Terrence L. Chapman, Nathan M. Jensen, Edmund J. Malesky, S. Wolford
When do well-intended regulatory regimes have unintended consequences? We examine one obstacle to successful regulation, “regulatory leakage,” in the context of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC). Leakage occurs when regulated behavior decreases for actors under a regime’s jurisdiction, but increases among those outside of it. We analyze a formal model that demonstrates how the ABC may simultaneously reduce bribery among firms from member countries, while increasing bribery by firms from non-ABC member countries. We also show how the ABC may lead firms from ABC member countries to shift to bribery through intermediaries. New empirical evidence of MNC activity in Vietnam shows evidence of both regulatory leakage and bribery through intermediaries.
{"title":"\"Leakage\" in International Regulatory Regimes: Did the OECD Anti-bribery Convention Increase Bribery?","authors":"Terrence L. Chapman, Nathan M. Jensen, Edmund J. Malesky, S. Wolford","doi":"10.1561/100.00019193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019193","url":null,"abstract":"When do well-intended regulatory regimes have unintended consequences? We examine one obstacle to successful regulation, “regulatory leakage,” in the context of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC). Leakage occurs when regulated behavior decreases for actors under a regime’s jurisdiction, but increases among those outside of it. We analyze a formal model that demonstrates how the ABC may simultaneously reduce bribery among firms from member countries, while increasing bribery by firms from non-ABC member countries. We also show how the ABC may lead firms from ABC member countries to shift to bribery through intermediaries. New empirical evidence of MNC activity in Vietnam shows evidence of both regulatory leakage and bribery through intermediaries.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contemporary U.S. Policymaking","authors":"D. Baron","doi":"10.1561/100.00019221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019221","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Newspapers Benefit Incumbents? Evidence from Denmark 1849–1915","authors":"Alexander Fouirnaies","doi":"10.1561/100.00019054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019054","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Direct Primary and the Incumbency Advantage in the US House of Representatives","authors":"Michael P. Olson","doi":"10.1561/100.00018168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00018168","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"15 1","pages":"483-506"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41386709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Mechanisms of Direct and Indirect Rule: Colonialism and Economic Development in Africa","authors":"N. Letsa, Martha Wilfahrt","doi":"10.1561/100.00019086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019086","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"15 1","pages":"539-577"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00019086","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47448681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rulemaking procedures provide interest groups two opportunities to persuade regulators: ex parte meetings and public comments. Regulated entities use both avenues more extensively than other groups, but how much do they gain by doing so? By analyzing changes in the stock price of firms in the hours following rule announcements, I study the effect of lobbying on Dodd–Frank implementation at the Federal Reserve Board. I find that meetings and comments were associated with abnormal returns in the tens of billions, yet meetings were worth more. Returns of firms that met or commented were excessive in comparison to baseline expectations and the performance of all their disengaged competitors. When comparing firms that lobby with their most similar competitors, however, only meetings are associated with excess returns. By comparing comment requests to rule texts, I show that policy concessions were both pervasive and correlate with market outcomes. I connect these findings to contemporary debates about the design of administrative procedures and regulatory inequality.
{"title":"Meetings, Comments, and the Distributive Politics of Rulemaking","authors":"Brian Libgober","doi":"10.1561/100.00018135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00018135","url":null,"abstract":"Rulemaking procedures provide interest groups two opportunities to persuade regulators: ex parte meetings and public comments. Regulated entities use both avenues more extensively than other groups, but how much do they gain by doing so? By analyzing changes in the stock price of firms in the hours following rule announcements, I study the effect of lobbying on Dodd–Frank implementation at the Federal Reserve Board. I find that meetings and comments were associated with abnormal returns in the tens of billions, yet meetings were worth more. Returns of firms that met or commented were excessive in comparison to baseline expectations and the performance of all their disengaged competitors. When comparing firms that lobby with their most similar competitors, however, only meetings are associated with excess returns. By comparing comment requests to rule texts, I show that policy concessions were both pervasive and correlate with market outcomes. I connect these findings to contemporary debates about the design of administrative procedures and regulatory inequality.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"15 1","pages":"449-481"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00018135","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48905690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite what the theory predicts, supply of redistributive policies does not always respond to rising inequality. We argue that redistribution reacts to changes in inequality, as long as the economy is not overshadowed by non-economic issues during the elections. To this end we construct a unique data set — where we estimate the race of candidates competing in all elections for U.S. state legislatures since 1980 — and show that the share of racially differentiated electoral contests has a disentangling effect on the inequality–redistribution link: when there are few (many) racially differentiated electoral contests, redistribution is (not) found to be sensitive to changes in inequality.
{"title":"Class versus Identity: Candidates' Race and the Inequality–Redistribution Nexus","authors":"Konstantinos Matakos, Dimitrios Xefteris","doi":"10.1561/100.00018138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00018138","url":null,"abstract":"Despite what the theory predicts, supply of redistributive policies does not always respond to rising inequality. We argue that redistribution reacts to changes in inequality, as long as the economy is not overshadowed by non-economic issues during the elections. To this end we construct a unique data set — where we estimate the race of candidates competing in all elections for U.S. state legislatures since 1980 — and show that the share of racially differentiated electoral contests has a disentangling effect on the inequality–redistribution link: when there are few (many) racially differentiated electoral contests, redistribution is (not) found to be sensitive to changes in inequality.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"15 1","pages":"401-447"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00018138","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42630248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rational Quagmires: Attrition, Learning, and War","authors":"Colin Krainin, Caroline D. Thomas, Thomas Wiseman","doi":"10.1561/100.00018008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00018008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"15 1","pages":"369-400"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/100.00018008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44316851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Local Representation and Voter Mobilization in Closed-list Proportional Representation Systems
封闭式比例代表制下的地方代表制与选民动员
{"title":"Local Representation and Voter Mobilization in Closed-list Proportional Representation Systems","authors":"Jon H. Fiva, A. Halse, Daniel M. Smith","doi":"10.1561/100.00019147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019147","url":null,"abstract":"Local Representation and Voter Mobilization in Closed-list Proportional Representation Systems","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46363409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The under-representation of women in American politics can likely be explained, at least in part, by women’s comparatively lower levels of political ambition. We analyze a co-ed, religious program for high school students in which participants lobby their Members of Congress and receive political skills training. By leveraging longitudinal survey data about the participants and a difference-in-differences design, we find that the program successfully increased the political ambition of its female participants. To the best of our knowledge, we offer the first quasi-experimental evidence demonstrating a possible means of increasing the political ambition of high school-aged American women. Our results demonstrate that female political ambition can be increased without relying on programs that explicitly focus on gender and ambition.
{"title":"Can the Political Ambition of Young Women Be Increased? Evidence from U.S. High School Students","authors":"Joshua L. Kalla, Ethan Porter","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/7uy8w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/7uy8w","url":null,"abstract":"The under-representation of women in American politics can likely be explained, at least in part, by women’s comparatively lower levels of political ambition. We analyze a co-ed, religious program for high school students in which participants lobby their Members of Congress and receive political skills training. By leveraging longitudinal survey data about the participants and a difference-in-differences design, we find that the program successfully increased the political ambition of its female participants. To the best of our knowledge, we offer the first quasi-experimental evidence demonstrating a possible means of increasing the political ambition of high school-aged American women. Our results demonstrate that female political ambition can be increased without relying on programs that explicitly focus on gender and ambition.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44617140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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