Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2023.2233114
N. Lawtoo, Adriana Cavarero
ABSTRACT In this article, Adriana Cavarero and Nidesh Lawtoo resume a dialogue on mimetic inclinations in view of furthering a relational, embodied and affective conception of subjectivity that challenges homo erectus from the immanent perspective of homo mimeticus. If a dominant philosophical tradition tends to restrict mimesis to an illusory representation of reality, Plato was the first to know that mimesis also operates as an affective force, or pathos, that dispossesses the subject. While Plato tended to emphasize the pathological implications of mimesis, Cavarero and Lawtoo agree that both mimesis and inclinations go beyond good and evil and can be put to both pathological and democratic use. Picking up a dialogue started during a walk in New York City, Cavarero and Lawtoo, take their shared interests in Joseph Conrad's relating narratives as an occasion to discuss good and bad mimetic inclinations in contemporary politics and ethics. Joined in conclusion by the Gendered Mimesis team (Willow Verkerk, Isabelle Dahms and Giulia Rignano), topics addressed include new fascism, surging democracy, ethical responsibility for vulnerable others, hypermaternity and public happiness in a precarious world.
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Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2023.2233113
Timothy J. Huzar
ABSTRACT In this article I further Adriana Cavarero and Nidesh Lawtoo’s discussion of “mimetic inclination” to consider the way a person can be known in their uniqueness. Cavarero says that we receive a sense of the uniqueness of another by relating their narrative. I suggest that this also reveals a sense of the uniqueness of the one narrating, and that this can be understood as a practice of care. This narration is, as a consequence, distinct from representation (which itself is distinct from mimesis) and is better described as apprehension. By drawing on Toni Morrison’s Beloved and Christina Sharpe’s In the Wake: On Blackness and Being, I detail a primary form of care connected to apprehension that is engendered by what Sharpe calls “the weather of antiblackness”. Morrison both details this form of care in Beloved and practises it herself in her storytelling. This expands feminist analyses of vulnerability, providing critical resources for rethinking existence apart from its colonial and patriarchal articulation.
{"title":"Mimetic Apprehension: Care, Inclination and the Weather of Antiblackness","authors":"Timothy J. Huzar","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2023.2233113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2023.2233113","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article I further Adriana Cavarero and Nidesh Lawtoo’s discussion of “mimetic inclination” to consider the way a person can be known in their uniqueness. Cavarero says that we receive a sense of the uniqueness of another by relating their narrative. I suggest that this also reveals a sense of the uniqueness of the one narrating, and that this can be understood as a practice of care. This narration is, as a consequence, distinct from representation (which itself is distinct from mimesis) and is better described as apprehension. By drawing on Toni Morrison’s Beloved and Christina Sharpe’s In the Wake: On Blackness and Being, I detail a primary form of care connected to apprehension that is engendered by what Sharpe calls “the weather of antiblackness”. Morrison both details this form of care in Beloved and practises it herself in her storytelling. This expands feminist analyses of vulnerability, providing critical resources for rethinking existence apart from its colonial and patriarchal articulation.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"24 1","pages":"180 - 194"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49602982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2023.2233110
Giulia Ulla Rignano
ABSTRACT This article engages with Adriana Cavarero’s analysis of the Muse of Greek oral poetry to rethink the relationship between mimesis and narration, and the shaping power of the act of narration on the subject. I suggest that Cavarero’s reading of the Muse provides an understanding of mimesis that moves beyond representation to a form of contagion between embodied and temporal subjectivities. To clarify this, I show how Cavarero’s Muse anticipates her critique of rectitude in Inclinations and makes it clear that the inclined subject is not only the vulnerable and open subject as opposed to the vertical and autonomous one, but also the subject that has the power to incline the narratives that mimetically straighten it. The aim is to understand mimetic inclinations as destabilising voices of vertical narrations. As a concrete example of the troubling power of mimetic inclinations, I propose a rereading of Cavarero’s technique of theft presented in In Spite of Plato as a strategy of mimetic resistance.
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Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2023.2233109
W. Verkerk
ABSTRACT This paper takes Cavarero’s arguments against the Homo erectus seriously and asks: how can we model an alternative to it? It proposes that a notion of the mimetically inclined subject is required, one that thickens Cavarero’s affirmative account of inclination by way of a new philosophical understanding of mimesis that includes habit and disciplinarity. Following Cavarero, the mother is positioned as a key figure to place nurturing and love at the centre of subject-making. However, they are shown to be a necessary but not sufficient step for the process of re-evaluation. An account of disciplinary mimesis which draws on a Nietzschean legacy in Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, together with Simone de Beauvoir’s account of woman as a situation, demonstrate the pitfalls of idealizing the mother. I argue that to challenge the particularized universalism of the European subject with an affirmative account of mimetic inclination, other figures which embrace Cavarero’s notion of relational vulnerability alongside the mother are required. The agonistic friend who practices an open, feminist curiosity is proposed as one such exemplar and, in closing remarks, I gesture to other necessary models in feminist and Indigenous thought that are key to remaking the androcentric subject of European philosophy.
{"title":"A Re-evaluation of the Androcentric Subject of European Philosophy","authors":"W. Verkerk","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2023.2233109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2023.2233109","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper takes Cavarero’s arguments against the Homo erectus seriously and asks: how can we model an alternative to it? It proposes that a notion of the mimetically inclined subject is required, one that thickens Cavarero’s affirmative account of inclination by way of a new philosophical understanding of mimesis that includes habit and disciplinarity. Following Cavarero, the mother is positioned as a key figure to place nurturing and love at the centre of subject-making. However, they are shown to be a necessary but not sufficient step for the process of re-evaluation. An account of disciplinary mimesis which draws on a Nietzschean legacy in Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, together with Simone de Beauvoir’s account of woman as a situation, demonstrate the pitfalls of idealizing the mother. I argue that to challenge the particularized universalism of the European subject with an affirmative account of mimetic inclination, other figures which embrace Cavarero’s notion of relational vulnerability alongside the mother are required. The agonistic friend who practices an open, feminist curiosity is proposed as one such exemplar and, in closing remarks, I gesture to other necessary models in feminist and Indigenous thought that are key to remaking the androcentric subject of European philosophy.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"24 1","pages":"115 - 130"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43014348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2023.2195800
Bárbara Buril Lins
ABSTRACT This article establishes a dialogue between the philosopher Axel Honneth and the feminist scholars Silvia Federici and Nancy Fraser. The aim is to emphasize the limits of Honneth’s philosophical reflections on the normative dimension of the family developed in Freedom’s Right. First, I present his ideas on how a normative expectation of social freedom permeates familial relations. According to him, after women entered the labour market, a normative notion of symmetrical participation in the family was produced. I aim to defend here that, whether normative or not, this idea of family is not only limited but also false, since it does not consider the dilemmas of social reproduction whose consequences contradict social freedom. Next, I develop Federici’s and Fraser’s analyses of how families have always faced conflicts concerning the requirements of social reproduction and have produced diverse forms of subjugation that go against the very idea of the family as an unquestioned sphere of freedom. It is necessary to analyse how families produce new forms of subjugation to transform familial relations into truly possible ways of being socially free – and this requires making visible some figures who structure the family, such as nannies, friends and grandparents.
{"title":"Social Reproduction is not a Fairy Tale: A Conversation Between Axel Honneth, Silvia Federici, and Nancy Fraser","authors":"Bárbara Buril Lins","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2023.2195800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2023.2195800","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article establishes a dialogue between the philosopher Axel Honneth and the feminist scholars Silvia Federici and Nancy Fraser. The aim is to emphasize the limits of Honneth’s philosophical reflections on the normative dimension of the family developed in Freedom’s Right. First, I present his ideas on how a normative expectation of social freedom permeates familial relations. According to him, after women entered the labour market, a normative notion of symmetrical participation in the family was produced. I aim to defend here that, whether normative or not, this idea of family is not only limited but also false, since it does not consider the dilemmas of social reproduction whose consequences contradict social freedom. Next, I develop Federici’s and Fraser’s analyses of how families have always faced conflicts concerning the requirements of social reproduction and have produced diverse forms of subjugation that go against the very idea of the family as an unquestioned sphere of freedom. It is necessary to analyse how families produce new forms of subjugation to transform familial relations into truly possible ways of being socially free – and this requires making visible some figures who structure the family, such as nannies, friends and grandparents.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"24 1","pages":"15 - 31"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45496337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2023.2195802
Itay Snir
ABSTRACT Children have always been an essential part of politics. However, the political struggles in which children are involved are rarely, if at all, for the equality of children as such. Struggles for the benefit of children are nearly always led by adults, focusing on children’s rights in an adult-dominated world. In this paper, I develop the possibility of Children’s political struggle for equality, informed by the political philosophy of Jacque Rancière. I present the educational backdrop for Rancière’s claim that all intelligences are equal, and argue that it implies that children are by nature equal to adults, hence also equally capable of political action. By demonstrating that children are a “part of those who have no part” in the existing sociopolitical order, I examine the possibility of a collective political subject of children, and articulate the implications child politics may have.
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Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2023.2195804
J. Braun
ABSTRACT I emphasize how The Return of Work in Critical Theory: Self, Society, Politics deals with details on labor problems ordinarily not handled by modern day critical theory, whereas Experience: New Foundations for the Human Sciences to a large extent justifies the use of a phenomenological approach to psychology with applications for theory building in general, and Authoritarianism: Three Inquiries in Critical Theory provides commentary on the concept of authoritarianism that has ramifications for use of critical theory for understanding political problems. I emphasize the distinction between naturalism of the sort practiced in the physical sciences and neo-Kantian historicism that reflects religious ideals of morality even if in secular form. Thus, I distinguish between motive (can be driven by psychological impulse, but often comes originally from the acceptance of cultural meaning), and mechanism that has explanatory value because of acceptance of the reality of physical causality, usually the result of social structure acting as a controlling mechanism. Similar distinctions are made by Scott Lash, for the purpose of distinguishing between deductive and inductive reasoning. The book on authoritarianism is discussed with emphasis on how their conceptualization fits neither deductive nor inductive conceptualizations entirely. I conclude with a commonsense discussion of these same topics.
{"title":"Retaining the Good, the True and the Beautiful, While Bringing Critical Theory Down to Earth","authors":"J. Braun","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2023.2195804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2023.2195804","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 I emphasize how The Return of Work in Critical Theory: Self, Society, Politics deals with details on labor problems ordinarily not handled by modern day critical theory, whereas Experience: New Foundations for the Human Sciences to a large extent justifies the use of a phenomenological approach to psychology with applications for theory building in general, and Authoritarianism: Three Inquiries in Critical Theory provides commentary on the concept of authoritarianism that has ramifications for use of critical theory for understanding political problems. I emphasize the distinction between naturalism of the sort practiced in the physical sciences and neo-Kantian historicism that reflects religious ideals of morality even if in secular form. Thus, I distinguish between motive (can be driven by psychological impulse, but often comes originally from the acceptance of cultural meaning), and mechanism that has explanatory value because of acceptance of the reality of physical causality, usually the result of social structure acting as a controlling mechanism. Similar distinctions are made by Scott Lash, for the purpose of distinguishing between deductive and inductive reasoning. The book on authoritarianism is discussed with emphasis on how their conceptualization fits neither deductive nor inductive conceptualizations entirely. I conclude with a commonsense discussion of these same topics.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"24 1","pages":"88 - 102"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41459009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2023.2195801
Ö. Özden
ABSTRACT In this paper, I will try to address the question of how to conceptualise a form of life that is better than others, by putting Rahel Jaeggi’s pragmatism inspired critical theory and Giorgio Agamben’s genealogical perspective in conversation. I argue that for both authors the critique of forms of life is intertwined with “the critique of how”. Not restricting itself to ethical abstinence, and without imposing certain norms upon forms of life, “the critique of how” focuses on the reflexive capacity of forms of life, or their ability to question how they become what they are, which gives rise to an increased perception of the connections and continuities of activities in which they are engaged. In this sense, it may become possible to free the present in order to open it to contingency, and to see the glimpses of a better form of life.
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Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2023.2195799
Luiz Repa
ABSTRACT The article argues that Honneth’s idea of reconstructive critique represents a type of immanent critique. Starting from the objection raised by Rahel Jaeggi, who considers the reconstructive critique to be a genre of internal criticism devoid of any transformative negativity, it seeks to show, on the contrary, that Honneth’s notion of “surplus of validity” plays a role of transcendence within the historical reality, which could explain his understanding of reconstructive critique as immanent one. In the second part, the paper displays how Honneth applies this conception of critique to solve the division within Critical Theory, induced by Habermas’s use of the idea of rational reconstruction, which would have split off the tasks of founding the normative criteria and discovering immanently elements for the social transformation. In the third part, the category of surplus of validity is investigated in its function of enlightening possibilities of transformation following an “universal-particular dialectic”. In its final part, the paper addresses some conceptual difficulties in Honneth’s attempt to clarify the systematic value and philosophical meaning of the surplus of validity within the framework of normative reconstruction.
{"title":"Reconstructive Critique as Immanent Critique: On the Notion of Surplus of Validity in Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition","authors":"Luiz Repa","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2023.2195799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2023.2195799","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article argues that Honneth’s idea of reconstructive critique represents a type of immanent critique. Starting from the objection raised by Rahel Jaeggi, who considers the reconstructive critique to be a genre of internal criticism devoid of any transformative negativity, it seeks to show, on the contrary, that Honneth’s notion of “surplus of validity” plays a role of transcendence within the historical reality, which could explain his understanding of reconstructive critique as immanent one. In the second part, the paper displays how Honneth applies this conception of critique to solve the division within Critical Theory, induced by Habermas’s use of the idea of rational reconstruction, which would have split off the tasks of founding the normative criteria and discovering immanently elements for the social transformation. In the third part, the category of surplus of validity is investigated in its function of enlightening possibilities of transformation following an “universal-particular dialectic”. In its final part, the paper addresses some conceptual difficulties in Honneth’s attempt to clarify the systematic value and philosophical meaning of the surplus of validity within the framework of normative reconstruction.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"24 1","pages":"1 - 14"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42853654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2022.2104079
Santiago Castro-Gómez
ABSTRACT This article is a slightly modified version of the first part of Chapter 4 of Revoluciones sin sujeto. Slavoj Žižek’s y la crítica del historicismo posmoderno (Madrid: Akal, 2015) translated by Douglas Kristopher Smith and Nicolas Lema Habash. This text seeks to overcome the scission between Slavoy Žižek and Michel Foucault by challenging the notion that Foucault lacks an ontology of power, beyond contingent historical processes. By exposing the underlying Nietzschean relational ontology of struggle—as distinct from a fundamental, positive grounding—in Foucault’s work, the piece shows how this aspect has been largely misunderstood—including by Žižek himself. Furthermore, it demonstrates how this agonistic ontology of human experience can serve to shed light on Žižek’s notion of the incompleteness of the subject by bringing it into the realm of politics.
本文是对《论服从的革命》第四章第一部分略作修改的版本。斯拉沃伊Žižek的《y la crítica del historicismo posmoderno》(马德里:Akal出版社，2015)，道格拉斯·克里斯托弗·史密斯和尼古拉斯·勒玛·哈巴什译。本文试图克服斯拉沃伊Žižek和米歇尔·福柯之间的分歧，挑战福柯缺乏权力本体论的观念，超越偶然的历史过程。通过揭露尼采式的斗争关系本体论——与福柯作品中根本的、积极的基础截然不同——这篇文章展示了这方面是如何在很大程度上被误解的——包括Žižek自己。此外，它还展示了人类经验的这种对抗本体论如何能够通过将主体带入政治领域来阐明Žižek关于主体不完整性的概念。
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