Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2021
G. Trousdale
Abstract A recent strand in research in historical linguistics has argued that language change often involves constructional routinization (e.g., Traugott and Trousdale 2013), while recent psycholinguistic work has also suggested parallels between alignment, routinization, and change (Garrod and Pickering 2013) — such routines have been shown to emerge in conversational flow as a product of interaction between speakers and hearers. Similar claims have been made for the development of musical routines in improvisation: much improvisational work involves the use of prefabricated routines (Torrance and Schumann 2018). This article seeks to contribute to the debate on creativity by providing an analysis of some of the similarities and differences between musical and linguistic conventions, including a comparison of creative improvisation in music and innovation in language. The discussion is couched in a cognitive linguistic framework with a particular focus on linguistic constructions (see the overview in Hoffmann and Trousdale 2013) and a reflection of how this might be extended to consider aspects of the cognitive representation of musical structures.
{"title":"Creativity, reuse, and regularity in music and language","authors":"G. Trousdale","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2020-2021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2020-2021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A recent strand in research in historical linguistics has argued that language change often involves constructional routinization (e.g., Traugott and Trousdale 2013), while recent psycholinguistic work has also suggested parallels between alignment, routinization, and change (Garrod and Pickering 2013) — such routines have been shown to emerge in conversational flow as a product of interaction between speakers and hearers. Similar claims have been made for the development of musical routines in improvisation: much improvisational work involves the use of prefabricated routines (Torrance and Schumann 2018). This article seeks to contribute to the debate on creativity by providing an analysis of some of the similarities and differences between musical and linguistic conventions, including a comparison of creative improvisation in music and innovation in language. The discussion is couched in a cognitive linguistic framework with a particular focus on linguistic constructions (see the overview in Hoffmann and Trousdale 2013) and a reflection of how this might be extended to consider aspects of the cognitive representation of musical structures.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88688622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2025
Alexander T. Bergs, N. Kompa
Abstract In this paper, we distinguish two types of creativity (F-creativity and E-creativity; Sampson 2016) and briefly address the question of language change and linguistic innovation in language acquisition. Cognitively speaking, the two types of creativity may impose different cognitive demands on a speaker. But the most pressing question, from our point of view, is the question whether E-creativity itself is constrained or forces us to ‘transcend’ the (rules of the) system. We will, eventually, argue that what looks like creative language use (metaphor, coercion, etc.) is still governed by rules (or hypermaxims). True E-creativity would then mean to step outside the system.
{"title":"Creativity within and outside the linguistic system","authors":"Alexander T. Bergs, N. Kompa","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2020-2025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2020-2025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we distinguish two types of creativity (F-creativity and E-creativity; Sampson 2016) and briefly address the question of language change and linguistic innovation in language acquisition. Cognitively speaking, the two types of creativity may impose different cognitive demands on a speaker. But the most pressing question, from our point of view, is the question whether E-creativity itself is constrained or forces us to ‘transcend’ the (rules of the) system. We will, eventually, argue that what looks like creative language use (metaphor, coercion, etc.) is still governed by rules (or hypermaxims). True E-creativity would then mean to step outside the system.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"867 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85710775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2027
P. Uhrig
Abstract The distinction between creative language use and linguistic errors is not always straightforward. Even less clear is what factors play a role in the attribution of a positive evaluation (= creative) or a negative one (= error). In this paper, it is argued that a Construction Grammar approach can model the difference based on two basic mechanisms: Frequency effects (either modelled as preemption or as negative entrenchment) and hearer expectations, which are continuously updated and based on a wide range of linguistic and contextual factors such as dialect and speech situation, influencing the perception of the abilities and intentions of the speaker.
{"title":"Creative intentions — The fine line between ‘creative’ and ‘wrong’","authors":"P. Uhrig","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2020-2027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2020-2027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The distinction between creative language use and linguistic errors is not always straightforward. Even less clear is what factors play a role in the attribution of a positive evaluation (= creative) or a negative one (= error). In this paper, it is argued that a Construction Grammar approach can model the difference based on two basic mechanisms: Frequency effects (either modelled as preemption or as negative entrenchment) and hearer expectations, which are continuously updated and based on a wide range of linguistic and contextual factors such as dialect and speech situation, influencing the perception of the abilities and intentions of the speaker.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77980040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2024
Alexander T. Bergs
Abstract This response to the paper by Cristóbal Pagán Cánovas argues that wide-learning networks might actually be useful in the description and analysis of phonology and morphology, but it is less than clear that the same applies to syntax or text. Phenomena such as proverbs and oral poetic formulae are probably better understood in a traditional Construction Grammar framework with mid-level abstract units based on compositionality.
{"title":"Learning formulaic creativity: Chunking in verbal art and speech – a response to Cristóbal Pagán Cánovas","authors":"Alexander T. Bergs","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2020-2024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2020-2024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This response to the paper by Cristóbal Pagán Cánovas argues that wide-learning networks might actually be useful in the description and analysis of phonology and morphology, but it is less than clear that the same applies to syntax or text. Phenomena such as proverbs and oral poetic formulae are probably better understood in a traditional Construction Grammar framework with mid-level abstract units based on compositionality.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90796012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2030
Karin Kukkonen
Abstract Literature is often considered the creative expression of language par excellence. This coda considers how the perspectives from Construction Grammar, as they are outlined in this special issue, can enter into dialogue with recent developments in how literary studies address creativity. Construction Grammar concerns itself with the productive generation and manipulation of language in everyday contexts, but, as this special issue goes to show, these processes can also be discussed in terms of creativity and deployed to shed light on creative processes in the arts. Convergences between Construction Grammar and (cognitive) literary studies appear to emerge in particular around the question of creative practice in literary language and (1) in how far writing gives rise to particular kinds of creativity; (2) how one can generalize between different creative media, such as literature, painting and music; and (3) how writing-based creativity can be investigated. Literary studies with its interests in media environments, social/historical context and textual analysis might provide a larger testing ground for claims about the compatibility and incompatibility of everyday and literary creativity as they are put forward in this special issue.
{"title":"Coda: Literature, language, and creativity","authors":"Karin Kukkonen","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2020-2030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2020-2030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Literature is often considered the creative expression of language par excellence. This coda considers how the perspectives from Construction Grammar, as they are outlined in this special issue, can enter into dialogue with recent developments in how literary studies address creativity. Construction Grammar concerns itself with the productive generation and manipulation of language in everyday contexts, but, as this special issue goes to show, these processes can also be discussed in terms of creativity and deployed to shed light on creative processes in the arts. Convergences between Construction Grammar and (cognitive) literary studies appear to emerge in particular around the question of creative practice in literary language and (1) in how far writing gives rise to particular kinds of creativity; (2) how one can generalize between different creative media, such as literature, painting and music; and (3) how writing-based creativity can be investigated. Literary studies with its interests in media environments, social/historical context and textual analysis might provide a larger testing ground for claims about the compatibility and incompatibility of everyday and literary creativity as they are put forward in this special issue.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86986884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2026
B. Cappelle
Abstract Bergs and Kompa (Creativity within and outside the linguistic system. Cognitive Semiotics 13. 1, 2020) discuss creativity in language, which they see as largely rule-bound, as opposed to ‘true,’ rule-breaking creativity in the arts. However, the distinction between intra- and extra-system creativity is not always easy to make. Languages have evolved into efficient systems for communication and occasionally allow for divergences of their own norms, within limits of comprehensibility, just like games are developed to enable maximum player creativity or even rule bending (as in the case of Monopoly Cheaters Edition). The paradox of systems licencing violations of their own norms and rules is similar to the one underlying avant-garde as one or more movements in the history of art, when breaking with expectations was the vogue of the time — hence, somehow to be expected. Judging art as innovative or not also depends on what we adopt as our artistic frame of reference. Furthermore, single works of art or single artists can be ahead of the times in some respects but not in others. Turning again to language, I agree with Bergs and Kompa that competent speakers abide by the rules, which implies such language users also know (perhaps not always fully consciously) how to exploit in-built mechanisms that make them sound creative.
{"title":"Playing by/with the rules: Creativity in language, games, and art","authors":"B. Cappelle","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2020-2026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2020-2026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Bergs and Kompa (Creativity within and outside the linguistic system. Cognitive Semiotics 13. 1, 2020) discuss creativity in language, which they see as largely rule-bound, as opposed to ‘true,’ rule-breaking creativity in the arts. However, the distinction between intra- and extra-system creativity is not always easy to make. Languages have evolved into efficient systems for communication and occasionally allow for divergences of their own norms, within limits of comprehensibility, just like games are developed to enable maximum player creativity or even rule bending (as in the case of Monopoly Cheaters Edition). The paradox of systems licencing violations of their own norms and rules is similar to the one underlying avant-garde as one or more movements in the history of art, when breaking with expectations was the vogue of the time — hence, somehow to be expected. Judging art as innovative or not also depends on what we adopt as our artistic frame of reference. Furthermore, single works of art or single artists can be ahead of the times in some respects but not in others. Turning again to language, I agree with Bergs and Kompa that competent speakers abide by the rules, which implies such language users also know (perhaps not always fully consciously) how to exploit in-built mechanisms that make them sound creative.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82682760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Understanding the very nature of creativity is a hot topic in research across various disciplines and has profound societal relevance. In this contribution, we discuss verbal creativity by highlighting its definition, psychometric measurement, and relations with other personality dispositions. We relate psychological research with findings from linguistics presented in this issue and depict similarities and differences between both approaches. More specifically, we relate the linguistic terminology of F-creativity to fluency and flexibility, whereas we identify E-creativity as akin to originality. We propose latent semantic analysis as a possible approach for evaluating originality and compare this approach with more commonly applied human ratings. Based on contributions in this issue, we discuss creativity as a domain-general process that is (e. g., in applied arts) often driven by the recombination of mental elements. Lastly, we propose several intelligence and personality dispositions as determinants of individual differences in creativity. We conclude that creativity research in linguistic and psychology has many communalities and interdisciplinary work bears strong promises for the future.
{"title":"Coda: Creativity in psychological research versus in linguistics – Same but different?","authors":"S. Weiss, O. Wilhelm","doi":"10.31234/osf.io/asbrx","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/asbrx","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Understanding the very nature of creativity is a hot topic in research across various disciplines and has profound societal relevance. In this contribution, we discuss verbal creativity by highlighting its definition, psychometric measurement, and relations with other personality dispositions. We relate psychological research with findings from linguistics presented in this issue and depict similarities and differences between both approaches. More specifically, we relate the linguistic terminology of F-creativity to fluency and flexibility, whereas we identify E-creativity as akin to originality. We propose latent semantic analysis as a possible approach for evaluating originality and compare this approach with more commonly applied human ratings. Based on contributions in this issue, we discuss creativity as a domain-general process that is (e. g., in applied arts) often driven by the recombination of mental elements. Lastly, we propose several intelligence and personality dispositions as determinants of individual differences in creativity. We conclude that creativity research in linguistic and psychology has many communalities and interdisciplinary work bears strong promises for the future.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76981416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2028
Thomas Hoffmann
Abstract In his contribution to the present volume, Uhrig (2020. Cognitive Semiotics 13, 1) focusses on an interesting question: When is a novel utterance considered “creative” and when is it seen as “wrong?” As I will show, Uhrig offers many important answers to this question. At the same time, I argue 1) that deliberateness is not (always) important for linguistic creativity; 2) that appropriateness requires a closer look; and 3) that frequency does not (always) play the most important role.
{"title":"Speakers are creative, within limits — a response to Peter Uhrig","authors":"Thomas Hoffmann","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2020-2028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2020-2028","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his contribution to the present volume, Uhrig (2020. Cognitive Semiotics 13, 1) focusses on an interesting question: When is a novel utterance considered “creative” and when is it seen as “wrong?” As I will show, Uhrig offers many important answers to this question. At the same time, I argue 1) that deliberateness is not (always) important for linguistic creativity; 2) that appropriateness requires a closer look; and 3) that frequency does not (always) play the most important role.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79298747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-15DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2020-2019
Mark B. Turner
Abstract The first principle of cognitive linguistics is to look for the origins of linguistic powers in robust mental operations not specific to language. For millennia, language science has assumed that human beings possess mental operations for unifying, combining, and merging patterns to create expressions, and that, conversely, they can analyze expressions they encounter to recognize patterns that were combined to produce them. The third section of this article reviews some of the literature concerned with these powers to combine patterns into expressions and to analyze expressions into patterns that were blended to create them. Any assumption about such a linguistic power takes out a loan on theory that must be cashed out with a non-language-specific explanation if the theory is to count as cognitive. One can stipulate to the existence of some unexplained power that is needed for linguistic performance, but that stipulation is insubstantial until it is grounded in a demonstrated non-language-specific operation. An assumption or stipulation about a linguistic power is cashed out when we locate and model the non-language-specific cognitive operations that make that linguistic power possible. The first section of this article presents the proposition that the non-language-specific mental operation that accounts for these linguistic powers is blending, otherwise known as conceptual integration. The second section provides a topical review of blending in specific communicative form-meaning pairs and their combination. Blending is the foundation of creativity in communication, or, more specifically, in the creation and combining of form-meaning pairs, also called “constructions.”
{"title":"Constructions and creativity","authors":"Mark B. Turner","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2020-2019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2020-2019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The first principle of cognitive linguistics is to look for the origins of linguistic powers in robust mental operations not specific to language. For millennia, language science has assumed that human beings possess mental operations for unifying, combining, and merging patterns to create expressions, and that, conversely, they can analyze expressions they encounter to recognize patterns that were combined to produce them. The third section of this article reviews some of the literature concerned with these powers to combine patterns into expressions and to analyze expressions into patterns that were blended to create them. Any assumption about such a linguistic power takes out a loan on theory that must be cashed out with a non-language-specific explanation if the theory is to count as cognitive. One can stipulate to the existence of some unexplained power that is needed for linguistic performance, but that stipulation is insubstantial until it is grounded in a demonstrated non-language-specific operation. An assumption or stipulation about a linguistic power is cashed out when we locate and model the non-language-specific cognitive operations that make that linguistic power possible. The first section of this article presents the proposition that the non-language-specific mental operation that accounts for these linguistic powers is blending, otherwise known as conceptual integration. The second section provides a topical review of blending in specific communicative form-meaning pairs and their combination. Blending is the foundation of creativity in communication, or, more specifically, in the creation and combining of form-meaning pairs, also called “constructions.”","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82292631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-01DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2019-2012
M. Leone
Abstract The semiotics of phenomena like déjà vus and hallucinations constitute a limit-field of a theory of the sign, but one that offers opportunities to question the fundamental principles of the discipline while at the same time offering the opportunity to address their underlying cognitive processes. The article describes the cognitive nature of déjà vus and hallucinations, briefly reviews the literature about them, and reads them as cognitive perturbations in the light of a semiotics of mental simulacra related to perception, apperception, awareness, memory, and imagination. The article then uses such cognitive and semiotic modeling in order to develop a critique of present-day digital culture, in which the uncritical adoption of a mnemonic ideal based on digital memory jeopardizes one of the key features of embodied memory: imperfection and, as a consequence, the possibility to access aesthetic and temporal singularity. A collective memory prone to déjà vus and hallucinations ensues.
{"title":"Chronillogicalities : Déjà vus and hallucinations in the digital semiosphere","authors":"M. Leone","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2019-2012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2019-2012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The semiotics of phenomena like déjà vus and hallucinations constitute a limit-field of a theory of the sign, but one that offers opportunities to question the fundamental principles of the discipline while at the same time offering the opportunity to address their underlying cognitive processes. The article describes the cognitive nature of déjà vus and hallucinations, briefly reviews the literature about them, and reads them as cognitive perturbations in the light of a semiotics of mental simulacra related to perception, apperception, awareness, memory, and imagination. The article then uses such cognitive and semiotic modeling in order to develop a critique of present-day digital culture, in which the uncritical adoption of a mnemonic ideal based on digital memory jeopardizes one of the key features of embodied memory: imperfection and, as a consequence, the possibility to access aesthetic and temporal singularity. A collective memory prone to déjà vus and hallucinations ensues.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73091102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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