Sebastian Beer, Matthias Kasper, Erich Kirchler, Brian Erard
This paper employs unique tax administrative data and operational audit information from a sample of approximately 7,500 self-employed U.S. taxpayers to investigate the effects of operational tax audits on future reporting behavior. Our estimates indicate that audits can have substantial deterrent or counter-deterrent effects. Among those taxpayers who receive an additional tax assessment, reported taxable income is estimated to be 64% higher in the first year after the audit than it would have been in the absence of the audit. In contrast, among those taxpayers who do not receive an additional tax assessment, reported taxable income is estimated to be approximately 15% lower the year after the audit than it would have been had the audit not taken place. Our results suggest that improved targeting of audits towards noncompliant taxpayers would not only yield more direct audit revenue, it would also pay dividends in terms of future tax collections.
{"title":"Do Audits Deter or Provoke Future Tax Noncompliance? Evidence on Self-Employed Taxpayers","authors":"Sebastian Beer, Matthias Kasper, Erich Kirchler, Brian Erard","doi":"10.1093/cesifo/ifz018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifz018","url":null,"abstract":"This paper employs unique tax administrative data and operational audit information from a sample of approximately 7,500 self-employed U.S. taxpayers to investigate the effects of operational tax audits on future reporting behavior. Our estimates indicate that audits can have substantial deterrent or counter-deterrent effects. Among those taxpayers who receive an additional tax assessment, reported taxable income is estimated to be 64% higher in the first year after the audit than it would have been in the absence of the audit. In contrast, among those taxpayers who do not receive an additional tax assessment, reported taxable income is estimated to be approximately 15% lower the year after the audit than it would have been had the audit not taken place. Our results suggest that improved targeting of audits towards noncompliant taxpayers would not only yield more direct audit revenue, it would also pay dividends in terms of future tax collections.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":"92 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138504609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The case for competition in health-care markets rests on economic models in which providers seek to maximize profits. However, little is known regarding how public health-care providers, who might not have a profit motive, react to increased competition from private providers. This study considers the heterogeneous effects of a primary health-care reform in a Swedish region that considerably loosened entry restrictions and increased patients’ freedom of choice, thus enabling increased competition. Our difference-in-differences analysis contrasts local markets that were affected by both entry and choice with local monopoly markets, which were unaffected by the reforms. Using detailed administrative data on all visits to public health centers in 2008–2011, we find that providers in markets with increasing competition registered more diagnoses in an administrative database, thus increasing their reimbursement per patient. Although the economic significance of the effect is small, the result suggests that public providers are indeed sensitive to competition.
{"title":"Competition, Capitation, and Coding: Do Public Primary Care Providers Respond to Increased Competition?","authors":"Margareta Dackehag, L. Ellegård","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The case for competition in health-care markets rests on economic models in which providers seek to maximize profits. However, little is known regarding how public health-care providers, who might not have a profit motive, react to increased competition from private providers. This study considers the heterogeneous effects of a primary health-care reform in a Swedish region that considerably loosened entry restrictions and increased patients’ freedom of choice, thus enabling increased competition. Our difference-in-differences analysis contrasts local markets that were affected by both entry and choice with local monopoly markets, which were unaffected by the reforms. Using detailed administrative data on all visits to public health centers in 2008–2011, we find that providers in markets with increasing competition registered more diagnoses in an administrative database, thus increasing their reimbursement per patient. Although the economic significance of the effect is small, the result suggests that public providers are indeed sensitive to competition.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44513704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What is the impact of private for-profit (PfP) hospital ownership on costs and quality of care? In light of a substantial and increasing share of PfP hospitals in many hospital markets like the USA or Germany, this is an important question. We estimate the effect of PfP ownership on hospital 30-day- and 1-year-mortality outcomes and hospital costs by focusing on heart attacks and pneumonia, two very common conditions in healthcare markets. We use rich administrative hospital data from Germany for the years 2006–2015. Applying differential distance as instrument for hospital choice, we imitate randomization of patients into PfP hospitals. Our results suggest that PfP hospitals have no higher mortality rates for heart attack treatment than public ones. For pneumonia patients, we even find lower 30-day-mortality rates of PfP hospitals compared to public hospitals. Finally, we show that PfP hospitals have higher hospital costs than public or private not-for-profit hospitals for both conditions.
{"title":"The Impact of Private for-Profit Hospital Ownership on Costs and Quality of Care – Evidence from Germany","authors":"A. Wübker, Christiane Wuckel","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What is the impact of private for-profit (PfP) hospital ownership on costs and quality of care? In light of a substantial and increasing share of PfP hospitals in many hospital markets like the USA or Germany, this is an important question. We estimate the effect of PfP ownership on hospital 30-day- and 1-year-mortality outcomes and hospital costs by focusing on heart attacks and pneumonia, two very common conditions in healthcare markets. We use rich administrative hospital data from Germany for the years 2006–2015. Applying differential distance as instrument for hospital choice, we imitate randomization of patients into PfP hospitals. Our results suggest that PfP hospitals have no higher mortality rates for heart attack treatment than public ones. For pneumonia patients, we even find lower 30-day-mortality rates of PfP hospitals compared to public hospitals. Finally, we show that PfP hospitals have higher hospital costs than public or private not-for-profit hospitals for both conditions.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47297357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public sector outsourcing, in the form of private production of tax-financed services, is on the increase with economic and social consequences for consumers, taxpayers, and employees. The development has given rise to so-called quasi-markets with choice and competition between public, for-profit, and non-profit providers. By introducing the main characteristics of quasi-markets with a focus on prices, this article provides background perspectives. It sets the stage for the other six articles on public sector outsourcing in this special issue of the journal. (JEL codes: D23, H11, H44, L33).
{"title":"Perspectives on Public Sector Outsourcing: Quasi-markets and Prices","authors":"Henrik Jordahl","doi":"10.1093/cesifo/ifz015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifz015","url":null,"abstract":"Public sector outsourcing, in the form of private production of tax-financed services, is on the increase with economic and social consequences for consumers, taxpayers, and employees. The development has given rise to so-called quasi-markets with choice and competition between public, for-profit, and non-profit providers. By introducing the main characteristics of quasi-markets with a focus on prices, this article provides background perspectives. It sets the stage for the other six articles on public sector outsourcing in this special issue of the journal. (JEL codes: D23, H11, H44, L33).","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/cesifo/ifz015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41914443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A number of papers have compared the effectiveness of private and public schools in different institutional settings. However, most of these studies are observational and do not utilize experimental or quasi-experimental design to evaluate the value-added or the effectiveness of private schools in comparison to public schools. This study focuses on private and public high schools in Helsinki, the capital city of Finland. We use two different methods to compare private and public schools, value-added estimation and regression discontinuity design (RDD). Although based on somewhat different assumptions, both methods allow us to evaluate the causal effect of private schools on the exit exam results in high school. We find that private schools perform marginally better than public schools, but the difference in performance is small and statistically insignificant according to both methods. Various robustness and validity checks strengthen our RDD results and the validity of the discontinuity design.
{"title":"Effectiveness of Private and Public High Schools: Evidence from Finland","authors":"Mika Kortelainen, Kalle Manninen","doi":"10.1093/cesifo/ifz014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifz014","url":null,"abstract":"A number of papers have compared the effectiveness of private and public schools in different institutional settings. However, most of these studies are observational and do not utilize experimental or quasi-experimental design to evaluate the value-added or the effectiveness of private schools in comparison to public schools. This study focuses on private and public high schools in Helsinki, the capital city of Finland. We use two different methods to compare private and public schools, value-added estimation and regression discontinuity design (RDD). Although based on somewhat different assumptions, both methods allow us to evaluate the causal effect of private schools on the exit exam results in high school. We find that private schools perform marginally better than public schools, but the difference in performance is small and statistically insignificant according to both methods. Various robustness and validity checks strengthen our RDD results and the validity of the discontinuity design.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":"96 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138504608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nikos Tsakiris, P. Hatzipanayotou, Michael S. Michael
Within a model of variable supply of capital due to international mobility and variable labor supply due to endogenous labor-leisure choice, we revisit the issues of vertical fiscal externalities, and of federal tax-transfers. Capital and labor taxes by federal and state governments finance the provision of federal and of state public consumption goods. When capital and labor are substitutes in production, we show that (i) the state’s optimal policy calls for capital and labor taxes, (ii) the vertical fiscal externality can be reversed from negative, implying inefficiently high noncooperative capital taxes, to positive, implying inefficiently low noncooperative capital taxes, and (iii) under centralized leadership the federal government replicates the second best optimum with a capital tax, and possibly, top-down transfers. (JEL codes: F18, F21, H21).
{"title":"Vertical Fiscal Externalities and Federal Tax-Transfers under Variable Factor Supplies","authors":"Nikos Tsakiris, P. Hatzipanayotou, Michael S. Michael","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Within a model of variable supply of capital due to international mobility and variable labor supply due to endogenous labor-leisure choice, we revisit the issues of vertical fiscal externalities, and of federal tax-transfers. Capital and labor taxes by federal and state governments finance the provision of federal and of state public consumption goods. When capital and labor are substitutes in production, we show that (i) the state’s optimal policy calls for capital and labor taxes, (ii) the vertical fiscal externality can be reversed from negative, implying inefficiently high noncooperative capital taxes, to positive, implying inefficiently low noncooperative capital taxes, and (iii) under centralized leadership the federal government replicates the second best optimum with a capital tax, and possibly, top-down transfers. (JEL codes: F18, F21, H21).","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44759070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is widely accepted that incumbents in democratic societies may use various economic policies to increase their chances of re-election. But incumbents in the most advanced democracies may be restrained in overtly manipulating economic policy instruments before elections, because more experienced voters could penalize them for such opportunistic behavior. Incumbents may embrace indirect and more ‘camouflaged’ means such as opportunistically relaxing the stance of tax revenue performance before elections, either by laxer collection efforts, additional tax exemptions or preferential treatments, or a combination of these. In this article, we present evidence of election-related cycles in the tax revenue performance of 25 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development advanced democracies. We empirically analyze the collection effectiveness of Value Added Tax (VAT) around elections. The findings reveal significant deterioration of VAT revenue performance before elections.
{"title":"Electoral Cycles of Tax Performance in Advanced Democracies","authors":"E. Lami, D. Imami","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 It is widely accepted that incumbents in democratic societies may use various economic policies to increase their chances of re-election. But incumbents in the most advanced democracies may be restrained in overtly manipulating economic policy instruments before elections, because more experienced voters could penalize them for such opportunistic behavior. Incumbents may embrace indirect and more ‘camouflaged’ means such as opportunistically relaxing the stance of tax revenue performance before elections, either by laxer collection efforts, additional tax exemptions or preferential treatments, or a combination of these. In this article, we present evidence of election-related cycles in the tax revenue performance of 25 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development advanced democracies. We empirically analyze the collection effectiveness of Value Added Tax (VAT) around elections. The findings reveal significant deterioration of VAT revenue performance before elections.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41358712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"GDP Growth through Private Debt: The Effect of Monetary Shocks","authors":"Gianluca Cafiso","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY027","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41948682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. Luca, Paolo Mazzocchi, Claudio Quintano, A. Rocca
{"title":"Italian NEETs in 2005–2016: have the Recent Labour Market Reforms Produced Any Effect?","authors":"G. Luca, Paolo Mazzocchi, Claudio Quintano, A. Rocca","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFZ004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46402822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Dynamics of Tax Elasticities in the Whole European Union","authors":"Gilles Mourre, Savina Princen","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY028","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY028","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41823573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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