32 mainstream newspapers, one left-wing and one right-wing, in 16 developed countries and 6 languages — we investigate media coverage of the economy that bears implications for electoral accountability and partisan advantage. We find that the tone of most mainstream newspapers tracks the economy faithfully, although the frequency of coverage increases with negative outcomes. While we find some evidence for partisan bias in tone for growth headlines and in frequency of coverage for unemployment articles, its substantive magnitude is diminutive. Mainstream newspaper coverage of the economy provides voters with largely accurate information.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42917119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do Reelection Incentives Improve Policy Implementation? Accountability versus Political Targeting
重选激励措施能改善政策执行吗？问责与政治目标
{"title":"Do Reelection Incentives Improve Policy Implementation? Accountability versus Political Targeting","authors":"A. Frey","doi":"10.1561/100.00019089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019089","url":null,"abstract":"Do Reelection Incentives Improve Policy Implementation? Accountability versus Political Targeting","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43394192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Siegel, E. Nikitin, Pablo Barberá, Joanna Sterling, Bethany Pullen, Richard Bonneau, Jonathan Nagler, Joshua A. Tucker
Trumping Hate on Twitter? Online Hate Speech in the 2016 U.S. Election Campaign and its Aftermath
推特上的特朗普仇恨?2016年美国大选中的网络仇恨言论及其后果
{"title":"Trumping Hate on Twitter? Online Hate Speech in the 2016 U.S. Election Campaign and its Aftermath","authors":"A. Siegel, E. Nikitin, Pablo Barberá, Joanna Sterling, Bethany Pullen, Richard Bonneau, Jonathan Nagler, Joshua A. Tucker","doi":"10.1561/100.00019045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019045","url":null,"abstract":"Trumping Hate on Twitter? Online Hate Speech in the 2016 U.S. Election Campaign and its Aftermath","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47418452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Model of Interest Group Influence and Campaign Advertising","authors":"Zuheir Desai, John Duggan","doi":"10.1561/100.00019123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019123","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Terrence L. Chapman, Nathan M. Jensen, Edmund J. Malesky, S. Wolford
When do well-intended regulatory regimes have unintended consequences? We examine one obstacle to successful regulation, “regulatory leakage,” in the context of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC). Leakage occurs when regulated behavior decreases for actors under a regime’s jurisdiction, but increases among those outside of it. We analyze a formal model that demonstrates how the ABC may simultaneously reduce bribery among firms from member countries, while increasing bribery by firms from non-ABC member countries. We also show how the ABC may lead firms from ABC member countries to shift to bribery through intermediaries. New empirical evidence of MNC activity in Vietnam shows evidence of both regulatory leakage and bribery through intermediaries.
{"title":"\"Leakage\" in International Regulatory Regimes: Did the OECD Anti-bribery Convention Increase Bribery?","authors":"Terrence L. Chapman, Nathan M. Jensen, Edmund J. Malesky, S. Wolford","doi":"10.1561/100.00019193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019193","url":null,"abstract":"When do well-intended regulatory regimes have unintended consequences? We examine one obstacle to successful regulation, “regulatory leakage,” in the context of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC). Leakage occurs when regulated behavior decreases for actors under a regime’s jurisdiction, but increases among those outside of it. We analyze a formal model that demonstrates how the ABC may simultaneously reduce bribery among firms from member countries, while increasing bribery by firms from non-ABC member countries. We also show how the ABC may lead firms from ABC member countries to shift to bribery through intermediaries. New empirical evidence of MNC activity in Vietnam shows evidence of both regulatory leakage and bribery through intermediaries.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contemporary U.S. Policymaking","authors":"D. Baron","doi":"10.1561/100.00019221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019221","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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