This study analyses the international relations of subnational governments, a phenomenon conceptualized as paradiplomacy. The scholarly literature on paradiplomacy tends to focus overly on subnational governments in federal systems, rather than those in unitary and centralized countries whose subnational governments have been increasingly proactive in international relations. China is one of these countries. Among the limited numbers of works on Chinese paradiplomacy, the majority are framed within the central-local interactions on foreign affairs and pay inadequate attention to how these provinces have participated directly in external cooperation, in line with their local interests. This body of works also displays a geographical bias, showing more interest in the prosperous coastal regions of China than its inland and border regions. This study, therefore, seeks to address the question of how Yunnan, a border province in the southwest of China, has become an international actor by exploring its international actorness. The thesis develops an original analytical framework. In contrast with previous analytical paradiplomacy frameworks, it combines the concept of paradiplomacy with the theory of actorness. After reviewing the relevant scholarly works, four dimensions of actorness have been considered: motivation, opportunity, capability, and presence. First, this study argues that, in the face of profound domestic developments and a complex external environment, Yunnan has been motivated to engage in cross-border cooperation and to consolidate its external affairs powers. This is followed by a discussion of how external affairs powers have enabled Yunnan to leverage three broad instruments to incentivise neighbouring countries to cooperate with it: infrastructure development, economic statecraft, and diplomatic efforts. Lastly, it is argued that the increased external powers of Yunnan have propelled its role as an international relations actor towards recognition by both neighbouring countries and the Chinese central government. The primary empirical data informing this study was collected through qualitative interviews with those involved in the implementation of Yunnan’s foreign agenda, representatives from province-owned enterprises, universities, and think tanks, and officials and experts from the neighbouring countries of Yunnan. Relevant information was also collected from official documents, gazettes, almanacs, and media reports. Participant observation was conducted as a complement to interviews and content analyses. Consequently, this thesis contributes to the paradiplomacy literature by providing in-depth insights into the international actorness of an under-researched border Chinese province. It has contributed to the extant paradiplomacy literature by proposing a new analytical framework that provides an opening to explore the international actorness of a subnational government. Among previous works, few analytical frameworks have
{"title":"Beyond the hinterland: exploring the international actorness of China’s Yunnan province","authors":"Yao Song","doi":"10.1093/IRAP/LCZ026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ026","url":null,"abstract":"This study analyses the international relations of subnational governments, a phenomenon conceptualized as paradiplomacy. The scholarly literature on paradiplomacy tends to focus overly on subnational governments in federal systems, rather than those in unitary and centralized countries whose subnational governments have been increasingly proactive in international relations. China is one of these countries. Among the limited numbers of works on Chinese paradiplomacy, the majority are framed within the central-local interactions on foreign affairs and pay inadequate attention to how these provinces have participated directly in external cooperation, in line with their local interests. This body of works also displays a geographical bias, showing more interest in the prosperous coastal regions of China than its inland and border regions. This study, therefore, seeks to address the question of how Yunnan, a border province in the southwest of China, has become an international actor by exploring its international actorness. \u0000\u0000The thesis develops an original analytical framework. In contrast with previous analytical paradiplomacy frameworks, it combines the concept of paradiplomacy with the theory of actorness. After reviewing the relevant scholarly works, four dimensions of actorness have been considered: motivation, opportunity, capability, and presence. First, this study argues that, in the face of profound domestic developments and a complex external environment, Yunnan has been motivated to engage in cross-border cooperation and to consolidate its external affairs powers. This is followed by a discussion of how external affairs powers have enabled Yunnan to leverage three broad instruments to incentivise neighbouring countries to cooperate with it: infrastructure development, economic statecraft, and diplomatic efforts. Lastly, it is argued that the increased external powers of Yunnan have propelled its role as an international relations actor towards recognition by both neighbouring countries and the Chinese central government. \u0000\u0000The primary empirical data informing this study was collected through qualitative interviews with those involved in the implementation of Yunnan’s foreign agenda, representatives from province-owned enterprises, universities, and think tanks, and officials and experts from the neighbouring countries of Yunnan. Relevant information was also collected from official documents, gazettes, almanacs, and media reports. Participant observation was conducted as a complement to interviews and content analyses. Consequently, this thesis contributes to the paradiplomacy literature by providing in-depth insights into the international actorness of an under-researched border Chinese province. It has contributed to the extant paradiplomacy literature by proposing a new analytical framework that provides an opening to explore the international actorness of a subnational government. Among previous works, few analytical frameworks have","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49007867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite systemic internal and external differences, Australia and China have shown striking similarities in their pursuit of disputed maritime resource and jurisdictional claims. This high-stakes area of international politics is governed by a codified, globally accepted international legal regime (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), making it an important case for examining the relationship between states’ foreign policies and the ‘rules-based international order’. In the South China Sea, Beijing is haunted by the legacy of its strong geopolitically driven support for an expansive law of the sea regime in the 1970s. Strategic considerations also drove Australia’s belated embrace of international legal processes in the Timor Sea in 2016. Before that, successive Australian governments had been as keen to pursue national maritime interests through bilateral negotiations as their Chinese counterparts. Australia’s shift was enabled by pro-Timor domestic public opinion and a confluence of geographic and commercial circumstances not present in the South China Sea.
{"title":"Australia, China and the maritime ‘rules-based international order’: comparing the South China Sea and Timor Sea disputes","authors":"M. Beeson, A. Chubb","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcz022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Despite systemic internal and external differences, Australia and China have shown striking similarities in their pursuit of disputed maritime resource and jurisdictional claims. This high-stakes area of international politics is governed by a codified, globally accepted international legal regime (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), making it an important case for examining the relationship between states’ foreign policies and the ‘rules-based international order’. In the South China Sea, Beijing is haunted by the legacy of its strong geopolitically driven support for an expansive law of the sea regime in the 1970s. Strategic considerations also drove Australia’s belated embrace of international legal processes in the Timor Sea in 2016. Before that, successive Australian governments had been as keen to pursue national maritime interests through bilateral negotiations as their Chinese counterparts. Australia’s shift was enabled by pro-Timor domestic public opinion and a confluence of geographic and commercial circumstances not present in the South China Sea.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/irap/lcz022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43682708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article investigates the linkage between Kim Jong-un’s power consolidation and Pyongyang’s abrupt return to the denuclearization negotiation table in 2018. It argues that behind Pyongyang’s turnabout lie the three unstable pillars of the Kim family’s rule: a faithful winning coalition, the juche ideology, and Chinese patronage. Upon taking office in 2011, Kim had to debilitate his father’s winning coalition to consolidate his power. With the winning coalition enervated, Kim could not expect its willingness to suppress the masses were they to develop into an ejectorate, and therefore introduced market reforms to secure the people’s support. The reforms, in return, inevitably eroded the ideological appeal of the Kim family, thereby rendering his hold on power more vulnerable to economic pressure. Under such circumstances, Chinese patronage increasingly faltered. It is due to the instability of these three pillars that Kim Jong-un returned to the negotiating table.
{"title":"Bringing North Korea to the negotiating table: unstable foundations of Kim Jong-un’s North Korean regime","authors":"Son Daekwon","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcz024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article investigates the linkage between Kim Jong-un’s power consolidation and Pyongyang’s abrupt return to the denuclearization negotiation table in 2018. It argues that behind Pyongyang’s turnabout lie the three unstable pillars of the Kim family’s rule: a faithful winning coalition, the juche ideology, and Chinese patronage. Upon taking office in 2011, Kim had to debilitate his father’s winning coalition to consolidate his power. With the winning coalition enervated, Kim could not expect its willingness to suppress the masses were they to develop into an ejectorate, and therefore introduced market reforms to secure the people’s support. The reforms, in return, inevitably eroded the ideological appeal of the Kim family, thereby rendering his hold on power more vulnerable to economic pressure. Under such circumstances, Chinese patronage increasingly faltered. It is due to the instability of these three pillars that Kim Jong-un returned to the negotiating table.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/irap/lcz024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47538502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When a war directly intrudes citizens’ living space, it becomes a war of necessity for the public to defend themselves. However, current literature on public support for war has focused exclusively on wars of choice, not of necessity. Thus, we wonder if existing indicators of war support have explanatory power in this context. In this article, we examine existing indicators in a war of necessity—a cross-Strait conflict between Taiwan and China—to study how the public in Taiwan reacts. In addition to finding support for most of our hypotheses, the new context also contributes novel findings to the literature.
{"title":"When war hits home: Taiwanese public support for war of necessity","authors":"Yao‐Yuan Yeh, Charles K. S. Wu","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcz023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When a war directly intrudes citizens’ living space, it becomes a war of necessity for the public to defend themselves. However, current literature on public support for war has focused exclusively on wars of choice, not of necessity. Thus, we wonder if existing indicators of war support have explanatory power in this context. In this article, we examine existing indicators in a war of necessity—a cross-Strait conflict between Taiwan and China—to study how the public in Taiwan reacts. In addition to finding support for most of our hypotheses, the new context also contributes novel findings to the literature.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/irap/lcz023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48066564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyzes how and why contemporary Global South countries’ South–South cooperation (SSC) exhibits a convergence between normative and material interests. The normative approach underlines that SSC is driven by a country’s experience with colonialism and underdevelopment. SSC is perceived as a mechanism to alter the Global South’s asymmetrical relations with the dominant Global North. The material approach highlights the strategic values of SSC for Southern powers. Through SSC, Southern countries desire to improve their reputation, garner support from other South countries in international fora, and pursue their own broader economic agendas. By utilizing domestic politics analysis, Indonesia’s experience shows that a more pragmatic approach to SSC reflects a broader transformation of Indonesia’s domestic political configuration. While Indonesia’s early practices of SSC prefer normative over material interests, the country’s current policies display a convergence of its material and normative interests, which signifies the emergence of ‘interest-based Third World solidarity’.
{"title":"Indonesia’s South–South cooperation: when normative and material interests converged","authors":"P. Winanti, Rizky Alif Alvian","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcz021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article analyzes how and why contemporary Global South countries’ South–South cooperation (SSC) exhibits a convergence between normative and material interests. The normative approach underlines that SSC is driven by a country’s experience with colonialism and underdevelopment. SSC is perceived as a mechanism to alter the Global South’s asymmetrical relations with the dominant Global North. The material approach highlights the strategic values of SSC for Southern powers. Through SSC, Southern countries desire to improve their reputation, garner support from other South countries in international fora, and pursue their own broader economic agendas. By utilizing domestic politics analysis, Indonesia’s experience shows that a more pragmatic approach to SSC reflects a broader transformation of Indonesia’s domestic political configuration. While Indonesia’s early practices of SSC prefer normative over material interests, the country’s current policies display a convergence of its material and normative interests, which signifies the emergence of ‘interest-based Third World solidarity’.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/irap/lcz021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45034735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hegemony and the US–Japan Alliance","authors":"M. Itayama","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcz012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/irap/lcz012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45534448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Governments often adopt hedging strategies to mitigate risks they face in international affairs. They hedge in the conventional, financial sense of the term by seeking to offset risks in global markets. They also adopt strategies to hedge against international security hazards by preserving strategic ambiguity, forging limited security alignments, and cultivating modest self-protection in case potential threats materialize. Both types of hedging typically are seen as prudent behavior. However, hedging strategies sometimes fail. Risks can be difficult to calculate, and the measures needed to hedge against them can be costly. Hedging international security risks can be particularly challenging, as governments sometimes lack access to adequate protective options at any price. This article illustrates the argument with two contrasting cases: relatively successful Southeast Asian hedging against the risk of financial calamity after the 1997 crisis and less effective efforts by some of the same states to hedge against the security risk of Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea.
{"title":"The variable effectiveness of hedging strategies","authors":"J. Ciorciari","doi":"10.1093/IRAP/LCZ007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Governments often adopt hedging strategies to mitigate risks they face in international affairs. They hedge in the conventional, financial sense of the term by seeking to offset risks in global markets. They also adopt strategies to hedge against international security hazards by preserving strategic ambiguity, forging limited security alignments, and cultivating modest self-protection in case potential threats materialize. Both types of hedging typically are seen as prudent behavior. However, hedging strategies sometimes fail. Risks can be difficult to calculate, and the measures needed to hedge against them can be costly. Hedging international security risks can be particularly challenging, as governments sometimes lack access to adequate protective options at any price. This article illustrates the argument with two contrasting cases: relatively successful Southeast Asian hedging against the risk of financial calamity after the 1997 crisis and less effective efforts by some of the same states to hedge against the security risk of Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47947315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hedging in international relations: an introduction","authors":"J. Ciorciari, J. Haacke","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcz017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/irap/lcz017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46669007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the context of the complex unipolar post-Cold War period that has witnessed China’s reemergence as an economic and military power, small and middle powers are increasingly considered to be hedging. This analysis is especially prevalent in relation to Southeast Asian countries, many of which face security challenges posed by China. However, as the literature on hedging has expanded, the concept’s analytical value is no longer obvious. Different understandings of hedging compete within the literature, and there are many criteria by which hedging is empirically ascertained, leading to confusion even over the basic question of which countries are hedging. In response, this article presents a modified conceptual and methodological framework that clearly delineates hedging from other security strategies and identifies key criteria to evaluate whether smaller powers are hedging when confronting a serious security challenge by one of the major powers. This framework is then applied to Malaysia and Singapore.
{"title":"The concept of hedging and its application to Southeast Asia: a critique and a proposal for a modified conceptual and methodological framework","authors":"J. Haacke","doi":"10.1093/IRAP/LCZ010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the context of the complex unipolar post-Cold War period that has witnessed China’s reemergence as an economic and military power, small and middle powers are increasingly considered to be hedging. This analysis is especially prevalent in relation to Southeast Asian countries, many of which face security challenges posed by China. However, as the literature on hedging has expanded, the concept’s analytical value is no longer obvious. Different understandings of hedging compete within the literature, and there are many criteria by which hedging is empirically ascertained, leading to confusion even over the basic question of which countries are hedging. In response, this article presents a modified conceptual and methodological framework that clearly delineates hedging from other security strategies and identifies key criteria to evaluate whether smaller powers are hedging when confronting a serious security challenge by one of the major powers. This framework is then applied to Malaysia and Singapore.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46874439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The literature on hedging as a secondary state strategy – built largely on evidence from United States-China competition in East and Southeast Asia – focuses on conditions where a major power presents both an economic opportunity and a security threat. In South Asia, in contrast, secondary states facing strategic competition between India and China have pursued hedging strategies in the absence of a security threat. We develop a theoretical reconciliation of these two phenomena. Hedging at its core involves a trade-off between the material benefits and autonomy costs of cooperating with a major power in a competitive environment. States are likely to hedge when these benefits and costs are simultaneously rising. We test the plausibility of this theory in the cases of the Maldives and Sri Lanka. The autonomy trade-off operates both in the absence and in the presence of a security threat, thus offering a theoretical advancement with greater empirical scope.
{"title":"Hedging in South Asia: balancing economic and security interests amid Sino-Indian competition","authors":"Darren J. Lim, R. Mukherjee","doi":"10.1093/IRAP/LCZ006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The literature on hedging as a secondary state strategy – built largely on evidence from United States-China competition in East and Southeast Asia – focuses on conditions where a major power presents both an economic opportunity and a security threat. In South Asia, in contrast, secondary states facing strategic competition between India and China have pursued hedging strategies in the absence of a security threat. We develop a theoretical reconciliation of these two phenomena. Hedging at its core involves a trade-off between the material benefits and autonomy costs of cooperating with a major power in a competitive environment. States are likely to hedge when these benefits and costs are simultaneously rising. We test the plausibility of this theory in the cases of the Maldives and Sri Lanka. The autonomy trade-off operates both in the absence and in the presence of a security threat, thus offering a theoretical advancement with greater empirical scope.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46177076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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