Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2022.2081409
M. Deleixhe
ABSTRACT Radical democracy was, at its inception, a polemical alternative to the hegemony of Marxism over the political discourse of the Left. This is particularly striking in the work of two of its figureheads, Miguel Abensour and Chantal Mouffe. Whereas C. Mouffe advocates for radical democracy to break free from the rigidness and the determinacy of Marxism, M. Abensour goes back to the young Marx’s plea for a “real democracy”. It results in radical democrats locating differently the radicality of their approaches. While post-Marxists emphasize the crucial and dynamic role of divisive conflicts within the political community and consequently grant the State a role as their arbitrator, “Young Marxists” emphasize a constant struggle against an abusive institutionalization of the State. As a result, they advocate for a form of political spontaneity that is complicated to reconcile with consideration of the political community’s inner conflicts. The regrouping of disparate critical works under a single label makes us shortsighted to some of its internal contradictions.
{"title":"Post-Marxists and “Young Marxists”: Two Conflicting Visions of Radical Democracy","authors":"M. Deleixhe","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2022.2081409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2022.2081409","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Radical democracy was, at its inception, a polemical alternative to the hegemony of Marxism over the political discourse of the Left. This is particularly striking in the work of two of its figureheads, Miguel Abensour and Chantal Mouffe. Whereas C. Mouffe advocates for radical democracy to break free from the rigidness and the determinacy of Marxism, M. Abensour goes back to the young Marx’s plea for a “real democracy”. It results in radical democrats locating differently the radicality of their approaches. While post-Marxists emphasize the crucial and dynamic role of divisive conflicts within the political community and consequently grant the State a role as their arbitrator, “Young Marxists” emphasize a constant struggle against an abusive institutionalization of the State. As a result, they advocate for a form of political spontaneity that is complicated to reconcile with consideration of the political community’s inner conflicts. The regrouping of disparate critical works under a single label makes us shortsighted to some of its internal contradictions.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"23 1","pages":"157 - 171"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48730976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2022.2081414
A. Braeckman
ABSTRACT One of the productive political-philosophical concepts Foucault developed is that of governmentality. According to Foucault, governmentality is in many respects the heir of pastoral power. However, Foucault has never conclusively demonstrated the genealogical link between pastoral power and governmentality. The hypothesis that I want to put forward is that the “missing link” in this genealogy should be situated in the governmental transformations that took place in the period of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, more specifically in the period of the “confessionalization”. To substantiate this claim, I briefly discuss the ideal-typical relationship between pastoral power and governmentality while indicating how Foucault accounts for this relationship. I then criticise his account by showing that it fails to expose the genealogical link between pastoral power and governmentality. Finally, I show how, from a genealogical point of view, the confessionalization theory makes a convincing connection between the revival of pastoral power during the Reformation and the development of a “confessional governmentality” in which religious and secular authorities intersect.
{"title":"The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Governmentality: An Unwritten Chapter in Foucault’s Genealogy of the Modern State","authors":"A. Braeckman","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2022.2081414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2022.2081414","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT One of the productive political-philosophical concepts Foucault developed is that of governmentality. According to Foucault, governmentality is in many respects the heir of pastoral power. However, Foucault has never conclusively demonstrated the genealogical link between pastoral power and governmentality. The hypothesis that I want to put forward is that the “missing link” in this genealogy should be situated in the governmental transformations that took place in the period of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, more specifically in the period of the “confessionalization”. To substantiate this claim, I briefly discuss the ideal-typical relationship between pastoral power and governmentality while indicating how Foucault accounts for this relationship. I then criticise his account by showing that it fails to expose the genealogical link between pastoral power and governmentality. Finally, I show how, from a genealogical point of view, the confessionalization theory makes a convincing connection between the revival of pastoral power during the Reformation and the development of a “confessional governmentality” in which religious and secular authorities intersect.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"23 1","pages":"134 - 156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42098744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2022.2081410
G. Rae
ABSTRACT Judith Butler’s work has tended to be read through two axes: (1) an early gender theory/later ethical theory division, and/or (2) an ethical/political divide. In contrast, I aim to undercut both hermeneutical strategies by turning to her epistemology, as manifested through her analyses of normativity and “frames,” to argue that the latter acts as the hinge uniting her so-called early and later works and the ethical and political dimensions of her thinking. From this premise, I maintain that Butler (1) affirms that these frames are conditioned by power relations and contingency, (2) points to the existence of multiple frameworks that simultaneously compete against one another, and (3) insists that frames are culturally specific and determining of the categories that identify what counts as a legitimate life for a particular community and the ways in which each (form of) life is to be treated. By highlighting the social, performative, and normative dimensions of epistemic practices, Butler offers an epistemology based in the construction of contingent and contestable frameworks and shows how the contestation between distinct frameworks conditions the ethical-political life of each community.
{"title":"Judith Butler and the Politics of Epistemic Frames","authors":"G. Rae","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2022.2081410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2022.2081410","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Judith Butler’s work has tended to be read through two axes: (1) an early gender theory/later ethical theory division, and/or (2) an ethical/political divide. In contrast, I aim to undercut both hermeneutical strategies by turning to her epistemology, as manifested through her analyses of normativity and “frames,” to argue that the latter acts as the hinge uniting her so-called early and later works and the ethical and political dimensions of her thinking. From this premise, I maintain that Butler (1) affirms that these frames are conditioned by power relations and contingency, (2) points to the existence of multiple frameworks that simultaneously compete against one another, and (3) insists that frames are culturally specific and determining of the categories that identify what counts as a legitimate life for a particular community and the ways in which each (form of) life is to be treated. By highlighting the social, performative, and normative dimensions of epistemic practices, Butler offers an epistemology based in the construction of contingent and contestable frameworks and shows how the contestation between distinct frameworks conditions the ethical-political life of each community.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"23 1","pages":"172 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46543963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2022.2081408
Brian C. J. Singer
ABSTRACT Marcel Gauchet spoke of the “eclipse of the political” during the neo-liberal era, but with the rise of populism he is now forced to speak of a “revenge of the political”. As the eclipse was discussed in terms of a new era of individualization, understood as the culmination of the “disenchantment of the world”, one has a right to ask what is the place of individualization in the era of the political’s revenge, particularly as, in the face of Covid 19, the refusal to wear masks is couched in terms of the defense of individual liberties? In what is an immanent critique of Gauchet’s claims, individualization is considered under four rubrics: abstract individualization vs. concrete socialization; the dilemmas of recognition; rejection of alterity; and the loss of the sense of the social. The paper concludes that the “revenge” should be understood as a revenge of an “anti-political” politics.
{"title":"Trumpism and the Defense of Individual Liberties: Considerations on Marcel Gauchet’s Discussion of Individualism","authors":"Brian C. J. Singer","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2022.2081408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2022.2081408","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Marcel Gauchet spoke of the “eclipse of the political” during the neo-liberal era, but with the rise of populism he is now forced to speak of a “revenge of the political”. As the eclipse was discussed in terms of a new era of individualization, understood as the culmination of the “disenchantment of the world”, one has a right to ask what is the place of individualization in the era of the political’s revenge, particularly as, in the face of Covid 19, the refusal to wear masks is couched in terms of the defense of individual liberties? In what is an immanent critique of Gauchet’s claims, individualization is considered under four rubrics: abstract individualization vs. concrete socialization; the dilemmas of recognition; rejection of alterity; and the loss of the sense of the social. The paper concludes that the “revenge” should be understood as a revenge of an “anti-political” politics.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"23 1","pages":"111 - 133"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46594823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2022.2054185
Samuel Ferns
ABSTRACT Robert Brandom reads from Kant an account of reasoning and concept use centred upon normativity and autonomous freedom in the act of judgement. I claim that this reading is flawed because it screens from view another aspect of Kant’s reflections on freedom and reason. By comparing Brandom’s interpretation of Kant with that of Theodor W. Adorno, highlighting their contrasting views of the relation between transcendental and empirical, I contend that Brandom unduly conflates freedom and normativity and thereby takes the freedom of judgement to consist in the endorsement of or commitment to a conceptual norm and argue instead for a reading that takes such freedom as consisting also in the determination or creation of conceptual content. I further claim that the deficiencies of Brandom’s reading are carried over in his transition from Kant to Hegel. Finally, I outline initial elements of an Adornian conception of freedom and reason after Kant.
{"title":"Freedom, Normativity, and Concepts: Adorno Contra Brandom on the Path from Kant","authors":"Samuel Ferns","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2022.2054185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2022.2054185","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Robert Brandom reads from Kant an account of reasoning and concept use centred upon normativity and autonomous freedom in the act of judgement. I claim that this reading is flawed because it screens from view another aspect of Kant’s reflections on freedom and reason. By comparing Brandom’s interpretation of Kant with that of Theodor W. Adorno, highlighting their contrasting views of the relation between transcendental and empirical, I contend that Brandom unduly conflates freedom and normativity and thereby takes the freedom of judgement to consist in the endorsement of or commitment to a conceptual norm and argue instead for a reading that takes such freedom as consisting also in the determination or creation of conceptual content. I further claim that the deficiencies of Brandom’s reading are carried over in his transition from Kant to Hegel. Finally, I outline initial elements of an Adornian conception of freedom and reason after Kant.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"23 1","pages":"55 - 77"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48470969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2022.2054184
Otto H. Linderborg
ABSTRACT This article investigates social critique in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. Two famous Thucydidean episodes are in focus: the Mytilenean Debate in Book III and the Melian Dialogue in Book V of the History. These episodes are interpreted here as inquiries assuming the shape of subversive and transformative social criticism: immanent critique. Immanent critique aims at shifting horizons of meaning in social contexts, and the philosophers practicing this kind of social criticism understand themselves as physicians of a failing society. In Thucydides’ work, a particular object of criticism is formed by varying dominant social and moral ordering principles. In the Mytilenean Debate, it is the principle of expediency (τò ξύμφορον) that rules, whereas in the Melian Dialogue the governing normative ordering principle is that of safety and survival (σωτηρíα). In each episode, a contending perspective is introduced for the purpose of undermining the dominating principle.
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Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2021.1957363
P. Murphy
ABSTRACT John Rundell’s Kant explores the themes of imagination, anthropology and freedom across the entire Kantian corpus. The book casts a revealing light on Kant’s conception of the imagination. It does so in a sustained dialogue with Immanuel Kant’s views on the human condition and political and civil freedom. Rundell explores different approaches that Kant employs to account for the imagination. Rundell’s Kant discusses reproductive, productive, synthesising, monogrammatical, schematic, free, wild and sublime forms of imagination and how these are deeply interwoven with both the antinomies of human freedom and the distinctive philosophical anthropology (species-being) of humankind.
{"title":"Immanuel Kant’s Monograms of the Imagination","authors":"P. Murphy","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2021.1957363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2021.1957363","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT John Rundell’s Kant explores the themes of imagination, anthropology and freedom across the entire Kantian corpus. The book casts a revealing light on Kant’s conception of the imagination. It does so in a sustained dialogue with Immanuel Kant’s views on the human condition and political and civil freedom. Rundell explores different approaches that Kant employs to account for the imagination. Rundell’s Kant discusses reproductive, productive, synthesising, monogrammatical, schematic, free, wild and sublime forms of imagination and how these are deeply interwoven with both the antinomies of human freedom and the distinctive philosophical anthropology (species-being) of humankind.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"23 1","pages":"93 - 109"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46128675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2021.1957362
Gianluca Cavallo
ABSTRACT The paper examines the role of shame as a motivator to engage in social struggles. The author first introduces a distinction between social and moral shame arguing that, while the former can lead to a passive submission to injustice, the latter usually works as a motivating force to resist it. He subsequently discusses three cases of injustice, in which the subject is respectively the victim, the actor, and the witness. The main thesis of the paper is that in all three cases the subject may feel moral shame for tolerating injustice and therefore be motivated to resist it. The conditions under which moral shame arises are discussed, while the absence of moral shame is attributed, through reference to clinical studies, to psychic defence mechanisms, such as negation and rationalisation, which allow the subject to tolerate injustice when it would be too costly to fight it. Throughout the paper, the author engages in a discussion of Honneth’s theory of social struggles, reassessing the role of recognition within the moral grammar of social struggles while attributing the due importance to the desire to live up to one’s self-ideal.
{"title":"Injustice, Shame, and the Moral Grammar of Social Struggles","authors":"Gianluca Cavallo","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2021.1957362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2021.1957362","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper examines the role of shame as a motivator to engage in social struggles. The author first introduces a distinction between social and moral shame arguing that, while the former can lead to a passive submission to injustice, the latter usually works as a motivating force to resist it. He subsequently discusses three cases of injustice, in which the subject is respectively the victim, the actor, and the witness. The main thesis of the paper is that in all three cases the subject may feel moral shame for tolerating injustice and therefore be motivated to resist it. The conditions under which moral shame arises are discussed, while the absence of moral shame is attributed, through reference to clinical studies, to psychic defence mechanisms, such as negation and rationalisation, which allow the subject to tolerate injustice when it would be too costly to fight it. Throughout the paper, the author engages in a discussion of Honneth’s theory of social struggles, reassessing the role of recognition within the moral grammar of social struggles while attributing the due importance to the desire to live up to one’s self-ideal.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"22 1","pages":"386 - 401"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47623555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2021.1957355
G. Schweiger
ABSTRACT Based on Honneth's distinction of recognition in love, respect and social esteem, the social suffering of refugees is criticized in this contribution as an experience of disrespect. In the first part, I will address the fact that moral claims to recognition have a temporal dimension. Then I will ask what role the duration of their flight, the waiting in camps and until admission play for the social suffering of refugees. I will highlight the particular vulnerability of refugees during this time and distinguish different forms of disrespect - with regard to love, social esteem, and respect and rights - faced by them. In the final section, I pose the question which individuals and institutions are responsible for enabling conditions of recognition for refugees.
{"title":"Recognition, Suffering and Refugees","authors":"G. Schweiger","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2021.1957355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2021.1957355","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Based on Honneth's distinction of recognition in love, respect and social esteem, the social suffering of refugees is criticized in this contribution as an experience of disrespect. In the first part, I will address the fact that moral claims to recognition have a temporal dimension. Then I will ask what role the duration of their flight, the waiting in camps and until admission play for the social suffering of refugees. I will highlight the particular vulnerability of refugees during this time and distinguish different forms of disrespect - with regard to love, social esteem, and respect and rights - faced by them. In the final section, I pose the question which individuals and institutions are responsible for enabling conditions of recognition for refugees.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"22 1","pages":"351 - 369"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44480119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2021.1957360
S. Saha
ABSTRACT Focusing on the philosophical puzzle of time and its relation with being and presence the paper explores the volatile relationalities un/tying them in shaping our conceptualisation of memory as re-turning. With such an approach the paper analyses the paradoxes that always haunt any attempt at thinking time, being and presence in their specificity as well as within their general embrace. It is through such play of the specific and general, the paper submits, that the thinking of memory and its acts of re-turning comes to be conceptualised in terms of linear, teleological, homogenous understanding of continuity. Turning towards Bergson and Heidegger’s approaches to the question of time, presence and being the paper attempts to open-up the layered paradoxes that not only shape any act of turning but also the thinking of possible itself as a general category for conceptualising memory as re-turning. Bringing in the question of language and its ontological and temporal concerns, the paper thus brings in the concept of “poetics” to hint at the continuous negotiation that thinking of such interstices in language demands. It is towards such contingencies of the (un)timely, the paper submits, that any attempt at thinking memory as re-turning gestures.
{"title":"Memory and the Writing of (Un)Time: Being, Presence and the Possible","authors":"S. Saha","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2021.1957360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2021.1957360","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Focusing on the philosophical puzzle of time and its relation with being and presence the paper explores the volatile relationalities un/tying them in shaping our conceptualisation of memory as re-turning. With such an approach the paper analyses the paradoxes that always haunt any attempt at thinking time, being and presence in their specificity as well as within their general embrace. It is through such play of the specific and general, the paper submits, that the thinking of memory and its acts of re-turning comes to be conceptualised in terms of linear, teleological, homogenous understanding of continuity. Turning towards Bergson and Heidegger’s approaches to the question of time, presence and being the paper attempts to open-up the layered paradoxes that not only shape any act of turning but also the thinking of possible itself as a general category for conceptualising memory as re-turning. Bringing in the question of language and its ontological and temporal concerns, the paper thus brings in the concept of “poetics” to hint at the continuous negotiation that thinking of such interstices in language demands. It is towards such contingencies of the (un)timely, the paper submits, that any attempt at thinking memory as re-turning gestures.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"23 1","pages":"247 - 264"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49120401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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