T he basic tenets of democracy are under threat worldwide as governance and human rights re-emerge as sources of ideological contention between China and the United States. Freedom House reported that between 2005 and 2020, “the number of Free countries in the world reached its lowest level...while the number of Not Free countries reached its highest level.”1 African countries are prominent in this ideological contention due to their political and economic proximity to both powers. The majority of countries that Freedom House found to have regressed are in Africa and, in particular, sub-Saharan Africa, where since 2010 there have been fourteen successful military coups, most recently in Chad, Mali, Guinea, and Sudan. In all these countries, militaries re-emerged as political players in the countries’ governance, shrinking the space for civil society and civilian politics. Africa is not alone, however; democracy faced major setbacks from ultra-nationalism, populist regimes, threats to minority rights, and attacks on the freedom of the press even in European Union countries such as Hungary and Poland. At the core of these challenges to democracy and political freedom is the shifting balance of power from the West to China, suggesting a showdown between authoritarianism and democracy. Undoubtedly, the emergence of nondemocratic powers such as China that contest the assumption “democracy leads to development” adds new complexities to democracy’s global crisis. In short, China’s extraordinary economic growth illustrated the efficacy of a strong developmental state without political pluralism. Accordingly, as China increases its influence abroad—particularly in Africa—concern is rising in the West that “the share of international power held by highly industrialized democracies is dwindling as the clout of China, India, and other newly industrialized economies increases.”2 As such, an
{"title":"The China Effect: Democracy and Development in the 21st Century","authors":"Obert Hodzi","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0050","url":null,"abstract":"T he basic tenets of democracy are under threat worldwide as governance and human rights re-emerge as sources of ideological contention between China and the United States. Freedom House reported that between 2005 and 2020, “the number of Free countries in the world reached its lowest level...while the number of Not Free countries reached its highest level.”1 African countries are prominent in this ideological contention due to their political and economic proximity to both powers. The majority of countries that Freedom House found to have regressed are in Africa and, in particular, sub-Saharan Africa, where since 2010 there have been fourteen successful military coups, most recently in Chad, Mali, Guinea, and Sudan. In all these countries, militaries re-emerged as political players in the countries’ governance, shrinking the space for civil society and civilian politics. Africa is not alone, however; democracy faced major setbacks from ultra-nationalism, populist regimes, threats to minority rights, and attacks on the freedom of the press even in European Union countries such as Hungary and Poland. At the core of these challenges to democracy and political freedom is the shifting balance of power from the West to China, suggesting a showdown between authoritarianism and democracy. Undoubtedly, the emergence of nondemocratic powers such as China that contest the assumption “democracy leads to development” adds new complexities to democracy’s global crisis. In short, China’s extraordinary economic growth illustrated the efficacy of a strong developmental state without political pluralism. Accordingly, as China increases its influence abroad—particularly in Africa—concern is rising in the West that “the share of international power held by highly industrialized democracies is dwindling as the clout of China, India, and other newly industrialized economies increases.”2 As such, an","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"51 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49051190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This article analyzes the historical evolution of Japan's positions, posture, and policies relevant to a possible conflict across the Taiwan Strait, including the potential roles of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and Japan's Self-Defense Forces.main argument In April 2021, Japan's then prime minister Yoshihide Suga and U.S. president Joe Biden made global headlines when they jointly "underscored the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues"—the first such reference in a summit-level statement since 1969. This statement catalyzed a striking degree of public discussion in Japan and expressions of concern about cross-strait stability from Japanese leaders. It also elicited widespread, though often misleading or inaccurate, assertions overseas that Japan's position vis-à-vis a "Taiwan contingency" had abruptly or radically transformed. Especially given the proximity of Japan (and U.S. military bases in Japan) to Taiwan, soberly appreciating the complexity and incremental evolution of Japan's nuanced and intentionally ambiguous positions and policies, as well as its unique domestic constraints, is critical. Doing so is especially crucial for policymakers to accurately assess the status quo, manage expectations within and beyond the alliance, and ensure sound decision-making as the cross-strait deterrence challenge seems all but certain to deepen in the years ahead.policy implications •Japan's decades-old, intentionally ambiguous official posture toward a possible Taiwan Strait contingency has not radically changed. Any action Japan would take in a possible crisis will depend on top-level political judgments about the particular contingency's nature, how it began, how Taipei and Washington have responded, and the perceived threat to Japan itself.• Ambiguity—by design—should not be misunderstood as apathy or ambivalence in Tokyo about democratic Taiwan's future or cross-strait peace and stability. Recent developments suggest a new sense of urgency and openness to deepen contingency and bilateral planning with Washington to enhance deterrence and to prepare options if deterrence fails. Though not originally motivated by a possible Taiwan contingency, Japan's national security and alliance reforms over the past decade have expanded the options for allied cooperation and Japan's potential role(s) in the event one occurs.• Important constraints on Japan are still apparent. It remains an open question how—and how quickly—Japan's leaders could respond to use of force by China against Taiwan and what consequences any indecision could have on Japan's and the alliance's response or how a conflict plays out.
{"title":"The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Taiwan","authors":"Adam P. Liff","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0038","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article analyzes the historical evolution of Japan's positions, posture, and policies relevant to a possible conflict across the Taiwan Strait, including the potential roles of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and Japan's Self-Defense Forces.main argument In April 2021, Japan's then prime minister Yoshihide Suga and U.S. president Joe Biden made global headlines when they jointly \"underscored the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues\"—the first such reference in a summit-level statement since 1969. This statement catalyzed a striking degree of public discussion in Japan and expressions of concern about cross-strait stability from Japanese leaders. It also elicited widespread, though often misleading or inaccurate, assertions overseas that Japan's position vis-à-vis a \"Taiwan contingency\" had abruptly or radically transformed. Especially given the proximity of Japan (and U.S. military bases in Japan) to Taiwan, soberly appreciating the complexity and incremental evolution of Japan's nuanced and intentionally ambiguous positions and policies, as well as its unique domestic constraints, is critical. Doing so is especially crucial for policymakers to accurately assess the status quo, manage expectations within and beyond the alliance, and ensure sound decision-making as the cross-strait deterrence challenge seems all but certain to deepen in the years ahead.policy implications •Japan's decades-old, intentionally ambiguous official posture toward a possible Taiwan Strait contingency has not radically changed. Any action Japan would take in a possible crisis will depend on top-level political judgments about the particular contingency's nature, how it began, how Taipei and Washington have responded, and the perceived threat to Japan itself.• Ambiguity—by design—should not be misunderstood as apathy or ambivalence in Tokyo about democratic Taiwan's future or cross-strait peace and stability. Recent developments suggest a new sense of urgency and openness to deepen contingency and bilateral planning with Washington to enhance deterrence and to prepare options if deterrence fails. Though not originally motivated by a possible Taiwan contingency, Japan's national security and alliance reforms over the past decade have expanded the options for allied cooperation and Japan's potential role(s) in the event one occurs.• Important constraints on Japan are still apparent. It remains an open question how—and how quickly—Japan's leaders could respond to use of force by China against Taiwan and what consequences any indecision could have on Japan's and the alliance's response or how a conflict plays out.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"125 - 160"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48206568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T here are many threads of discourse in Africa-China relations, inspired by growing flows of investment, trade, and aid. One important consideration in the budding relationships between African states and China is the adoption of digital infrastructure and surveillance technologies.1 Many experts have argued that China’s intentions are to garner access to African developing markets while also allowing Beijing a “backdoor” through which to secure access to data. Thus, research and media coverage have focused disproportionately on Chinese reasons and incentives in the proliferation of information and communications technology (ICT) and surveillance technology, but little systematic attention has focused on the multiple uses, properties, and applications of these digital tools in local environments. For this reason, this essay seeks to critically examine some of the more familiar preoccupations about the exportation of Chinese governance and surveillance technologies to Africa in the process of developing countries’ ICT infrastructure and smart cities. The essay chiefly brings to the fore the local factors that contribute to the growing use of Chinese digital infrastructure in Kenya. There is limited analytical research on the spread of Chinese digital infrastructure and its consequences for African local environments and actors. Accordingly, the essay seeks to examine the growing use of Chinese-produced digital infrastructure in Kenya and its consequences. It focuses attention on the often-neglected details of Chinese operations and local smart city initiatives.
{"title":"Chinese ICT and Smart City Initiatives in Kenya","authors":"Bulelani Jili","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0051","url":null,"abstract":"T here are many threads of discourse in Africa-China relations, inspired by growing flows of investment, trade, and aid. One important consideration in the budding relationships between African states and China is the adoption of digital infrastructure and surveillance technologies.1 Many experts have argued that China’s intentions are to garner access to African developing markets while also allowing Beijing a “backdoor” through which to secure access to data. Thus, research and media coverage have focused disproportionately on Chinese reasons and incentives in the proliferation of information and communications technology (ICT) and surveillance technology, but little systematic attention has focused on the multiple uses, properties, and applications of these digital tools in local environments. For this reason, this essay seeks to critically examine some of the more familiar preoccupations about the exportation of Chinese governance and surveillance technologies to Africa in the process of developing countries’ ICT infrastructure and smart cities. The essay chiefly brings to the fore the local factors that contribute to the growing use of Chinese digital infrastructure in Kenya. There is limited analytical research on the spread of Chinese digital infrastructure and its consequences for African local environments and actors. Accordingly, the essay seeks to examine the growing use of Chinese-produced digital infrastructure in Kenya and its consequences. It focuses attention on the often-neglected details of Chinese operations and local smart city initiatives.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"40 - 50"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44206907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This essay spotlights interactions between private think tanks' security policy proposals and the development of the Japanese government's security policies since 1995, identifies items on the current security policy agenda, and suggests the future direction of Japan's security policy.main argument Japan's defense and security policy is steadily moving in a pragmatic and proactive direction toward becoming a "normal country" through "passive realism," although the direction and speed of change is not dramatic or linear. Interactions between think tanks' policy recommendations and the government's realization of them since 1995 illustrate in part this development process. For example, following a committee's suggestions to revitalize the Japan-U.S. alliance to deal with contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese government adopted a related law after it agreed upon the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation with its U.S. counterpart. The Abe cabinets implemented many ambitious policies suggested in think tank proposals, including permitting the exercise of the right of collective defense, creating the National Security Council, and establishing the National Security Strategy. Currently, the Japanese government is conducting a series of conversations with security experts to revise the National Security Strategy and the ruling LDP has announced a general policy proposal. The proposal recommends that the Kishida cabinet initiate the development of an indigenous counterstrike capability and increase the defense budget toward 2% of GDP. Past interactions between policy think tanks and the Japanese government suggest that the government will continue to take steps toward becoming a so-called normal country, although such steps could be gradual and incremental.policy implications • Japan should continue to implement a realistic security policy agenda, which will contribute not only to its survival but to regional stability in the new era following the post–Cold War.• The U.S. should encourage and cooperate with Japan's proactive development of its realistic and pragmatic security policy since it will be important both to regional stability and to a sustainable U.S. security strategy in the face of threats from an assertive Russia and China.• Japan and the U.S. should collaborate on research and development in defense and dual-use technology, which are critical for Japan's sustainable development of its defense capability and industrial base.
{"title":"Japan's Security Policy Evolution: The Interaction between Think Tank Proposals and Government Implementation","authors":"Tsuneo Watanabe","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0040","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay spotlights interactions between private think tanks' security policy proposals and the development of the Japanese government's security policies since 1995, identifies items on the current security policy agenda, and suggests the future direction of Japan's security policy.main argument Japan's defense and security policy is steadily moving in a pragmatic and proactive direction toward becoming a \"normal country\" through \"passive realism,\" although the direction and speed of change is not dramatic or linear. Interactions between think tanks' policy recommendations and the government's realization of them since 1995 illustrate in part this development process. For example, following a committee's suggestions to revitalize the Japan-U.S. alliance to deal with contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese government adopted a related law after it agreed upon the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation with its U.S. counterpart. The Abe cabinets implemented many ambitious policies suggested in think tank proposals, including permitting the exercise of the right of collective defense, creating the National Security Council, and establishing the National Security Strategy. Currently, the Japanese government is conducting a series of conversations with security experts to revise the National Security Strategy and the ruling LDP has announced a general policy proposal. The proposal recommends that the Kishida cabinet initiate the development of an indigenous counterstrike capability and increase the defense budget toward 2% of GDP. Past interactions between policy think tanks and the Japanese government suggest that the government will continue to take steps toward becoming a so-called normal country, although such steps could be gradual and incremental.policy implications • Japan should continue to implement a realistic security policy agenda, which will contribute not only to its survival but to regional stability in the new era following the post–Cold War.• The U.S. should encourage and cooperate with Japan's proactive development of its realistic and pragmatic security policy since it will be important both to regional stability and to a sustainable U.S. security strategy in the face of threats from an assertive Russia and China.• Japan and the U.S. should collaborate on research and development in defense and dual-use technology, which are critical for Japan's sustainable development of its defense capability and industrial base.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"107 - 124"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41419851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Foreword To The Special Essay","authors":"D. Djalal","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0037","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"79 - 79"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42574245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I n Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia, Timothy Frye presents a strong case for how Russia’s current politics and policies cannot be fully understood as simply “a reflection either of Vladimir Putin’s worldview or Russia’s unique history and culture” (pp. vii–viii). Instead, Russia can—and should—be understood with reference to the growing social science literature on nondemocracies to see how Putin’s Russia is similar to or different from other autocratic regimes. Frye finds that Putin’s Russia is more similar to other personalist autocracies than to autocracies ruled by organizations such as the military or a ruling party. Frye is quite persuasive in making his argument, showing in successive chapters how Putin’s ability to maintain popularity, manipulate domestic elections, manage the economy, use repression, and control domestic media are all similar to what other personalist autocratic leaders have done (and continue to do) in other countries. What Frye shows so well is that Putin is not unique but can be better understood through comparison with other personalist autocrats. Indeed, the challenge for this reviewer is to try to find arguments about how to understand Putin’s Russia that the author did not consider (but might respond to in his reply to this essay). One is that while Putin’s Russia is not a military or party dictatorship, it may be more similar to a theocratic regime such as the Islamic Republic of Iran than a personalist regime. For instance, Putin’s and the Moscow patriarchy’s conflation of Russian Orthodoxy with Russian great-power nationalism is similar to the way in which first Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and then Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have conflated their interpretation of Shiism with Iran’s own great-power nationalism. In addition, the National Guard created under Putin in 2016 plays a similar role to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) in preserving not just the regime but its ideology. It might be argued that the National Guard is far more powerful in Russia than the Moscow Patriarchy. Scholars studying Iran, however, see the IRGC as having become stronger vis-à-vis the Shiite clergy. The increasingly dominant role the IRGC is playing in
{"title":"How Can Putin's Russia Be Best Understood?","authors":"M. Katz","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0042","url":null,"abstract":"I n Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia, Timothy Frye presents a strong case for how Russia’s current politics and policies cannot be fully understood as simply “a reflection either of Vladimir Putin’s worldview or Russia’s unique history and culture” (pp. vii–viii). Instead, Russia can—and should—be understood with reference to the growing social science literature on nondemocracies to see how Putin’s Russia is similar to or different from other autocratic regimes. Frye finds that Putin’s Russia is more similar to other personalist autocracies than to autocracies ruled by organizations such as the military or a ruling party. Frye is quite persuasive in making his argument, showing in successive chapters how Putin’s ability to maintain popularity, manipulate domestic elections, manage the economy, use repression, and control domestic media are all similar to what other personalist autocratic leaders have done (and continue to do) in other countries. What Frye shows so well is that Putin is not unique but can be better understood through comparison with other personalist autocrats. Indeed, the challenge for this reviewer is to try to find arguments about how to understand Putin’s Russia that the author did not consider (but might respond to in his reply to this essay). One is that while Putin’s Russia is not a military or party dictatorship, it may be more similar to a theocratic regime such as the Islamic Republic of Iran than a personalist regime. For instance, Putin’s and the Moscow patriarchy’s conflation of Russian Orthodoxy with Russian great-power nationalism is similar to the way in which first Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and then Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have conflated their interpretation of Shiism with Iran’s own great-power nationalism. In addition, the National Guard created under Putin in 2016 plays a similar role to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) in preserving not just the regime but its ideology. It might be argued that the National Guard is far more powerful in Russia than the Moscow Patriarchy. Scholars studying Iran, however, see the IRGC as having become stronger vis-à-vis the Shiite clergy. The increasingly dominant role the IRGC is playing in","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"193 - 196"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43818271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
W ith socioeconomic development as the aim of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an expected effect is a boost in science and technology across the participating regions. Collectively, the countries participating in BRI are home to 65% of the world’s population, and digital technology is playing an increasingly crucial role in diplomacy, trade, and geopolitics. BRI’s infrastructure-building campaign includes digital development through the Digital Silk Road (DSR), which aims to support BRI’s streamlining of trade and industrial overcapacity with greater digital integration.1 To date, 52 of 55 African Union members have signed a memorandum of understanding with China on BRI.2 Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has adopted the BRI and DSR as organizing concepts of its foreign policy. As such, the role of the internet and digital infrastructure must be critically examined, particularly with regard to China’s foreign policy intentions toward Africa. In line with the rise of Chinese internet companies on the global stage, there has also been an increased foreign policy push to build an “information silk road,” as China’s policymakers articulated in 2015.3 The DSR aims to facilitate the integration of networked technologies such as cloud computing and artificial intelligence further into BRI.4 Even though there is growing consensus on the importance of BRI, there has been little debate on the role of the internet in the progress and development of BRI, which in this context manifests as the DSR.
{"title":"The Digital Silk Road: Connecting Africa with New Norms of Digital Development","authors":"Ovigwe Eguegu","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0049","url":null,"abstract":"W ith socioeconomic development as the aim of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an expected effect is a boost in science and technology across the participating regions. Collectively, the countries participating in BRI are home to 65% of the world’s population, and digital technology is playing an increasingly crucial role in diplomacy, trade, and geopolitics. BRI’s infrastructure-building campaign includes digital development through the Digital Silk Road (DSR), which aims to support BRI’s streamlining of trade and industrial overcapacity with greater digital integration.1 To date, 52 of 55 African Union members have signed a memorandum of understanding with China on BRI.2 Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has adopted the BRI and DSR as organizing concepts of its foreign policy. As such, the role of the internet and digital infrastructure must be critically examined, particularly with regard to China’s foreign policy intentions toward Africa. In line with the rise of Chinese internet companies on the global stage, there has also been an increased foreign policy push to build an “information silk road,” as China’s policymakers articulated in 2015.3 The DSR aims to facilitate the integration of networked technologies such as cloud computing and artificial intelligence further into BRI.4 Even though there is growing consensus on the importance of BRI, there has been little debate on the role of the internet in the progress and development of BRI, which in this context manifests as the DSR.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"30 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43642486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M auritius is a small island state situated strategically in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Home to 1.3 million people, its population claims ancestry from three continents—Europe, Asia, and Africa. France, and then Britain, ruled the island as a colony from 1715 to 1968, bringing enslaved Africans to tend the sugar plantations and attracting indentured laborers from India and merchants from China. France established a plantocracy economy and made French the island’s official language. Britain’s legacy is mainly administrative, having founded the island’s modern electoral, legal, and parliamentary systems. Notably, Britain allowed French to remain the island’s official language.1 In Mauritius today, many “ancestral” languages are taught in schools and used daily, primarily from India, China, Madagascar, and Mozambique. This essay assesses the impact that China has had on Mauritius and how the “China story” is represented through the country’s local media. Despite its small size, several actors compete for influence on the island: France and Britain, given their historic colonial ties; the United States, as an important trade and diplomatic partner; India, from where roughly 70% of the population claims ancestry; and, of course, China.
{"title":"China in Mauritius: The Telling of the Chinese Story","authors":"Roukaya Kasenally","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0052","url":null,"abstract":"M auritius is a small island state situated strategically in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Home to 1.3 million people, its population claims ancestry from three continents—Europe, Asia, and Africa. France, and then Britain, ruled the island as a colony from 1715 to 1968, bringing enslaved Africans to tend the sugar plantations and attracting indentured laborers from India and merchants from China. France established a plantocracy economy and made French the island’s official language. Britain’s legacy is mainly administrative, having founded the island’s modern electoral, legal, and parliamentary systems. Notably, Britain allowed French to remain the island’s official language.1 In Mauritius today, many “ancestral” languages are taught in schools and used daily, primarily from India, China, Madagascar, and Mozambique. This essay assesses the impact that China has had on Mauritius and how the “China story” is represented through the country’s local media. Despite its small size, several actors compete for influence on the island: France and Britain, given their historic colonial ties; the United States, as an important trade and diplomatic partner; India, from where roughly 70% of the population claims ancestry; and, of course, China.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"70 - 78"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42942666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Timothy Frye begins his fine book, Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia, with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the question of whether the United States should have militarily intervened in 2014. The book is intended to “improve our public conversation” about Russia (p. vii). His argument is that Russia is a personalist autocracy and an “opportunistic power that uses its military and economic might to influence weaker countries in its neighborhood while picking its spots against more powerful rivals like the European Union, United States, and China” (p. 200). Even so, Frye (correctly, in my view) both highlights the significant limits to Putin’s power and also suggests that “Russia’s next few years will likely be rocky” because of “deep economic crisis” and public fatigue with Putin (p. 200). This analysis sounds like a view written in spring 2022, but Frye wrote his book well before Moscow’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in February. The ongoing relevance of his intention to improve our public conversation is being proved as the West debates Putin’s rationality, the desirability and nature of a military intervention in the war, and even the possibility of an escalation to World War III and the use of nuclear weapons. The great-power competition that became part of policy and public discussion in the West in the mid-to-late 2010s is now very real. Informed public conversation could hardly be more timely or important. To enhance public understanding of Russia, Frye seeks to answer the main questions that have dominated Western debate about Russia since the mid-2000s. Book chapters cover Putin’s popularity; the role of elections, repression, and media manipulation; fluctuations in Russia’s economy; and Moscow’s great-power posturing and assertive foreign policy, including in the cyber realm. Thus, Frye aims to show how Russia “actually” works and how it does not, what Russian politics is and what it is not. Helpfully, he also compares Russia with other autocracies to place it into the wider context. Frye’s analysis to demonstrate how Putin is a “weak strongman” is admirably concise, well-organized, and accessible. The most valuable insights are in how Frye takes us beyond “Putinology,” reflecting instead on
蒂莫西·弗莱(Timothy Frye)以俄罗斯吞并克里米亚以及美国是否应该在2014年进行军事干预的问题开始了他的好书《软弱的强人:普京统治下的俄罗斯的权力极限》(Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin)。这本书的目的是“改善我们对俄罗斯的公众对话”(第7页)。他的论点是，俄罗斯是一个个人主义的专制国家，是一个“机会主义的大国，利用其军事和经济实力影响其邻国的较弱国家，同时选择自己的位置来对抗更强大的对手，如欧盟、美国和中国”(第200页)。即便如此，弗莱(在我看来是正确的)既强调了普京权力的重大限制，也暗示“俄罗斯未来几年可能会很艰难”，因为“严重的经济危机”和公众对普京的厌倦(第200页)。这篇分析听起来像是2022年春天写的，但弗莱写这本书的时间早在莫斯科今年2月再次入侵乌克兰之前。西方正在讨论普京的合理性、军事干预战争的可取性和性质，甚至是升级为第三次世界大战和使用核武器的可能性，这证明了普京改善公众对话的意图的持续相关性。大国竞争在2010年代中后期成为西方政策和公共讨论的一部分，现在已经非常真实。有见地的公众对话是最及时、最重要的。为了增进公众对俄罗斯的了解，弗莱试图回答自2000年代中期以来主导西方关于俄罗斯辩论的主要问题。书中的章节涵盖了普京的受欢迎程度;选举、镇压和媒体操纵的作用;俄罗斯经济的波动;以及莫斯科的大国姿态和自信的外交政策，包括在网络领域。因此，弗莱的目的是展示俄罗斯“实际上”是如何运作的，而不是如何运作的，俄罗斯的政治是什么，不是什么。有益的是，他还将俄罗斯与其他独裁国家进行了比较，将其置于更广阔的背景中。弗莱的分析展示了普京是一个“软弱的强人”，令人钦佩的简洁、条理清晰、平易近人。最有价值的见解是弗莱如何带领我们超越“普京学”，而是反思
{"title":"An Autocrat's Dilemmas: Putin's Power and Its Limits","authors":"Andrew Monaghan","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0045","url":null,"abstract":"Timothy Frye begins his fine book, Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia, with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the question of whether the United States should have militarily intervened in 2014. The book is intended to “improve our public conversation” about Russia (p. vii). His argument is that Russia is a personalist autocracy and an “opportunistic power that uses its military and economic might to influence weaker countries in its neighborhood while picking its spots against more powerful rivals like the European Union, United States, and China” (p. 200). Even so, Frye (correctly, in my view) both highlights the significant limits to Putin’s power and also suggests that “Russia’s next few years will likely be rocky” because of “deep economic crisis” and public fatigue with Putin (p. 200). This analysis sounds like a view written in spring 2022, but Frye wrote his book well before Moscow’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in February. The ongoing relevance of his intention to improve our public conversation is being proved as the West debates Putin’s rationality, the desirability and nature of a military intervention in the war, and even the possibility of an escalation to World War III and the use of nuclear weapons. The great-power competition that became part of policy and public discussion in the West in the mid-to-late 2010s is now very real. Informed public conversation could hardly be more timely or important. To enhance public understanding of Russia, Frye seeks to answer the main questions that have dominated Western debate about Russia since the mid-2000s. Book chapters cover Putin’s popularity; the role of elections, repression, and media manipulation; fluctuations in Russia’s economy; and Moscow’s great-power posturing and assertive foreign policy, including in the cyber realm. Thus, Frye aims to show how Russia “actually” works and how it does not, what Russian politics is and what it is not. Helpfully, he also compares Russia with other autocracies to place it into the wider context. Frye’s analysis to demonstrate how Putin is a “weak strongman” is admirably concise, well-organized, and accessible. The most valuable insights are in how Frye takes us beyond “Putinology,” reflecting instead on","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"189 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46110182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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