To what extent does United Nations peacekeeping assist in laying the foundations for economic development? We conduct the first exploratory analysis of the effect of peace operations on the economic development of the host countries. We highlight the need for new inferential methods to reveal the extent to which robust conclusions about the success of missions can be drawn. We then apply synthetic control methods to 11 peace operations deployed since the end of the Cold War. Our results suggest that, in seven cases, peacekeeping does not seem to significantly affect economic rehabilitation. In two of the remaining four cases, the impact is negative rather than positive, pointing to persistent hurdles to identification.
{"title":"Economic Development in Peacekeeping Host Countries","authors":"V. Bove, Leandro Elia","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFX009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX009","url":null,"abstract":"To what extent does United Nations peacekeeping assist in laying the foundations for economic development? We conduct the first exploratory analysis of the effect of peace operations on the economic development of the host countries. We highlight the need for new inferential methods to reveal the extent to which robust conclusions about the success of missions can be drawn. We then apply synthetic control methods to 11 peace operations deployed since the end of the Cold War. Our results suggest that, in seven cases, peacekeeping does not seem to significantly affect economic rehabilitation. In two of the remaining four cases, the impact is negative rather than positive, pointing to persistent hurdles to identification.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47671507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article shows that a defending army, particularly a small one, can fight hard when attacked by a predator. The result arises in the commitment equilibrium of a model with intergenerational altruism. By implication, the article offers a novel theory of deterrence and defence policy. It shows that in the absence of informational constraints, there is a unique army size that is sufficient for deterrence. Under informational restrictions, a pooling equilibrium may exist where a victim with strong intergenerational altruism overinvests in its army, while the victim with a more limited altruism free rides on the information gap of the predator and builds a smaller army. Conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium are established in terms of the cost of war. It turns out that the optimal defence policy need not satisfy the deterrence requirement. The case of separating equilibrium helps to explain why wars exist in equilibrium.
{"title":"Defence Commitment and Deterrence in the Theory of War","authors":"V. Kanniainen","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY001","url":null,"abstract":"The article shows that a defending army, particularly a small one, can fight hard when attacked by a predator. The result arises in the commitment equilibrium of a model with intergenerational altruism. By implication, the article offers a novel theory of deterrence and defence policy. It shows that in the absence of informational constraints, there is a unique army size that is sufficient for deterrence. Under informational restrictions, a pooling equilibrium may exist where a victim with strong intergenerational altruism overinvests in its army, while the victim with a more limited altruism free rides on the information gap of the predator and builds a smaller army. Conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium are established in terms of the cost of war. It turns out that the optimal defence policy need not satisfy the deterrence requirement. The case of separating equilibrium helps to explain why wars exist in equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49127933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Violence and conflicts have caused suffering throughout history. Moreover, the arrival of nuclear weapons even raised concerns about the survival of humankind. This special issue analyzes the causes and consequences of violence and conflict. It covers wars, civil wars, and terrorism, as well as organization of the military and its effects on the rest of the society.
{"title":"The Economics of Peace and War: An Overview","authors":"V. Kanniainen, Panu Poutvaara","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY026","url":null,"abstract":"Violence and conflicts have caused suffering throughout history. Moreover, the arrival of nuclear weapons even raised concerns about the survival of humankind. This special issue analyzes the causes and consequences of violence and conflict. It covers wars, civil wars, and terrorism, as well as organization of the military and its effects on the rest of the society.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49263241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Military campaigns are studied as dynamic best-of-three contests, where final victory is attributed to the first player who wins a critical number of battles. The article studies how overall budget constraints and different assumptions about the destruction of military resources used in a given battle affect the dynamics and overall equilibrium resources in a best-of-three contest. Discouragement effects for players who lag behind and the showdown effect when the campaign reaches a more decisive state vanish if players have to choose an overall budget and can draw on what is left from this budget in the course of the campaign. This is true both in a context in which the resources allocated to a battle are used up there as well as if player’s battle resources carry over to future battles. If only the winner’s contest resources carryover, this generates precautionary behavior of the leading player and all-in behavior for the player lagging behind.
{"title":"Budget and Effort Choice in Sequential Colonel Blotto Campaigns","authors":"Kai A. Konrad","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY010","url":null,"abstract":"Military campaigns are studied as dynamic best-of-three contests, where final victory is attributed to the first player who wins a critical number of battles. The article studies how overall budget constraints and different assumptions about the destruction of military resources used in a given battle affect the dynamics and overall equilibrium resources in a best-of-three contest. Discouragement effects for players who lag behind and the showdown effect when the campaign reaches a more decisive state vanish if players have to choose an overall budget and can draw on what is left from this budget in the course of the campaign. This is true both in a context in which the resources allocated to a battle are used up there as well as if player’s battle resources carry over to future battles. If only the winner’s contest resources carryover, this generates precautionary behavior of the leading player and all-in behavior for the player lagging behind.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46377257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper shows that a defending army, particularly a small one, can fight hard when attacked by a predator. The result arises in the commitment equilibrium of a model with intergenerational altruism. By implication, the paper offers a novel theory of deterrence and defence policy. It shows that in the absence of informational constraints, there is a unique army size that is sufficient for deterrence. Under informational restrictions, a pooling equilibrium may exist where a victim with strong intergenerational altruism overinvests in its army, while the victim with a more limited altruism free rides on the information gap of the predator and builds a smaller army. Conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium are established in terms of the cost of war. It turns out that the optimal defence policy need not satisfy the deterrence requirement. The case of separating equilibrium helps to explain why wars exist in equilibrium. JEL Classification: H12, H56
{"title":"Corrigendum to: Defence Commitment and Deterrence in the Theory of War","authors":"V. Kanniainen","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY022","url":null,"abstract":"The paper shows that a defending army, particularly a small one, can fight hard when attacked by a predator. The result arises in the commitment equilibrium of a model with intergenerational altruism. By implication, the paper offers a novel theory of deterrence and defence policy. It shows that in the absence of informational constraints, there is a unique army size that is sufficient for deterrence. Under informational restrictions, a pooling equilibrium may exist where a victim with strong intergenerational altruism overinvests in its army, while the victim with a more limited altruism free rides on the information gap of the predator and builds a smaller army. Conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium are established in terms of the cost of war. It turns out that the optimal defence policy need not satisfy the deterrence requirement. The case of separating equilibrium helps to explain why wars exist in equilibrium. JEL Classification: H12, H56","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43538884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, I examine the relation between workers’ reciprocal attitudes, as measured in 2005 and 2010, and participation in work-related training courses in 2007 and 2013, respectively. Theory predicts that employers find it more profitable to invest in human capital of workers who have positively reciprocal attitudes, because they are more likely to return their employer’s kindness with higher effort and/or loyalty. The findings are mixed, depending on the survey year. I find that positively reciprocal workers are more likely to participate in employer-financed training in 2007, in particular when training is general. Also, consistent with theoretical expectations, I do not find a relation between workers’ reciprocal attitudes and participation in training that is not financed by the employer. However, workers’ reciprocal attitudes are not related to training participation in 2013. A possible explanation is that employers use training to induce reciprocal feelings in a slack labour market only. (JEL codes: M53 and D91).
我利用德国社会经济研究小组(German economic - social - economic Panel)的数据，分别考察了2005年和2010年工人的互惠态度与2007年和2013年工人参加与工作相关的培训课程之间的关系。理论预测，雇主发现投资于具有积极互惠态度的员工的人力资本更有利可图，因为他们更有可能以更高的努力和/或忠诚来回报雇主的好意。根据调查年份的不同，调查结果好坏参半。我发现，2007年，积极互惠的员工更有可能参加雇主资助的培训，尤其是在培训是一般性的情况下。此外，与理论预期一致，我没有发现工人的互惠态度与参与非雇主资助的培训之间存在关系。然而，2013年员工的互惠态度与培训参与无关。一种可能的解释是，雇主只是在低迷的劳动力市场上利用培训来诱导互惠感。(JEL代码:M53和D91)。
{"title":"Training Participation and the Role of Reciprocal Attitudes","authors":"Arjan Non","doi":"10.26481/UMAGSB.2018024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26481/UMAGSB.2018024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, I examine the relation between workers’ reciprocal attitudes, as measured in 2005 and 2010, and participation in work-related training courses in 2007 and 2013, respectively. Theory predicts that employers find it more profitable to invest in human capital of workers who have positively reciprocal attitudes, because they are more likely to return their employer’s kindness with higher effort and/or loyalty. The findings are mixed, depending on the survey year. I find that positively reciprocal workers are more likely to participate in employer-financed training in 2007, in particular when training is general. Also, consistent with theoretical expectations, I do not find a relation between workers’ reciprocal attitudes and participation in training that is not financed by the employer. However, workers’ reciprocal attitudes are not related to training participation in 2013. A possible explanation is that employers use training to induce reciprocal feelings in a slack labour market only. (JEL codes: M53 and D91).","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45477051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research suggests that if supply-side reforms take place as the nominal interest rate hits the so-called ‘zero lower bound’ (ZLB), the benefits of reforms are outweighed by the negatives, and the net effect is contractionary (Eggertsson et al. 2014; Fernandez-Villaverde 2014). In this article, we show that the effectiveness of temporary reforms that reduce price markups is determined by the interaction between two offsetting effects on the real interest rate: one deflationary and one inflationary. If the latter outweighs the former, the reforms can become expansionary. The effectiveness of permanent reforms is determined by the monetary policy outside the ZLB: a wealth effect. If the effect is large enough, the reforms can also become expansionary (JEL codes: E30, E50, E60).
研究表明，如果在名义利率达到所谓的“零利率下限”(ZLB)时进行供给侧改革，那么改革的好处将被负面影响所抵消，净效应是收缩的(Eggertsson et al. 2014;Fernandez-Villaverde 2014)。在本文中，我们证明了降低价格加价的临时改革的有效性取决于对实际利率的两种抵消效应之间的相互作用:一种是通货紧缩效应，另一种是通货膨胀效应。如果后者的影响大于前者，改革就可能变成扩张性的。永久性改革的有效性取决于ZLB之外的货币政策:财富效应。如果效果足够大，改革也可以变得扩张性(JEL代码:E30, E50, E60)。
{"title":"Are Supply-side Reforms Contractionary at the Zero Lower Bound?*","authors":"Yangyang Ji","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY021","url":null,"abstract":"Research suggests that if supply-side reforms take place as the nominal interest rate hits the so-called ‘zero lower bound’ (ZLB), the benefits of reforms are outweighed by the negatives, and the net effect is contractionary (Eggertsson et al. 2014; Fernandez-Villaverde 2014). In this article, we show that the effectiveness of temporary reforms that reduce price markups is determined by the interaction between two offsetting effects on the real interest rate: one deflationary and one inflationary. If the latter outweighs the former, the reforms can become expansionary. The effectiveness of permanent reforms is determined by the monetary policy outside the ZLB: a wealth effect. If the effect is large enough, the reforms can also become expansionary (JEL codes: E30, E50, E60).","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41569150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Individual well-being depends not only on monetary income but is affected by various non-income dimensions of human life. While this is now broadly acknowledged, a unanimous way to measure such multidimensional well-being does not exist. In this article we examine the various approaches that have been proposed in this vein in welfare economics, by highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, and devote particular attention to the equivalent income. We use this indicator to compute individual well-being and social welfare for all the European Union (EU) and some non-EU countries with the data from the 3rd wave of the European Quality of Life Survey referred to the period 2011–2012. Our analysis shows that, whether we adopt a utilitarian or rank-dependent representation of social preferences, the ranking of countries based on their equivalent incomes is substantially different from that based on monetary incomes.
{"title":"Computation of Equivalent Incomes and Social Welfare for EU and Non-EU Countries","authors":"Ida Petrillo","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFX024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX024","url":null,"abstract":"Individual well-being depends not only on monetary income but is affected by various non-income dimensions of human life. While this is now broadly acknowledged, a unanimous way to measure such multidimensional well-being does not exist. In this article we examine the various approaches that have been proposed in this vein in welfare economics, by highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, and devote particular attention to the equivalent income. We use this indicator to compute individual well-being and social welfare for all the European Union (EU) and some non-EU countries with the data from the 3rd wave of the European Quality of Life Survey referred to the period 2011–2012. Our analysis shows that, whether we adopt a utilitarian or rank-dependent representation of social preferences, the ranking of countries based on their equivalent incomes is substantially different from that based on monetary incomes.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46693912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Bartolini, Agnese Sacchi, S. Salotti, Raffaella Santolini
The virtues of fiscal decentralisation are usually assessed against the provision of local public goods, little is said about its impact on public finances. There is, however, a growing concern that central governments losing control over part of the budget could negatively affect public finances, especially in times of adverse financial conditions. The present work shows that these concerns are misplaced. The empirical investigation on 19 OECD countries, over the period 1980-2010, shows that expenditure decentralisation improves the central budget balance without prejudice for local budgets, thus improving the overall country’s fiscal position. This effect is reinforced when combined with tax autonomy. During periods of financial crises, the disciplinary role of fiscal decentralisation appears to be even stronger, raising concerns about the recentralisation trend recently pursued by some advanced economies precisely to face fiscal distress and economic stagnation.
{"title":"Fiscal decentralisation in times of financial crises","authors":"D. Bartolini, Agnese Sacchi, S. Salotti, Raffaella Santolini","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFX008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX008","url":null,"abstract":"The virtues of fiscal decentralisation are usually assessed against the provision of local public goods, little is said about its impact on public finances. There is, however, a growing concern that central governments losing control over part of the budget could negatively affect public finances, especially in times of adverse financial conditions. The present work shows that these concerns are misplaced. The empirical investigation on 19 OECD countries, over the period 1980-2010, shows that expenditure decentralisation improves the central budget balance without prejudice for local budgets, thus improving the overall country’s fiscal position. This effect is reinforced when combined with tax autonomy. During periods of financial crises, the disciplinary role of fiscal decentralisation appears to be even stronger, raising concerns about the recentralisation trend recently pursued by some advanced economies precisely to face fiscal distress and economic stagnation.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45826153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper acknowledges that the relationship between log wages and schooling is considerably more complex than the simple human capital earnings function suggests and that schooling is endogenous. We estimate a model where educational attainment is discrete and ordered and log wages are determined by a simple function of work experience for each level of attainment. We distinguish between lifecycle and cohort effects by exploiting the fact that we have a short panel. We strongly reject both the usual separability assumption and exogeneity of educational attainment.
{"title":"Estimates of the causal effects of education on earnings over the lifecycle with cohort effects and endogenous education","authors":"Giuseppe Migali, I. Walker","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFX020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX020","url":null,"abstract":"This paper acknowledges that the relationship between log wages and schooling is considerably more complex than the simple human capital earnings function suggests and that schooling is endogenous. We estimate a model where educational attainment is discrete and ordered and log wages are determined by a simple function of work experience for each level of attainment. We distinguish between lifecycle and cohort effects by exploiting the fact that we have a short panel. We strongly reject both the usual separability assumption and exogeneity of educational attainment.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42097006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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