Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2021-2036
V. Colapietro
Abstract The author begins by highlighting Peirce’s claim that every kind of consciousness is more or less like a cognition. He concludes by making a plea for a cognitive semiotics in which both mechanistic explanations and accounts framed in terms of personal agents are necessary for an adequate account of human cognition. The topics of habit-taking and the form of consciousness associated with this process are what link Peirce’s cognitivist approach to consciousness and an inclusive, non-reductionist vision of cognitive semiotics. Impersonal mechanisms play an integral role in even the most sophisticated forms of human cognition. But the self-critical endeavors of personal agents, especially ones susceptible to “crises” such as doubt, play no less an important role.
{"title":"Habit-change, heightened consciousness, and agential “crises”: impersonal mechanisms, personal agents, and their complex entanglement","authors":"V. Colapietro","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2021-2036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2021-2036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The author begins by highlighting Peirce’s claim that every kind of consciousness is more or less like a cognition. He concludes by making a plea for a cognitive semiotics in which both mechanistic explanations and accounts framed in terms of personal agents are necessary for an adequate account of human cognition. The topics of habit-taking and the form of consciousness associated with this process are what link Peirce’s cognitivist approach to consciousness and an inclusive, non-reductionist vision of cognitive semiotics. Impersonal mechanisms play an integral role in even the most sophisticated forms of human cognition. But the self-critical endeavors of personal agents, especially ones susceptible to “crises” such as doubt, play no less an important role.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"34 1","pages":"9 - 28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86911956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2021-2037
A. Pietarinen
Abstract Pragmaticism states that general rules of action, or habits, are generalizing tendencies that lead us to action in conceivable situations describable in general terms. As a method of ‘putting questions to our minds,’ it assigns meanings to signs in terms of conceivable practical consequences for rational conduct. Questions are experiments on various ways of finding solutions in thoughts. This paper proposes pragmaticism as a logical method to study consciousness. In particular, perceptions of relations of differences create a “temporal contract” between states of minds that give rise to experiences. Peirce’s “dyadic consciousness” is this drafting of a contract between states of mind, anticipating and occasionally furthering beyond the key notions of 4E cognitive science.
{"title":"Pragmaticism as a logical study of consciousness","authors":"A. Pietarinen","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2021-2037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2021-2037","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Pragmaticism states that general rules of action, or habits, are generalizing tendencies that lead us to action in conceivable situations describable in general terms. As a method of ‘putting questions to our minds,’ it assigns meanings to signs in terms of conceivable practical consequences for rational conduct. Questions are experiments on various ways of finding solutions in thoughts. This paper proposes pragmaticism as a logical method to study consciousness. In particular, perceptions of relations of differences create a “temporal contract” between states of minds that give rise to experiences. Peirce’s “dyadic consciousness” is this drafting of a contract between states of mind, anticipating and occasionally furthering beyond the key notions of 4E cognitive science.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"37 1","pages":"29 - 46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81288536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2034
J. Mendoza-Collazos
Abstract The present review is conceived to be a contribution from the double perspective of a semiotician and a designer to the current debate on the extended mind and on distributed cognition, focusing on the role of things (artefacts, material culture) for the emergence of agency in animate beings. The theory of material engagement as conceived by Lambros Malafouris was formally introduced seven years ago, proposing an idea of boundless cognition and reformulating key notions such as agency, intentionality, and mental representations, philosophically framed with the help of approaches such as postphenomenology (Ihde 2009; Ihde and Malafouris 2019). There is much to commend about a non-hierarchical, interdependent relationship between the world and living organisms — and more specifically between material things and human beings. Nevertheless, a balanced review of the notion of “material agency” is still called for. In this review, I show that an asymmetry can be introduced into the relationship between artefacts and human beings without committing the “sin” of anthropocentrism.
本文旨在从符号学家和设计师的双重视角，对当前关于扩展思维和分布式认知的争论做出贡献，重点关注事物(人工制品、物质文化)在生物能动性出现中的作用。Lambros Malafouris提出的物质参与理论于七年前正式提出，提出了无限认知的概念，并重新制定了代理、意向性和心理表征等关键概念，并在后现象学(Ihde 2009;Ihde and Malafouris(2019)。世界与生物之间——更具体地说，是物质与人类之间——存在着一种非等级制的、相互依赖的关系，这有很多值得赞扬的地方。然而，仍然需要对“物质能动性”的概念进行平衡的审查。在这篇综述中，我展示了一种不对称可以被引入到人工制品和人类之间的关系中，而不会犯人类中心主义的“罪”。
{"title":"On the importance of things: a relational approach to agency","authors":"J. Mendoza-Collazos","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2020-2034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2020-2034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The present review is conceived to be a contribution from the double perspective of a semiotician and a designer to the current debate on the extended mind and on distributed cognition, focusing on the role of things (artefacts, material culture) for the emergence of agency in animate beings. The theory of material engagement as conceived by Lambros Malafouris was formally introduced seven years ago, proposing an idea of boundless cognition and reformulating key notions such as agency, intentionality, and mental representations, philosophically framed with the help of approaches such as postphenomenology (Ihde 2009; Ihde and Malafouris 2019). There is much to commend about a non-hierarchical, interdependent relationship between the world and living organisms — and more specifically between material things and human beings. Nevertheless, a balanced review of the notion of “material agency” is still called for. In this review, I show that an asymmetry can be introduced into the relationship between artefacts and human beings without committing the “sin” of anthropocentrism.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79997467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2032
S. B. Trasmundi, J. S. Philipsen
Abstract This paper is an empirically-based theoretical contribution to the field of research that investigates the function of trust and re-enactment in psychotherapeutic interaction. We use an ecological, embodied approach that pays attention to how human interaction is constrained by multiple timescales (past, present and future). The analysis sheds light on how trust, here in terms of a therapeutic alliance, is enabled, performed and maintained in interaction through the work with embodied re-enactments of previous events. Specifically, we describe how this therapeutic work constitutes an emerging, situated opportunity for teaching/practising embodied emotion regulation in the form of a co-participated enaction of “taking a deep breath,” and we emphasise how embodied, co-participated re-enactment of past (dys)functional behaviours outside of therapy can be a resource for redirecting, teaching and reinforcing therapeutically relevant behaviours in the context of therapy presenting themselves as fruitful opportunities for facilitating incremental change. Further, psychotherapy serves as a useful case for demonstrating the relevance of such an embodied interaction approach far more generally.
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Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2031
Joschka Briese
Abstract This article presents a sign- and usage-based model of intentionality following the works of Robert B. Brandom and T. L. Short. The concept of discursive intentionality is established within Brandom’s theory of language explains discursive and practical reasoning as well as attributive and ascriptive practices. Discursive intentionality is distinguished from other intentionalities of conceptual proximity. Because Brandom’s concept of signs is underdetermined in his works, it will be complemented with T. L. Short’s theory of intentional signs. This dual theoretical framework leads to an innovative analysis of verbs which locates discursive intentionality at the semantic/pragmatic interface. After giving a definition of discursive intentionality, it will be diagrammed by breaking it down into different components (relata, relations, and predicates). Finally, it is tested regarding the plausibility of the diagrammatics of discursive intentionality, using the intentional verb “to promise” to differentiate between the ascription of intentionality and intention.
摘要本文根据罗伯特·b·布兰登和t·l·肖特的研究成果，提出了一个基于符号和使用的意向性模型。话语意向性的概念是在布兰登的语言理论中建立起来的，它解释了话语推理和实践推理以及定语和归因实践。话语意向性区别于概念接近性的其他意向性。由于布兰登的符号概念在他的作品中是不确定的，因此将与T. L. Short的意向性符号理论相补充。这种双重理论框架导致了对动词的创新分析，将话语意向性定位于语义/语用界面。在给出话语意向性的定义之后，将通过将其分解为不同的组件(关联、关系和谓词)来绘制图表。最后，本文用意向性动词“承诺”来区分意向性的归属和意图，对语篇意向性图式的合理性进行了检验。
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Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2033
Laura Pielli, J. Zlatev
Abstract Living with an artificial limb is a reality for millions of people around the world, and it is not without its challenges. The body of the prosthesis user must adapt to the presence of an external aid and the user must learn how to act in the world by means of it. We analyze such a “cyborg body” with the help of a cognitive semiotic framework, benefiting from pheno-methodological triangulation, and the conceptual-empirical loop. Further, adopting a broad notion of phenomenological embodiment, with focus on both lived experience and external representations, we show that claims that “the cyborg” is the very nature of humanity are mistaken as they misrepresent the experiences of people with prosthetic limbs. Finally, we apply the Semiotic Hierarchy model to the levels of selfhood that need to be reconstructed when incorporating a prosthetic limb, distinguishing between subjective, intersubjective, and signitive levels. We conclude that the “lowest” level concerning the body schema, agency and ownership is hardest to reconstruct, supporting arguments for the centrality of proprioception for a sense of agency and ownership.
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Pub Date : 2020-07-07DOI: 10.1515/COGSEM-2020-2023
Cristóbal Pagán Cánovas
{"title":"Learning formulaic creativity: Chunking in verbal art and speech","authors":"Cristóbal Pagán Cánovas","doi":"10.1515/COGSEM-2020-2023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/COGSEM-2020-2023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72985963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2018
Thomas Hoffmann
Abstract Creativity is an important evolutionary adaptation that allows humans to think original thoughts, to find solutions to problems that have never been encountered before, and to fundamentally change the way we live. Recently, one important area of creativity, namely verbal creativity, has attracted considerable interest from constructionist approaches to language. The present issue builds on this emerging field of study and adds an interdisciplinary perspective to it by also presenting the view from cognitive literary studies as well as psychology. First, however, this introduction surveys the recent issues arising in constructionist studies of verbal creativity.
{"title":"Construction grammar and creativity: Evolution, psychology, and cognitive science","authors":"Thomas Hoffmann","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2020-2018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2020-2018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Creativity is an important evolutionary adaptation that allows humans to think original thoughts, to find solutions to problems that have never been encountered before, and to fundamentally change the way we live. Recently, one important area of creativity, namely verbal creativity, has attracted considerable interest from constructionist approaches to language. The present issue builds on this emerging field of study and adds an interdisciplinary perspective to it by also presenting the view from cognitive literary studies as well as psychology. First, however, this introduction surveys the recent issues arising in constructionist studies of verbal creativity.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77987232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2020
T. Herbst
Abstract This short response to Mark Turner’s article on “Construction and creativity” takes the idea of blending — which is at the centre of Turner’s argument — a step further and shows how it can be applied to syntactic analysis. Furthermore, it distinguishes between blendedness and blending, discussing the relevance of these concepts with respect to their relevance with respect to linguistic creativity.
{"title":"Blending is creative, but blendedness is not — a response to Mark Turner","authors":"T. Herbst","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2020-2020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2020-2020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This short response to Mark Turner’s article on “Construction and creativity” takes the idea of blending — which is at the centre of Turner’s argument — a step further and shows how it can be applied to syntactic analysis. Furthermore, it distinguishes between blendedness and blending, discussing the relevance of these concepts with respect to their relevance with respect to linguistic creativity.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"252 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76534064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2022
Hendrik De Smet
Abstract One view of language change sees changes as originating in erroneous deviations from the linguistic norm and diffusing through social transmission. An alternative is to see changes as originating in speakers’ problem-solving activities and spreading in response to system pressures that reflect speakers’ recurrent communicative needs and shared resources. It is argued here that the latter may well be the dominant scenario.
{"title":"Are changes transmitted mistakes?","authors":"Hendrik De Smet","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2020-2022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2020-2022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One view of language change sees changes as originating in erroneous deviations from the linguistic norm and diffusing through social transmission. An alternative is to see changes as originating in speakers’ problem-solving activities and spreading in response to system pressures that reflect speakers’ recurrent communicative needs and shared resources. It is argued here that the latter may well be the dominant scenario.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"244 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74701545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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