This article investigates the linkage between Kim Jong-un’s power consolidation and Pyongyang’s abrupt return to the denuclearization negotiation table in 2018. It argues that behind Pyongyang’s turnabout lie the three unstable pillars of the Kim family’s rule: a faithful winning coalition, the juche ideology, and Chinese patronage. Upon taking office in 2011, Kim had to debilitate his father’s winning coalition to consolidate his power. With the winning coalition enervated, Kim could not expect its willingness to suppress the masses were they to develop into an ejectorate, and therefore introduced market reforms to secure the people’s support. The reforms, in return, inevitably eroded the ideological appeal of the Kim family, thereby rendering his hold on power more vulnerable to economic pressure. Under such circumstances, Chinese patronage increasingly faltered. It is due to the instability of these three pillars that Kim Jong-un returned to the negotiating table.
{"title":"Bringing North Korea to the negotiating table: unstable foundations of Kim Jong-un’s North Korean regime","authors":"Son Daekwon","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcz024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article investigates the linkage between Kim Jong-un’s power consolidation and Pyongyang’s abrupt return to the denuclearization negotiation table in 2018. It argues that behind Pyongyang’s turnabout lie the three unstable pillars of the Kim family’s rule: a faithful winning coalition, the juche ideology, and Chinese patronage. Upon taking office in 2011, Kim had to debilitate his father’s winning coalition to consolidate his power. With the winning coalition enervated, Kim could not expect its willingness to suppress the masses were they to develop into an ejectorate, and therefore introduced market reforms to secure the people’s support. The reforms, in return, inevitably eroded the ideological appeal of the Kim family, thereby rendering his hold on power more vulnerable to economic pressure. Under such circumstances, Chinese patronage increasingly faltered. It is due to the instability of these three pillars that Kim Jong-un returned to the negotiating table.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/irap/lcz024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47538502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When a war directly intrudes citizens’ living space, it becomes a war of necessity for the public to defend themselves. However, current literature on public support for war has focused exclusively on wars of choice, not of necessity. Thus, we wonder if existing indicators of war support have explanatory power in this context. In this article, we examine existing indicators in a war of necessity—a cross-Strait conflict between Taiwan and China—to study how the public in Taiwan reacts. In addition to finding support for most of our hypotheses, the new context also contributes novel findings to the literature.
{"title":"When war hits home: Taiwanese public support for war of necessity","authors":"Yao‐Yuan Yeh, Charles K. S. Wu","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcz023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When a war directly intrudes citizens’ living space, it becomes a war of necessity for the public to defend themselves. However, current literature on public support for war has focused exclusively on wars of choice, not of necessity. Thus, we wonder if existing indicators of war support have explanatory power in this context. In this article, we examine existing indicators in a war of necessity—a cross-Strait conflict between Taiwan and China—to study how the public in Taiwan reacts. In addition to finding support for most of our hypotheses, the new context also contributes novel findings to the literature.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/irap/lcz023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48066564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyzes how and why contemporary Global South countries’ South–South cooperation (SSC) exhibits a convergence between normative and material interests. The normative approach underlines that SSC is driven by a country’s experience with colonialism and underdevelopment. SSC is perceived as a mechanism to alter the Global South’s asymmetrical relations with the dominant Global North. The material approach highlights the strategic values of SSC for Southern powers. Through SSC, Southern countries desire to improve their reputation, garner support from other South countries in international fora, and pursue their own broader economic agendas. By utilizing domestic politics analysis, Indonesia’s experience shows that a more pragmatic approach to SSC reflects a broader transformation of Indonesia’s domestic political configuration. While Indonesia’s early practices of SSC prefer normative over material interests, the country’s current policies display a convergence of its material and normative interests, which signifies the emergence of ‘interest-based Third World solidarity’.
{"title":"Indonesia’s South–South cooperation: when normative and material interests converged","authors":"P. Winanti, Rizky Alif Alvian","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcz021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article analyzes how and why contemporary Global South countries’ South–South cooperation (SSC) exhibits a convergence between normative and material interests. The normative approach underlines that SSC is driven by a country’s experience with colonialism and underdevelopment. SSC is perceived as a mechanism to alter the Global South’s asymmetrical relations with the dominant Global North. The material approach highlights the strategic values of SSC for Southern powers. Through SSC, Southern countries desire to improve their reputation, garner support from other South countries in international fora, and pursue their own broader economic agendas. By utilizing domestic politics analysis, Indonesia’s experience shows that a more pragmatic approach to SSC reflects a broader transformation of Indonesia’s domestic political configuration. While Indonesia’s early practices of SSC prefer normative over material interests, the country’s current policies display a convergence of its material and normative interests, which signifies the emergence of ‘interest-based Third World solidarity’.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/irap/lcz021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45034735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hegemony and the US–Japan Alliance","authors":"M. Itayama","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcz012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/irap/lcz012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45534448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Governments often adopt hedging strategies to mitigate risks they face in international affairs. They hedge in the conventional, financial sense of the term by seeking to offset risks in global markets. They also adopt strategies to hedge against international security hazards by preserving strategic ambiguity, forging limited security alignments, and cultivating modest self-protection in case potential threats materialize. Both types of hedging typically are seen as prudent behavior. However, hedging strategies sometimes fail. Risks can be difficult to calculate, and the measures needed to hedge against them can be costly. Hedging international security risks can be particularly challenging, as governments sometimes lack access to adequate protective options at any price. This article illustrates the argument with two contrasting cases: relatively successful Southeast Asian hedging against the risk of financial calamity after the 1997 crisis and less effective efforts by some of the same states to hedge against the security risk of Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea.
{"title":"The variable effectiveness of hedging strategies","authors":"J. Ciorciari","doi":"10.1093/IRAP/LCZ007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Governments often adopt hedging strategies to mitigate risks they face in international affairs. They hedge in the conventional, financial sense of the term by seeking to offset risks in global markets. They also adopt strategies to hedge against international security hazards by preserving strategic ambiguity, forging limited security alignments, and cultivating modest self-protection in case potential threats materialize. Both types of hedging typically are seen as prudent behavior. However, hedging strategies sometimes fail. Risks can be difficult to calculate, and the measures needed to hedge against them can be costly. Hedging international security risks can be particularly challenging, as governments sometimes lack access to adequate protective options at any price. This article illustrates the argument with two contrasting cases: relatively successful Southeast Asian hedging against the risk of financial calamity after the 1997 crisis and less effective efforts by some of the same states to hedge against the security risk of Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47947315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hedging in international relations: an introduction","authors":"J. Ciorciari, J. Haacke","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcz017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/irap/lcz017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46669007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The literature on hedging as a secondary state strategy – built largely on evidence from United States-China competition in East and Southeast Asia – focuses on conditions where a major power presents both an economic opportunity and a security threat. In South Asia, in contrast, secondary states facing strategic competition between India and China have pursued hedging strategies in the absence of a security threat. We develop a theoretical reconciliation of these two phenomena. Hedging at its core involves a trade-off between the material benefits and autonomy costs of cooperating with a major power in a competitive environment. States are likely to hedge when these benefits and costs are simultaneously rising. We test the plausibility of this theory in the cases of the Maldives and Sri Lanka. The autonomy trade-off operates both in the absence and in the presence of a security threat, thus offering a theoretical advancement with greater empirical scope.
{"title":"Hedging in South Asia: balancing economic and security interests amid Sino-Indian competition","authors":"Darren J. Lim, R. Mukherjee","doi":"10.1093/IRAP/LCZ006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The literature on hedging as a secondary state strategy – built largely on evidence from United States-China competition in East and Southeast Asia – focuses on conditions where a major power presents both an economic opportunity and a security threat. In South Asia, in contrast, secondary states facing strategic competition between India and China have pursued hedging strategies in the absence of a security threat. We develop a theoretical reconciliation of these two phenomena. Hedging at its core involves a trade-off between the material benefits and autonomy costs of cooperating with a major power in a competitive environment. States are likely to hedge when these benefits and costs are simultaneously rising. We test the plausibility of this theory in the cases of the Maldives and Sri Lanka. The autonomy trade-off operates both in the absence and in the presence of a security threat, thus offering a theoretical advancement with greater empirical scope.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46177076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the context of the complex unipolar post-Cold War period that has witnessed China’s reemergence as an economic and military power, small and middle powers are increasingly considered to be hedging. This analysis is especially prevalent in relation to Southeast Asian countries, many of which face security challenges posed by China. However, as the literature on hedging has expanded, the concept’s analytical value is no longer obvious. Different understandings of hedging compete within the literature, and there are many criteria by which hedging is empirically ascertained, leading to confusion even over the basic question of which countries are hedging. In response, this article presents a modified conceptual and methodological framework that clearly delineates hedging from other security strategies and identifies key criteria to evaluate whether smaller powers are hedging when confronting a serious security challenge by one of the major powers. This framework is then applied to Malaysia and Singapore.
{"title":"The concept of hedging and its application to Southeast Asia: a critique and a proposal for a modified conceptual and methodological framework","authors":"J. Haacke","doi":"10.1093/IRAP/LCZ010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the context of the complex unipolar post-Cold War period that has witnessed China’s reemergence as an economic and military power, small and middle powers are increasingly considered to be hedging. This analysis is especially prevalent in relation to Southeast Asian countries, many of which face security challenges posed by China. However, as the literature on hedging has expanded, the concept’s analytical value is no longer obvious. Different understandings of hedging compete within the literature, and there are many criteria by which hedging is empirically ascertained, leading to confusion even over the basic question of which countries are hedging. In response, this article presents a modified conceptual and methodological framework that clearly delineates hedging from other security strategies and identifies key criteria to evaluate whether smaller powers are hedging when confronting a serious security challenge by one of the major powers. This framework is then applied to Malaysia and Singapore.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46874439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines whether the Asia-Pacific region’s geopolitical vicissitudes are causing Japan to ‘hedge’ against deepening uncertainty and risk through major strategic realignments or diversification of security and economic ties, as the original hedging literature would expect. It examines trends since 2009 in three domains fundamental to identifying whether shifts are underway in Japan’s strategic orientation vis-à-vis China: security policy (primary), trade/investment, and public opinion. Despite deepening uncertainty (and volatility), especially in ‘the Trump era’, this study finds negligible evidence of hedging behavior: e.g., realigning toward Beijing or adopting a ‘middle position’, much less developing any meaningful security ties with China. Rather, contemporary trends point in the opposite direction: Japan’s China strategy primarily centers on strengthening indigenous deterrence capabilities, bolstering the US–Japan alliance, and diversifying regional security ties beyond Beijing. Even the latter, somewhat paradoxically, aims to deepen ties with Washington and to keep it actively engaged in regional affairs.
{"title":"Unambivalent alignment: Japan’s China strategy, the US alliance, and the ‘hedging’ fallacy","authors":"Adam P. Liff","doi":"10.1093/IRAP/LCZ015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ015","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines whether the Asia-Pacific region’s geopolitical vicissitudes are causing Japan to ‘hedge’ against deepening uncertainty and risk through major strategic realignments or diversification of security and economic ties, as the original hedging literature would expect. It examines trends since 2009 in three domains fundamental to identifying whether shifts are underway in Japan’s strategic orientation vis-à-vis China: security policy (primary), trade/investment, and public opinion. Despite deepening uncertainty (and volatility), especially in ‘the Trump era’, this study finds negligible evidence of hedging behavior: e.g., realigning toward Beijing or adopting a ‘middle position’, much less developing any meaningful security ties with China. Rather, contemporary trends point in the opposite direction: Japan’s China strategy primarily centers on strengthening indigenous deterrence capabilities, bolstering the US–Japan alliance, and diversifying regional security ties beyond Beijing. Even the latter, somewhat paradoxically, aims to deepen ties with Washington and to keep it actively engaged in regional affairs.","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/IRAP/LCZ015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45586628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers","authors":"K. Kimura","doi":"10.1093/irap/lcz014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51799,"journal":{"name":"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/irap/lcz014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44566055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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