Why has the United States delegated most of its crisis lending to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in recent years, although it provided large-scale bilateral bailouts to strategically important countries until the mid-1990s? Previous research on the choice of bailout strategy has failed to explain this important change, and a major problem with such research is that it has focused on executive branch preferences, overlooking those of the legislative branch. The legislature can significantly influence the choice of bailout policies, and existing research also implies that the US Congress has steered the recent change. This article hypothesizes that, caught in a dilemma between the need for bailouts and voters’ opposition caused by widening inequality, Congress delegated bailouts to the IMF for blame avoidance. To test this hypothesis, the study conducts a statistical analysis of the IMF’s capital increase votes and case analyses of the Mexican and Asian crises.
{"title":"Why delegate to the IMF? Congressional preference and blame avoidance","authors":"Masafumi Fujita","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcad006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Why has the United States delegated most of its crisis lending to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in recent years, although it provided large-scale bilateral bailouts to strategically important countries until the mid-1990s? Previous research on the choice of bailout strategy has failed to explain this important change, and a major problem with such research is that it has focused on executive branch preferences, overlooking those of the legislative branch. The legislature can significantly influence the choice of bailout policies, and existing research also implies that the US Congress has steered the recent change. This article hypothesizes that, caught in a dilemma between the need for bailouts and voters’ opposition caused by widening inequality, Congress delegated bailouts to the IMF for blame avoidance. To test this hypothesis, the study conducts a statistical analysis of the IMF’s capital increase votes and case analyses of the Mexican and Asian crises.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48370358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Nexus of Naval Modernization in India and China: Strategic Rivalry and the Evolution of Maritime Power (Oxford International Relations in South Asia)","authors":"Tomoko Kiyota","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcad005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48746157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chien-Huei Wu, Howard Jyun-Syun Li, Mao-wei Lo, Wen-Chin Wu
In light of Hong Kong’s failed attempt to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance in 2019 and China’s enactment of the 2020 National Security Law for Hong Kong, many countries have voiced unease about their extradition agreements with China. Some, out of concern over potential adverse impacts on human rights, have even suspended their extradition agreements with Hong Kong. In this article, we investigate factors affecting the signing of extradition agreements between China and other countries. We hypothesize that third countries are more likely to conclude an extradition agreement with China if they are more economically engaged with China or are already cooperating with China in civil and criminal matters. In contrast, countries more strongly committed to the rule of law, or those which maintain a Common Law system, are less likely to sign an extradition agreement with China. Statistical analyses of the 57 Chinese extradition agreements signed between 1993 and 2019 support our hypotheses.
{"title":"Long arm of the regime: who signs extradition agreements with China?","authors":"Chien-Huei Wu, Howard Jyun-Syun Li, Mao-wei Lo, Wen-Chin Wu","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcad004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In light of Hong Kong’s failed attempt to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance in 2019 and China’s enactment of the 2020 National Security Law for Hong Kong, many countries have voiced unease about their extradition agreements with China. Some, out of concern over potential adverse impacts on human rights, have even suspended their extradition agreements with Hong Kong. In this article, we investigate factors affecting the signing of extradition agreements between China and other countries. We hypothesize that third countries are more likely to conclude an extradition agreement with China if they are more economically engaged with China or are already cooperating with China in civil and criminal matters. In contrast, countries more strongly committed to the rule of law, or those which maintain a Common Law system, are less likely to sign an extradition agreement with China. Statistical analyses of the 57 Chinese extradition agreements signed between 1993 and 2019 support our hypotheses.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46301697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite the pragmatic character of Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s foreign policy and the regression of the country’s democracy index, Indonesia remains eager for the continuation of Bali Democracy Forum (BDF). This article aims to solve this apparent contradiction using the concept of middle power diplomacy. This article argues that, in contrast to his predecessor, Widodo does not perceive BDF as an instrument to promote or project democracy abroad. Rather, Widodo considers the BDF to accentuate Indonesia’s leadership role in multilateral fora. This ‘middlepowermanship’ challenges the elite-based approach in explaining Indonesia’s foreign policy, which puts a strong emphasis on Jokowi’s personal character traits. The continuation of the BDF under Widodo reflects Indonesia’s default thinking of its status as a middle power.
{"title":"Neither promoting nor projecting democracy: Indonesia’s middlepowermanship in the Bali democracy forum under Joko Widodo","authors":"Mohamad Rosyidin, I. Kusumawardhana","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcad002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Despite the pragmatic character of Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s foreign policy and the regression of the country’s democracy index, Indonesia remains eager for the continuation of Bali Democracy Forum (BDF). This article aims to solve this apparent contradiction using the concept of middle power diplomacy. This article argues that, in contrast to his predecessor, Widodo does not perceive BDF as an instrument to promote or project democracy abroad. Rather, Widodo considers the BDF to accentuate Indonesia’s leadership role in multilateral fora. This ‘middlepowermanship’ challenges the elite-based approach in explaining Indonesia’s foreign policy, which puts a strong emphasis on Jokowi’s personal character traits. The continuation of the BDF under Widodo reflects Indonesia’s default thinking of its status as a middle power.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45208839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mobilizing for Elections: Patronage and Political Machines in Southeast Asia, Edward Aspinall, Meredith L. Weiss, Allen Hicken and Paul D. Hutchcroft","authors":"Hidekuni Washida","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcad003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44249691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Contrary to predictions that smaller powers will balance against or bandwagon with external threats, Southeast Asian states are hedging by deepening their security cooperation with both the United States and China. Prevailing accounts of hedging do not adequately explain the persistence of such policy choices given growing threat perceptions of China and mounting bipolar pressures. After considering the limitations of existing theories, this article contends that a neoclassical realist approach to hedging better integrates the domestic and international factors that inform decision-makers’ preferences. It operationalizes this theoretical framework in three case studies: Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines. A neoclassical realist approach takes the role of individual perceptions and bureaucracies seriously, without dismissing the significance of variables identified by neorealism, including security threats, treaty alliances, and economic benefits. Ultimately, a more complete and accurate understanding of what continues to propel hedging in Southeast Asian states can mitigate the risks of great power conflict.
{"title":"Navigating great power competition: a neoclassical realist view of hedging","authors":"Hunter S Marston","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcad001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contrary to predictions that smaller powers will balance against or bandwagon with external threats, Southeast Asian states are hedging by deepening their security cooperation with both the United States and China. Prevailing accounts of hedging do not adequately explain the persistence of such policy choices given growing threat perceptions of China and mounting bipolar pressures. After considering the limitations of existing theories, this article contends that a neoclassical realist approach to hedging better integrates the domestic and international factors that inform decision-makers’ preferences. It operationalizes this theoretical framework in three case studies: Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines. A neoclassical realist approach takes the role of individual perceptions and bureaucracies seriously, without dismissing the significance of variables identified by neorealism, including security threats, treaty alliances, and economic benefits. Ultimately, a more complete and accurate understanding of what continues to propel hedging in Southeast Asian states can mitigate the risks of great power conflict.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135424828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the international relations theory (IRT) of Daoism, one of Asia’s long-standing traditions to have theorized international politics. Drawing upon Laozi’s Dao De Jing, this study elucidates two Daoist IR theories. First, Laozi provides a state-focused guo-based IRT for conducting foreign policy and managing inter-state relations with emphasis on yielding and softness to overcome violence and domination. Second, Laozi offers a Utopian and globalist tianxia-centered IRT based on following the Dao whereby inter-state rivalry is dissolved in favor of peaceful planetary governance in harmony with the natural rhythms of the cosmos. Whereas previous scholarship often concentrates on only one of these two scenarios, I argue the two visions are tightly connected with the more pragmatic first theory envisioned as a stepping stone to obtaining the second. This link demonstrates how Daoism offers a sophisticated non-Western IRT with relevance to addressing planetary challenges today.
{"title":"From guo to tianxia: linking two Daoist theories of International Relations","authors":"D. Joshi","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcac015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study examines the international relations theory (IRT) of Daoism, one of Asia’s long-standing traditions to have theorized international politics. Drawing upon Laozi’s Dao De Jing, this study elucidates two Daoist IR theories. First, Laozi provides a state-focused guo-based IRT for conducting foreign policy and managing inter-state relations with emphasis on yielding and softness to overcome violence and domination. Second, Laozi offers a Utopian and globalist tianxia-centered IRT based on following the Dao whereby inter-state rivalry is dissolved in favor of peaceful planetary governance in harmony with the natural rhythms of the cosmos. Whereas previous scholarship often concentrates on only one of these two scenarios, I argue the two visions are tightly connected with the more pragmatic first theory envisioned as a stepping stone to obtaining the second. This link demonstrates how Daoism offers a sophisticated non-Western IRT with relevance to addressing planetary challenges today.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41557347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When Japan in 2019 removed South Korea from its whitelist of most trusted trading partners, South Koreans responded by organizing mass nationalist boycotts against Japanese goods. What affects South Korean citizens’ willingness to participate in this nationalist movement? In this article, we offer a systematic investigation of individuals’ motivations behind their boycott participation along the two dimensions of nationalist boycotts – boycotts as a collective choice and boycotts as an emotional reaction – as well as the historical patterns of South Korean nationalist boycotts against Japan. From original survey data collected in South Korea, we find that citizens’ baseline nationalism is an important moderating factor. For those who have strong nationalistic sentiments against Japan, both collective action and emotional primes have only a marginal impact. However, for those who have relatively low baseline nationalism against Japan, an expectation of mass participation plays a critical role in boosting their desire for boycott participation.
{"title":"‘No Japan’: explaining motivations behind nationalist boycotts in South Korea","authors":"Jiyoung Ko, Sung Mi Kim","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcac010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When Japan in 2019 removed South Korea from its whitelist of most trusted trading partners, South Koreans responded by organizing mass nationalist boycotts against Japanese goods. What affects South Korean citizens’ willingness to participate in this nationalist movement? In this article, we offer a systematic investigation of individuals’ motivations behind their boycott participation along the two dimensions of nationalist boycotts – boycotts as a collective choice and boycotts as an emotional reaction – as well as the historical patterns of South Korean nationalist boycotts against Japan. From original survey data collected in South Korea, we find that citizens’ baseline nationalism is an important moderating factor. For those who have strong nationalistic sentiments against Japan, both collective action and emotional primes have only a marginal impact. However, for those who have relatively low baseline nationalism against Japan, an expectation of mass participation plays a critical role in boosting their desire for boycott participation.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42962120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do states signal resolve and conduct coercive diplomacy differently on land and at sea? This question has important implications for security in the Asia-Pacific, which is predominantly a maritime region. While the field of International Relations has been criticized for exhibiting a Cold War and European bias, this article is based on the observation that the field may suffer from continentalism: a reliance on land-based issues and ideas. We thus examine the potential for incorporating the maritime domain more explicitly into IR to better address the challenges to security in the Asia-Pacific. Specifically, we consider how signaling restraint, costly signals of resolve, and engaging in limited conflicts to conduct violent coercive diplomacy differ on land and at sea. Our findings suggest that addressing the challenges to security in the Asia-Pacific can benefit from a deeper understanding of signaling, coercive diplomacy, and international relations in the maritime domain.
{"title":"Security in the Asia-Pacific and signaling at sea","authors":"Brian C. Chao, Hyun-Binn Cho","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcac007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How do states signal resolve and conduct coercive diplomacy differently on land and at sea? This question has important implications for security in the Asia-Pacific, which is predominantly a maritime region. While the field of International Relations has been criticized for exhibiting a Cold War and European bias, this article is based on the observation that the field may suffer from continentalism: a reliance on land-based issues and ideas. We thus examine the potential for incorporating the maritime domain more explicitly into IR to better address the challenges to security in the Asia-Pacific. Specifically, we consider how signaling restraint, costly signals of resolve, and engaging in limited conflicts to conduct violent coercive diplomacy differ on land and at sea. Our findings suggest that addressing the challenges to security in the Asia-Pacific can benefit from a deeper understanding of signaling, coercive diplomacy, and international relations in the maritime domain.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49489130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I investigate three factors that keep countries from adopting the strategy of cross-domain warfare and launching cyber and military operations at the same time. I do so by disentangling the relationship between international law, cybersecurity norms, and the concept of cross-domain operations. My analysis of Japan’s cross-domain vision indicates how difficult it can be for norm-compliant countries to launch cross-domain operations. In Japan’s case, the reason for the challenge rests with flaws in its legal system and a long-standing commitment to international legal and normative regulations applied to cyberspace dynamics. The three factors are behind the reason why Japan has never carried out a cross-domain operation, even though other states have essentially done so. The analysis generates several strategic implications for other countries contemplating the use of cross-domain operations within their own legal and international parameters.
{"title":"The promise and challenges of launching cyber-military strikes: Japan’s ‘cross-domain’ operational concepts","authors":"Noriyuki Katagiri","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcac008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I investigate three factors that keep countries from adopting the strategy of cross-domain warfare and launching cyber and military operations at the same time. I do so by disentangling the relationship between international law, cybersecurity norms, and the concept of cross-domain operations. My analysis of Japan’s cross-domain vision indicates how difficult it can be for norm-compliant countries to launch cross-domain operations. In Japan’s case, the reason for the challenge rests with flaws in its legal system and a long-standing commitment to international legal and normative regulations applied to cyberspace dynamics. The three factors are behind the reason why Japan has never carried out a cross-domain operation, even though other states have essentially done so. The analysis generates several strategic implications for other countries contemplating the use of cross-domain operations within their own legal and international parameters.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49271368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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